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Abstract  
 
This research’s classic content analysis (n = 900) critically investigates the mediated dynamic of 
framing Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan between 2006-2011.  This study found that 
while journalists overwhelmingly indexed their stories to elite sources, they frequently fact 
checked the media frames sponsored by government and military leaders.  Journalists used elite 
criteria to evaluate and critique the media frames sponsored by military and government leaders. 
Most of the coverage of the conflict was hegemonic, episodic and event-oriented rather than 
thematic and contextual.  While Canadian journalists frequently fact checked official claims of 
improving security, for instance, the news media’s coverage of Canada’s military mission in 
Afghanistan lacked broader critical appraisal.  The abundance of fact checking by news 
professionals did not challenge hegemonic interpretations about the war, the military and 
Canadian foreign policy, raising questions about journalism’s normative role in Canadian 
democracy.   
 
This research also presents the findings of a population-based survey experiment (n = 1,131) 
aimed at testing the potential influence of fact checking and media discourse surrounding the 
news coverage of Afghanistan.   This experiment found no statistically significant influence of 
fact checking on news consumers, suggesting journalists may wish to re-think how they 
challenge the media messages of officials.  This study argues that the news media’s practice of 
fact checking – coupled with an abundance of episodic coverage – does not offer audiences 
sufficient information to make considered decisions about issues and events.   This research 
found that Canadians’ attitudes about their country’s military role in Afghanistan are best 
understood as a confluence of media discourse, popular wisdom and experiential knowledge.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  4 
Acknowledgements  
 
I am grateful to many people for their help — and support — with this thesis.   
This research was supported with the financial help of the London School of Economics and 
Political Science and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.  
I wish to acknowledge the kind mentoring of my supervisors, Dr. Bart Cammaerts and Professor 
Charlie Beckett.  Additionally, I want to thank Ellen Helsper for her guidance concerning my 
population-based survey experiment.  
I want to especially thank Bart for his academic rigour and unwavering commitment to critical 
scholarship. Bart’s generous spirit — and friendship — meant a lot to me over the last four 
years.  His chill nature made the perfect match to my decidedly less relaxed personality.  He 
challenged me to think differently – and critically.  In the end, I am so grateful for the academic 
journey of the last four years.   
I also wish to thank Nick Couldry, Goran Bolin of Sodertorn University, Stockholm, and 
Andreas Hepp, from the University of Bremen, for their continued efforts to nurture friendship 
and collaboration between PhD researchers and senior scholars of media and communication in 
Bremen, Stockholm and London through the Brestolon network.  
Thank you also to the LSE library and its staff, especially Heather Dawson.  I also want to 
extend my gratitude to the Media and Communication Department’s helpful and kind 
administrative support, James Deeley, Nicole Garnier, Cath Bennett and Michael Ethridge.  
Additionally, I wish to thank Alex Chalis for copy editing my thesis.   
I must extend special thanks to the folks at Vox Pop Labs, Clifton van Der Linden, Gregory Kerr 
and Gregory Eady, for their help with my population-based survey experiment.   
I would like to thank my colleagues, friends and family Fabien Cante, Paula Kiel, Anthony 
Kelly, Ruth Garland, Meagan Zurn, Svenja Ottovordemgentschenfelde, Angelos Kissas, Nora 
Kroeger, Karen Darmon, Olivier Driessens, César Jiménez-Martínez, Peter Carrol, Fiona 
Campbell, Charlotte Lamont, Susie Sourwine, Geordie Raine, Kelly Kehn, Lynn Woods Strang, 
Jim Strang, Patrick McCurdy, Helen Charles, David Common, Jay Bertagnolli, Helen 
Henderson, Kent and Lia Morley, Suzanne Vickers, Jason Doupe, Travis Doupe, Michelle 
Denny, Nicole Kruppi, and Terry Arseneau, Judy Sletto, Christy, Renee, Cailey and Abby Stark, 
Ryan, Reid, Emmit, Melanie and Sharleen DeCillia, Sean Cullen and Fay Coleby for their 
kindness and unfailing support.   
Finally, I cannot express (here) the profound gratitude I feel for my family, Tracy and Andy 
  5 
Sletto.  Thank you for your patience.  Thank you for wholeheartedly embracing the adventure of 
doing a PhD in the United Kingdom.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  6 
Contents 
 
Abstract  3 
Acknowledgements  4 
Contents 6 
Tables and Figures 11 
Tables 11 
Figures  11 
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms  12 
Map of Afghanistan  13 
Chapter One:  Introduction  14 
1.0. Introduction 14 
1.1. The News Media and Public Opinion About Afghanistan 18 
1.2. A Brief History of Canada's Military Interventions in Afghanistan 22 
1.3. Canadian Journalists Embed with Canadian Forces  27 
1.4. Some Caveats   29 
1.5.  Conclusion and Roadmap 30 
Chapter Two:  Shaping the news content that shape the pictures in our heads 33 
2.0. Introduction 33 
2.1. Shaping News Content 34 
2.2. The Hierarchy of Influences Model 39 
2.3. A Critique of the Hierarchy of Influences Model 42 
2.4. Overlap Between the Shaping Levels of the Hierarchy of Influences Model 44 
2.5. Limitations of the Hierarchy of Influences Model 45 
2.6. The Utility of the Hierarchy of Influences Model 47 
2.7. Focusing on Three Levels of the Hierarchy of Influences Model 48 
2.8. Social System Level  49 
2.9. Gramsci and Cultural Hegemony and the Social System Level 53 
2.10. The Media and Hegemony 55 
2.11. Framing  56 
2.12. The Origins of Media Framing Theory 57 
2.13. Defining Media Framing 57 
2.14. The Difference Between Discourse and Frames 58 
  7 
2.15. Elite Framing 59 
2.16.  Public Relations: Nefarious Spin or Public Benefit? 60 
2.17. A Hypothetical Example to Illustrate the Different Forms of Media Frames 63 
2.18. Normative Notions of the News Media’s Role in Democracy 64 
2.19. Normative Models of the News Media 65 
2.20. The Monitorial Role 66 
2.21. The Facilitative Role 68 
2.22. The Radical Role 68 
2.23. The Collaborative Role 71 
2.24. The Implications of Normative Conceptions of the News Media  72 
2.25. Social Institution Level of the Hierarchy of Influences Model 73 
2.26. Embedding Journalists with the Military as a Social Institution Level Influence 75 
2.27. Indexing 77 
2.28. Indexing’s Theoretical Origins 78 
2.29. Indexing and War and Terrorism 79 
2.30. Overestimating Indexing’s Effect 81 
2.31. An Updated Conception of Indexing’s Shaping Power  82 
2.32. Routines and Practices Level 83 
2.33. News Values   84 
2.34. Journalistic Counter-framing and Fact checking  85 
2.35. Social Media and War 89 
2.36. Demanding Accountability  91 
2.37. Defining Fact checking 92 
2.38. Conclusion - Hierarchy of Influences Model 93 
2.39. Introduction - Frame-setting  95 
2.40.  Frame-setting and Frames as Independent Variable  96 
2.41. The History Media Effects Research 96 
2.42. The Powerful Effects Model 97 
2.43. The Minimal Effects Model  98 
2.44. The Swing Back to the More Powerful Effect Model 98 
2.45. Reconceptualizing Audiences  102 
2.46.  The Potential Influence of News Framing  104 
2.47.  News and Individual Factors  106 
  8 
2.48. Gamson’s Model of Political Opinion Formation 107 
2.49.  The Media and Constructing Meaning  109 
2.50. Popular Wisdom 111 
2.51. Experiential Knowledge 112 
2.52. Conclusion: The confluence of Media, Experience and Popular Wisdom  114 
2.53.  Conceptual Framework & Research Questions  115 
Chapter Three: Research Methodology   119 
3.0. Introduction 120 
3.1.  Rationale 120 
3.2. Defining Content Analysis  122 
3.3. The Difficulty of Finding Media Frames 122 
3.4. Identifying the Media Frame  126 
3.5. Pilot Project  128 
3.6. News Media Sample 128 
3.7. Systematic Sample 130 
3.8.  Limitations of a Classic Content Analysis  131 
3.9.  Coding/Inter-coding Reliability 132 
3.10. Data Analysis  132 
3.11. Population-based Survey Experiment  133 
3.12. Research Background: Canada’s Military Mission  in Afghanistan 137 
3.13. Population-based Survey Experiment Design 138 
3.14. Questionnaire  139 
3.15. Stimuli /Treatment  143 
3.16. Validity and Reliability 145 
3.17. Ethics  146 
3.18. Participants / Anonymity, Data Protection, Privacy and Treatment Assignment 147 
3.19.  Respondents’ Demographics  148 
3.20. Data Analysis 153 
3.21. Limitations 154 
3.22. Conclusion  156 
Chapter Four:  “But it is not getting any safer!” 157 
4.0. Introduction 157 
4.1. Framing and Focus of News Media Coverage of the War in Afghanistan  159 
  9 
4.2. Little Counter-framing or counter-hegemonic Coverage 162 
4.3.  Episodic Focus of Coverage 163 
4.4. Analysis:  Social System Level Influences on News Coverage  164 
4.5. News Values Influence  168 
4.6. Analysis: News Values Influence  169 
4.7. Fact checking Government and Military Leaders' Frames  174 
4.8. Violence & Safety and Security  176 
4.9.  Analysis:  Reality Versus Government and Military Media Framing 177 
4.10. Indexing  183 
4.11. Indexing: Secondary Sources 184 
4.12. Frame Sponsorship 186 
4.13. Embedded Journalists vs. Non-embedded Journalists Use of Sources 187 
4.14. Analysis: Indexing 188 
4.15. Indexing and Embedding 188 
4.16. What Unified Elite? 191 
4.17. An Updated Conception of Indexing’s Effect 195 
4.18. Normative Conceptions of the News Media  197 
4.19. Conclusion 202 
Chapter Five:  Putting it All Together 204 
5.0.  Introduction 204 
5.1.  Fact Checking & Support for the Military Mission  205 
5.2. Analysis:  Influence of Journalistic Fact checking 208 
5.3 Popular Wisdom and Peacekeeping  211 
5.4. Analysis: Popular Wisdom About Peacekeeping 215 
5.5. Experiential Knowledge and Canada’s Military Mission in Afghanistan  219 
5.6. Analysis: Experiential Knowledge and Canada’s Combat Role in Kandahar  221 
5.7.  Gender 222 
5.8.  Politics and Attitudes Towards the Conflict in Afghanistan  223 
5.9. Emotion and its Role in Opinion Formation   226 
5.10. Putting It All Together 228 
5.11. Analysis:  Putting it All Together 230 
5.12. Popular Wisdom and Peacekeeping 230 
5.13. Experiential Knowledge 231 
  10 
5.14.  Media Discourse and Canadian Attitudes Towards the Conflict in Afghanistan 232 
5.15. Conclusion  235 
Chapter Six: Conclusion 236 
6.0. Introduction  236 
6.1. Empirical Findings 237 
6.2. Framing Canada’s Military Mission in Afghanistan  238 
6.3. The Influence of News Values   239 
6.4.  Fact checking the Media Framing of Canada’s Military Mission in Afghanistan 240 
6.5.  Indexing the War to Officials  241 
6.6. The Influence of Journalistic Fact checking 243 
6.7. Popular Wisdom 243 
6.8. Experiential Knowledge  244 
6.9. A Confluence of Factors Shaping Opinions About War 246 
6.10. Theoretical Interventions 247 
6.11. The Hierarchal Model? 248 
6.12. Indexing & Dramatic Events  250 
6.13. Fact Checking's Impact on Counter-framing  251 
6.14.  Fact Checking and Journalism’s Normative Role 254 
6.15. The Confluence of Factors Shaping Public Opinion  255 
6.16. Methodological Reflections  255 
6.17. Future Research  261 
6.18. Recommendations for Fact Checking  264 
6.19. Some Lessons for Canadian Democracy 272 
6.20. Conclusion 274 
Appendix One 277 
Appendix Two 286 
Appendix Three 287 
References  296 
 
 
 
 
  11 
 
 
 
 Tables & Figures  
 
Tables 
 
Table  Page  
Table 1 – Three Levels of the Hierarchy of Influences Model    48 
Table 2 – Frame Elements - Operational Definition  127 
Table 3 – Media Samples 130 
Table 4 – Frame Stimuli / Treatment 138 
Table 5 – Pre-test Correlations Prompts 146 
Table 6 – Partisan Support 152 
Table 7 – Gender Left/Right 152 
Table 8 – Three Levels of the Hierarchy of Influences Model 158 
Table 9 – Treatment Group & Level of Support  206 
Table 10 – Treatment Groups & Hypothesis Test of Independent Samples  207 
Table 11 – Security Frame with Fact Check  207 
Table 12 – Reconstruction Frame with Fact Check 208 
Table 13 – Regional Breakdown & Military Role 212 
Table 14 – Political Interest & Military Role      213 
Table 15 – Voter Intention - Armed Combat Versus Peacekeeping 214 
Table 16 – Regional Breakdown - Pride in Canada’s Afghanistan Mission 
Table 17 – Partisanship & Pride  
220 
221 
Table 18 – Binary Logistic Regression Model: Support for Combat 229 
 
Figures  
 
Figure Page 
Figure 1 – Hierarchy of Influences Model 40 
Figure 2 – The Shaping Power of Three Levels  94 
Figure 3 – Gamson’s (1992) Model of Negotiating Meaning 105 
Figure 4  – An Integrated Process Model of Framing 116 
Figure 5 – Conceptual Framework  117 
Figure 6 – Possible Media Samples — 2006-2009 129 
Figure 7 – Regional Response Breakdown 142 
Figure 8 – Education Levels 150 
Figure 9 – Income Levels 151 
Figure 10 – Government / Military Frames  160 
Figure 11 – Multiple Preferred Government / Military Frames 160 
Figure 12 – Focus of News Coverage 169 
Figure 13 – Primary Sources 183 
Figure 14 – Secondary Sources 185 
Figure 15 – Frame Sponsor 186 
 
  12 
Abbreviations and Acronyms  
 
 
Abbreviation / Acronym  
ABC Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation 
BMD Ballistic Missile Defence  
CA Content analysis  
CAD Canadian dollar 
CBC Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
CTV Canadian Television  
Col. Colonel  
ELM Elaboration likelihood model  
Gen. General 
GMG Glasgow Media Group 
ISAF 
KAF 
International Security Force 
Kandahar Airfield  
LSE London School of Economics and Political 
Science 
MP Member of Parliament 
MRQ Main Research Question 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NDP New Democratic Party 
np no page 
PMO Prime Minister’s Office 
Pvt. Private 
RAS Receive accept sample model 
UN 
U.S. 
U.K. 
United Nations 
United States of America 
United Kingdom  
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  13 
Map of Afghanistan  
 
 
 
 (Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan 2008: 41) 
  
  14 
Chapter One: Introduction  
 
1.0. Introduction 
 
“I don't quite understand this worship of objectivity in journalism. Now, just flat-out 
lying is different from being subjective” – Hunter S. Thompson (as quoted in Hahn 1997: 
np; italics in original). 
This story — like so many about Afghanistan — begins on a rugged old road in the countryside.   
Under the scorching midday summer heat, I stood next to an ephemeral riverbed, part of an 
intricate irrigation system of wadis fed by the Arghandab River.  A handful of Afghan and 
Canadian soldiers shoveled gravel, building up the approach to a new bridge they were 
constructing in the village of Makuan. Dozens of Afghan villagers looked on, smiling, seemingly 
pleased to see their bombed out bridge being fixed.  It seems almost absurd now — but I was 
there to tell a story about Canadian soldiers fixing the bridge.  Rewind a week earlier and 
Canadian soldiers were fighting with Taliban insurgents near this village west of Kandahar City, 
the spiritual birthplace of the Taliban.  During that battle, dubbed “Operation Medusa”, I was 
embedded with the Canadian artillery.  (The military’s mythical illusion of decapitating their 
enemy’s head never really materialized.)  Standing there, a week later in Makuan, I wondered if 
some of the munitions fired by the soldiers I was with seven days earlier had landed near the 
farmland where I had come that day to report for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC).  
I also feared — although I did not express it publicly — that I was nothing more than a 
propagandist for the Canadian military at that moment.   
 
On that day, in the summer of 2006, I travelled with Canadian Forces 20 kilometres west of 
Kandahar City to hear the military brag about its development work.  The public affairs officers 
who pitched the story to me promised it would be a ‘great way’ to show off the Canadian 
military’s efforts to win hearts and minds and convince Afghans to reject the Taliban and 
embrace Hamid Karzai’s fledgling government in Kabul.  I was skeptical — but it was a chance 
to get out behind the wire of the Kandahar Airfield (KAF).  All the journalists at the KAF were 
keen to leave the wire and do some real reporting.  
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It was grape season — and my radio report from that day highlighted the farmers’ need to get 
their crops to the nearby markets in Kandahar City.  My story clipped Canada's Captain John 
Angus who was eager to make sure the villagers gave credit to ‘the Canadians’ for fixing the 
bridge destroyed in the recent battle.  “This is why we’re here… [for] the betterment of the 
average Afghan citizen,” Canadian audiences heard him say in my radio story for CBC Radio’s, 
World Report (CBC 2006b: np).  I was cynical about the military’s development efforts.  For my 
mind, so many of the earnest officers, such as Captain Angus, seemed to be talking out of both 
sides of their mouths.  In one moment, they were extolling the notion of building trust through 
building bridges.  Seconds later, the emphasis turned to the cold and clinical calculus of killing 
Taliban fighters.  In the months leading up to Canadian Forces deploying to Kandahar, Canada’s 
top general, Chief of the Defence Staff General Rick Hillier, famously labeled the Taliban 
“detestable murderers and scumbags” (Hillier, as quoted in The Globe and Mail 2005: np).  I 
hope my radio report from that hot summer day telegraphed some of my skepticism about 
Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan1.  I concluded by stressing that while the Canadian 
soldiers may have impressed some of the villagers in Makuan, the insurgents could return 
moments after the military pulled out, “destroying all their good deeds and undermining their 
good intentions” (CBC 2006b: np). 
 
Without question, the Conservative Government of Stephen Harper and the Department of 
National Defence strategically marketed Canada’s combat operations in the southern 
Afghanistan province of Kandahar (2006-2011) as part of a noble effort to: (1) make Afghanistan 
safe; (2) rout terrorists; (3) help women and children; (4) provide micro finance to Afghans; (5) 
clear land mines; (6) support the democratically elected government; and (7) police the war-torn 
nation (Government of Canada 2008a).  An investigation by The Canadian Press uncovered that 
the Conservative government “systematically script[ed] the words it wanted to hear from the 
mouths of its top diplomats, aid workers and cabinet ministers in 2007-08 to divert public 
attention from the soaring double-digit death toll of Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan” 
(Blanchfield and Bronskill 2010: np).  Moreover, a report commissioned by the Department of 
Foreign Affairs concluded that the Harper government’s public comments about the war were 
                                                
1 Canada’s combat military role in Kandahar, Afghanistan ran from 2006-2011.   
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“too American”, suggesting that government and military officials instead use phrases such as 
“rebuilding, restoring, reconstruction, hope, opportunity, and enhancing the lives of women and 
children” in an effort to persuade Canadians to support the conflict (Woods 2007: np). 
  
Amidst all the war marketing, I worried my reporting was too easily accepting of government 
and military leaders’ media framing of the war.  The American news media’s failure to properly 
interrogate George W. Bush’s trumped up threats in 2002/2003 surrounding Iraq’s so-called 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) left me (and some of my colleagues) cynical about the 
Canadian government and the military’s pretext for involvement in Afghanistan.  I was 
tormented by fears of pulling my punches and trumpeting official talking points.  But other 
journalists did not seem to share my concerns.  One of my colleagues, whom I spent lots of time 
with in Kandahar, newspaper columnist Christie Blatchford openly — and proudly — admired 
Canadian soldiers serving in Afghanistan between 2006-2011.  The veteran columnist wrote 
vividly and affectionately about Canada’s military men and women.  Accused by her critics of 
cheerleading for Canadian soldiers and the war (Solga 2009: np), Blatchford’s dispatches from 
Kandahar were often poetic, as in this example describing the repatriation ceremony for Private 
Robert Costall after he was killed in battle: 
“The young Canadian man who died in service of his Afghan counterpart was sent off 
home last night. 
 
Into the warm and deceptively benevolent spring night — with songbirds, confused by 
the lights in the big hangar optimistically called Taliban's Last Stand, chirping as 
thousands of army boots moved with surprising quiet onto the darkened tarmac – his 
casket was borne to the flight line in one of the LAVs, or light armoured vehicles, so 
beloved of the Canadian infantry, his pallbearers arriving in another. 
 
Two rear doors opened and Pte. Costall was on his way to the waiting ramp of a great 
grey Hercules C-130. 
 
Piper Master-Corporal Callum Campbell played the lament. 
 
Canadians, and soldiers from eight other nations, saluted their fallen comrade. 
 
All the way home to Canada, escort officer Sergeant Bill Grady, of 7 Platoon, was with 
the young man's body. 
 
Robert Costall was never alone, not for a minute. 
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When it was all over, Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope, the commanding officer of the 
Canadian battle group known as Task Force Orion, looked skyward and pointed. 
 
“Orion,” he said, of the bright and beautiful constellation above” (Blatchford 2006: np).  
 
Blatchford’s focus was clearly on the soldiers.  I am not critical of her emphasis.  As a columnist, 
Blatchford was upfront about her admiration for Canadian soldiers. Her father, after all, served in 
the Canadian Forces (Blatchford 2007a).  Blatchford was clear about her agenda:  She wanted to 
tell soldiers’ stories. She wanted to document their duty to serve and their actions on the 
battlefield. She aimed to make their service and sacrifices meaningful.  These are laudable goals, 
arguably.  As a reporter for a public broadcaster — someone who is expected to never 
editorialize — I worried that embedding left me with a tunnel vision that only allowed me to tell 
one side of the story.  I feared my audience was only getting a very narrow — hegemonic — 
view of what was going on in Afghanistan.   
 
I also wondered about the impact of all the news media’s coverage of Afghanistan on Canadians. 
Public opinion about Canada’s combat operations in Afghanistan changed considerably in the 
first year.  It shifted dramatically between when I first went to Kandahar in the summer of 2006 
and when I returned the following summer. In 2001, Canadians were overwhelmingly supportive 
when Canadian soldiers first went to Afghanistan as part of the United States-led invasion to 
overthrow the Taliban (Boucher and Nossal 2015). Support was also high for Canada’s military 
contribution to the UN-led mission to stabilize the capital of Kabul between 2003-2005 
(Saideman 2016).  While initially supportive of Canada’s military role in Kandahar starting in 
early 2006 (The Strategic Counsel 2006a), public opinion soured during Canada’s stepped up 
combat operations in southern Afghanistan (CTV 2007: np).   
 
I wondered during my first trip to Afghanistan if Canadians would accept seeing their soldiers do 
something other than peacekeeping internationally.  I was curious about the impact of dead 
soldiers on Canadians’ attitudes towards the war.  This thesis reflects my intellectual journey 
from that bridge in the baking heat of Kandahar’s summer to the considerably cooler 
temperatures of Houghton Street at the London School of Economics and Political Science 
(LSE). This research attempts to sort out the influences of government and military leaders’ 
messages about the war in Afghanistan on journalists and the public.  I use a content analysis (n 
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= 900) to assess the shaping power of various factors on news content and a representative 
population-based survey experiment (n = 1,131) to assess the potential influence or effects2 of 
media messages (and, in particular, journalistic fact checking) on Canadians’ opinions towards 
their military and Canada’s combat mission in Afghanistan.   
 
The goal of this chapter is to provide both an introduction and a roadmap for this thesis.  As well, 
this introduction also sets the table, per se, for understanding the justification for this research 
and its contribution to media and communication scholarship.  This introduction begins by 
outlining why the news media offer an important site for understanding Canada’s military role in 
Afghanistan — and a springboard for this work’s attempt to explain how the news media may 
have shaped Canadians’ opinions towards the conflict. In conjunction with this, I outline the 
theoretical tensions this study aims to address.  I also foreshadow the research questions this 
study wants to answer.  After that, I sketch the necessary context required to understand this 
research.  Admittedly, this introduction offers more history than most media and communication 
PhD research.   But the short history lesson I offer surrounding Canada’s military interventions 
in Afghanistan helps set up this research’s arguments concerning media discourse and its 
potential impact on citizens.  With the background for this study established, I also detail 
numerous caveats or limitations surrounding this work.  Finally, I offer a brief sketch of the 
coming chapters. This introduction begins, though, with the theoretical debates this research 
explores.   
 
1.1. The News Media and Public Attitudes About Afghanistan 
 
 
Canada’s media were the site of significant public debate about Afghanistan — and this study 
examines them “as both an agent and a venue” with an eye to understanding how journalistic 
practices may “contest the ways in which we think and talk about policy issues” (Kosicki and 
Pan 1997: 8). As Gitlin (2003 [1980]: 9) rightly explains, the media are “a significant social 
                                                
2 The influence or effects of the news media, of course, remain a contested concept in media and 
communication scholarship (Corner 2000; McQuail 2005). Audiences are not passive receivers of media 
messages.  I expand on the debate about reception – and position this research in relation to that argument 
– in my coming theory chapter.   
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force in the forming and delimiting of public assumptions, attitudes, and moods.” Furthermore, 
to better understand normative conceptions of media, war coverage “should not be seen as a 
special case of how the media works” but a chance to take a close-up look at “many of the things 
that happen in peacetime” (Williams 1992: 158; see also Carruthers 2000). Academic 
assessments of the news coverage of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan have concluded 
that journalists failed to serve Canadian audiences effectively (Bergen 2009; Maloney 2015). 
Considerable research, especially in the U.S. context, suggests that journalists frequently fail to 
live up to their normative watchdog role during times of war, often acting as nothing more than 
stenographers, echoing and amplifying, uncritically, the media framing of military and political 
leaders (see, for example, Herman and Chomsky 2002 [1988]; Massing 2004; Bennett, 
Lawrence, and Livingston 2006; Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston 2007).   
Fletcher, Bastedo and Hove (2009: 925) concluded that the Canadian government’s “information 
transmission” about the war in Afghanistan succeeded.  Little scholarly attention, however, has 
focused on the actual media messages available to Canadians during the conflict.  If content is 
instrumental to understanding the potential influence of media and how the news might “exert 
their own unique shaping power” (Shoemaker and Reese 2014: 4), then it follows that 
researchers investigate the actual content to interrogate what role (if any) Canadian journalists 
played in the information transmission Fletcher and colleagues (2009: 925) describe.  This study 
responds to this academic deficit, concluding that Canadians did not receive uncontested media 
messages sponsored by government and military leaders.  Canadian journalists fact checked the 
media frames offered by officials about the war in Afghanistan.  But, as this work argues, fact 
checking only goes so far and does not represent a truly counter-hegemonic expression (Pratt 
2004).   
 
This research explores three theoretical tensions in journalism scholarship concerning: (1) 
indexing; (2) journalistic fact check; and (3) the implications of fact checking for normative 
conceptions of the news media (monitorial and collaborative). This study offers evidence 
critiquing the indexing hypothesis (Bennett 1990) and support for an events-driven argument 
concerning counter-framing by journalists (Baum and Groeling 2010a; Speer 2017).  This study 
argues that while journalists overwhelmingly indexed their stories to elite sources, they 
frequently fact checked the frames sponsored by government and military leaders, thereby 
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offering a degree of counter-framing.  Unlike some research (Baum and Groeling 2010a; Baum 
and Groeling 2010b) that contends elites have considerable shaping power at the start of wars — 
and journalists require time to begin challenging the claims of political actors — this research 
also posits that because of the growing practice of fact checking, journalists can sometimes 
challenge elite media frames about war from the onset of conflicts.  
Yet, while some may argue that fact checking represents a form of watchdog or accountability 
journalism (Jones 2009; Dobbs 2012), this research argues that because news professionals 
frequently use elite criteria (Ettema and Glasser 1989, 1998) to challenge the media frames of 
officials, this practice does not represent a true challenge to hegemonic forces.  Dominant 
interpretations of war in the news media are, arguably, further exacerbated by the predominance 
of episodic coverage. Canadian journalists may have challenged official claims of improving 
security, but because so much of their reporting focused on events, the coverage lacked context 
and critical appraisal of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan.  This, in turn, raises 
theoretical questions about journalism’s supposed monitorial role in democracy (Christians et al. 
2009).   
Critical scholarship is also left to wonder if the news media’s fact checking actually has an 
impact on audiences.  This work also intervenes in the theoretical debates concerning public 
support for war — and the potential impact of media messages in the formation of those public 
attitudes.  The data from this work’s content analysis served as a launching pad for testing the 
potential impact of fact checking and media messages on Canadian audiences.  This research 
provides some empirical and theoretical insight into the debate about the efficacy of fact 
checking.  Moreover my conclusion makes a number of recommendations for future research to 
better test fact checking’s impact on audiences.  As well, I included a number of 
recommendations aimed at how journalists can avoid, sometimes unwittingly, perpetuating 
hegemonic interpretations of war. 
As I mentioned before, Canadians’ support for the military mission dropped quickly in the first 
12 months of the conflict (The Strategic Counsel 2006b).  What happened?  What led Canadians 
to switch from support to opposition?  Indeed, public support for war is not a blank cheque 
(Gartner 2008).  There is little agreement on what individuals “rely on when forming their 
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attitudes toward war” (Gelpi 2010: 88).  Some scholarship suggests citizens rally around the flag 
at the onset of conflict (Mueller 1970, 1973).  Other scholarship suggests the body bags returning 
from the frontline turns the public off war (Larson 1996; Berinsky 2007).  Alternatively, we must 
also wonder if events on the ground — the perception of success or failure — also shapes the 
public’s opinions about conflict (Kull and Ramsay 2001; Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Gelpi, Feaver 
and Reifler 2006).  Perhaps, though, people listen to what elites say about war, as other 
scholarship suggests (Zaller 1992; Berinsky 2007).  
 
This study argues that Canadians’ opinions about the conflict in Afghanistan are best understood 
as a confluence of media discourse, popular wisdom and experiential knowledge (Gamson 1992).  
This work adds evidence to the argument that attitudes about war are largely influenced by 
domestic factors, especially ideological orientation and partisanship (Gaines et al. 2007; 
Jacobson 2008; Berinksy 2009).  Moreover, this research suggests political communication 
scholarship should pay more attention to the role that emotion plays in forming political 
attitudes, especially about war (Fletcher et al. 2009; Fletcher and Hove 2012).   
This study additionally explores the theoretical conflict concerning the impact of journalistic fact 
checking on audiences (Skurnik et al. 2005; Nyhan and Reifler 2010; Pingree 2011; Graves 
2016; Nyhan et al. 2017). This work’s population-based survey experiment (n = 1,131) questions 
the efficacy of the current configuration of journalistic fact checking, whereby journalists usually 
dispute or challenge the veracity of political actors’ claims. In line with other scholarship 
(Skurnik et al. 2005; Nyhan and Reifler 2010; Nyhan et al. 2017), this research’s data suggests 
that fact checking in news does not overcome people’s predispositions and the power elites have 
to influence public opinion (Zaller 1992; Berinksy 2009).   
To be sure, as the coming theory chapter stresses, there is a big difference often between the 
intended message of the news media and what active audiences take away from those messages 
(Livingstone 1993, 1996, 2000; McQuail 2005). My project seeks to open up the connection 
between news media messages and their potential impact on audiences.  “Research which rests 
on content analysis alone,” argues Philo and Berry (2004: 98-99), “leaves the researchers in the 
position of having to assert what the audience would be likely to understand from the news.”  
The first half of this research maps the news content — and media framing — available to 
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Canadians about the war in Afghanistan.  This study attempts to offer insight into how actual 
news media content — rather than fabricated treatments dreamed up by researchers and 
administered in laboratories — may have shaped Canadians’ attitudes towards combat operation 
in Kandahar. It also seeks to test the potential efficacy of fact checking in the news media. This 
study combines audience research with a robust content analysis in order to capture the full 
extent of media production and their potential influence(s). The coming pages offer some 
historical context to help situate this research.   
1.2. A Brief History of Canada’s Military Interventions in Afghanistan 
 
“There will be some who want to cut and run, but cutting and running is not my way and 
it's not the Canadian way.” — Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, March, 2006  
(CBC 2006a: np). 
 
“Quite frankly, we are not going to ever defeat the insurgency.” — Canadian Prime 
Minister Stephen Harper, March, 2009 (Foot 2009: np). 
 
Not since the Korean War did Canadians soldiers fight and die in such great numbers as 
witnessed in southern Afghanistan between 2006-2011 3 . Undoubtedly, Canada’s military 
intervention in Afghanistan was a difficult and even agonizing experience.  Many Canadians had 
an emotional response to the conflict (Fletcher and Hove 2012).  Canadian Forces, of course, 
have deployed in dangerous peacekeeping operations in Rwanda, Haiti, Cyprus, Croatia and 
other places since the Korean War.  As a founding member of NATO, Canadian soldiers also 
served on the frontline of the Cold War in West Germany.  But the war in Afghanistan 
represented something decidedly different than what most Canadians were familiar with.  It had 
been generations since Canadian infantry soldiers took to the battlefield in large numbers like 
they did in Kandahar.  The deployment saw a battle group of more than 2,000 soldiers 
continually fighting a fierce war between 2006-2011 against Taliban insurgents in the volatile 
southern Afghan province of Kandahar (CBC 2009).  Between 2001 and 2014, more than 40,000 
Canadian soldiers served in Afghanistan (Government of Canada 2017).  The human losses were 
substantial — and proportionally higher than other NATO countries (Gross Stein and Lang 
                                                
3 This synopsis of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan draws from Saideman’s (2016) historical 
account.   
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2007).  In the end, 160 Canadians lost their lives, 1,000 soldiers were wounded and the conflict 
cost more than $20 billion (CAD) (Saideman 2016). 
While this research focuses on Canada’s combat operations in Kandahar between 2006-2011, 
Canadian Forces have been deployed four times since 2001 to Afghanistan in different locations 
and for different purposes.  In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in America, Canadian Forces 
were part of the U.S.-led invasion to overthrow the Taliban between October 2001 to July 2002.  
Canadian soldiers were also deployed as part of the UN-sanctioned stabilization force based in 
the Afghan capital of Kabul between 2003-2005.  Between 2006-2011, Canada took on its 
toughest assignment, assuming a combat and reconstruction and development role in the volatile 
region of Kandahar.  For many Canadians, this period is synonymous with their country’s 
military role in the South Asian country.  After Kandahar, Canada’s military role transitioned to 
training the National Afghan Army in Kabul between 2012-2014 (Government of Canada 2017).  
Two competing narratives explain how Canada ended up in Kandahar (Saideman 2016).  In the 
first account, a dithering Liberal Party Prime Minister Paul Martin delayed making a decision 
about Canada’s inevitable participation in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF), allowing other alliance nations to choose easier — less dangerous — regions of 
Afghanistan to stabilize (Saideman 2016).  In the second competing historical account, posited 
by Gross Stein and Lang (2007), Canada’s military brass hoodwinked Martin’s government into 
taking on the volatile region of Kandahar. 
The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 was decidedly unpopular in Canada (EKOS 2003).  
Despite fears of damaging U.S.-Canada relations for years, Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chrétien 
insisted that Canada would not participate in the invasion of Iraq without UN Security Council 
support (Freeman 2013).  Two years later, the new Liberal prime minister, Paul Martin, rejected 
Canada’s participation in the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) programme shielding North 
America, even after U.S. President George W. Bush had pressured Canada to join the U.S. 
missile programme while visiting the country in 2005 (CBC 2005).  Spurning America twice left 
many officials in Ottawa believing that Canada needed to “up the ante” on the international stage 
to placate its most important ally and trading partner for not participating in Iraq (Cooper 2009: 
366). Canada’s top military officials believed that rejecting the BMD necessitated Canada 
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stepping up to do “something that the Pentagon really valued” in Afghanistan, especially when 
the Americans were stretched so thin holding off a growing insurgency in Iraq (Gross Stein and 
Lang 2007: 181).  Michael Kergin, the former Canadian ambassador to Washington, summed up 
the thinking of many in Canada’s foreign affairs and defence community:   
“There was this sense that we had let the side down… and then there was the sense that 
we could be more helpful, militarily, by taking on a role in Afghanistan… We could 
make a contribution in a place like Kandahar” (Kergin, as quoted in Gross Stein and Lang 
2007: 181-82). 
 
Former Prime Minister Martin, himself, confirms that many military and foreign affairs officials 
were convinced that Canada had “to do something in order to repair the relationship in terms of 
both Iraq and BMD.  I didn’t agree” (Martin, as quoted in Gross Stein and Lang 2007: 182).  
Martin’s chief of staff, Tim Murphy, called Canada’s participation in Afghanistan “something 
we had to do more than something we wanted to do” (Murphy, as quoted in Cooper 2009: 363).  
Gross Stein and Lang (2007) argue Canada’s Chief of Defence Staff Rick Hiller, used his artful 
skills of persuasion to win over Martin and his cabinet to take on the tough deployment of 
sending troops to Kandahar to, in part, impress American military leaders.   
 
As well, Canada’s military leadership may have also pushed the tough combat deployment in 
Kandahar in hopes of shattering the so-called peacekeeping myth4 (Saideman 2016).  Gross Stein 
                                                
4 In the minds of many Canadians, peacekeeping is linked with the country’s military. National surveys in 
Canada consistently rank UN peacekeeping as a “top priority” for Canada’s military, with some polls 
even placing the role above North American security and patrolling the country’s Arctic (Koring 2012: 
np).  Peacekeeping is, undoubtedly, linked with Canadian Forces in many Canadians’ minds (Martin and 
Fortmann 1995; Munton and Keating 2001; Munton 2003; Granatstein 2007; Roussel and Boucher 2008). 
Notably, Morton (1990: 5) called peacekeeping “the only thing that the public thinks the military are any 
good for.” In 2016, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Liberal government committed $450 million (CAD) 
and as many as 600 troops to future UN peacekeeping missions (Brewster 2016). Some historians 
discount connections between Canadian Forces and peacekeeping, calling it a peacekeeping myth 
(Granatstein 2007; Maloney 2007). This research does not attempt to settle the historical debate over the 
so-called peacekeeping myth.  In order to make this study’s argument, however, it is necessary to 
highlight the symbolic power of peacekeeping in many Canadians’ minds.   
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and Lang (2007: 196) argue, “[t]here is little doubt” that senior defence officials wanted to blow 
up “the myth that the Canadian Forces were primarily peacekeepers.”  In his memoir, Chief of 
Defence Staff General Rick Hiller makes clear that he hoped Kandahar would help Canadian 
Forces shed the peacekeeper label: 
“Everyone who wore a uniform had experienced a cultural revolution.  We were proud to 
wear our uniforms, but we also had confidence in who we were — warriors first and 
foremost, able to do any task — with a first responsibility to finish tough, often violent 
tasks when Canada needed them done… The immense frustration at the ignorance of so 
many who labeled us “only” peacekeepers had disappeared” (Hillier 2010: 493-94). 
 
Hillier and other military leaders surely knew that deploying to the volatile region of Kandahar 
would test Canadian Forces — and challenge traditional notions that Canadian soldiers only keep 
the peace.  But it is unclear if the politicians who authorized the mission knew what they were 
committing to in Afghanistan.   
 
With little understanding of the tough multi-year fight ahead of it, Canada “slid into a war” in 
Afghanistan in 2006 (Gross Stein and Lang 2007: 289). Prime Minister Paul Martin instructed 
Canada’s top soldier: “We do peacekeeping and reconstruction and win hearts and minds” 
(Martin, as quoted in Gross Stein and Lang 2007: 191).  In their historical account of how 
Canadian troops ended up fighting a war in Kandahar, Gross Stein and Lang (2007: 186; italics 
in original) stress that military officials rarely spoke about an “insurgency” when pitching the 
proposed mission in Kandahar to politicians.  Notably, during his tour of the country to garner 
Canadians’ support for the coming mission in Kandahar, Defence Minister Bill Graham did not 
call Canada’s upcoming military role in Afghanistan a war — and he did not link the conflict to 
the U.S-led war on terror (Miller 2010). 
“Our role is quintessentially Canadian:  we are helping to rebuild a troubled country and 
we are giving hope for the future to a long and suffering people.  This is a clear 
expression of Canadian values at work” (Graham 2005: np). 
 
Reflecting on the his decision to send troops to Afghanistan in 2007 after leaving power, Paul 
Martin insisted he had no idea that Canadian Forces would have to be engaged in such intense 
fighting (Gross Stein and Lang 2007).  While the Liberal Government of Paul Martin may not 
have known what it was getting into in Afghanistan when it gave Canadian Forces the green light 
to deploy to Kandahar, it was another government that took over the handling of the mission.     
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Afghanistan, in many ways, shaped Stephen Harper’s premiership.  It became “a defining feature 
of his government” (Gross Stein and Lang 2007: 232). Harper’s Conservative Party won a 
minority government on January 23, 2006, replacing Paul Martin’s Liberal minority government 
(CBC 2006c).  The next day, the prime minister-designate stressed his commitment to Canadian 
soldiers being deployed to Kandahar, saying:  
“We will continue to help defend our values and democratic ideals around the globe — as 
so courageously demonstrated by those young Canadian soldiers who are serving, and 
who have sacrificed, in Afghanistan” (Harper, as quoted in Kirton 2006: 37).   
 
Soon after, Harper made a surprise trip — his first overseas as prime minister — to Afghanistan 
to visit Canadian troops. Afghanistan became “Mr. Harper’s war”, owning it both symbolically 
and instrumentally (Bratt 2007: 5).  Throughout 2006, the war in Kandahar intensified.  Thirty-
six Canadian soldiers died (Government of Canada 2017), making it abundantly clear that 
Canadian Forces were not, in fact, peacekeeping in Afghanistan. 
 
The new minority Conservative government championed the war as part of Canada’s 
international duty (Government of Canada 2008a).  Ultimately, though, the Conservative 
Government’s decision-making about Afghanistan was heavily influenced by the “dynamics of 
domestic politics instead of foreign policy imperatives” (Boucher and Nossal 2015: 59).  Public 
opposition to the military mission grew quickly, with a majority of Canadians – and especially 
the Québécois5 — opposing the war by late 2006 (The Strategic Counsel 2006b).   When the 
Conservatives could not suppress public concerns, the minority government “sought ways to 
limit the potential political damage” (Boucher and Nossal 2015: 60).  On May 17, 2006 the 
Conservatives initiated an emergency debate in the House of Commons about extending the 
military mission in Kandahar to 2009 from the initial end date of February 2007 (Parliament of 
Canada 2007).  The vote was close — 149 to 145 (The Toronto Star 2010).  The Conservatives 
won the vote with the help of 30 Liberal MPs.  After this vote, Canada’s Parliament was 
increasingly split over the question of Afghanistan. Eventually, the nationalist Bloc Québécois 
                                                
5 I use the term Québécois and Quebecers interchangeably to denote all people (English and French-
speaking) who live in the province of Quebec.   
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and the left-leaning New Democratic Party demanded that Canada pull its soldiers out of 
Afghanistan immediately.  
 
In 2007, Harper began publicly suggesting that the military mission in Afghanistan should be 
extended to the end of 2011 (O’Neill and Mayeda 2008). In a speech to Australia’s Parliament 
the prime minister noted the increasing public opposition to the war in Afghanistan — but vowed 
not to walk away from the troubled South Asian country (Reuters 2007).  Aware of the growing 
public unease with the war, Harper appointed an independent panel of eminent Canadians, 
chaired by former Liberal Party cabinet minster John Manley, to investigate the military mission 
and make recommendations (Globe and Mail 2007).  The panel’s report in early 2008 
recommended extending the stay of Canadian Forces in Kandahar if NATO sent more troops and 
specialty helicopters to help Canada’s combat operations (CBC 2008b).  Manley’s report gave 
Harper “the political cover necessary to convince enough Liberals to vote for an extension” 
(Saideman 2016: 47).  To that end, Harper accepted the thrust of the report written by the former 
Liberal deputy prime minister.  Harper even later accepted the Liberal Party’s recommendations 
that the military mission focus on: (1) training the Afghan Army; (2) beefing up security for 
reconstruction efforts; and (3) continuing development efforts in Kandahar (CBC 2009).  Soon 
after, in May 2008, the Conservatives and Liberals teamed up in the minority Parliament once 
again to extend Canada’s combat operations in Kandahar until the end of 2011 (Woods 2008), 
effectively taking the combat mission off the political agenda (Boucher and Nossal 2015).  
Harper, arguably, also used the parliamentary debates as cover to hide from the unpopularity of 
the war in Kandahar.  In a minority Parliament, resolutions extending Canada’s military mission 
in Afghanistan could be blamed on both the Liberals and the Conservatives.  To be sure, public 
opinion definitely soured quickly on Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan (CTV 2007).  
Because much of the coverage of the conflict came from journalists embedded with Canadian 
Forces, the coming pages offer a brief synopsis of the Canadian embedding process.   
1.3. Canadian Journalists Embed with Canadian Forces  
 
 
In line with Shoemaker and Reese’s (2014) model, institutional factors such as embedding can 
shape and frame news content. Canadian journalists embedded with the military in Kandahar 
lived, slept, ate and were in harm’s way with Canadian Forces (Potter 2014). The practice 
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influenced the news coverage produced by Canadian journalists (Bergen 2009). My previous 
research (DeCillia 2009) offers some tentative conclusions about the impact of embedding on 
Canadian journalists who covered the conflict, including: 
 
1. Canadian journalists were keen to tell stories about Canada’s first real war in decades and 
the brave men and women fighting it; 
  
2. Embedded journalists were on guard after no WMD were found in Iraq, making them 
skeptical of Canadian officials’ spin about the war in Afghanistan; 
 
3. Canadian journalists were particularly cynical about the Harper Government’s framing of the 
war given the acrimonious relations between the new Government and the news media; and 
 
4. Journalists in Afghanistan possessed a strong normative compunction to fact check the 
media frames used by government and military leaders about the war (DeCillia 2009: 30-35). 
 
Canadian journalists were not subject to censorship, per se, in Afghanistan.  The military did not 
vet journalists’ stories before publication and all conversations with Canadian Forces were on-
the-record (Henderson 2006).  Journalists agreed to certain conditions in order to be embedded 
with the military, including not revealing future troop movements6.  As well, reporters were 
prevented from disseminating any information that commanders in Kandahar “restricted for 
operational reasons” (Lamarche 2013: np).  Journalists, not surprisingly, complained that the 
military used that restriction pell-mell to the point where it “became like a moving yard stick 
throughout the whole war” (Lamarche 2013: np).  While there was no censorship, there was 
discursive implications as the coming theory chapter explains.  Having situated the context of 
this research, I wish to now offer a few brief comments about the limitations of my study.        
 
  
                                                
6 Canadian Forces’ media embedding program guidelines are available at: 
http://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/290/291/286/banville.pdf 
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1.4. Some Caveats   
 
“Social science,” emphasizes Sayer (1992: 2), “has been singularly unsuccessful in discovering 
law-like regularities.”  Scott, (1990: 4), notably, contends “…there is no satisfactory way to 
establish definitively some bedrock reality or truth behind any set of social acts.”  To be sure, the 
observations and metrics employed by social scientists remain fallible.  Moreover, all researchers 
are inherently biased, of course, because of their cultural experiences and worldviews.  
Recognizing that my comprehension of the social production is, indeed, liable to error because of 
this, I also concede that my construction of that reality can also be defective.  I believe the best 
means of coming to some sort of understanding of our social world is to triangulate theory and 
method.  This study is positioned as decidedly critical — and also understands that reflexivity, 
“with no place for [an] absolutist mind”, is required in order to interpret and understand both the 
media coverage of Afghanistan and its potential influence on Canadians’ attitudes towards the 
war (Hamelink 2008: 3). 
 
This study’s content analysis (n = 900) reduces words to numbers.  Admittedly, it is reductionist, 
compressing news content to only a text and eliminating powerful images and sound from its 
corpus.  To be sure, there is rich data to be mined in visual representations of war (Zelizer 2002; 
Butler 2009; Matthes 2009).  This study’s primary focus, however, examines the potential impact 
of government and military leaders’ media frames on journalists. As a result, I focused on textual 
over visual representations.  While classic content analysis offers an efficient means to 
characterize a representative sample of news coverage, it does not offer the rich descriptive detail 
that discourse analysis provides (Gill 1996).  My methods chapter addresses how I attempt to 
overcome these deficits.  Moreover, my conclusion details a number of critical reflections on my 
methods, their limits, and recommendations to overcome such deficiencies in future research.   
 
As the coming theory chapter makes clear, the influence of media messages remains a contested 
intellectual terrain.  Moreover, reducing complicated political opinion formation to quantitative 
results is also problematic (Lewis 2001).  Habermas (1974 [1964]) argued that surveys are too 
reductionist and prevent the full formation of ideas in the public sphere.  Bourdieu (1979) 
famously asserted that there is no such thing as public opinion.  Then, of course, there is a
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Foucauldian (1991 [1977]) interpretation of surveys which sees the method as a controlling and 
disciplinary mechanism.   
 
To be sure, trying to ascertain how Canadians feel about a military mission that ended six years 
ago is not without its limitations.  Initially, I had hoped to conduct focus groups to supplement 
the deficiencies associated with my population-based survey experiment (n = 1,131).  Time and 
resources prevented this from happening.  Nevertheless, this research’s audience experiment data 
offer insight into what factors likely shaped Canadians’ attitudes about the war in Afghanistan.  
This study’s results, as I will argue in my conclusion, offer a solid starting point for further 
qualitative research.  
 
With concerns about the efficacy of surveys in mind, this research makes careful knowledge 
claims about the impact of news media and fact checking and their potential influences on 
audiences.  I also offer supplementary evidence and scholarship to back up my knowledge claims 
with a mind to triangulating theory and evidence to make cautious — and nuanced — knowledge 
claims. In my two findings and discussion chapters, for instance, I provide numerous examples 
and other quantitative and qualitative data to bolster my probabilistic claims and arguments.  
Moreover, my analysis is grounded in Gamson’s (1992) contention that media messages may 
play a part in how individuals form political attitudes — but popular wisdom and experiential 
knowledge can also play a crucial (and often defining) role. Despite these limitations, I do 
believe that the combination of a content analysis and a population-based survey experiment 
does offer some important insights into the nexus of news media discourse and audience 
reception.  
 
1.5.  Conclusion and Roadmap 
 
Back on that hot day back in 2006 in the village of Makun I worried about being a cheerleader 
for the Canadian Forces.  I was apprehensive about being spun — and, in turn, spinning the 
Canadian public.  Firstly, this thesis asks what Canadian journalists did with the media framing 
offered to them by government and military officials.  It also wonders how journalists 
themselves, framed (or counter-framed) the war.  It also questions the efficacy of fact checking.  
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Secondly, this research is curious about what it all — government and military messaging and 
news media coverage  — meant for Canadians’ political opinion formation about the conflict in 
Afghanistan. Did what politicians, military personnel and journalists say about the war even 
matter?  Moreover, did the fact checking by journalists influence audiences?  Perhaps, though, 
Canadians’ political predisposition played a bigger role than what government and military 
leaders said — and what journalists did with their words. 
 
This thesis uses a classic content analysis to determine what government and military officials 
said about the war — and how journalists reacted to that media framing.  The method offers an 
effective means for identifying and classifying media phenomena such as indexing, framing and 
fact checking (Hallin 1986; Bennett 1990; Entman 1991; Bennett et al. 2006, 2007; Baum and 
Groeling 2010a, 2010b; Porpora, Nikolaev, Hagmann 2010; Speer 2017). Secondly, this research 
used a population-based survey experiment (Mutz 20101) to examine how Canadians’ 
predispositions (Gamson 1992; Zaller 1992; Western 2005; Berinksy 2009) and media messages 
may have influenced attitudes towards the war in Afghanistan.  This experiment also provides 
some insight into how audiences react to fact checking in news coverage of conflict.   
 
In Chapter Two, I offer a synthesis of theory that helps to: (1) explain the factors that can shape 
news content; and (2) conceptualize how audiences may be influenced by the news media. The 
first half of the coming chapter interrogates the rich literature surrounding news content 
production. Numerous conceptual frameworks (see, for example, Gans 1979; Gitlin 2003 [1980]) 
shed light on how media content gets shaped. This study is anchored in Shoemaker and Reese’s 
(2014) hierarchy of influences model, formally known as the hierarchical influences model, as a 
conceptual starting point for understanding and testing how indexing, framing and journalistic 
practices influenced the news and analysis about Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan. This 
work also attempts to link news content with its potential influence. The second part of the 
theoretical chapter outlines how individuals develop political attitudes (sometimes) through a 
process of combining media messages with popular wisdom and experiential knowledge 
(Gamson 1992).   
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Chapter Three, Research Methodology, outlines my rationale and procedures for conducting a 
content analysis and a population-based survey experiment.  Chapter Four, “But it is not getting 
any safer, details and analyzes this work’s key empirical findings from its content analysis.  
Chapter Five, Putting it All Together, outlines and interprets this study’s data concerning its 
population-based survey experiment. Chapter Six, Conclusion, provides a synthesis of this 
work’s findings along with a number of critical reflections about theory and methodology. The 
conclusion also offers some suggestions about future research — and several recommendations 
for journalists concerning fact checking. With a mind to situating this research’s methods and 
empirical findings theoretically, the forthcoming chapter turns to this study’s conceptual 
underpinnings.   
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Chapter Two: Shaping the news content that shapes the pictures in our heads 
 
2.0. Introduction 
 
 
“The only feeling that anyone can have about an event he does not experience is the 
feeling aroused by his mental image of that event.  That is why, until we know what 
others think they know, we cannot truly understand their acts… Our opinions cover a 
bigger space, a longer reach of time, a greater number of things, than we can directly 
observe. They have, therefore, to be pieced together out of what others have reported and 
what we can imagine” (Lippmann 2004 [1922]: 7, 43). 
The story of this chapter happens in two acts.  I begin by exploring how numerous macro, meso 
and micro-factors shape news content.  The second part of this chapter scrutinizes how media 
messages (or frames) potentially influence audiences.  Frames, to be sure, exist in different 
locations — communicator(s), text(s), receiver(s) and culture(s) — and at different times.  I 
imagine framing at two different stages: (1) frame-building; and (2) frame-setting (D'Angelo 
2002; de Vreese 2005).  Frame-building involves numerous components and circumstances — 
ideological, cultural, institutional and individual — that influence or frame the news content 
journalists produce (Tuchman 1978a; Gans 1979; Snow and Benford 1992; Shoemaker and 
Reese 2014). Frame-building, for instance, can include newsroom policies or politics or external 
values such as ideology.  Frame-setting, on the other hand, comprises the processing influence of 
frames on audiences and represents a complex mechanism entailing both the “interaction 
between media frames and an individual’s prior knowledge and predispositions” (de Vreese 
2005: 52).  Cappella and Jamieson (1997: 47; italics in original) stress that frames can potentially 
“activate knowledge, stimulate stocks of cultural mores and values, and create context within 
which what are typically called media effects are produced.”   
 
It is also helpful (to follow the two key threads of this chapter) to imagine frames as both 
independent and dependent variables (Scheufele 1999).  The first part of this chapter critically 
examines numerous social and structural (Shoemaker and Reese 2014), individual (Tuchman 
1978a) and organizational (Gans 1979) factors that shape or determine news content. The second 
section of this theoretical chapter then turns to evaluating frames at the audience level as an 
independent variable (Kahneman and Tversky 1984; Gamson 1992; Pan and Kosicki 1993) that 
may (or may not) influence political opinions.  This theoretical chapter seeks to set up this 
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research’s empirical attempt to bridge that scholarly gap.  But first, the following section 
addresses frame-building (or frames as a dependent variable) before moving on to this chapter’s 
review of frame-setting (or frames as an independent variable).   
 
2.1. Shaping News Content  
 
In this first section, I offer both an overview of the various theoretical conceptions that 
potentially shape news content — and my argument for focusing on three factors. With a mind to 
situating this work’s methods and empirical findings theoretically, the coming pages sketch 
useful analytical tools for understanding the factors influencing the news content that Canadian 
journalists produced about the war in Afghanistan. To be sure, numerous scholars (Galtung and 
Ruge 1965; Tuchman 1978a, 1978b; Gans 1979; Herman and Chomsky 2002 [1988]; Gitlin 2003 
[1980], to name only a few) have offered various micro, meso and macro conceptualizations of 
the factors that shape news production.  Debates about the forces influencing news frequently get 
reduced to arguments about structure versus agency.  Herman and Chomsky (2002 [1988]), for 
instance, argue that ideology plays a crucial role in shaping the mostly hegemonic news content 
journalists produce. The other school of thought (Schlesinger and Tumber 1999 [1994]; Baum 
and Groeling 2010b; Potter and Baum 2010: 455; Porpora et al. 2010; Speer 2017) rejects 
notions of assembly line passivity on the part of journalists passing along elite messages, arguing 
news professionals have considerable agency and important framing or shaping power over news 
content.   
 
In addition to the scholarship that investigates factors that shape news, Bourdieu’s field theory 
(1980, 1998, 2005) remains a popular conceptual framework in media and communication 
scholarship for understanding the journalistic field and the structures and agents that shape news 
content (see, for example, Benson 1999, 2004, 205; Perreault and Stanfield 2018).  Bourdieu’s 
thinking and methodology provide an often useful analytic for sorting out the cultural and 
economic capital that can shape news.  Following from Weber and Durkheim, Bourdieu focuses 
on the increasing differentiation of specialized spheres in our modern world. The social world, in 
Bourdieu’s conceptualization, consists of many space and sub-spaces (or fields), such as 
institutions, social groups or workplaces.  The real, in this way of thinking, is fundamentally 
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relational, meaning that social existence is marked by “one’s differences vis-à-vis others in an 
ongoing process that is enacted for the most part unconsciously without strategic intention” 
(Benson and Neveu 2005: 3).  Fields, which Bourdieu defined as the social space where “various 
actors struggle for the transformation or preservation of the field,” have a profound shaping 
power on the social world (Bourdieu 1998, 40–41).  Bourdieu, in fact, described the field as a 
game of sorts.  “What players can do and where they can go during the game,” writes Thomson 
(2014: 66), “depends on their field position.”   
“Any social formation is structured by way of a hierarchically organized series of fields 
(the economic field, the educational field, the political field, the cultural field, etc.), each 
defined as a structured space with its own laws of functioning and its own relations of 
force independent of those of politics and the economy... Each field is relatively 
autonomous but structurally homologous with the others.  Its structure, at any given 
moment, is determined by the relations between the positions agents occupy in the field” 
(Bourdieu [Johnson] 1993: 6). 
 
Position, according to Bourdieu, is determined by economic, social and cultural capital.  Players 
with more capital have more advantages.   
“Positions can be plotted on a field by amassing a set of data about the type and volumes 
of capital held by agents (institutions and individuals): for example, data about an 
individual’s social origins, educational level institution attended, social networks, 
memberships and affiliations, employment, place of residence and so on” (Thomson 
2014: 70). 
 
Individuals navigate and interpret fields with embodied — and shared — dispositions (or 
habitus).  Each field has its own rules and logic (Hackett 2006).  Individuals enter into each field 
with the sum of their economic, cultural and social capital, prescribing their position in the field.   
Each field has its own rules, shared understanding (or what Bourdieu termed doxa).  In the 
journalism field, routines and practices, such as news values and ethics, represent a doxa or 
shared beliefs.   
 
Everyday practice is fundamental to understanding the social dynamics of journalism.  It is 
through practice that journalism’s field is constructed and social actors are conditioned by their 
position in the field.  Moreover, power relations:  
“may be manifested or even constituted, within the everyday routines and ethos of 
workaday journalism — a conception which implies the productivity and power of 
journalism, and the potential agency of journalists as social actors, without seeing it as 
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entirely free-floating or self- determining” (Hackett 2006: 7).   
 
Individual action is shaped by both agency and the “structuring structure” of habitus that 
“organizes practices and perception of practices” (Bourdieu 2010 [1984]: 166). Habitus, with 
respect to journalism, involves an understanding of the “journalistic game” (Willig 2013: 18).    
Field theory, when used to understand journalism, examines both the interactions amongst news 
professionals in their own field and the field’s reciprocal actions with other fields such as politics 
(Benson 2004).   On the field, a game ensues when journalists attempt to transform or preserve 
the field (Bourdieu 1998: 40-41).  
 
Capital — or resources — is crucial to understanding journalists’ position within their field.  
Bourdieu’s work focuses on three manifestations of capital: cultural, economic and social 
(Benson and Neveu 2005).  With respect to the news media, cultural capital is best understood as 
personal assets (education, background, titles or awards).  Economic capital, in the news media, 
is often judged through factors such as audience reach — ratings, circulation and advertising 
revenue. Social capital encompasses both the tangible and intangible resources journalists 
possess because of their relationships or social networks.  A journalist, for instance, with more 
followers on Twitter, arguably, has more social capital than a journalist with fewer followers.   
 
Journalists, in Bourdieu’s understanding, can both preserve and alter their field.  As social actors, 
journalists strategize and struggle to preserve or reshape their field.  When studying the 
journalistic field it is, therefore, necessary to know who is playing in the field and what is the 
sum of her/his capital.  Moreover, an examination of the field must also scrutinize the doxa that 
constructs and codifies the play of news professionals in the field (Benson and Neveu 2005).  
What, for instance, do journalists find newsworthy on a regular basis? What ethics shape their 
practices?  Media and communication scholars who use field theory also pay attention to the 
habitus of journalists on the field.  That is, what personal and professional knowledge shapes 
how journalists play the game?  With those questions in mind, field theory offers an analytical 
tool for understanding how journalists produce news content.  Bourdieu urged social scientists to 
focus on three avenues of inquiry:  (1) determine the field’s relationship with larger fields.  In the 
case of journalism, the larger fields may be political or economic;  (2) investigate the internal 
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structures — the doxa  and habitus — of the field; and (3) explore the historical origins of the 
habitus of the dominant players in the field (Benson 2015).    
 
Field theory is not with out its limitations, though.  Thomson (2014) identifies four problems 
with field theory: 
 
1. The borders between fields are “fuzzy” or hard to distinguish (Thomson 2014: 77).   Where 
does the field of journalism begin and end?  Political journalism has a symbiotic relationship 
with government and politics (Capella and Hall Jamieson 1997; Street 2001; Meyers 2002; 
Louw 2005).    
2. There are too many fields to assess at one time.  In the case of journalism, there are four 
potential fields:  (1) the field of power; (2) the broader field of economics and politics; (3) 
the news media field; and (4) the agents or journalists in the field.  “Perhaps this are too 
many fields altogether!” (Thomson 2014: 77). 
3. Field theory is deterministic. Change happens slowly — and is often top down.  Cultural 
studies scholars have criticized Bourdieu for underestimating the radical potential of culture.  
As Benson and Neveu (2005: 3) stresses, field theory analysis frequently “produces more 
churn than change.”  That is, the theory is better at foregrounding the repetition of social 
practice rather than any transformative phenomena.  
4. It is hard to define the inter-field connections.  According to Bourdieu, some fields are 
dominant, while others are subordinate.  In the case of journalism, one must wonder if the 
news media are dominant over politics?  Meyer (2002) convincingly argues that media has 
colonized politics.  While widely debated, proponents of mediatization, in fact, contend that 
media logic shapes and frames political communication (Couldry and Hepp 2013).   
 
Field theory proved a hard theoretical fit for this research’s agenda.  At its heart, this research 
aims to investigate what journalists did with the political rhetoric (or media framing) offered by 
government and military leaders about Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan.  Economic, 
social and cultural capital might, indeed, influence if news professionals fact check what officials 
say about war — but it may not.  Also, it would have been difficult for this research, happening 
after the war ended, to assess the capital of journalists who covered the conflict.  As well, most 
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journalists covering the war were, arguably, similarly situated in terms of capital.  Canadian 
journalists share similar educational and social backgrounds (Chiu 2016).  The two broadcasters 
— CBC and CTV — have similar audiences.  At the time of the war, both the national 
newspapers at the time also had similar reaches, too. Capital, arguably, therefore, had very little 
to do with the routine and practice of fact checking.   
 
It is also difficult to disentangle and differentiate fields during times of war.  As  Gramsci (1971) 
stresses, elites do not always represent a unified bloc.  This research explores the differences 
between what government and opposition politicians said about the conflict in Afghanistan.  
Furthermore, embedding, with its potential for collaboration, also increases the fuzzy distinctions 
between the fields of journalism, politics and economics.  Moreover, it is difficult to determine, 
using Bourdieu’s original classifications, if the military is part of the sub-field of bureaucracy or 
politics.  Plus, given the military’s symbiotic relationship with military corporations, is Canada’s 
Department of National Defence its own separate field or really just a part of the economic field 
as well?   
 
As noted above, it is also theoretically difficult to sort out if what political actors and journalists 
do — how they perform on the field — can be understood against a backdrop of an institutional 
logic, which is neither purely political nor media focused.  Both of these logics are produced 
together and exist as sedimentations within the fields.  As well, for the purposes of this research, 
field theory offers an insufficient account of how power flows — and its productive quality 
(Foucault 1990). Field theory is also overly deterministic.  The theory “dwells too much on the 
reproductive aspects of the field and not their change” (Thomson 2014: 77).  What about 
contingency and agency?  The theoretical approach I prefer — and outline in the coming pages 
— foregrounds the complexity of power relationships that are more mutable than Bourdieu's 
understanding of field, capital, habitus and doxa.   
 
I organize my theoretical understanding of news production under the umbrella of Shoemaker 
and Reese’s (2014) hierarchy of influences model.  I must stress, however, that I use the model 
as an organizing or mapping tool.  Shoemaker and Reese’s (2014) model is a heuristic and not a 
theory.   The model, contends Hackett (2006: 6), “should be evaluated on the basis of its utility 
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in raising questions and organizing research data, rather than its explanatory power as such.”  I 
use the model as a typology to map and classify the three shaping phenomena of interest for this 
research.  Shoemaker and Reese’s (2014) model helped me categorize the macro forces — social 
system or ideology — meso forces — social institutions and media organizations — and micro 
forces — individuals, routines and practices — that might shape news content. As the coming 
pages make clear, I use other theory — Gramscis’s understanding of cultural hegemony; 
Bennett’s (1990) indexing hypothesis; and normative understandings of journalism’s role in 
democracy — to conceptualize the potential shaping influences delineated in Shoemaker and 
Reese’s (2014) model.  By means of a roadmap, I begin by offering a brief outline of Shoemaker 
and Reese’s (2014) model, illuminating the mapping tool’s five levels.  The purpose of this 
section underpins my justification for why three levels of Shoemaker and Reese’s five-level 
model are most useful for understanding this work’s empirical findings.  After sketching the 
basics of the model, I explore how the hierarchy of influences model (Shoemaker and Reese 
2014) offers a solid categorization system for examining this study’s research goals.  From there, 
I transition to exploring, in greater detail, the theory that serves as my analytical tools for 
conceptualizing my study’s findings.   
 
2.2. The Hierarchy of Influences Model 
 
The hierarchy of influences model (Shoemaker and Reese 2014) offers a categorizing tool for 
understanding micro, meso and macro factors that influence news media production.  Editorial 
decision-making, in this conception, occurs at five levels:  (1) social systems; (2) social 
institutions; (3) media organizations; (4) routine practices; and (5) individuals (see Figure One 
below).  
 
News content, according to Shoemaker and Reese (2014), gets shaped by a confluence of levels 
or an individual level.  The authors imagine five shaping levels: 
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1. Social System Level: News content is influenced by larger forces such as ideology7 “in 
the service of power” (see, for example, Thompson 1990: 7) and perpetuates the status 
quo (Adorno and Horkheimer 1979; Hallin 1986; Herman and Chomsky 2002 [1988]; 
Hallin 1994; McChesney 2002; Bennett et al. 2006, 2007; Castells 2009).  
 
Figure 1.  Hierarchy of Influences Model (Shoemaker and Reese 2014)8 
 
2. Social Institution Level: News content gets shaped by the news media’s close relationship 
with institutions (think: government and business) This meso-level helps to reinforce or 
perpetuate dominant values articulated at the macro-level and inspire practices and routines 
at the micro-level (see, for example, Cook 2005, 2006; Sparrow 1999, 2006). 
                                                
7 A universal definition of ideology remains elusive.  Bell (1960) influentially dismissed ideology. Non-
Marxists — in a decidedly uncritical fashion — view ideology as merely a belief system. The traditional 
Marxist perspective of ideology, of course, views ideology as a false consciousness.  Neo-Marixists 
divorced ideology from the super-structure and post-Marxists similarly deemphasized economic 
determinism and highlighted the contested dynamic of hegemony (Gramsci 1971).  Akin to Cammaerts 
(2016), this thesis understands ideology as “discursive forms that construct a horizon of all possible 
representation within a certain context, which establish the limits of what is sayable” and what is 
debatable (Laclau 2006: 114; italics in original).  
8 Shoemaker and Reese (2014) depict their model as a concentric circles with individuals at the centre and 
the social system in the outermost ring.  As Shoemaker and Reese (2014) concede, their model is not a 
real hierarchy.  Moreover, as my coming critique argues, it makes more sense to envision the model as a 
circuit or system instead of a ranking system of media influences.   
Social 
Institutions 
Media 
Organizations  
Routines & 
Practices 
Individuals 
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3. Media Organization Level: News is shaped by the organization that produces it.  Factor 
such as who owns the news organization, who works for it, its ambitions and objectives and 
its internal rules and ethics can all influence content (see, for example, White 1950; 
Tuchman 1978a; Gans 1979; Gitlin 2003 [1980]; Aday 2010).  
4. Routines and Practices Level: Journalistic routines norms and practices (often inspired by 
normative conceptions of their role in democracy) shape news content (see, for example, 
Tuchman 1977, 1978a, 1978b; Bennett 1990; Høyer 2005; Bennett 2012). 
5. Individual Level: Personal characteristics such as gender, race, class, religion, politics, 
education, ambition and ethics influence the individual journalists who produce news content  
(see, for example, Gans 1979; Weaver et al. 2007). 
 
At the individual and routines and practices levels, for instance, journalists’ personal values and 
their practices such as fact checking can influence and frame the content they produce.  
Moreover, the corporations or institutions (organizational level) that journalists work for can also 
effect news media production.  Journalists at the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), for 
example, frequently produce different content than journalists who work for Rupert Murdoch’s 
tabloid The Sun because of the different media organizations’ agendas and policies.   
 
At the social institution level, Shoemaker and Reese (2014) contend that the relationships the 
news media have with other institutions also molds content.  Frequently viewed through a new 
institutionalism lens (Sparrow 1999; Cook 2005), the news media are conceptualized as a social 
actor.  The content the news media produces, as a result, gets shaped and influenced by its 
interactions with other institutions such as the public relations industry.  As well, the news 
media’s propensity to locate its bureaus at sites of power such as stock markets and government 
institutions can shape the kind of content that gets produced.  Other institutional shaping force 
such as regulation and libel laws also mold news coverage.  The BBC’s content, for example, is 
not only influenced by organizational factors, but is also shaped by regulatory requirements that 
news content be impartial and accurate (Ofcom 2017). 
 
News content is also influenced by the social system in which it is situated.  Critical media and 
communication scholarship (Hallin 1986; Herman and Chomsky 2002 [1988]; Hall 1989; 
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Entman 1993; Hallin 1994) link the shaping power of ideology to the production of news 
content.  In this conception, the news media serve “a hegemonic function” by constantly echoing 
and amplifying dominant ideas and positions (Shoemaker and Reese 2014: 81).  Hallin’s (1986) 
seminal examination of the Vietnam War, of note, concluded that during the early years of the 
war, journalists largely concurred with the prevailing elite-held Cold War perspective about the 
conflict.  Having sketched the essentials of Shoemaker and Reese’s model, I now turn to offering 
a critique of it — and my rationale for its use in understanding the phenomena that influence 
news content.   
 
2.3. A Critique of the Hierarchy of Influences Model 
 
While some scholarship (Franklin et al. 2005) calls Shoemaker and Reese’s framework a 
fundamental approach in journalism studies, others (Nam-Jin 2004; Hackett 2006) are more 
critical of its conceptual capacity.  In this chapter, I intend to argue that the model lacks 
theoretical rigour.  It is, however, a helpful categorization tool for understanding this research’s 
questions about the macro forces, meso-level structures, and the micro pushes and pulls that 
shaped the news coverage of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan (Hackett 2006).  As I 
outlined in the introduction, this research is focused on understanding how the Canadian 
government and military officials framed the war in Afghanistan and how journalists reacted to 
those frames.  Most of the coverage of the war emanated from journalists embedded with 
Canadian military forces.  As I argue in this chapter, it makes sense to narrow my examination to 
three levels of the hierarchy of influences model:  (1) social system; (2) social institutions; and 
(3) routines and practices.  Without question, the other two levels (media organizations and 
individuals) also possessed a shaping influence on the content journalists produced about the war 
in Afghanistan.   Yet it is beyond the scope of this research to analyze those influences.  
 
Reese and Shoemaker (2016: 390) recently argued that their theorization “helps disentangle” the 
conjunction between individual-level forces such as journalistic routines and larger 
organizational and social forces that shape news production.  With a mind to building theory, 
Shoemaker and Reese (2014) hope their model helps scholars draw connections in media and 
communication research. The pair also suggests that their conceptualization gives researchers a 
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standard means of understanding media shaping factors.  Additionally, the authors contend their 
way of thinking about how news content gets produced addresses the American theoretical 
exceptionalism that imagines news professionals as the primary shapers of news content.  
Shoemaker and Reese (2014) also stress that their framework helps to highlight how 
understanding content is key to examining how the news media might shape public opinion 
(Shoemaker and Reese 2014).  The authors encourage media and communication scholars to 
move beyond a propensity to view media messages as an independent variable that may (or may 
not) influence audience thinking or actions.  Media content, according to the hierarchy of 
influences model, needs to be understood as a dependent variable that is potentially shaped by 
the five levels of independent variables in the hierarchy of influences model.  
 
Shoemaker and Reese (2014) insist the model is not dependent on a positivist cause-and-effect 
understanding of media.  The researchers argue their thinking allows for critical interpretations 
of how the media are both shaped by — and perpetuate — dominant meanings and systems.  
Most importantly, Shoemaker and Reese’s model wisely encourages a multi-layered analysis and 
understanding of the reciprocity and associations between levels and their potential shaping 
power on news content. A news story, in this understanding, can be influenced (largely or 
minimally, or not at all) by individual attitudes, routines and practices — but it can also be 
shaped by the news organization it was produced within.  What is more, its message can be both 
hegemonic and/or non-hegemonic because of the social system within which it was produced.  In 
short, news media content is potentially the sum of one level or many levels of the hierarchy of 
influences model.   
 
Reese and Shoemaker (2016: 406) urge researchers to view “linkages between levels… as 
interactive and multi-directional.”  Shoemaker and Reese (2014), in fact, emphasize that the 
shaping power can flow in any direction and no one level is ultimately more powerful than the 
other four levels, clearly discounting the notion that the conceptualization is a hierarchy or 
ranking system.  Lewis and Reese’s (2009) interviews with journalists, by means of an example, 
concluded that news media coverage of the aftermath of the September 11 terror attacks in 2001 
was influenced at two levels — the social (ideological) and the routines and practices levels.  
Journalists were reluctant to challenge the “war on terror” frame sponsored by the executive 
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branch of the U.S. government because it was unpatriotic — but they also refrained from 
labeling it a “so-called” war on terror because they considered that tag unprofessional.  To be 
certain, the model helps illuminate how the influences on media content are multifaceted and 
consistently in flux.   Yet, the framework is not without its drawbacks.   
 
2.4. Overlap Between the Shaping Levels of the Hierarchy of Influences Model 
 
As I stressed earlier, it is not prudent to interpret the shaping of media content in isolation — but 
instead to adopt a multi-level analysis. Shoemaker and Reese (2014: 11) concede media and 
communication researchers cannot, of course, take every level into their account in their analysis 
— but it is imperative to examine and interpret “findings within the context of other levels.”   
The media sociologists note that research adopting their model as a framework frequently gets 
used to analyze shaping effects on one or two, and maybe even three, levels. Notably, Vos and 
Heinderyckx (2015) ambitiously scrutinized all five levels in their gatekeeping study, 
determining that news decision-making gets shaped at all levels.  But rarely does scholarship 
move beyond interpreting more than three levels of explanation (Shoemaker and Reese 2014). 
 
It is worth noting (as the coming pages will make plain) that some news media phenomena 
originate in more than one level.  Indexing and framing, on the one hand, are a journalistic 
routine.  News professionals, as a part of their everyday craft, turn to expert sources and frame 
their stories in a way that makes them relatable to their audiences.  Yet at the social level of 
influences, journalists may adopt the view of the expert(s) or political actor(s) they use in their 
stories or commentary.  “One of the key functions of the media,” contend Shoemaker and Reese 
(2014: 75), “is to maintain the boundaries within society, to define ideas and actions as either 
within the bounds of acceptability or as deviant and not politically legitimate.”  Arguably, 
journalists frame their stories in hegemonic ways because they reliably turn to elite sources 
(Bennett 1990) — and they have been interpolated by the dominant ideology within which they 
live and work (Fowler 1991).  Conversely, indexing and framing could originate at the 
organizational level.  Journalists who work at Fox News, for instance, are likely to turn to more 
conservative-leaning voices than the more liberal voices that journalists who work for MSNBC 
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News may include in their coverage (Aday 2010).  News organizations can also even dictate 
what types of frames journalists use.   
 
Fairness and balance, to use another example, can arguably be thought of as a journalistic routine 
or practice.  Yet, journalists’ personal attitudes (a desire to be fair) can also compel them to seek 
out both sides of a story.  Alternatively, at the individual level, a journalist could adopt an 
objective position in their coverage because he or she knows it might impress their boss and lead 
to recognition and possible advancement (Tuchman 1977).  Furthermore, at the organizational 
level, editors can impose fairness and balance on reporters.  Editors are, of course, notorious for 
demanding that reporters get reaction from the other side to balance stories.  As well, on the 
institutional level, libel laws dictate giving those accused of wrong doing fair comment.  
Similarly, broadcasters such as the BBC are required by its national regulator and arms-length 
governing body to be fair and impartial.  To be certain, there is overlap between the levels in the 
hierarchy of influence model.  
 
2.5. Limitations of the Hierarchy of Influences Model 
 
Like most theory, there are limitations to (and critiques of) the hierarchy of influences model that 
Shoemaker and Reese (2014) offer.   Their framework is imprecise and unclear in some ways.  
Nam-Jin (2004: 2) contends the model is vague and neglects to explain how researchers “can 
empirically separate the effect of one level from that of another; or how one can accurately 
compare those effects with one another.”  In fact, some scholars propose amended models to 
account for journalistic ethics (Voakes 1997) and emerging routines in digital media (Keith 
2011).  
 
To be sure, the framework is under-theorized.  At its core, the hierarchy of influences model is 
not, as Shoemaker and Reese (2014) concede in the latest edition of their book, a hierarchy or 
ranking system.  Yet, even in their most recent edition of Mediating the Message the 21st 
Century: A Media Sociology Perspective, Shoemaker and Reese (2014) do place emphasis on the 
social system level, contending it is the foundation on which the other four levels rest.  This 
thinking, however, contrasts with postmodern understanding of power that is ubiquitous rather 
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than possessed by a few (Foucault 1990).  In addition, Shoemaker and Reese seemingly also 
contradict themselves, writing that their model does not “single out any one level as more 
powerful” (Shoemaker and Reese 2014: 8).  Yet, most recently, the pair argued that the 
hierarchical power of government appears to be “reasserting itself” in shaping news content 
(Reese and Shoemaker 2016: 397). 
 
In a theoretical sense, Shoemaker and Reese’s (2014) conceptualization does not offer a 
consistent explanation of media shaping influences. The fuzziness of the levels produces research 
that reaches scattered conclusions, emphasizing, on the one hand, the impact of micro pushes and 
pulls (Fahmy and Johnson 2012) and, on the other hand, meso-level forces (Napoli 1997) that 
determine the shape and character of news content.  Furthermore, the model — to construct its 
“theoretical umbrella for research” of factors that shape the news (Shoemaker and Reese 2014: 
8) — incorporates several theories from divergent epistemological roots, ranging from Gramsci’s 
(1971) conceptualization of cultural hegemony to new institutionalism imaginations (Cook 2005) 
of the news media as a political actor. Arguably, the framework represents a collection of 
theoretical tools to contemplate how news content gets shaped.  Shoemaker and Reese (2014: 5), 
in reality, admit that calling their model a  “theory” could be could be considered “grandiose.”  
 
Hackett (2006) stresses that the U.S. origins of the model, requires media and communication 
researchers, when studying other countries, to be mindful of the cultural and economic contexts 
of non-American countries and the effects of globalization.  Admittedly, a great deal of 
American-focused theory informs this research.  In addition to Shoemaker and Reese’s model, I 
also use indexing and media framing theory to conceptualize my findings and analysis.  
Unquestionably, most of the conceptual frameworks underpinning this research are imagined 
within (and focused on) the American context.  These theories’ normative conceptions also align 
with a U.S. media system that prizes western journalistic notions such as objectivity, fairness and 
accountability.  
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2.6. The Utility of the Hierarchy of Influences Model 
 
U.S.-inspired theory, arguably, applies well to the Canadian context.  In addition, to the global 
“homogenization of media systems” (Hallin and Mancini 2004b: 273), Canada and the U.S. are 
geographically close and share a similar culture. Furthermore, both countries are arranged as 
federal states and share similar political practices.  As well, Canadian media are shaped by the 
overwhelmingly bigger U.S media (Taras 2001). Moreover, journalists in both Canada and U.S. 
hold similar outlooks about their roles in democracy (Hallin and Mancini 2004a).  Notably, a 
recent edited book about the crisis in Canadian journalism relies heavily on U.S. theory and 
scholarship to conceptualize the problem in Canada, noting that “much can be learned from 
experiences” of the U.S. (Crowther et al. 2016: 5).  Furthermore, recent international work 
(Jones and Sheets 2009; Robinson et al. 2009; Shehata 2010) concluded indexing theory, for 
instance, is applicable to media systems outside the U.S.  
 
It makes sense for different studies to position the origins of the media phenomenon under the 
microscope at different influencing levels for compelling empirical and theoretical reasons.  
Ultimately, what is important is the evidence and logic researchers posit to back up their 
theoretical level of emphasis.  Sorting out these questions and distinctions, suggest Shoemaker 
and Reese (2014), rests with scholars — and is dependent on interpretive preferences and 
scholarly intent. Furthermore, researchers, to be fair, have biases and will place emphasis on 
“explanation[s] that [fit] their disciplinary and political leanings” (Shoemaker and Reese 2014: 
12).   
 
My research aims to understand the potential impact of ideology, official sources and journalistic 
routines and practices on the news content surrounding the war in Afghanistan.  This study also 
wishes to shed light on the contested dynamic between government and military leaders and 
journalists surrounding the media framing of Canada’s military mission Afghanistan. For this 
research — since much of the coverage was produced by reporters embedded with the military 
— the social, social institution and routines and practice levels are, arguably, the most logical 
shaping factors of the coverage of the conflict in Afghanistan. I now turn to outlining a more 
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detailed discussion of the theory that underpins how I sorted out these questions and the 
distinctions I used to interpret my empirical findings.  
 
2.7. Focusing on Three Levels of the Hierarchy of Influences Model 
 
In this section, I focus on what factors shaped the content journalists produced surrounding 
Canada’s combat role in Afghanistan.  It specifically examine the influences of: (1) military and 
government leaders on framing the mediated messages about the war; (2) journalists’ reliance on 
official sources (indexing); and (3) journalistic routines and practices surrounding news values 
and fact checking the preferred frames of government and military officials.  As a result, this 
work’s attention concentrates on three levels of analysis:  (1) the macro-level social system; (2) 
the meso-level social institution; and (3) the micro-level routines and practices.  Table One 
details the various news media forces and phenomena such as indexing, framing and normative 
conceptions of journalism that are under examination in this study. The table defines and 
categorizes the news media shaping characteristics.  At the macro-level social system level, there 
are three values and phenomena of interest: (1) ideology; (2) elite framing; and (3) normative 
conceptions of journalism.  I highlight two shaping factors at the meso-level social institution 
level:  (1) embedding journalists with the military; and (2) indexing.  I conceptualize two 
elements of interest at the micro-level routine and practice level:  (1) news values and (2) 
counter-framing or fact checking.  
 
Table 1 — Three Levels of the Hierarchy of Influences Model 
Level  Definition News Media Shaping Value or Phenomenon  
Social System Ideology  Ideology / Horizon of Possibility 
Framing 
Normative Conceptions of Journalism  
Social Institution Institutions  Embedding journalists with military 
Indexing 
Routines and 
Practices  
Rules, Habits, 
Forms, Methods and 
Patterns 
Counter-framing and Fact checking 
News values 
 
Having sketched the essentials of the model and my rationale for focusing on three levels, the 
coming pages offer a more detailed conceptualization and illustration of: (1) the social system 
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level; (2) the social institution level; and (3) the routines and practices level. What follows 
includes both a theoretical discussion along with numerous examples that illuminate this 
research’s focus.    
 
2.8. Social System Level 
 
In this section, I set the theoretical stage for this research’s conceptual framework by 
highlighting (in much greater detail) the possible influences of the social system on news and 
analysis produced about Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan.  Shoemaker and Reese 
(2014) emphasize that news content is shaped by dominant ideology and reinforces the status 
quo.  Notably, Hall (1989: 309) contends a scholarly focus on ideology allows scholarship to 
understand how the media have the power to “define situations and label groups and individuals 
as deviant.” The imprint of ideology limits and narrows perspectives in news content, making 
dominant ways of thinking “appear universal, natural and conterminous with “reality” itself” 
(Hall 1982: 65).  While “consent or control is neither automatic nor guaranteed”, the imprint of 
dominant ideology surely shapes news content (McCullagh 2002: 40). 
 
I agree with Shoemaker and Reese’s (2014) suggestion that Gramsci’s (1971) understanding of 
hegemony offers a useful theoretical lens for conceptualizing the influence of ideology on the 
news media.  Agency and contingency are central to the Italian political philosopher’s 
understanding of the social world — and are crucial underpinnings of this research’s conceptual 
framework.  What follows is, by no means, an exhaustive exploration of Gramsci’s thinking 
about hegemony.  Instead, the coming pages set the table for understanding how social system 
factors that frame news content represents a contested dynamic or a struggle, as Gramsci 
envisions, between dominant groups and counter-hegemonic forces such as journalists and the 
public.   
 
2.9. Gramsci and Cultural Hegemony and the Social System Level 
 
Gramsci’s (1971) thinking about hegemony offers a more nuanced and intellectually robust 
conceptualization of power than orthodox Marxism.  The Italian political philosopher’s emphasis 
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on agency and contingency moves beyond notions of ideology representing a petty bourgeois 
false consciousness.  Furthermore, ideology, in Gramsci’s thinking, evolves from more than a 
“posthumous” rationale for elites — but a “force capable of creating a new history and of 
collaborating in the formation of a new power” (Bobbio 1979: 36).  Hall (1996: 411) 
prominently praises Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony for its “sophisticated kind” of 
understanding and potential efficacy for “complexifying existing theories and problems.”  In 
doing so, Gramsci contested orthodox economic determinism at the centre of Marxist theory and 
opened up space for critical analysis of culture.   
 
At its core, Gramsci’s imagination of cultural hegemony imagines both direct (force) and indirect 
(consent) understandings of power. He grappled with why Italian workers and peasants did not 
rise up against bourgeois and fascist forces as Marx predicted.  The Italian intellectual and 
activist concluded that dominant groups (alliances or blocs) rarely impose their will on 
subordinate groups through force — but, in fact, manage and govern with considerable 
cooperation and even the consent of the submissive.   This form of rule appears natural because 
the “conditions were socially constructed through communication and practice” (Artz and 
Murphy 2000: 11).  Hegemony, in this way of thinking, is not passive — but a “highly complex” 
process and “never singular” (Williams 1977: 112).   Furthermore, hegemony: 
“…does not passively exist as a form of dominance.  It has to continually be renewed, 
recreated, defended and modified.  It is also continually resisted, limited, altered, 
challenged by pressure not at all its own” (Williams 1977: 112).   
 
Hegemony occurs because the ruling class “exerts a consensus that makes the power of the 
dominant group appear both natural and legitimate” (Watson and Hill 2000: 125).  Artz and 
Murphy (2000: 1; italics in original) adeptly define hegemony “as the process of moral, 
philosophical and political leadership that a social group attains only with the active consent of 
other important social groups.” Hegemony succeeds because subordinate groups participate in 
the process, seeing it as natural and not oppressive. Ideology inspires cultural practices, 
producing “hegemonic apparatuses” such as working and consuming. These complex cultural 
structures, contend Artz and Murphy (2000: 40), “build consent by establishing accepted 
practices through sheer reputation (“this is the way we do things here”), then legitimizing them 
as valuable and natural (“this must be the ways to do things”).” 
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Ideology is not separate from practice in Gramsci’s (1971) understanding of hegemony.  The two 
are connected.  Moreover, ideology has practical — material — consequences.   
“[T]hinking is not divorced from being.  Ideas don’t float around like leaves in a breeze.  
Ideas are always carried in and through human beings.  Consequently, ideas don’t make 
history.  People make history — people do history” (Artz and Murphy 2000: 13; italics in 
origincal). 
 
Hegemony, argue Artz and Murphy (2000: 20), is not another word, therefore, for 
“indoctrination” — but manifests itself “as a consensual culture”, whereby the dominant group 
meets the needs of the subordinate group while perpetuating the interest of elites.  Those who 
have the power to influence practice frequently determine dominant meaning, in turn.  Gitlin 
(2003 [1980]) constructively stresses that dominant groups are able to define and frame much of 
the social world, making it appear natural.   
“[T]hose who run the dominant institutions secure their power in large measure directly 
and indirectly, by impressing their definitions of the situation upon those they rule, and, if 
not usurping the whole of ideological space, still significantly limiting what is thought 
through society” (2003 [1980]: 10; italics in original). 
 
Elites — often with the help of modern public relation specialists and spin doctors — articulate a 
common sense view (often through the news media) that wins the consent of subordinate groups 
(Artz and Yahya 2003).  By common sense, Gramsci meant prevailing ideas that are, literally, 
common to everyone. While Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks makes no specific reference to 
counter-hegemony9, he does offer two means of resisting hegemony:  (1) a “war of maneuver” 
that involves physical force; and (2) a “war of position” that represents a lengthy battle fought 
mostly in civil society whereby social actors agitating for change must articulate a new and 
winning common sense that gains widespread support (Gramsci 1971: 304 / 217).  Hegemony’s 
consensus in democracy, therefore, remains in constant flux and can be disrupted by articulations 
of other commons sense narrative by competing elites or subalterns. 
 
Mouffe (1979) deftly links Gramsci’s notion of common sense to Foucault’s (1980: 197) idea of 
episteme, that is: “the strategic apparatus which permits of separating out from among all the 
                                                
9 Gramsci does not use the term counter-hegemony, yet he did call for “intellectual and moral reform” 
(Gramsci, 1971: 132).  
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statements which are possible those that will be acceptable…”  This rules in and rules out what 
gets talked about — what’s even possible to talk about — and how those things get talked about.   
Orwell’s (1945) proposed preface to Animal Farm, similarly, warns:   
“At any given moment there is an orthodoxy, a body of ideas which it is assumed that all 
right-thinking people will accept without question.  It is not exactly forbidden to say this, 
that or the other, but it is ‘not done’ to say it, as in mid-Victorian times it was ‘not done’ 
to mention trousers in the presence of a lady” (Orwell 1945: 163).  
 
In a similar way, Laclau (2006: 114; italics in original) describes a “horizon” that defines and 
prescribes the “possibilities” for communication and action “establish[ing] the limits of what is 
sayable.”   The horizon represents “an absolute limit which structures a field of intelligibility” 
(Laclau 1990: 64). This understanding, 10  notably, aligns, with Foucault’s perspective on 
discourse (1980), whereby language and practice are connected, words and texts have 
consequences and power is linked to knowledge (Foucault 1984).  Language, as Hackett (1984: 
236) stresses, does not offer a “neutral transmission belt which can refer directly to a world of 
non-discursive objects.”  Words come with values.  They convey values and attitudes about what 
they are describing (McCullagh 2002). 
 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985) also helpfully fold Gramsci’s thinking about hegemony into an 
understanding of the social world, recognizing the shaping power of discourse while rejecting 
economic determinism and the belief in a pure truth.  Hegemony, as a result, is never fixed and 
the struggle to articulate a winning common sense is constant.  This refinement of Gramsci’s 
thinking helpfully adds more precision and conceptual weight to the social level analysis of news 
media.  Therefore, for the sake of simplicity — and borrowing from what Laclau (1990) labeled 
the “horizon” and what Foucault (1980) termed episteme – I use the expression horizon in this 
research to represent the totality or higher meta-order discourse that encapsulates the knowledge 
and practices surrounding Canada’s military intervention in Afghanistan.  The term is a useful 
metaphor for understanding and contextualizing the discourse surrounding Canada’s 
                                                
10  Artz and Murphy (2000: 68) take exception to Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) suggestion that “[p]olitics 
and ideology are sole[ly] a question of linguistic articulations.” Artz and Murphy (2000: 68) dispute this 
position, stressing that Gramsci did not view the social world as grounded only in rhetoric — but also 
practice.    
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involvement in Afghanistan — and, in turn, how government and military leaders tried to frame 
the war in the news media.    
 
Many political actors — and scholars — frequently, for instance, depict Canada’s military 
intervention in Afghanistan as inevitable.  It is portrayed as organic and taken for granted.  
According to many accounts, deploying troops to the volatile region of Kandahar was the natural 
manifestation of both Canada’s traditional middle power role or more recent model power 
persona in foreign affairs (see, for example, Gross Stein and Lang 2007; Boucher and Nossal 
2015; Saideman 2016).  As a good friend to the United States and stand up member of the 
NATO alliance, Canada’s military participation in Afghanistan was a forgone conclusion 
(Saideman 2016).  There was no debate.  The horizon was set. Canada had an “obligation to 
stand with the alliance in Afghanistan…” (Gross Stein and Lang 2007: 192).  “The question was 
not if,” writes Saideman (2016: 30), “but where, the Canadians would deploy and in what 
capacity.”  As I argue in my fourth chapter, that horizon defined how Canada’s involvement in 
Afghanistan was first imagined by government and military leaders and then framed in the news 
media.  While there are, no doubt, material ramifications of militarization, it also represents “a 
set of discursive practices that, over time, embed military assumptions and values into the very 
definition of what is “normal” in everyday life” (Turenne Sjolander and Cornut 2016: 275).  
2.10. The Media and Hegemony 
 
Dominant groups, arguably, rely on the media to systematically perpetuate their dominant 
discourse or perceived “common sense” (Artz and Yahya 2003).  Gitlin (2003 [1980]: 2) holds 
“the mass media produce fields of definition and association, symbols and rhetoric, through 
which ideology becomes manifest and concrete.”  In so doing, the news media does not 
frequently challenge hegemonic positions and values (Gans 1979), allowing dominant ideas and 
definitions to shape and frame news content, especially during times of war (Hallin 1986, 1994).  
Indeed, considerable scholarship points to news organizations uncritically echoing and 
amplifying elite values and definitions (Herman and Chomsky 2002 [1988]; Hallin 1994; 
McChesney 2004; Bennett et al. 2007; Bennett 2012).  Understanding the news media as a 
hegemonic apparatus is useful for not only thinking about how ideology or the social system 
influences the content journalists produce (frame-building) — but also how audiences use that 
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content (frame-setting) to potentially produce meaning.  (The second part of this chapter returns 
to Gramsci’s theoretical usefulness for understanding audiences and media framing’s potential 
role in shaping public opinion.)    
 
Hegemony, as Gramsci stresses, is never fixed. The news media persists as a site of contestation 
where the preferred meaning of dominant groups are perpetually “resisted, limited, altered, and 
challenged” by forces sometimes outside of the ruling class’ control (Williams 1977: 112).  In an 
interview with Carpentier and Cammaerts (2008: 5) Mouffe argued that the media play “an  
important  role in  the  maintenance  and  production  of  hegemony.” 
“[B]ut it is something that can be challenged. Every hegemony can be challenged.  I do 
not think that one should see hegemony as some kind of fatality, leading us to say: ‘ah, 
we cannot do it because of the media’” (Carpentier and Cammaerts 2008: 5). 
 
Indeed, the news media do not always pass on — uncritically — elite frames (Althaus 2003; 
Potter and Baum 2010). Journalists, in fact, often resist and question elite definitions, counter-
framing events (Speer 2017).  Plus, news professionals are prone to highlight conflict and elite 
disagreement in their coverage (Baum and Groeling 2010a, 2010b).   
 
It is also worth noting here that identity and roles of journalists and the news media are also 
constantly in flux.  It is useful to view the identities of news professionals through the theoretical 
lens of hegemony — and its focus on contingency and agency.  Carpentier (2005) constructively 
theorizes journalists’ roles and identities using Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985) discourse theory.  
Building on this thinking, journalists’ subjectivity and practices are contingent and flexible.  Yet, 
hegemony can anchor and define how journalists see themselves and their part in the social 
world, fixing how they understand their work and their role in society (Laclau 1990).  Carpentier 
(2005: 201) details four discursive nodes or anchors for journalists: (1) “the (semi-)professional 
link to the media organization, (2) management, (3) autonomy and (4) objectivity.”  Carpientier 
concludes that journalists can contest their roles.  In line with Foucault’s (1978) understanding, 
power is not monopolized and journalists can resist their discursive field (or normative 
conception) within which they work.  Yet, “the rigidity of hegemonic articulation” that surrounds 
the role of journalists has a formidable shaping power over journalists’ subject position and 
practice (Carpentier 2005: 199). (The coming section about the normative roles of journalism 
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later on in this chapter fleshes out more fully the implications of journalists’ ideological 
obligations.)  The contested nature of hegemony is also pronounced in the media framing 
process.  First, though, the coming pages highlight the contested dynamic between elites, 
journalists (and sometimes the public) in the framing of news content.   
 
2.11. Framing  
 
Theorizations of framing remain scattered and inconsistent (Reese 2007) and continue to 
represent a “fractured paradigm” (Entman 1993: 51).  Moreover, frames lead a double life 
(D'Angelo 2002).  They are both strategic rhetoric used by elites and journalists (Entman 1993) 
and the intellectual scaffolding used by audiences to interpret news (Kinder and Sanders 1990).  
Individuals, routines and their news organizations — but also the social context within which 
they are created — shape media frames.  As a theory, framing offers a grounding to examine a 
number of media phenomena, including “bias, ideological construction, political power and 
audience reception” (Tumber and Zelizer 2010:  387).  Social constructivists, for their part, put 
journalists at the centre of the media framing practice, creating “interpretive packages” that often 
reflect their source’s preferred frames (Gamson and Modigliani 1989: 2; italics in original).  The 
critical paradigm (Entman 1993; Hackett and Zhao 1994; Gitlin 2003 [1980]), however, remains 
much more focused on the structural or ideological powers that shape frames in the news media.   
 
As noted at the onset of this chapter, the factors that shape news content, such as media framing, 
can arguably originate at many levels in Shoemaker and Reese’s (2014) hierarchy of influences 
model. Professional routines and practices and individual motivations can often be the impetus 
for how some news content gets framed (Sigal 1973; Tuchman 1978a; Gans 1979).  Moreover, 
institutional factors (Cook 1998) and the requirements of specific news organizations (Aday 
2010) can also shape the framing process.  Furthermore, interest groups (Gamson and Modigliani 
1987) and elites (Sigal 1973; van Dijk 1985; Bennett 1990, 2012) can also have tremendous 
shaping power over how news gets produced.  This research, however, focuses on the social 
level factors that influence framing.   
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Miliband (1969), poignantly, argued that because journalists often come from the same class as 
the people they report on, they tend to produce hegemonic content.  Moreover, ‘[b]y adhering to 
routine channels of newsgathering” journalists defer considerably to elite definitions and 
dominant positions (Sigal 1986: 33).  Simply put, ideology holds tremendous sway over how 
news gets framed.   An overreliance by news professionals on elite sources (Bennett 1990) 
positions dominant groups as “primary definers” (Hall 1982: 102) who perpetuate their 
imagination of the world or horizon in their mediated messages.  Indeed, even those with 
alternative points of view, contends Hall (1982: 62), “must respond in terms pre-established by 
the primary definers and privileged definitions.”  Akin to this argument, Reese (2007) draws in 
thinking about ideology and hegemony to understand frames as: 
“…structures that draw boundaries, set up categories, define some idea as out and others 
in, and generally operate to snag related ideas in their net in an active process” (Reese 
2007: 150). 
 
To be sure, the social system — or ideology — has a profound shaping power over how news 
content gets framed.  This work is predominantly interested in assessing how journalists and 
audiences react to the frames sponsored by government and military officials.  Therefore, for this 
research, it makes sense to conceptualize framing at the social system or ideological level of 
Shoemaker and Reese’s (2014) hierarchy of influences model.  Before outlining the powers of 
elites to frame news, the coming pages steps back to first trace the origins of framing theory and 
outline the practical definition of framing used by this research.   
 
2.12. The Origins of Media Framing Theory 
 
Nearly a century ago, Lippmann (Lippmann 2009 [1927]: 14), writing about the “swarming 
confusion of problems” hinted at the idea of framing in his description of the competing political 
ideas swirling in the popular press attempting to shape the so-called “pictures in our heads” 
(2004 [1922]: 1). Modern thinking about framing traces its lineage to anthropology, psychology 
and sociology.  Bateson (1972: 191), in his work as an anthropologist, first linked the term 
“frame” to a communication process, calling it “a spatial and temporal bonding of a set of 
interactive messages.”  Inspired by Bateson, the sociologist Goffman (1974: 21) mapped how 
people use “primary frameworks… to locate, perceive identify, and label” the world around 
them.   Around the same time, the computer scientist Minsky (1974: 1) offered a “partial theory 
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of human thinking” that likened frames to “a data structure for representing a stereotyped 
situation.”  Tuchman’s (1978a) account of newsrooms and Gitlin’s (2003 [1980]) investigation 
of social movement representations in the news media connected framing to the creation of 
mediated public realities.  
 
A decade after Goffman, Kahneman and Tversky (1981; 1984) — working as cognitive 
psychologists — adapted framing for their experimental research examining risk and consumer 
choice.  Political scientists (Gamson 1992) and media and communication scholars (Kinder and 
Sanders 1990; Entman 1991) also took up the concept, conceptualizing framing as a 
communication device in public discourse. As noted above, this research is primarily focused on 
the political communication surrounding framing.  
 
2.13. Defining Media Framing 
 
“Reality is not given,” argues Carey (1989: 25), it is “brought into existence, is produced, by 
communication.”  Our stories — our storytelling — breathe life into that existence.  And our 
narratives or frames “organize everyday reality” (Tuchman 1978a: 193) in a manner that helps to 
give “meaning to and unfolding strip of events” (Gamson and Modigliani 1987: 143), while at 
the same time incorporating “organizing principles” or symbols that help structure reality (Reese 
2001: 11; italics in original; see also Reese 2010: 17).  Former U.S. President George W. Bush, 
for instance, often conflated the so-called war on terror to a binary discourse, suggesting a 
struggle between “good versus evil” (Kuypers 2010: 302).   Frames, such as Bush’s, are often 
repetitive within news stories and “convey thematically consonant meanings across… time” 
(Entman 1991: 7). Frames provide “comprehensive structures of meaning” by juxtaposing new 
concepts with familiar ones (Hertog and McLeod 2001: 140).  Frames, in essence, express 
“culturally shared notions” (Van Gorp 2010: 85).  
 
“Similar to a wooden frame around an oil painting, any given news frame will draw attention to 
certain objects and relations while downplaying others” (Scheufele and Scheufele 2010: 128; 
italics in original).   At their core: frames “simplify complex issues” (Nisbet 2010: 47) when 
ideas compete in mediated discourse (Popkins 1993). These communication devices can operate 
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like “recipes” from elites to guide citizens on how they should “cook up their opinions” (Kinder 
and Sanders 1996: 156).  As well, media frames “make the world beyond direct experience look 
natural” (Gitlin 2003 [1980]: 6) by bringing “order to events” and providing a language to “make 
the world make sense” (Manoff and Schudson 1986: 228).  Similar to Goffman, Gamson and 
Mogdiliani (1989) suggest that frames represent a helpful explanation or a mental short-hand, per 
se, that people employ to construct meaning and sort through complicated information and 
events. Entman (1993: 53), one of the leading critical framing scholars, stresses that media 
frames “highlight some features of reality while omitting others” — and “frames typically 
perform four functions: problem definition, causal analysis, moral judgment and remedy 
promotion” (Entman 2010: 336).  In addition to defining the problem and highlighting a solution, 
media frames often point to who is responsible (e.g. big business, government, the poor) for 
solving the problem (Entman 1993).  
 
Social constructivists, as noted above, imagine journalists playing a crucial role in the process of 
framing, producing “interpretive packages” that often echo their elite sources’ preferred 
definitions (Gamson and Modigliani 1989: 3). Iyengar (1991), notably, distinguished between 
episodic and thematic coverage.  Episodic framing, he contends, “depicts concrete events that 
illustrate issues (Iyengar 1991: 14).  Thematic frames, on the other hand, highlight the general or 
abstract and offer context or background that connect problems in news coverage with their 
structural origins (Iyengar 1991: 14). (In the second part of this chapter, I return to outlining the 
potential influence of thematic and episodic framing on news audiences.)  Having defined 
framing, this discussion now transitions to a brief distinction between framing and discourse.   
 
2.14. The Difference Between Discourse and Frames 
 
It seems prudent at this point to draw distinctions between framing and the discursive concept of 
the horizon outlined above.  As Cammaerts (2016: 2) notes, framing and discourse exist at the 
“intersection” of political science and media and communications scholarship as “two distinct 
epistemologies and conceptual toolboxes” for understanding the shaping power of language and 
texts.  Different scholars use both framing and discourse to help explain how both the symbolic 
and human actions shape the real world.   
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Despite their divergent roots, uniformity exists amongst the conceptual tools.  Citing Minksy 
(1974: 30-31), who defines discourse as something that “assembles a network of instantiated 
frames and subframes”, Cammaerts (2016: 30) contends that discourse should be viewed as a 
higher or “meta-order compared to frames.” Media frames flow from this discourse or horizon.   
Inspired by a way of seeing the world, political actors attempt to “temporarily fix meaning and 
ways of understanding” to serve their agendas (Cammaerts 2016: 30).  
 
2.15. Elite Framing 
 
As noted in the introduction, the Conservative government of Stephen Harper purposely scripted 
its media framing of Canada’s NATO-led military mission in Afghanistan. Dimitri Soudas, 
Harper’s former director of communication, details in his master’s thesis how governments 
effectively “manipulate” public opinion through news media framing (2015). While Soudas’ 
claim of manipulation is debatable, it is, of course, a long-established practice for political actors 
to attempt to advance their agendas with strategic communication (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995; 
McNair, 2000). Politicians hope their media frames provide citizens “influential cues” 
(Callaghan and Schnell, 2005: 2) “that promote their preferred vision of reality” (Johnson-
Cartee, 2005: 199).  Gamson and Modigliani (1987) contend elite media framing is aimed at 
influencing how audiences perceive an issue or event. 
To that end, “[p]olitical actors,” write King and Wells (2009: 9) “continually produce, publicize, 
maintain, and, when necessary, remake and reaffirm their versions of political truth.” During 
times of war, elite-sponsored media frames attempt to tap into common narratives (Reese 2004; 
Jackson 2005). The Bush Administration’s ability to effectively frame the news coverage of the 
so-called “war on terror” in the aftermath of 9/11 illustrates well the power of frames (Robinson 
and Livingston 2006).  Bush’s binary framing — “good” versus “evil” and “freedom” versus 
“tyranny,” for instance — was closely echoed by U.S. media in 2001 and 2002 (Entman 2003; 
Coe et al. 2004; Jackson 2005).  The “war on terror” became a “linguistic staple” of the 
administration and news organizations after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Munshi 
2004: 54).  This type of “antagonistic” speech “become[s] very quickly hegemonic, defining the 
horizon of our thought and excluding other discourses” (Carpentier 2007: 2; italics added). 
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Stripped of its ideological tone and endowed instead with a “common sense” value, the struggle 
becomes neutral and “power derived from it takes on a hegemonic form” (van Dijk 2008: 34).  
Ryan’s (2004) content analysis of U.S. newspapers, by means of an example, found military 
intervention in Afghanistan was regarded as inevitable or the right thing to do after the 9/11 
attack, representing an exertion of ideological power over the news media.  This power of 
officials to perpetuate hegemonic positions is strengthened by the public relations infrastructure 
of modern governments. 
2.16.  Public Relations: Nefarious Spin or Public Benefit? 
 
Governments remain instrumental as both sources of and stories for journalists (Cook 1998; 
Meyer 2002; Graber 2003).  To be sure, the news media and pubic relations have become 
increasingly intertwined.  Meyer (2002: xiv, 57) notably contends the news media “colonized” 
politics, transforming traditional notions of democracy into a “media democracy,” whereby “the 
rules of the media logic recast the constitutive factors” of politics and democracy.  
“From the “spin-doctoring” that follows every televised debate to the timing and 
stagecrafting of press conferences, political elites devote considerable effort towards 
influencing not only what information gets on the air but how it is presented” (Nelson, 
Clawson, and Oxley 1997: 224; italics in original). 
 
Esser (2013: 160) even argues the very nature of democracy is changed because of “the growing 
intrusion of media logic as an institutional rule into other fields where it now supplements (and 
in extreme cases replaces) existing rules for defining appropriate behaviour.”  Proponents of 
mediatization, on the other hand, see a symbiotic relationship, whereby media and politics “work 
in tandem” (Hepp, Hjarvard, and Lundby 2015: 4-5).  Dainith (2001) is much more pessimistic, 
arguing mediatized political communications undermines the vital necessity of informed citizens 
in democracy.  Other scholarship (Couldry and Hepp 2017), however, contends that the 
mediatization of politics offers both advantages and disadvantages.  
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Elites rely on public relations and spin11 to drum up support for war.  Government and military 
leaders are increasingly focused on shaping public opinion during times of conflict.  The U.S. 
government, for instance, hired the high profile public relations firms Hill and Knowlton and 
Wirthlin Group to help manage the strategic communication surrounding both the first and 
second Gulf Wars (Carruthers 2011: 36). Public relations veteran Victoria Clark, who came from 
the PR giant Hill and Knowlton, managed the Pentagon’s communications surrounding the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 as the assistant secretary of defence for public affairs (MacArthur 2004). 
The deceptive use of government communications to garner public support for war12 is well 
represented by the imbroglio surrounding the sexed up intelligence contained in the September 
24, 20002 United Kingdom government’s dossier, Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. That 
strategic communication surrounding the justification for war sparked considerable criticism and 
condemnation (Hutton 2004; Chilcot 2016).  
 
Demonized by some scholars (Habermas 1989 [1962]; Rawnsley 2000; Gaber 2004; Louw 
2007), government public relations or political spin is similarly savaged by journalists who 
herald their pure intentions and normative role in democracy while cynically deploring the 
strategic communication efforts of political actors (Savage and Riffen 2007).  U.K. Prime 
Minister Tony Blair’s press secretary Alastair Campbell, for example, was widely derided by 
many in the news media and even described as “a masterly propagandist” (Jones 2001: 185).  
This open contempt for political communication strategies, argues Capella and Hall Jamieson 
(1997: 142), manifests itself destructively in the public, inspiring a caustic “spiral of cynicism” 
about politicians amongst voters.   For his part, Habermas (2008: 366-67) prominently decried  
“a public sphere dominated by mass media and large agencies, observed by market and 
opinion research, and inundated by the public relations work, propaganda, and 
advertising of political parties and groups.”  
 
                                                
11 The genesis of “political spin” is not clear — but the term appears to have first been used in The New 
York Times in 1984 about the United States’ presidential debate.  See:  
www.theguardian.com/notesandqueries’query/0.5753,-1124.00.htm.  
12 O’Shaugnessy (2004) contends modern political communication — or so-called spin — surrounding 
war is best conceptualized as traditional propaganda.  Calling the phenomenon “ubiquitous”, 
O’Shaugnessy (2004: 244) argues that propaganda is “sophisticated and naturalized as part of the 
supposedly objective mass media communication.”  This work, however, questions the linear relationship 
between message and audience reception often suggested by theorizations of propaganda.   
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Essentially, critics contend public relations — and journalism’s over-reliance on it — sabotages 
the democratic purity of modern states.  
 
Scoffed at by many in the academy “as a perversion of what normative theory decrees the public 
sphere to be for” (McNair 2007: 95), spin has a bad name — but undeservedly so argues McNair 
(2000).  As Garland (2016: 14) has recently argued convincingly, critical accounts of spin 
justifiably question the nefarious uses of political communication — but, at the same time, 
needlessly “demonize the process of strategic communications by governments.”  Spin, to be 
sure, has a place in democracy. Normatively conceptualized, democracy represents a contest of 
ideas — a continuous debate, if you will.  The acceleration of spin in modern democracies, 
arguably, does not minimize the quality of the public sphere — but, in fact, represents a healthy 
effort by political actors to influence public opinion (McNair 2000).   
“Only persuasive discourse seeking to change the opinion of others is in fact capable of 
eliciting the consent of a majority where, at the outset, there is nothing but a large number 
of divergent opinions” (Manin 1997: 198). 
 
Journalists, in fact, have become adept at resisting spin, “with retaliatory measures of their own, 
devoting more and more time to uncovering and critiquing the activities of their ‘evil twins’” in 
public relations (McNair 2000: 138).   Additionally, fact checking has become a staple of 
modern political journalism (Graves 2016).  
 
The deceptive public relations surrounding the Iraq war in both the U.S. and U.K., as I expand 
upon later in this chapter, represents an important fracture point for journalists.  There is little 
doubt the torqued spin surrounding the weapons of mass destruction made journalists less 
trusting of political actors and more likely to challenge their claims about war (Allan and Zelizer 
2004; Graves 2016).13.  Having detailed the origins and theoretical contours of framing, the 
                                                
13 Recently, some elite spin has attempted to persuade public opinion by discrediting journalists and the 
news media Donald Trump’s run for the White House revived the old Nazi slur Lügenpresse” (lying 
press) to discredit the media.  Adolf Hitler used the expression to stigmatize his critics and inflame hatred 
against Jews and communists, frequently branding his critics as part of the “Lügenpresse apparatus” 
(Noack 2016).  Trump frequently refers to the “lying” and “dishonest” media (Talbot 2016: np).  His 
former top strategist refers to the news media as the “opposition party” (Gertz 2017: np).  Trump’s 
mendacity has even extended to calling the news media the “enemy of the people” (Higgins 2017: np).  
Hours, in fact, after repeating that claim for a second time, the president’s press secretary then barred 
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coming pages conclude with an illustration of the different forms media framing can take in 
news and analysis. 
 
2.17. A Hypothetical Example to Illustrate the Different Forms of Media Frames 
 
Elite-sponsored media frames can take on numerous shapes in news content.  Journalists can use 
the frames suggested by government officials, for instance, to structure their story or 
commentary.  Conversely, they can frame their stories and analysis in a different way, but still 
include an elite frame in their story as a means of fairness and balance (D'Angelo and Kuypers 
2010).   Let me offer a hypothetical (but realistic) example:  Suppose a journalist produces a 
news story analyzing a government’s proposed tax cut.  The story aims to illuminate the 
economic benefits and drawbacks of the tax cut for various socio-economic groups.  Let us also 
suppose that this story is produced around the same time the government imposes a time limit on 
the debate in Parliament over the tax cut.  The opposition parties are outraged by what they call 
the government’s “anti-democratic” move to curtail debate. The government rejects the 
oppositions’ claims, arguing the recent election gives them a mandate to impose the tax cut.  
“The people have already spoken,” the government’s finance minster claims, adding that the 
economy needs the boost the cut will produce.  
 
The journalist, in this example, frames her story on the winners and losers in the tax cut.  She 
highlights how high income people will benefit the most and low income people, despite the 
government’s framing, likely won’t see a lot of extra money in their pocket, especially since the 
government recently raised a number of government service fees.  The story mostly quotes 
everyday people and an economist.  Clearly, the story is framed as a pocketbook winners versus 
losers story. Yet, in order to hook the story to the timeliness of the parliamentary debate, the 
journalist includes information and quotes from both the government and opposition about the 
controversy surrounding limiting legislative debate. Moreover, the journalist fact checks the 
government’s framing of their rationale for stopping parliamentary debate by including a quote 
                                                                                                                                                       
journalists from several prominent news organizations, including The New York Times and CNN, from 
attending a so-called gaggle or briefing in his office (Hirschfeld-Davis and Grynbaum 2017). While 
Republicans in the past have charged that the media are “liberal” and “biased”, Trump’s actions seek to 
undermine the legitimacy of the media (Gitlin 2017: np).  
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from the prime minister from when she was in opposition and criticized the previous government 
for imposing a time limit on a tax bill.  So, while the journalist may have framed her story in 
terms of the economics of the tax cut (who wins and who loses), elite-sponsored frames (the 
government’s and the opposition’s) also get represented in the story.  Let us also assume (for the 
sake of illustrating the influence of the social level) that the story — like considerable news 
content — conforms to hegemonic capitalist values.  The story does not question the system or 
raise doubts about capitalism’s focus on economic growth over sustainable environmentally 
sensitive growth, arguably illustrating how the news story was shaped by the context of its social 
system. 
 
Admittedly, media frames and framing can be a bit slippery.  As the above example illustrates, 
theorizing frames and framing poses problems for researchers.  For the sake of clarity, I confined 
my search to evaluating the contested dynamic surrounding elite media framing and journalistic 
fact checking. I disaggregate frames used by government and military officials and those used by 
journalists (Speer 2017).  I am primarily interested in if — and how — journalists responded to 
official frames.  (I offer much more detail about journalistic fact checking later on in this 
chapter.)  
 
Having outlined the influence of the social system as an organizing system that often perpetuates 
the status quo in the news media, I now wish to transition to a discussion of how normative 
conceptions of the media’s role can shape the coverage journalists produce.  Murdock and 
Golding (1977: 35) argue it is important to link cultural values and thinking to “occupational 
ideologies.”  To that end, I now transition to doing that.  
 
2.18. Normative Notions of the News Media’s Role in Democracy 
 
Margaret Thatcher’s former Press Secretary, Bernard Ingham, characterized the dynamic 
between journalists and politicians as “essentially cannibalistic”, adding “they feed off each 
other but no one knows who is next on the menu” (Ingham, as quoted in Louw 2007: 149).  
Traditional pluralistic theory sees journalists as neutral, fact-based watchdogs of the powerful.  
Democracy, in this view of the world, writes Hallin (1994: 3), “requires only the state to be 
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prevented from interfering with the right of individuals to communicate.”  Journalists, in this 
conception, “serve as custodians of the national order” (Shoemaker and Reese 2014: 221).  Yet, 
as Schudson (1995, 2011) argues, journalist do not always live up to their normative conception 
— and while they may expose wrongdoing as in the Watergate scandal that ended Richard 
Nixon’s presidency, their coverage ultimately endorses and even celebrates the system within 
which they work (Schudson 1993; for more on the mythology of journalism and Watergate, see 
Feldstein 2014).   
 
Critical scholarship contends journalism produces meaning in service of dominant ideology, 
helping to manufacture consent (Herman and Chomsky 2002 [1988]) or perpetuate “corporate 
complicity” (Goodman and Goodman 2006).  Miliband (1969) sums up the criticism well: 
“The press may well claim to be independent and to fulfill an important watchdog 
function. What the claim overlooks, however, is the very large fact that it is the Left at 
which the watchdogs generally bark with most ferocity, and what they are above all 
protecting is the status quo” (Miliband 1969: 199; italics in original). 
 
In keeping with Miliband — and in contrast to the watch dog metaphor — a recent content 
analysis I helped with determined that the British print media act more like an attack dog when it 
comes to Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn (Cammaerts et al. 2016). Unquestionably, media and 
communication scholarship is filled with detailed accounts, as Gramsci (1971) notes, of 
normative discrepancies between the what ought to be and the what is.  Nevertheless, the news 
media view their role as important to democracy — and it is important, for this work’s 
understanding of how ideals inspire certain journalistic practices.   Yet, as Carpentier (2005) 
concluded, the who-ness and what-ness of journalists is prescribed but also contingent and fluid.  
(I come back to these ideas in the coming pages, but first I wish to outline some helpful 
normative conceptions of the news media in democracy.)  
 
2.19. Normative Models of the News Media 
 
Siebert, Peterson and Schramm's (1956) analysis ponders why media do different things in 
different places.  The scholars’ cataloguing of media systems — (1) authoritarian theory; (2) 
libertarian theory; (3) social responsibility theory; and (4) Soviet media theory — concludes “the 
  66 
press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which 
it operates” (Siebert et al. 1956: 1).  The western authors clearly prefer the freedoms ascribed to 
the libertarian model.  Moreover, their analysis viewed all four theories through “one of the four 
theories — classical liberalism” (Neorone 1995: 21).  To be certain, the end of the Cold War, the 
rise of the global south and increasing globalization makes the theory obsolete (Hallin and 
Mancini 2004b).  Christians et al. (2009: 16) call for “a new beginning” with their updated 
normative theoretical conception of journalism’s role in a democratic society.  The researchers 
posit that the news media perform four roles: (1) monitorial; (2) facilitative; (3) radical; and (4) 
collaborative.  The coming pages offer a brief synthesis of the four roles of journalists as 
imagined by Christians et al. (2009) as a means to lay the foundation for this research’s 
conceptual framework.  
 
2.20. The Monitorial Role 
 
Laswell (1948) first characterized communication’s purpose as surveillance, conjuring images of 
a “watching post, a lookout tower, or the crow’s nest of a ship” (Christians et al. 2009: 139).  
Monitoring often gets conflated with surveillance and associated with Bentham’s (2017 [1843]) 
panopticon prison, as a means of theorizing constant vigilance. Everyone in the social world 
becomes both the subject and the object of surveillance.  People — like the prisoners — are 
“watched” but also disciplined or educated to watch themselves (Feder 2011: 58).  Yet, this 
articulation of surveillance takes on a sinister tone and is not an appropriate description of news 
media’s monitoring role (Christians et al. 2009). 
 
The notion of monitorial more accurately stresses the constitution of media as both a receiver 
and disseminator of information. The news media do not control information.  Journalists in this 
conception act as observant informers, illuminating and educating audiences based on their 
relationships with sources such as government officials.  This can also be linked to liberalism, 
and a general distrust of the state and political elites who need to be kept in check.  
“Tenacious reporters expose lies as falsities, cutting exaggerated boasts down to size.  
They insist elected representatives make good on their electoral pledges and spend 
taxpayers’ money wisely.  In this watchdog role, the media constitute what’s often 
referred to as a ‘fourth estate:’ a check on executive power”  (Carruthers 2011: 9).  
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Critical scholars (Hall 1980; Hackett 1984; Herman and Chomsky 2002 [1988]), however, 
question the capacity of journalists to live up to this normative conception given the media’s 
propensity, as outlined earlier, to conform to rigid hegemonic discourses.   
 
The role of Canada’s news media flows most directly from liberal thinking, whereby journalists 
are watchdogs and truth-speakers who play an important function in democracy (Ward 2015).  
Reporting, in this conception, presupposes the notions of a clinical accounting of events (Russell 
1994).  Objectivity14, despite its criticisms15, remains — for many — a “cornerstone of the 
professional ideology of journalists in liberal democracies” (Lichtenberg 1996: 225). Citizens, in 
this way of thinking, need facts and “…good reporting requires the exercise of the highest 
scientific virtues” (Lippmann 1995 [1920]: 74).  Truth, fairness, balance and objectivity are, as a 
result, hallmarks of good journalism (King and Wells 2009).  The concept of objectivity in 
journalism — at the normative level — is “interconnected with some notion of ‘truth’” whereby 
                                                
14 For a history of objectivity in journalism see Schudson (2001). 
15 Objectivity in journalism is, no doubt, a long debated and much contested concept.  In the 1950s, 
Peterson, in Four Theories of the Press, called objectivity “a fetish” (Siebert et al. 1956: 88).  Notions of 
objectivity face persistent scrutiny from many corners, including postmodernists such as Lyotard (1984) 
and Baudrillard (1994) and critical scholars (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002 [1947]) who challenge the 
validity of objectivity.  The debate about objectivity in journalists rages with “some say[ing] that 
journalism is not objective, others that journalism cannot be objective and still others say[ing] that 
journalism should not be objective” (Lichtenberg 1996: 225). Objectivity has been further complicated by 
the ethics surrounding covering war crimes and the “journalism of attachment” that developed in the 
1990s (Tumber 2008: 263).  This research does not propose to settle the debate over objectivity. While 
many journalists and media scholars question traditional notions of objectivity (Ward 2015), journalists 
remain normatively objective in their method or work routines (Kovach and Rosenstiel 2014: 103).  
“Journalism and science,” argues Meyers (1998), “come from the same intellectual roots” (Meyers, as 
quoted in Kovach and Rosenstiel 2014: 108). There are practical implications to this normative 
conception.  The wire service, The Canadian Press, for example, stresses that it “deal[s] with facts that are 
demonstrable, supported by sources that are reliable and responsible” (Canadian Press 2013: 11).  
Moreover, this orientation fuels journalists’ compunction to fact check elites (Graves 2016).  
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journalists strive for accuracy (Tumber and Prentoulis 2005: 64). Akin to Tuchman (1972: 660), 
who conceptualized objectivity as a “strategic ritual”, Ward (2015) argues journalists invented 
objectivity to defend themselves against attacks of bias in the early 20th Century.  Schudson 
(2003: 75), along the same lines, contends news bosses use objectivity as a form of “industrial 
discipline” to control journalists.  
 
2.21. The Facilitative Role 
 
The origins of the facilitative role comes from civic republicanism (Christians et al. 2009).  In 
this conception, journalists are deeply imbedded in a broad spectrum of society’s political and 
social process.  Journalists reflect the political system within which they operate for the purposes 
of informing the public so they can make knowledgeable decisions in a democracy.  Journalism, 
in Carey’s (1987: 17) conception requires the news media to “preside over and within the 
conversation of our culture: to simulate it and organize it, to keep it moving…”  In this 
normative conception, journalism plays a crucial role in deliberative democracy, whereby the 
“media do not merely report on civil society’s associations and activities but seek to enrich and 
improve them” (Christians et al. 2009: 158).  Similar to Habermas’ (1989 [1962]) normative 
conception of the public sphere, this media-facilitated discourse must be equal, respectful and 
highlight “the mutual recognition of the deliberative liberties of others”  (Bohman 2000: 88-89).  
 
2.22. The Radical Role 
 
The radical role diverges significantly from the facilitative role and traces its origins to Marxist 
conceptions of the news media labouring to unite the working class. Freedom and equality for 
everyone is paramount. As a result, journalists, in this conception, move beyond mere 
information providers to advocates for a radical restructuring of the social, economic and 
political system (Christians et al. 2009).  In this understanding, elites not only control the 
mechanisms of production but also the construction of meaning.  Journalists, therefore, have an 
obligation to “help minorities articulate an alternative set of goals that represent the needs and 
just moral claims of all, especially the marginalized, the poor and the dispossessed” (Christians 
et al. 2009: 179).  In short, in the radical role, journalists comfort the afflicted and afflict the 
comfortable. Romantic depictions cast journalists as radicals trying to make the world a better 
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place.  Bollinger (1991: 55) describes an autonomous bohemian artist of sorts “who lives 
(figuratively) outside of society, beyond normal conventions.”  The traditional radical role of the 
press — in the early days of newspapers — diminished with the advent of the increasingly 
commercial mass media “with less and less space for traditional radicalism” (Christians et al. 
2009: 180).  Alternative and community news media remain today as vestiges of the radical role, 
circulating outside the centre of mainstream media (Couldry and Curran 2003).   
 
As a normative conception, peace journalism (Gultung and Ruge 1965; Lynch and McGoldrick 
2005, 2006) promotes, arguably, a radical role for the news media.  First imagined in his analysis 
of war reporting, Gultang developed his thinking into both a theoretical (1986, 2002a, 2002b) 
understanding and a practical reform-minded “working concept” that encouraged correspondents 
covering conflict to be more reflexive about reportage that valorizes war (Lee 2010: 362).  While 
a “single and universal concept of peace journalism” does not exist (Hanitzsch 2007:  2), Shinar 
(2007: 2) helpfully defines peace journalism as a: 
“normative mode of responsible and conscientious media coverage of conflict, that aims 
at contributing to peacemaking, peacekeeping, and changing the attitudes of media 
owners, advertisers, and audiences towards war and peace. Such goals are sought through 
(a) critical evaluations of the current state of conflict coverage and (b) efforts to 
conceptualize professional values and practices in both theoretical and operational 
terms.” 
 
At a conceptual level, peace journalism critiques the values and routines and practices that lead 
the news media during times of war to, wittingly or unwittingly, highlight: 
“sensationalism; identification with one or the home side; overemphas[ize]…  tangible 
losses such as human casualties and material damage; military triumphalist language; and 
a superficial narrative with little context, background, or historical perspective” (Lee 
2010: 362).   
 
Peace journalism involves a conscious and reflective practice whereby journalists consciously 
chose to make space for “and value non-violent responses to conflict” (Lynch and McGoldrick, 
2005: 12).  Peace journalism, as Lynch (2008) explains, attempts to:  
 
1. Foreground the history and context for the causes of the conflict from every side (and not 
just both sides; 
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2. Provide voice all parties — at all levels — in the dispute; 
3. Reports possible solutions for the conflict; 
4. Exposes lies and highlights suffering of all parties in the conflict; and  
5. Highlight stories of peace and post-war developments. 
 
The radical role, as imagined by Christians et al. (2009) best encapsulates peace journalism’s 
challenge to the structures that perpetuate hegemony about war and conflict (Lukacovic 2016).  
Christians et al. (2009: 181-82) imagine the radical role as “journalism as an instrument for 
challenging and changing political and economic systems.”   The radical role highlights notions 
of inequality and injustice in the social world.  Journalists, in the radical conception, challenge 
hegemony and defend the interests of those who are marginalized. “Peace journalism,” posits 
Lukacovic (2016: 3), “… presupposes an injustice in war journalism, which serves the purposes 
of elites and militarism  
 
To be sure, peace journalism challenges traditional monitorial notions of journalism with its 
hallmark of objective reporting.  Longtime BBC correspondent David Loyn (2007:1) argues 
forcibly against peace journalism, stressing that “objectivity could be a useful vaccine against the 
relativism of ‘attached journalists.’” 
“In the twenty-first century the world has moved on from the classic Clausewitzian vision 
of war as a continuation of politics ‘by other means’, to a situation where threats of 
asymmetric conflicts will continually wrong-foot diplomatic solutions, as they are 
normally constructed, as well as conventional armies – ‘war amongst the people’ in the 
new jargon. The tools of the reporter need to be sharpened not altered” (Loyn 2007: 1).   
 
In a similar vein, Hanitzsch (2005: 189) critiques what he terms the “myths and fallacies” of 
peace journalism, arguing that the practice inflates the impact of the news media and ignored the 
importance of interpersonal communication for resolving conflict.  Moreover, Hanitzsch (2007) 
contends that peace journalism inflates the importance of individual journalists and ignores 
crucial structural factors that shape and limit the work of journalists to effectively promote 
peace.   
“A peaceful culture is the precondition of peace journalism, rather than its outcome. In a 
culture in which a life has virtually no meaning and violence seems an appropriate 
measure of conflict resolution, peace journalism is not likely to evolve. While media 
critics continue to repeat their mantra-like question of why journalism serves society as 
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poorly as it currently does, I think it is time to turn the question around. We should rather 
ask: What kind of society do we live in that allows and creates a sort of journalism that 
has no sense of peace?” (Hanitzsch 2007: 7).   
 
Hackett (2006), as well, highlights numerous structural barriers — education, journalistic 
objectivity, source election, corporate media ownership — that prevents peace journalism from 
becoming a more mainstream practice in the news media.  To be sure, peace journalism faces 
several practical roadblocks if it is to be widely adopted in mainstream journalism (Lukacovic 
2016).  I will return to this debate in my final chapter when I reflect on this critical strand of 
scholarship with respect to my own normative conclusions about journalism’s coverage of the 
conflict in Afghanistan. 
 
2.23. The Collaborative Role 
 
In the collaborative conception, the news media are closely engrained within the political and 
economic power system. The role of journalists implies a partnership or relationship, according 
to Christians et al. (2009).  Collaboration, according to Christians et al. (2009: 197), reflects  
“an acknowledgement of the state’s interest — to which the media accede either 
passively or unwittingly, reluctantly or wholeheartedly — in participating in the choices 
journalists make and the coverage they provide.”   
 
While journalists in the watchdog conception often adopt a maverick posture in the face of 
power, news professionals in the collaboration role actively work to advance the state’s interests 
(Christians et al. 2009).  
 
As will be made clear in the coming pages, embedding journalists with the military often leads to 
a collaboration of sorts between news professionals and the military.  In order to gain access to 
the front lines of war, journalists agree to certain conditions.  Many journalists, however, do not 
view this as collaboration — but their obligation to get the story (Christians et al. 2009).   Of 
note, collaboration does not imply censorship.  Often journalists, in line with Herman and 
Chomsky’s (2002 [1988]) propaganda model align their reportage with the narrow and rigid way 
of seeing the world preferred by elites.   Singapore’s press, for instance, is required to cooperate 
with the government to bolster the city state’s goals of progress and prosperity (Christians et al. 
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2009).  Similarly, Israel’s news media give up some of their independence because of censorship 
rules, requiring journalists to withhold “national security” details from the public (Christians et 
al. 2009: 207).  For this research, the monitorial role, which aligns with classic liberal notions of 
the news media as watchdog, the facilitative role, whereby journalists have a constitutive role in 
democracy and the collaborative role, where journalists are embedded with military forces, 
represent the most useful models for understanding the Canadian news media’s roles surrounding 
the war in Afghanistan.   
 
2.24. The Implications of Normative Conceptions of the News Media  
 
Principles such as fairness, balance and transparency are highlighted in most mainstream news 
media organizations’ ethics and journalistic standards and practices (see, for example, The New 
York Times 2004).  The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation’s (CBC) policy dictates that the 
news service will not publish a story until it has “ensured that the facts and evidence support the 
conclusions and judgments” (CBC 2014: np).  Moreover, the corporation’s dedication to 
“accuracy and integrity” requires journalists to confirm information from second sources or 
authenticated documents (CBC 2014: np).  Borrowing from Mouffe (1979: 8), journalists adopt 
their profession’s code, sharing values and “conceptions of the world” with their colleagues.  To 
that end, habitual practices occur and the social agent becomes “caught up” in the process of 
identification with their “specific subject position” (Smith 1998: 63).  As a result, the norms 
surrounding the production of news are both externalized and internalized by journalists. 
Journalists produce content that conforms to a certain standard because they become the subject 
and the object of surveillance.    
 
In addition to internalizing the norms of journalism, the surveillance of news bosses and elites 
ensure reporters adhere to these codes.  Politicians and their aides upset with news coverage 
often complain to news executives or regulatory bodies.  Herman and Chomsky (2002 [1988]) 
contend journalists, in fact, self-censor themselves to avoid catching flack from elites if they 
produce counter-hegemonic interpretations of issues and events.  Born (2005), for instance, 
details the attack the Blair government led against the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 
for its alleged anti-war bias surrounding the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Blair’s long-time press 
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secretary, Alastair Campbell, often coordinated complaints on behalf of himself and his political 
master to news executives and regulatory agencies (Campbell 2012).  Oborne (1999: 182), 
notably, details a litany of Campbell’s “playground bully” tactics aimed at ensuring journalists 
produced sympathetic stories.  
“New Labour… never hesitated to destabilize journalists by going behind their backs to 
their bosses… This weapon could be used even against close allies who strayed from the 
party or government line” (Oborne 1999: 182).     
 
In Canada, as well, the Conservative government of Stephen Harper turned its complaints about 
the CBC into a fund-raising effort, asking its supporters for money to counter what it calls the 
public broadcaster’s supposed biased political coverage (Taber 2010).   
 
All journalists, of course, do not function as lap dogs of hegemonic forces as many Marxist and 
neo-pluralist accounts contend (Cammaerts 2015).  Carpentier (2005) contends that the role and 
identity of the journalists are fluid — but very much dependent on hegemonic articulations of the 
profession. Foucault would likely argue that journalists can resist hegemonic forces.  Still, as 
Lukes (2005 [1974]: 150) stresses, someone can “resent” the power over them — but “consent” 
to it begrudgingly.  Undoubtedly, the social level offers many moving parts to consider when 
assessing how dominant ideas shape news media content.  I now wish to turn from this macro-
level to the meso-level influence of institutions.  Shoemaker and Reese’s (2014) model posits 
that because the news media work in “relationship” or association with powerful organizations 
such as government and corporations, those institutions also influence the production of news.   
 
2.25. Social Institution Level of the Hierarchy of Influences Model 
 
Shoemaker and Reese (2014) urge researchers to conceptualize the news media as an 
institutional actor whose content is frequently shaped by its close relationship with political and 
economic power centres (see also: Benson 2004).  Media and communication scholarship in the 
new institutionalism paradigm frequently positions the news media as a political actor (Cook 
1998; Sparrow 2006).  Analysis, in this vein, views institutions through a sociological lens.  It 
attempts to understand, for instance, how the interaction between government and the news 
media possibly influences news content.   For this research, it makes sense to envision 
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embedding and indexing at the social institution level because so much of the news coverage of 
Afghanistan was produced by reporters embedded with Canadian Forces.   
 
There are practical reason for the news industry to locate many of its resources at official 
institutions such as the White House or the Pentagon (Cook 1994, 2005, 2006; Schudson 2003).  
It makes economic sense for news organizations to station their resources at these locations 
because they are guaranteed to yield news from what Tuchman (1978a) labeled the “news net.”  
Fishman (1980), in fact, concluded that the news media and government have combined to form 
a bureaucratic news producing machine.  Cunningham’s (2003: np) analysis of news coverage of 
the Iraq War in 2003, for instance, found that the vast majority of news stories by the three big 
U.S. networks originated from the White House, Pentagon and State Department, resulting in 
“too much of the “official” truth.”  Hallin (1992), notably, argues that journalists made a 
Faustian bargain of sorts with officials in the U.S. for access to official locations such as the 
Pentagon and White House.   As the following section makes plain, the institutional influence of 
embedding journalists with the military can, indeed, shape news content.   
 
Theoretically, it is also justifiable to view indexing as a social or ideological level influence. 
Bennett’s (1990) initial conception of the indexing hypothesis contended it was natural for 
journalists to afford more access to official sources in democracies. Indexing can also be viewed 
as a routine and practice.  Again, journalists gravitate towards sources who give them official 
accounts of events and, therefore, legitimate their stories.  Therefore, it makes conceptual sense 
for this research to view indexing as a social level influence.  As the coming methodology 
chapter makes clear, the coverage analyzed in this research came mostly from journalists 
embedded with Canadian Forces in Afghanistan.  In the coming pages I first critically examine 
the potential influences of embedding journalists with military forces on news content before 
reviewing the potential shaping power of indexing on news content.   
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2.26. Embedding Journalists with the Military as a Social Institution Level Influence 
 
“The principles of reporting are put to a severe test when your nation goes to war.  To 
whom are you true?”  (Kate Adie, BBC war correspondent, as quoted in Allan and 
Zelizer 2004: 3). 
 
Journalism and war share a long and intertwined relationship.  Complementary and conflicted, 
their storied entanglement engenders pugnacious squabbles, pitched pronouncements of 
independence, inevitably followed by admissions of their intrinsic need for one another.  Since 
the early days of the printing press, newspapers have yearned for dispatches from the front.  
British newspapers often paid soldiers for their eyewitness accounts — and even plagiarized 
reportage, stealing them from foreign newspapers (Bergen 2005).  The Times of London 
distinguishes itself as the first news organization to assign war correspondents to the front lines 
in 1854 (Knightly 2003 [1975]).  “War not only creates a supply of news,” wrote Laswell (1927: 
192), “but demands for it.”   
 
News and analysis about war has become increasingly complicated and dangerous (Tumber 
2002; Tumber and Palmer 2004; Tumber and Webster 2006; Tumber 2013).  Increasingly, 
journalists are targets in modern conflicts.  On top of the physical danger, there is also the 
psychological stress associated with covering war and terrorism.  Questions persist, too, about 
the role of embedded journalists during times of conflict: is the war correspondent a  
“participant” or “observer”? (Tumber 2002: 260; see also Tumber 2009).  Correspondents 
attached to military units during war frequently get criticized for echoing and amplifying military 
and political leaders’ framing of the war (Knightly 2003 [1975]) or identifying with the soldiers 
because they feel “an affinity with the troops, a shared determination to see the venture through 
to the end” (Morrison and Tumber 1988: 97).  Journalists embedded with U.S.-led forces in the 
Iraq war in 2003, for example, were more inclined to label the war a “liberation” than “invasion” 
(Sivek 2004: np).  The practice of embedding raises serious political and ethical questions.   
“[E]mbedding constitutes a strategic source of legitimization of war that becomes 
facilitated by the media in the eyes of the public. The war correspondent, then, is 
rendered a political instrument of war” (Tumber 2013: 52; italics in original).  
 
While military officials did not censor journalists with Canadian Forces in Kandahar, the 
embedding relationship definitely complicated normative ideals of journalists as independent 
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observers or watchdogs.  To be sure, government and military leaders hope embedded journalists 
feel and affinity with the troops they are with (Tumber and Palmer 2004; Carruthers 2011). 
Embedded journalists definitely worry about compromising their impartiality (Tumber 2009, 
2013).  Veteran journalist George C. Wilson with the National Reporter equated embedding to 
being on a dogsled team: 
“You see and hear a lot of the dog directly in front of you, and you see what is passing by 
on the left and right, but you cannot get out of the traces to explore intriguing sights you 
pass, without losing your spot on the moving team” (Wilson, as quoted in Linder 2009: 
23; see also Carruthers 2011: 230).  
 
As Carruthers (2011: 229; italics in original) justifiably wonders: “How could journalists, 
themselves coming under fire alongside their units, possibly not identify with the uniformed men 
and women on whom their protection depended?”  Long-time foreign correspondent Chris 
Hedges (2003) contends journalists who cover war are increasingly complicit in government spin 
and manipulation.  War correspondents, he contends: 
“want to do their bit. And their bit is the dissemination of myth, the myth used to justify 
war and boost the morale of the soldiers and civilians. The lie in wartime is almost 
always the lie of omission”  (Hedges 2003: np).     
 
While U.S. military officials, at first, worried about embedding reporters in 2003, those fears 
soon dissipated.  U.S. government and military officials were largely pleased with the embedding 
process (Tumber and Palmer 2004).  “Embedding,” opined The Guardian’s Oliver Burkeman 
(2003: np) “has been an astounding PR success for the Pentagon.”  Reporters, he emphasized: 
“use the words ‘we’ and ‘us’ profusely, identifying themselves with the military, and 
while this has prompted concerns about objectivity among US commentators, it is not 
surprising, given their very personal stake in their unit’s success” (see also Allan and 
Zelizer 2004: 6).  
 
Journalist Jeff Gralnick cautions that embedded correspondents often become sympathetic to the 
military men and women they are with.  
“You will fall in with a bunch of grunts, experience and share their hardships and fears 
and then you will feel for them and care for them.  You wind up loving them…” 
(Gralnick, as quoted in Tumber and Palmer 2004: 51) 
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Moreover, embedded reporters cannot easily turn to other sources to get the other side of the 
story as required by objective journalistic norms.  Embedding largely prohibits “the familiar 
practice of juxtaposing every ‘he said’ with a ‘she said’” (Carruthers 2011: 230).   
 
Embedded journalists, though, do not always slavishly churn out pro-military coverage about 
war.  Lewis, et al. (2006: 154) notably found no evidence of bias from embedded journalists 
covering the invasion of Iraq in 2003 — but their research did conclude that war zone reportage 
turns the conflict into a story that ultimately forces larger more critical questions about the war 
“into the background.”  While hegemony can never be understood to be total, embedding, 
arguably, has a profound influence on how journalists shape news and analysis.  Practically 
speaking, journalists are likely to become more sympathetic to the military personnel they are 
reporting on. Yet, as the coming section makes plain, even a reliance on military sources can still 
afford journalists latitude and agency to challenge the media frames of government and military 
leaders.  Having offered an overview of the potential shaping power of embedding, the coming 
pages now transition to outlining how indexing can also influence news content.  
 
2.27. Indexing 
 
The foundation of indexing theory holds that journalists and news organizations focus on — and 
implicitly place greater emphasis on — what elites do and say.  First postulated as a hypothesis 
(Bennett 1990), indexing theory offers a conceptual framework for understanding “press-state 
relations” and a means to forecast how elite discourse shapes news content.  News media 
coverage, posits Bennett (1990), largely mirror the consensus and disagreements amongst 
political actors.    
“Mass media news professionals, from the boardroom to the beat, tend to “index” the 
range of voices and viewpoints in news and editorials according to the range of views 
expressed in mainstream government debate about a topic” (Bennett 1990: 106). 
 
In short, issues and events that garner more attention by elites spark more attention from news 
media.  Murphy (1991) contends journalists gravitate towards official sources because their 
authority solves the new media’s verification problem.  Stories that quote officials are deemed to 
be reliable.  In her Oxford Bibliography entry about indexing, Lawrence (2012: np) intriguingly 
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equates indexing to the indicators economists frequently use to forecast economic performance. 
Elite disagreement, she contends, “predicts” the level of “conflict” about an issue or event that 
will be reflected in the news media.  In a similar way, Herman and Chomsky’s (2002 [1988]) 
political economy understanding of the news media posits that journalists’ overreliance on elite 
sources leads to news coverage that largely echoes elite discourse.   
 
2.28. Indexing’s Theoretical Origins 
 
Drawing on previous research (Sigal 1973; Tuchman 1978a; Gans 1979; Hallin 1986; Sigal 
1986), Bennett (1990) hypothesized that news content closely adheres to elite debate.  This 
conception flows from the normative assumption that journalists, in order to fulfill their role as 
honest brokers of information in a democracy, must represent the “legitimate” and “credible” 
views of elected representatives (Bennett 1990: 107).  Elites — cabinet ministers, Members of 
Parliament, military officials, senior civil servants, judges, experts, academics — have 
“privileged access to (and greater claims on) media coverage” because of their “status” or 
“claims to expert knowledge” (McCullagh 2002: 68).  The 4thEstate.net's media VoiceShare 
analysis, for example, found that only a third of the people quoted by major newspapers in the 
2012 U.S. presidential election were citizens compared to elite political actors (4thEstate.net 
2012).  
 
In a similar vein, Hall and his colleagues (1978, 1982, 1986) ascribed considerable power to 
elites to dominate news coverage, prescribing how events and issues get defined in the news 
media. This, in turn, allows these news sources to ““command the field” and set the terms of 
reference within which all further coverage of debate takes place” (Hall et al. 1978: 58).  This 
line of thinking, of course, is open to a Gramsci-inspired critique.  Underlying Hall et al.’s 
argument is the notion of a unified elite.  Surely, hegemony is sometimes contested by journalists 
and their sources. Schlesinger and Tumber (1999 [1994]: 259), of particular interest to this 
research, concluded that Hall and his colleagues “tend to overstate the passivity of the media as 
recipients of information from news sources.”  Accordingly, counter-hegemonic forces, such as 
public interest groups and advocates, can, in fact, have an important influence on news media 
discourse (Schlesinger and Tumber 1999 [1994]). Notably, Hall (1982:86), himself, concedes 
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that the “hegemony of the powerful” to shape news discourse is not complete because elites are 
not always unified and other counter-hegemonic voices are sometimes represented in the news 
media.   
 
2.29. Indexing and War and Terrorism 
 
Without question, government and military officials are dominant sources of information for 
most news organizations surrounding foreign affairs and during times of conflict (Hallin 1986; 
Zaller and Chiu 1996).  As a result, media coverage of war and terrorism tends to align with 
hegemonic interpretations and positions (Herman and Chomsky 2002 [1988]; Schudson 2002; 
Domke, Graham, and Coe 2006).  Embedded journalists, as the previous section highlighted, 
often are criticized for being government mouthpieces (Knightly 2003 [1975]).  This 
phenomenon, some have argued, became particularly pronounced in the aftermath of the 9/11 
terrorists attacks in the U.S. in 2001 (Zelizer and Allan 2002).  Using Herman and Chomsky’s 
(2002 [1988]) propaganda model, Boyd-Barrett’s (2004a: 448) analysis of news coverage after 
the 9/11 attacks concluded that the news media’s over-reliance on official sources led, in part, to 
“degrees of collaboration between media and propaganda sources.”   
 
Expanding and refining indexing theory, Bennett and his fellow researchers (2007), in fact, 
document how the U.S. news media failed because of their heavy reliance on elite sources and 
patriotic zeal to resist the considerable shaping power of George W. Bush’s push to invade Iraq 
in 2003.  Zaller and Chiu (1996: 385) champion indexing as “the single most important” factor in 
determining the narrow range of official views that get reproduced in coverage of U.S. foreign 
policy.  Their systematic analysis of news coverage between 1945-1991 concluded that the news 
media are the “government’s little helper[s]” when it comes to perpetuating dominant positions 
about foreign policy (Zaller and Chiu 1996: 385).  The news coverage of the lead up to the U.S-
led invasion of Iraq in 2003 exemplifies this well.  The New York Time’s overreliance on official 
sources produced “flawed journalism” about WMD, according to the newspaper’s own public 
editor (Orkent 2004: np). The Time’s Judith Miller was singled out for not challenging officials’ 
claims about WMD.  Miller, however, insists it is not a reporter’s job to: 
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“assess the government’s information and be an independent analyst myself.  My job is to 
tell readers of The New York Times what the government thought about Iraq’s arsenal”  
(Miller, as quoted in Massing 2004: 62). 
  
Yet, as the New York Time’s public editor stressed, this is reporting or stenography and not 
compatible with watchdog journalism (Orkent 2004: np). 
 
To underline the previous section about embedding, Hallin’s (1986) examination of news 
coverage of the Vietnam War offers useful empirical insight for this work into the influence of 
indexing on media production during times of conflict. Hallin (1986: 63-70) observes that war 
correspondents’ commitment to objectivity often blunted critical assessments of the conflict 
during its early phase.  Hallin’s (1986: 117) content analysis found that journalists’ reliance on 
official sources produced “spheres” of “consensus” and “legitimate controversy” in line with 
elite interpretations of the war.  Hallin (1986) details how news accounts of the conflict before 
1968 largely mirrored official statements and elite consensus about the war effort.  When 
controversy and criticism was reported, Congressional leaders were often the source.  However, 
after the surprise Tet Offensive, which left U.S. and South Vietnamese forces on their heels, elite 
consensus transformed — and the news media’s coverage of the war began reflecting that 
disagreement.  Moreover, Defence Secretary Robert McNamara, convinced that winning the war 
was no longer possible, resigned after President Lyndon Johnston escalated bombing in 
Southeast Asia.  Hallin (1986: 117) contends journalists picked up on the growing elite 
disenchantment about the war and became increasingly critical of the conflict, reflecting a 
“sphere of legitimate controversy.”  Intriguingly, though, the news media’s coverage of the 
Vietnam often gets blamed for “loosing” the war.  After the first Gulf War, George H. W. Bush 
famously bragged: “By God, we’ve finally kicked the Vietnam Syndrome” (Prashad 2003: np).  
 
Taking up Hallin’s (1986) typology, Schudson (2002) found that journalists also confined their 
coverage of war and foreign policy to the sphere of consensus in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 
2001.  Reporting about the so-called war on terror largely echoed the Bush Administration’s 
framing of the conflict.  Journalists, observed, Schudson (2002: 40), adopted what might “even 
be called a priestly or pastoral mode.  The tone of the detached neutrality was replaced by a 
quiet, solemn tone, as if speaking at a funeral.”  Tumber and Palmer (2004) also use Hallin’s 
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(1986) framework in their analysis of the U.K. news media’s coverage of the Iraq War in 2003.  
That research found that the pre-invasion reporting and analysis emphasized public opposition 
and scepticism about officials’ justification for the war (“sphere of legitimate controversy”) 
(Tumber and Palmer 2004: 164).  During the invasion, most of the news media adhered to the 
“sphere of consensus” (Tumber and Palmer 2004: 165).  Reporting and analysis after U.S-led 
forces took Baghdad, moved back to the “sphere of legitimate controversy”, transitioning “away 
from defining the violence only as a brief aftermath or as the remnants of the regime and towards 
seeing it as something more sustained” (Tumber and Palmer 2004: 165, 135).  
 
2.30. Overestimating Indexing’s Effect 
 
Journalists — and news organizations — can resist indexing’s power to shape news content.  A 
growing body of research (Wolfsfeld 1997; Oliver and Myers 1999; Lawrence 2000; Althaus 
2003; Kuypers 2006; Baum and Groeling 2010b; Harp, Loke, and Bachmann 2010; Porpora et 
al. 2010; Hayes and Guardino 2010; Speer 2017) argues indexing does not always directly 
correlate with elite discourse shaping news content. Hayes and Guardino (2010), for instance, 
suggest foreign opposition to the Gulf War in 2003 shaped U.S. domestic news.  American 
audiences, they argue, were not only presented with accounts of a unified elite consensus of the 
Iraq conflict. Foreign opposition the war also influenced news coverage.   In a similar way, Harp, 
Loke and Bachmann’s (2010: 467) content analysis results shows that while most of the critical 
voices in news coverage of the Iraq conflict (2003-2007) came from U.S. officials, Iraqi and 
American civilians “did have space to voice their dissatisfaction in the coverage.”  
 
In contrast to Bennett et al.’s (2006, 2007) analysis of the second Gulf War, Porpora and 
colleagues (2010) argue the Washington Post did not, in fact, accept — uncritically — the Bush 
administration’s framing of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal.   In a similar way, Althaus’ (2003) 
examination of television news broadcasts during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War discovered 
much more evidence of independence from elite discourse, despite a propensity by news 
professionals to index their coverage to official sources.  His case study argues that indexing 
research fails to recognize the critical interpretation journalists fold into their reports and 
analysis.  Even without much elite discontent over a public policy issue, argues Althaus (2003), 
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normative journalistic impulses lead news professionals to seek divergent points of view.  To this 
end, journalists highlight different possibilities or narratives even from anonymous sources.  
Journalists weave “off the record” discontent into their news coverage. Moreover, even when 
there is unanimity amongst elites, journalists will tend to “follow the trail of power” to non-
governmental sources with a stake in the policy or use “accidental occurrences as pegs on which 
to hang criticisms of government policy” (Althaus 2003: 405).   
 
Schlesinger (1990) also challenges the power of indexing, stressing that journalists use a range of 
diverse sources in their news and analysis.  Moreover, elites do not speak with a unified voice.  
While officials still have a privileged position when it comes to defining news, according to 
Schlesinger (1990), increased competition amongst interest groups for the media’s attention has 
intensified in recent decades, meaning news coverage does not strictly confine itself to the 
contours of elite discourse.  Ample research highlights the autonomy and agency of journalism 
(Patterson 1993; Callahan and Schnell 2001; Baum and Groeling 2010a, 2010b; Potter and Baum 
2010; Speer 2017). Of interest to this research, Potter and Baum 2010) argue that indexing 
theory underestimates the independence of the media.  “[O]nly when the press is an effective 
independent actor,” they contend, “are the actions of leaders transparent to the public” (Potter 
and Baum 2010: 454).  Groeling and Baum (2008) also highlight the interpretive (Zelizer 1993) 
quality of  journalism.  News professionals, they contend, prize analysis and conflict — and 
especially inter-party disagreement.   
 
2.31. An Updated Conception of Indexing’s Shaping Power  
 
Bennett et al. (2007) offer an updated understanding of indexing, suggesting a number of notable 
conditions such as events, technology, investigative journalism and counter-spin allow 
journalists to stray from hegemonic interpretations.  Dramatic events can push officials off their 
preferred message.  Events — especially dramatic ones — can disrupt the framing power of 
elites (Bennett and Lawrence 1995; Wolfsfeld 1997; Oliver and Myers 1999; Lawrence 2000; 
Baum and Groeling 2010b; Speer 2017).   Dramatic events — defined as “occurrences that are 
nonroutine” and “involve conflict [and] qualities that resonate with journalists’ perceptions of 
newsworthiness” — have been shown to disrupt the power of elites to frame issues and events 
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(Speer 2017: 284).  When no weapons of mass destruction (WMD), for instance, were found in 
Iraq (which contradicted a major justification for going to war in 2003), the news media 
increasingly reflected a less unified picture about the rationale for the military invasion of the 
Middle Eastern country and gave more prominence to anti-war frames.   
Entman’s (2003, 2004) cascading activation model also questions indexing’s predictive power, 
suggesting that journalists and audiences also have shaping (or framing) power over news 
content, despite the propensity of journalists to prize officials as sources.  Akin to Hallin’s 
(1986) work, this agency described by Entman is, however, usually associated with elite 
disagreement. Baum and Groeling (2010b), insightfully, offer their elasticity of reality concept as 
a means of understanding how elites often have more media framing power initially, but that 
influence wanes over time as reporters and the public gain “more information about an event and 
have the opportunity to retrospectively assess the reality of prior elite rhetoric” (Baum and 
Groeling 2010b: 10). As well, journalists, as a badge of honour, pride themselves on resisting 
spin or the party line (Zaller 1999). The absence of WMD in Iraq, notably, emboldened 
journalists to be more critical of the Bush Administration’s handling of the counter insurgency in 
that country.  Correlating survey data and a content analysis of news coverage of the Iraq war 
between 2003-2007, Baum and Groeling (2010a) determined that the Bush administration had a 
framing advantage at the onset of the war — but the administration’s power ebbed as security 
deteriorated in the country.   
 
Having completed my critical overview of the potential shaping power of indexing and 
embedding, I now wish to turn to scrutinizing how the everyday routines and practices of 
journalists shape the content they produce.  In the coming section, I explore the “patterned, 
repeated practices, forms, and rules” that guide journalists to craft news content in a certain and 
often expected way (Shoemaker and Reese 2014: 165). 
 
2.32. Routines and Practices Level 
 
There is little doubt that routines and practices situated at the micro level have an important 
framing or shaping power over news content (Tuchman 1978a; Gans 1979).  Notably, Tuchman 
(1977) observed that journalists who master their craft’s routines and practices are regarded as 
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professional and prized for their competence.  The coming pages intend to zero in on two news 
shaping values or phenomena at the routines and practice level:  (1) news values; and (2) 
journalistic fact checking.  It seems prudent to begin with the values and standards that inspire 
many routines and practices — and ultimately shape news content. 
 
2.33. News Values   
 
News gets shaped by numerous values (Galtung and Ruge 1965).  Journalists prize some stories   
— some narrative elements — over others.  Galtung and Ruge's (1965) pioneering work 
concluded that a dozen factors in three categories — (1) impact; (2) audience identification; and 
(3) practical issues associated with media coverage — shape news output.  Of note, Galtung and 
Ruge (1965) stress that elite voices are often featured more prominently in the news media than 
ordinary voices.  Plus, news coverage prizes frames of reference that allow for referencing 
ongoing stories.  Citing numerous studies (Stephens 1980; Dennis and Ismach 1981; Baskette, 
Sissirs, and Brooks 1982), Shoemaker and Reese (2014: 171) posit that news values are 
“predictable” shapers of news content.  The researchers offer six common news values that shape 
news: 
 
(1) Prominence and importance — that is, stories that are impactful and powerful; 
(2) Conflict and controversy over the status quo; 
(3) The unusual over the routine, for example: man bites dog; 
(4) Human interest stories such as celebrity and gossip; 
(5) Timeliness — that is, what is happening now?; and  
(6) Proximity — events nearby take on more importance than those far away (Shoemaker and 
Reese 2014). 
 
These news values influence news coverage — but no matter what their focus, most news 
content imposes storytelling (Uko 2007) or “narrativity” (Jacobs 1996: 373).  In particular, the 
news media’s focus on timely stories produces considerable episodic coverage focused on 
“events” (Iyengar 1991: 14). 
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Journalists also prize conflict — and overemphasize the negative (Sabato 1991; Patterson 1996; 
Cappella and Hall-Jamieson 1997). Tension, after all, remains a key ingredient of good 
storytelling (Uko 2007). Cynical editors often tell junior reporters that bad news equals a good 
story.  Furthermore, journalistic ethics and professional norms tend to ensure that both sides get 
represented in almost every story. Journalists do this, in part, to vaccinate themselves against 
charges of bias (Tuchman 1978a).  News demands new information and journalists search out 
“novelty, conflict, balance and authority” (Baum and Groeling 2010b: 87).  Moreover, when 
elites (particularly those from the same political party) disagree about an issue, those dissenting 
voices become even more newsworthy — and dissent is even more appealing when it is intra-
party conflict (Baum and Groeling 2010b).  
 
These norms produce conformity and repetition across the news media industry.  Reporters also 
rely on one another as reference points and ideas.  As a result, the news media frequently 
produce pack journalism (Shoemaker and Reese 2014).   This coverage is both “insular and self-
reinforcing” while offering journalists “a modicum of certitude that enables them to act in an 
otherwise uncertain environment” (Sigal 1973: 180-81).  Fact checking, as the next section 
points out, is also becoming a norm of news.   
 
2.34. Journalistic Counter-framing and Fact checking  
 
Journalists, as detailed earlier, sometimes use the media frames sponsored by political actors to 
produce compelling and newsworthy stories. They can adopt their sources’ frames, challenge 
them or crafting their own (D'Angelo and Kuypers 2010).  As part of their work routines, 
journalists “package” their stories in “efficient” ways so that their audiences will easily 
understand them (Gitlin 2003 [1980]: 7).  Reporters often reduce the complexity of politics, for 
instance, to horseraces — who’s winning who’s losing — stories and analysis.  News 
professionals also frequently interrogate, challenge and even reject the frames sponsored by 
political actors (Mermin 1996; Graber 1997; Callaghan and Schnell 2001; Groeling 2001; 
Lawrence 2010; Reese 2010; Van Gorp 2010).  “[T]he discipline of verification,” contends 
Kovach and Rosenstiel (2014: 98), “is what separates journalism from entertainment, 
propaganda, fiction or art.”  The tendency of journalists to challenge elite-sponsored frames 
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happens, in part, because of ideological and institutional forces within the media and journalistic 
routines and socialization (Shoemaker and Reese 2014; Graves 2016).  Entrenched in liberal 
theory, it is the job of journalists “to pierce [the] blanket of obfuscation” offered by elite media 
frames, especially during times of war (Carruthers 2011: 8).  
 
Journalistic challenges often come in the form of rational, technical and scientific claims.  Over 
the last decade, these challenges come in the form of fact checking.   Fact checking, though, 
remains a vague conception in media and communication literature.  The recent — and growing 
— practice, which grew out of an online movement, is stilling being defined and refined (Graves 
2016).  While fact checking is becoming increasingly mainstream in journalism, it remains 
controversial.  Fact checking, contends Graves (2016: 9) is a “deliberate critique of conventional 
reporting and its practices of objectivity” (Graves 2016: 9).  
“fact-checkers seek fairly openly to fix political journalism by introducing new practices, 
revising prevailing norms, and building institutional resources for what they see as an 
essential and undervalued form of public-affairs reporting” (Graves 2016: 37; italics in 
original). 
 
Donald Trump’s rise to the highest office in the United States sparked a recent explosion in fact 
checking by journalists. Stories regularly state that the president’s claims are “patently false” or 
represent “a false claim” (Adair 2016).  Graves, Nyhan and Reifler (2015) detail what they call 
the “global boom” in fact checking since 2010.  While Trump’s propensity to lie has heightened 
fact checking in journalism, the trend is not new and represents a decades-long interpretive turn 
(Schudson 1982; Zelizer 1993; Barnhurst and Mutz 1997; Barnhurst 2014) in journalism, 
whereby analysis is woven into reporting (Hallin 1992; Barnhurst 2003; Fink and Schudson 
2014). As “sacerdotal” journalism diminished, journalists became increasingly skeptical of 
political actors (Blumler and Kavanagh 1999: 218).  In the 1990s, broadcasters increasingly 
scrutinized political campaign commercials, questioning the truth of negative advertisements’ 
claims (Bank 2007; Papper 2007; Graves et al. 2015).  As Graves et al. (2015: 4) note, these fact 
checking critiques of negative political advertising garnered considerable attention and 
journalistic prizes, “helping to legitimate and institutionalize new practices.” 
 
Recent manifestations of journalistic fact checking flow from many practices pioneered by 
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online blogs and social media platforms. Early on in the World Wide Web’s history, Snopes.com 
emerged as an online fact checking organization.  Founded in 1994 by David and Barbara 
Mikkelson, the website began by investigating urban legends.  The independent, non-partisan 
and self-sufficient website prides itself on its “painstaking, scholarly and reliable” fact checking 
(Snopes.com: np).  Online fact checking grew in the subsequent years.  In 2001, three recent 
college graduates, “distressed at the growing dominance of spin in American politics” launched 
Spinsanity.org “as a nonpartisan watchdog dedicated to unspinning misleading claims from 
politicians, pundits and the press” (Spinsanity.org: 2018: np).   
 
Early online bloggers (run by citizen journalists and activists from the left and right of the 
political spectrum) pushed journalists to be more transparent (Scriber 2016).  Fact checking, 
posits Graves, was a “response to blogging’s critique of journalism” and even “define[ed] the 
medium” (Graves, as quoted in Scriber 2016: np).  Two landmark events illuminate the early 
power of blog on journalistic fact checking.  In 2002, Republican Senate Majority Leader Trent 
Lott offered effusive praise for one-time segregation supporter Senator Strom Thurmond.  Lott 
suggested “we wouldn't of [sic] had all these problems ... if Thurmond had won the presidency” 
when he led the States Rights Democratic Party in 1948 (Woan 2007: 490).    The mainstream 
media did not report Lott’s curious accolades for the retiring South Carolina Senator.  The 
ensuing online controversy over Lott’s remark sparked interest from legacy media.  The backlash 
in the mainstream media forced Lott to resign his leadership role in the Senate.   
 
Blogs, in this time, were also fact checking traditional news reports, too.  In September 2004, 
two months before the U.S. presidential election, CBS’s 60 Minutes revealed documents 
suggesting that President George W. Bush had not fulfilled his service to the National Guard in 
the 1970s.  Within hours of the report’s broadcast, bloggers scrutinized the authenticity of the 
documents offered by CBS News to question Bush’s service in the military (Pien 2005).  CBS 
News retracted their story and apologized two weeks later (Graves 2016).  Woan (2007: 491) 
contends both the Lott story and the CBS controversy highlight the “dialectic relationship 
between the blogosphere and traditional media.” 
“When a controversial issue arises in one media sphere, the other becomes a reactionary, 
often oppositional force, as both sides strive to arrive at the truth by exchanging 
contradictory ideas and propositions… Thus, in this manner, the blogosphere adds a 
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dimension to news reporting that did not exist when only traditional media dominated” 
(Woan 2007: 491). 
 
Amidst this growing power of blogs, Factcheck.org — a non-partisan and nonprofit website — 
began in 2003 to challenge political spin with the aim of cutting “the level of deception and 
confusion in U.S. politics” (Factcheck.org 2018: np).   The website dedicated to monitoring the 
factual accuracy of political actors was launched by long-time journalist Brooks Jackson and 
Annenburg Public Policy Centre Director Kathleen Hall Jamieson (Graves 2016).  While 
working at CNN, Jackson became known for his “Ad Police” segments that fact checked 
political campaign ads.  The emergence and growth of the Internet made:  
“it possible for these dedicated organizations to practice fact checking in a different way: 
to launch these sites that are dedicated exclusively to fact checking; to do research; and to 
show their research in a way that wasn’t as easy in traditional media” (Graves, as quoted 
in Scribes 2016: np). 
 
In this same period, fact checking picked up steam in the mainstream media during the U.S. 
presidential campaign of 2004 because of the so-called Swift Boat TV ads that questioned 
Democrat John Kerry’s Vietnam War record.   PolitiFact.com founder Bill Adair recalls that the 
campaign spurred him to step up his fact checking in response to the negative advertising.   
“This grew out of my own guilt.  I had covered political campaigns and felt that I had 
been a passive co-conspirator in sort of passing along inaccurate information and hadn’t 
fact-checked it in a way I should and so went to my editors with a proposal that we create 
a web site where we could do fact-checking full time”  (Adair, as quoted in Graves 2016: 
61). 
 
Four years later in 2007, PolitiFact.com launched as a collaboration between Times and the 
Congressional Quarterly (Graves 2016).  Both FactCheck.org and PolitiFact.com have 
increasingly institutionalized the fact checking form of news coverage that promotes 
accountability journalism (Graves 2016).  The routine has been widely adopted by an increasing 
number of news media organizations and individual journalists (Dobbs 2012).  Of note, the 
number of newspaper articles using “fact checking” or variants of the term grew “by more than 
300 per cent from 2008 to 2012” (Graves, Nyhan, Reifler 2015: 7).  
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2.35. Social Media and War 
 
Social media persists as an important site of fact checking in modern journalism.  Online social 
media platforms have also become a notable factor in media coverage of war.  While some have 
heralded social media’s democratizing of media (Beckett 2008), others have worried about 
surveillance and hoaxes (Sacco and Bossi 2015). Despite these debates, there is no doubt that 
social media technology has intensified the routines and practices of the news media in its 
overage of war — and increased the connection between journalists and their audiences (Beckett 
2008; Roginsky 2014).   No longer, as with traditional media, is communication a one-way 
affair.  The audience can talk back and fact check journalism in real time. The line between 
journalists and audience is, in fact, increasingly blurred.  Who is a witness and who is a journalist 
is increasingly complicated as citizens and soldiers disseminate information using social media 
from the centre of conflicts (Andén-Papadopoulos 2009).  Indeed, the frequent subjects (military 
personnel) of news reporting about conflict now produce their own homemade videos of war and 
broadcast them on social media sites.  This, in turn, has challenged the traditional news media’s: 
“claim to authenticity and credibility, precisely by showing that which the mainstream 
news will not show and thus rendering dubious the professional practices of selection, 
framing, and editing” (Andén-Papadopoulos 2009: 26).   
 
The traditional “hegemony of hierarchical news media,” writes Creig (2017: np) “is almost 
gone.”  Anyone — from a child tweeting about being bombed in Syria to a Russian troll farmer 
— can disseminate information about a conflict to a potentially mass audience now. 
 
To be sure, social media provides several new affordances to journalists covering conflict, 
including: (1) offering new — instantaneous — sources of information about unfolding events; 
(2) speeding up the dissemination of news; (3) extending the reach of journalists and their news 
organizations; and (4) increasing the plurality of voices included in coverage (Sacco and Bossio 
2015).   But it is important to remember, as Bruns (2014: 3) cautions, “media innovation is an 
innovation in media practices at least as much as in media technologies.”  Social media has 
changed the reporting practices surrounding war.  Social media resources come with their 
drawbacks and complexities.  Journalists covering war may, for instance, have access to multiple 
sources. Verification and contextualization are, however, increasingly problematic, especially in 
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chaotic and unsafe war situations (Beckett 2008).  In their examination of the Arab Spring, Sacco 
and Bossio (2015: 72) concluded that social media, while making journalism more complex, 
“can complement traditional media because it works as an alert and allows direct access to 
sources and images from remotes areas.”   Yet, considerable social media content, especially in 
conflict, is devoid of context and lacks explanation.  This requires journalists to be more zealous 
interpreters and gatekeepers.  At the same time, there is potential for traditional forms of news 
media to incorporate social media with a mind to make its content “stand as a positive vehicle to 
cover war and conflict and let foreign news gain its deserved attention” (Sacco and Bossio 2015:  
73).   
 
Social media, argues Patrikarakos (2017) has dramatically transformed how war is covered and 
consumed.  Power, according to Patrikarakos, has shifted away from traditional sources such as 
government and the news media to individuals.  “The information revolution has given ordinary 
people enhanced powers to change their circumstances”  (Patrikarakos, as quoted in Illing 2017: 
np).  Patrikarakos backs up his argument by pointing to British journalist and blogger Elliot 
Higgins who used social media to link Russia to the downing of Malaysia Airline Flight 17 in 
July of 2014.    
“A guy, for all intents and purposes, you would've considered an online nerd. He spent 
hours and hours and hours playing online role-playing games with people in other parts 
of the world.  He took these skills — his obsessive nature, his ability to marshal different 
people online — and [began using social media to investigate the downing of Malaysia 
Airlines Flight 17]. And he eventually proved that Russia had supplied the weapon, the 
missile, that shot down Flight MH17” (Patrikarakos, as quoted in Illing 2017: np).   
 
Higgin’s blog illustrates well how social media has disrupted the traditional role, authority and 
gatekeeper function of journalism.   
 
2.36. Demanding Accountability  
 
As Donald Trump demonstrates (almost daily it seems), politicians can sometimes have a 
tenuous relationship with honesty.  “Truthfulness,” observed Arendt (1971: np) after the release 
of the Pentagon Papers in 1971, “has never been counted among the political virtues, and lies 
have always been regarded as justifiable tools in political dealings.”  Journalists, it is argued, 
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have an obligation to be circumspect and analytical in response to the prevarication of 
politicians. Schudson (2013: 169), notably, observes that over the last decade there has been an 
increased emphasis on “truth-telling” and “policing of publicly relevant lies,” producing both 
“new venues” such as FactCheck.org and PolitiFact.com and “systematic procedures for holding 
accountable both governmental leaders and those who aspire to elective political office.” 
This compunction was compounded by journalism’s failure surrounding the Bush 
Administration’s push to invade Iraq (Bennett et al. 2007).  Skeptical reporting and fact checking 
became the “antidote to the stenographic reporting that helped the Bush Administration build its 
case of the war in 2002 and 2003” (Graves 2016: 62).  “Fact-checkers very much want to reject 
the tradition of “he said, she said” reporting” (Graves, as quoted in Scribes 2016: np). 
“Just as the Vietnam War destroyed the cozy relationship between the president and the 
White House press corps, the [weapons of mass destruction] fiasco caused many 
mainstream journalists to become much more cautious about accepting uncorroborated 
claims by politicians of all stripes” (Dobbs 2012: 6). 
These moments, arguably, “destabilize hegemonic discourses and identities and, at the same 
time, constitute the breeding ground for the origin of new discourses and identities” (Carpentier 
2005: 209).  For many journalists, the Iraq War and the failure to find WMD represented a 
breaking point, if you will, whereby news professionals began a reflexive search for new ways of 
counteracting elite spin.  But often, after war, journalists huff and puff about all the lies they 
were told by officials, “swearing never again to be so credulous…” (Carruthers 2011: 253).  Yet, 
as Carruthers (2011) justifiably notes, journalists upset with the media manipulation during the 
first Gulf War did not really change their practices for the second invasion of Iraq. 
 
2.37. Defining Fact checking 
 
Nietzsche famously asserted “there are no facts, only interpretations” (Nietzsche 1954 [1873]: 
45).  To be sure, truth remains a contested — and much debated — notion (Foucault 2004). As 
well, fact checking questions the idealized understanding of objective reporting.  It moves 
beyond the typical he said / she said false equivalence reporting.  Deciding what is true and what 
is not true, requires judgment.  “Journalism that challenges public statements,” writes Graves  
(2016: 42) makes it harder in practice for reporters to claim a clear separation from political 
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actors.”  Challenging a politician’s claims is, indeed, political.  The protection of objectivity 
evaporates when journalists start determining what is true and what is not.  Nevertheless, 
journalists are increasingly looking for a ways of holding decision-makers to account (Graves 
2016).   
While notions of journalistic objectivity are problematic (Ward 2015), journalism is normatively 
objective in terms of how it defines and determines truth (Kovach and Rosentiel 2014: 103).  
“Journalists’ authority,” writes Zelizer, (1993: 224-25), “is assumed to derive from their 
presence at events, from the ideology of eyewitness authenticity.”  Fact checking is similarly 
represented as an authentic expression of journalism’s attempt to expose the truth.  Proponents 
liken their efforts to sciences’ rigorous methods and procedures, “constantly inventing, 
discarding, and refining theories to explain the confusion of the contemporary world” (Dobbs 
2012: 3).  Uscinski and Butler (2013: 163) helpfully define fact checking as the process of 
“comparing” the statements of elites “to ‘the facts’ so as to determine whether a statement about 
these topics is a lie.”   The form of journalistic fact checking is often scientific and technical — 
and looking for a “goodness of fit” of evidence or “set of facts” that fits the “moral order” of its 
context (Ettema and Glasser 1998a: 135, 9).  
 
It is also important to note here that fact checking also represents a site of potential contestation 
in line with Gramsci’s (1971) thinking.  The practice has the potential to be counter-hegemonic. 
Fact checking allows news professionals the opportunity to counter-frame the media messages of 
elites.  Jones (2009: 2-3) contends the purpose of news is, in fact, to challenge officials and “hold 
government and those with power accountable.”  Sometimes, this journalistic counter-framing of 
issues and events wins out over the preferred media frames of elites (Wolfsfeld 1997; Speer 
2017).     
 
Journalists, though, tend to impeach elite rhetoric with elite standards because of normative 
practices of objectivity (Ettema and Glasser 1998a. 1998b).  This commitment to impartiality or 
objectivity, however, “often reproduces dominant understandings and values” (Carruthers 2000: 
18; see also Pedelty 1995: 9).  Mermin (1996) convincingly argues that journalists are not overly 
critical of broad policy decisions — but instead often only critique the ability of government 
officials to deliver on promises and execute policy decisions.  Moreover, when critical voices are 
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not readily available, journalists themselves are “compelled to challenge the official version of 
events” so as to include “tension and conflict that would otherwise be absent from their stories” 
and thus inure themselves and their news organizations against charges of bias (Cook 2005: 
106).  Interviews with Canadian journalists who covered the conflict in Afghanistan determined 
that reporters believed they possessed a professional obligation to challenge the media frames 
promoted by the government and military leaders about the war in Afghanistan (DeCillia 2009). 
Embedded reporters used their own observations about the conflict to challenge government and 
military leaders’ media framing of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan.   Bennett (2012: 
202) argues that this “posture of antagonism”, whereby journalists impeach the frames of elites 
with their own observations and research, “creates the appearance of mutual independence while 
keeping most news content to the political perspective certified by authorities.”   
  
2.38. Conclusion - The Hierarchy of Influences Model 
 
Media content, as I have outlined in the previous pages, can be shaped by an individual factor or, 
most often, a confluence of individual news professionals, institutions and the social system 
within which they operate.  While journalists, themselves, can have a profound shaping effect on 
journalism, most often the factors that influence news content are multilevelled and manifold.  
As Figure Two illustrates, news is not produced or framed in a vacuum, devoid of setting or 
circumstances.  Journalism is contingent on its social and cultural context. It is best understood 
as a system or circuit.   
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Figure 2 — The Shaping Power of Three Levels  
 
 
 
 
To be sure, in order to be understood by audiences, news takes on an expected and reliable form, 
shaped and molded by the steady churn of influence.    
“We may think news is just news, an ephemeral piece that informs about the world.  
What we may not realize is that by following the agreed conventions that make it 
recognizable as news, it sets up a framework within which its predefined elements are 
related to each other” (Rantanen 2009: xi). 
 
If content is key to understanding how the news media might “exert their own unique shaping 
power” on audiences (Shoemaker and Reese 2014: 4), then it is logical then that researchers also 
put the actual content audiences experience under the microscope before attempting to 
understand its potential impact. Having critically outlined the elements that shape news (or the 
frame-building process), this chapter now transitions to the frame-setting process.   
 
2.39. Introduction - Frame-setting  
 
Every day, a tsunami of a half a billion, ephemeral, 140-character tweets speed through 
cyberspace. Nearly 80 million photos from around the world get imprinted with Instagram’s 
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vintage look on an average day.  And nearly two billion people around the world are active on 
Facebook (Zephoria Digital Marketing 2017: np).  We swim — or drown, depending on your 
perspective — in world filled with media.  Our lives are truly — and thoroughly — mediated.  
While there is no doubting media’s ubiquitous nature, its effects — its one-to-one input/output 
stimulus response — remains decidedly less clear. Many people, of course, determine how to 
dress based on television or radio weather forecasts.  The tone of business news can often 
corresponds to consumer confidence (McQuail 2005).  People — with a seemingly phlegmatic 
response — throw out food when news reports talk of contaminated products.  Some research 
(Mann, Apter, and Bertolote 2005) even claims media can exacerbate suicide risk by simply 
mentioning it in newscasts.  On top of all that, whole industries (marketing, advertising, public 
relations and political communications) focus relentlessly on triggering some sort of media 
impact.  Despite all this, the influence of media (and especially the news) remains a hotly debate 
matter in media and communication scholarship.   
 
For many, a correlation between message and response seems natural and clear.  “The entire 
study of mass communication,” McQuail (1994: 327) famously suggested, “is based on the 
premise that the media have significant 16  effects.”  No doubt considerable media and 
communication research over the last 100 years assumes effects, “yet it seems to be the issue on 
which there is the least certainty and least agreement” in communication and media scholarship 
(McQuail 1987: 251). Despite the ongoing debate and lack of certainty over media effects, a 
body of literature (Gerbner 1972; Nimmo 1983; Iyengar 1991; Gamson 1992; Page and Shapiro 
1992; Zaller 1992; Callaghan and Schnell 2001; Lewis 2001; Johnson-Cartee 2005; Chong and 
Druckman 2007; Page, Shapiro and Dempsey 2007; Lecheler 2011; McCombs et al. 2011), 
points to the media influencing the public.  By means of a roadmap, the story of the second half 
of this theoretical chapter sketches the history and current thinking surrounding media effects, 
and specifically the potential impact of media frames.  I begin by briefly situating this research’s 
position concerning frame-setting and conceptualize frames as an independent variable. I also 
                                                
16 Of note, the evolution of McQuail’s (1987, 1994, 2005) book Mass Communication Theory: An 
Introduction highlights the evolution in thinking well.  McQuail (1987: 251) notes “that there are effects 
from the media” — but by the third edition, McQuail assigns “significant effects” to media (McQuail 
1994: 327). 
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outline Gamson’s (1992) useful model for understanding political opinion formation.  I 
concluded this chapter with my conceptual framework and my research questions.  As the 
coming pages make evident, a layered theoretical understanding offers a considered and nuanced 
way of thinking about the potential influences of media framing on audiences.  First, however, I 
offer some brief comments about frame-setting and frames as an independent variable.  
 
2.40.  Frame-setting and Frames as Independent Variable  
 
Frame-setting, as detailed at the onset of this chapter, amounts to the potential impact frames 
may have on audiences.  The messy process of framing effects likely mixes both the immediate 
impact of the media message and an individual’s entire knowledge and attitudes (Capella and 
Hall Jamieson 1997; de Vreese 2005).  At its core, frame-setting is best conceptualized as a 
potential framing effects.   Frames can spark individual changes in opinions, for example.  The 
media messages can also trigger societal-level shifts, whereby they influence collective action 
(de Vreese 2005).  The concept is best viewed as an independent variable.   This type of research 
(Entman 1993; Pan and Kosicki 1993) links media messages to public opinion.   In the coming 
pages I sketch the history of media effects research before turning to the literature concerning the 
potential influence of media frames.   
 
2.41. The History of Media Effects Research 
 
McQuail (2005: 457) suggests there is a “natural history” to media effects research, linking the 
scholarship to the era in which it was produced.  For instance, researchers in the early part of the 
20th century, having witnessed two world wars, worried about the impact of propaganda.  This 
scholarship — often described as the hypodermic needle or magic bullet tradition17 – aimed to 
draw direct links between media messages and mass public opinion.  In the next era of research, 
scholars rejected early notions of a powerful media effects.  This was followed by a return to 
                                                
17 Curran (2006: 116) contests what he calls the “caricatures of the history of communication research” 
that “mythologize” accounts of effects scholarship being “‘dominated’ by the hypodermic model.”  
Curran argues that the thrust of considerable early scholarship aimed to “assert the independence and 
autonomy of media audiences.”  
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findings of robust media effects.  The fourth era, dominated by social constructivism, “combines 
elements of both strong and limited effects of mass media” (Scheufele 1999: 105). In this most 
recent phase of research, the mass media are often conceptualized as having considerable 
influence over shaping the social world “by framing images of reality… in a predictable and 
patterned way” (McQuail 1994: 331).  But, media consumers — allowing for a more nuanced 
notion of power (Foucault 1978) — can resist or accept media messages.  Media messages, 
ample research stresses, are only part of resources and factors that shape mass public opinion 
(see, for example, Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Gamson 1992; Castells 2009; McCombs et al. 
2011). In the last decade, Bennett and Iyengar (2008) provocatively argued that we may have 
returned to a state of minimal media effects because to the growing detachment of individuals 
from mainstream media and the so-called filter bubbles that allow people to confirm their 
biases18. The following sections outline the century-long debate over media effects with a mind 
to positioning this research’s conceptual framework for understanding the potential influence of 
media frames on audiences.  
 
2.42. The Powerful Effects Model 
 
Around the time of the First World War (1900-1930), media were conceptually endowed with 
considerable power (Bauer and Bauer 1960; see also McQuail 2005).  Based largely on the 
popularity of newspapers, radio and film, Walter Lippmann highlighted the media’s role in 
shaping the “pictures in our heads” (Lippmann 2004 [1922]: 1); while Laswell (1927) inflated 
the power of propaganda.  Orson Welles’ infamous Halloween radio broadcast in 1938 of H.G. 
Wells’ novel The War of The Worlds reflects the real concern during this era about the perceived 
                                                
18 Bennett and Iyengar (2008) contend that the explosion of new interactive technologies, with their 
emphasis on choice, allows many to tune out mainstream mass media.  “As receivers exercise greater 
choice over both the content of messages and media sources,” the researchers argue (2008: 708), “effects 
become increasingly difficult to produce or measure in the aggregate while creating new challenges for 
theory and research.”  Holbert, Garrett and Gleason (2010) dispute Bennett and Iyengar’s arguments, 
suggesting (1) the pair gravitate towards technological determinism; (2) overestimate the effects of 
discriminatory exposure; (3) fixate on news as the predominant source of information; and (4) ignore the 
effects of “attitude reinforcement, long recognized as an important type of political media influence” 
(Holbert, Garrett, and Gleason 2010: 15).  In step with this research, Holbert, Garrett and Gleason (2010) 
posit that media effects models that incorporate nuanced understandings of the confluence of both media 
messages and individual factors can still help researchers understand the influence of political 
communication on audiences. 
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negative impact of media on mass audiences.  Also, in this period, some in the Frankfurt School 
worried about the mass media creating a docile public, readily accepting elite domination 
(Horkheimer and Adorno 2002 [1947]).  The primary focus of communication studies in this 
phase centred on a “one-way” media response with the audience “conceived as an unwitting 
target or a passive recipient of media stimuli” (McQuail 2005: 403).  This phase was, however, 
characterized by a lack of empirical evidence proving media effects.  Lazersfeld et al.’s (1944) 
ambitious attempt to draw a direct link between political campaign messages and voting 
intentions instead found a more complicated process of opinion formation.  This research led to 
the so-called two-step model of (or limited effects model) of media effects that dominated the 
next era of research. 
 
2.43. The Minimal Effects Model  
 
Unsatisfied with this lack of data to support a direct correlation between message and response, a 
second phase of effects investigation began.  This research period is recognized for the media’s 
minimal effects on audiences.  Katz and Lazarsfeld’s (1955), examination of women in Decatur, 
Illinois concluded that media influences opinion leaders who, in turn, interpret media messages, 
for others. Media messages essentially drift through social networks, filtered by community 
leaders, to other less informed individuals (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955).  This circuit produces 
political opinions.  Klapper (1960) reinforces the turn in direction for media effects research.  His 
phenomenistic approach posits the media are not the single dependent variable determining 
effects.  Other factors, he argues, such as life experience, politics, religion and attitudes, play a 
role as well.  Media stimulus, as a result, must be placed alongside “total observed phenomenon” 
(Klapper 1960: 5).  Moreover, individuals eschew media messages that do not adhere to their 
predispositions.  However, researchers working in this vein — despite its more sophisticated 
models and variables for measuring effects — became “increasing disillusion[ed]” with their 
inability to link media messages to effects (McQuail 2005: 459).   
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2.44. The Swing Back to the More Powerful Effects Model 
 
In the wake of the social upheaval of the 1960s, new research (see, for example, Glasgow 
University Media Group 1976, 1980, 1982, 1985; Gerbner 1972; McCombs and Shaw 1972; 
Gasmson and Modigliani 1989) began making a more direct connection between media texts and 
an impact on audiences.  Lang and Lang (1959), for instance, disputed notions of minimal 
effects, arguing that the media’s influence is cultural and long-term.  The pair found:  
“The mass media force attention to certain issues. They build up public images of 
political figures. They are constantly presenting objects suggesting what individuals in 
the mass should think about, know about, have feelings about” (1959: 232) 
 
This approach — looking at long-term impacts of media — imagined a more powerful effects.  
Mediated texts, images and audio, in this phase of effects scholarship, were conceptualized as 
playing an important role in a negotiated construction of reality. Audiences, in this conception, 
essentially build meaning by blending media messages with their own experience(s) and context. 
Citing the “bankruptcy of behaviourism”, the return to this more powerful conceptualization also 
coincided with a shift away from quantitative means of assessing effects to qualitative methods 
(McQuail 2005: 461).  
 
In this paradigm, for instance, “cultivation theory” singles out television as paramount in 
symbolic production (Gerbner 1972).  Gerbner et al. (1994) concluded that individuals who 
watch a lot of television tend to overestimate the amount of real crime in the world compared to 
those who watch less television.  Echoing the Frankfurt School’s critical analysis of media, 
cultivation theory categorizes television as the “cultural arm of the established industrial order 
[which] serves primarily to maintain, stabilize and reinforce rather than to alter, threaten or 
weaken conventional beliefs and behaviours” (Gross 1977: 180).  
 
In a similar hegemonic imaginary, Noelle-Neumann (1974) also offers her spiral of silence 
theory in this period, suggesting people consent to an often elite-sponsored heuristic of their 
social reality to avoid voicing opinion not in the mainstream.  People, she posits, essentially 
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adopt the every person opinions about public issues and remain reluctant to voice how they 
really feel.  Noelle-Neumann (1974) contends this “spiral of silence” happens because: 
 
1. Society threatens deviant thinkers with isolation; 
2. People fear isolation; 
3. People constantly assess the opinion climate at all times; and  
4. People resist expressing opinions in public. 
 
Simply put, individuals, in tune with what the media are telling them about public opinion, fear 
being in the minority and thus keep their opinions to themselves. Undoubtedly, Noelle-Neumann 
positions media as having powerful effects on audiences.  
 
Much of the research in this era is grounded in the underlying premise that media — in some 
obvious and opaque ways — lead audiences or “malleable citizens” (Brewer and Gross 2010: 
160) to certain conclusions, but not always (see, for example, Gamson and Modigliani 1987; 
Iyengar and Kinder 1987).  Iyengar (1997: 212) sums up this type of effects research, stressing 
with “confidence” that: 
“news affects people in different ways — some subtle and others not so subtle — and that 
people differ significantly in what they “get” from the news and their receptivity to the 
messages and the themes presented by the media.”   
 
The media, in this imagination, possess the power to make audiences think about certain issues 
and events.   
 
McCombs and Shaw’s (1972) agenda setting research, for instance, draws links between 
messages emphasized in the news media and public opinion.  At its core, agenda setting 
scholarship (see, for example, McCombs and Shaw 1972; McCombs, Einsiedel, and Weaver 
1991; Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey 2007) posits that what the news media focuses on have an 
important impact on what audiences think about. The media, as Cohen (Cohen 1963: 13) 
asserted, “may not be very successful much of the time in telling people what to think... it is 
stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.” Interestingly, Entman (2007: 
165) flips Cohen’s logic around — a staple of most media effects literature reviews — branding 
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it as misleading and stressing that if, indeed, the media are “stunningly successful in telling 
people what to think about, they must also exert significant influence over what they think.”  
Entman argues that when elites give people something to think about, that is the first step, in fact, 
in getting them to think and act in a certain way.  Influence in pluralistic democracies, Entman 
stresses, is the beginning of politicians constructing the context and information people will 
ultimately use to form political opinions.  
 
McCombs and Estrada (1997: 247) go further, arguing that in addition to determining what the 
public thinks about, the media also “may tell us how and what to think about it, and even what to 
do about it.”  Again, the ability of the news media to set the agenda and frame the issue(s), it is 
argued, is further enhanced when it comes to international relations (Palmgreen and Clarke 1991; 
Entman 2003, 2004; Berinsky 2007, 2009).  McCombs (2004), of note, controversially linked 
agenda setting to framing, conflating both concepts19.  
 
Priming is closely related to agenda setting as an effect of media.   The priming thesis holds that 
the media influence the criteria by which people evaluate public issues events and even 
politicians (Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder 1982; Iyengar and Kinder 1987).  First conceptualized by 
social psychologists, priming focuses on the activation and accessibility of information used to 
make judgments (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Johnston et al. 1992; 
Krosnick and Brannon 1993; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Pan and Kosicki 1997; Domke 1998; 
Callaghan and Schnell 2005; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007).   Iyengar and Kinder’s (1987) 
pioneering research on priming, concluding that news coverage makes specific issues and events 
more top of mind for the public. As a result of this highlighting, the media “shape the 
considerations” in the foreground of people’s thinking as they pass judgment on public policy 
                                                
19 McCombs (2004) argues that framing is an extension of agenda setting.  He characterized the 
phenomenon as “second-level agenda setting.” Several scholars (Price, Tewksbury, and Powers 1997; 
Scheufele 2000; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007) argue the two theories are distinct.  “Agenda setting 
[sic],” writes Price and Tewksburry (Price, Tewksbury, and Powers 1997: 184), “looks on story selection 
as a determinant of public perceptions of issue importance and, indirectly through priming, evaluations of 
political leaders. Framing cues not on which topics or issues are selected for coverage by the news media, 
but instead on the particular ways those issues are presented.”  Akin to Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007), 
this research takes the position that agenda setting and priming are an accessibility effects; whereas 
framing effects is one of applicability.  See also: Scheufele and Iyengar (2014).  
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and politicians (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007: 11).  While the media gain more influence over 
audiences in the conceptual swing back to a powerful conception of media effects, audiences also 
gained more power to resist media messages.   
 
2.45. Reconceptualizing Audiences  
 
Postmodern thinking inspired considerable media research to move away from the metanarrative 
of Marxism to a much more nuanced way of thinking about audiences.  The move away from a 
Marxist critique of media effects coincided with arguments trumpeting individualism, pluralism 
and subjectivity, all of them questioning the singular importance of economics to Marxist 
thinking (Curran 2006).  This new research (Hall 1990, 1982) reformulated the conceptualization 
of media power, grounding its assumptions in Gramsci’s (1971) thinking about cultural 
hegemony. The media, in this imagination, became a “contested space” (Curran 2006: 141).   To 
be sure, Gramsci’s (1971) understanding of hegemony opened up many new avenues of 
intellectual pursuit in audience research.  
 
No longer confined to the economic and rigid conception of class, Gramsci’s thinking allowed 
wider examinations of the shaping power of cultural and social identities such as gender, race, 
sexuality religion and even professional identifications (see, for example, Williams 1977, 1980; 
Hall et al. 1978; Hall 1980).  Culture, politics and economics, in Gramsci’s understanding, are 
understood as a network.  They influence each other.  They are relational.  The social world 
represents a place where dominant and oppositional cultures commingle and contest on another 
(Jones 2006: 126).  Culture, according Gramsci, is central to social change because it is “how 
class is lived” and shapes people’s “ability to imagine how it might be changed, and whether 
they see such changes as feasible or desirable” (Crehan 2002: 71). 
 
Gramsci’s conceptualization of a negotiated power demands a different approach to audience 
reception of media texts than traditional structuralist views. If hegemony is open and negotiated, 
then textual analysis requires a more open reading and conceptualization.  Texts, in a Gramscian 
understanding, are the products of producers who have agency — and their readers also have the 
ability to negotiate their meanings. The interpretation of media messages is polysemic.  Media 
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texts are a site of resistance (Gilroy 2009). Furthermore, texts cannot be analyzed in isolation.  
Interpretations of TV, for instance, must be “open enough to admit a range of negotiated 
readiness through which various social groups can find meaningful articulations of their own 
relation to the dominant ideology” (Fiske 1992: 126).  Furthermore, there is often a collaboration 
with audiences.  “The cultural hegemony system that results,” writes Gitlin (1979: 531), “is not a 
closed system. It leaks. Its very structure leaks, at the least because it remains to some extent 
competitive.” 
 
Inspired by Gramsci (1971) and other post-modern thinking20,  scholarship interested in the 
impact of media on audiences moved away from the traditional stimulus/response model.  The 
“birth” of reception studies is often traced to Hall’s (1980) theory “Encoding/Decoding” theory.  
Hall’s work also moves away from more orthodox, Marxist views of structure to Gramsci’s more 
nuanced and ideologically centred imagination of the social world.  Hall’s thinking challenges 
reductionist behaviouristic stimulus-response model that dominated early media effects research. 
Media’s impact is not “like a tap on the knee” (Hall 1980: 131).  The influence of media, in 
Hall’s way of thinking, depends on the interpretation by the individual receiving the message.  
Like earlier communication models (see, for example, Laswell 1948; Gerbner 1956; Shannon 
and Weaver 1963), Hall’s encoding/decoding conceptualization still imagines a message, 
reception and potential influence on its receiver.  
 
Media messages, for Hall, cannot be conceived of as “a ball that the sender throws to the 
receiver” (Alasiitari 1999: 3).  Still, Hall (1980) stresses that texts are inherently encoded with 
preferred meaning(s), fixing hegemonic forces.  Meaning making (or decoding) is contingent —
but dominant meanings are often encoded in media messages.  Hall (1980: 137) offers that an 
individual’s decoding can result in three outcomes: (1) a preferred hegemonic reading; (2) a 
negotiated reading; and (3) an oppositional reading.  Hall’s model is not without its detractors 
                                                
20 Curran (2006: 107) observes that a “revisionist movement” swept across cultural and media studies in 
the 1980s, inspired by liberal pluralist and neo-Marxist thinking.   
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who claim it is too political, too totalizing and places too much emphasis on ideology over 
material conditions (Schroder et al. 2003)21.    
 
Affording audiences more agency creates a paradox, undoubtedly, for critical media and 
communication scholarship (Lewis 2001; Philo 2001). Media messages and audiences are both 
powerful.  As well, critical scholarship frequently denounces the hegemonic meaning encoded in 
most media — and celebrates the active decoding of audiences.  To overcome this, Hall (1980) 
urges media scholars to focus on organic expressions of oppositional readings — and not textual 
analysis.  
 
To sum up, the literature remains divided about the actual effects of media.  While considerable 
research makes claims about media effects, not everyone is convinced.   Gauntlett (2001: 12), for 
instance, rejects the effects conceptualizations as “indefensible and unfortunate.”  Media effects, 
Couldry (2004: 17; italics added) helpfully offers, are: 
“hard to avoid if you start from the text itself:  Outside literary approaches, why else 
study the detailed structure of a media text as your primary research focus unless you can 
plausibly claim that those details make a difference to a wider social process?”   
 
Couldry (2004) urges researchers to de-centre media (and its power) and conceptualize our lives 
as media-related.  With this way of thinking, media texts offer a variety of competing messages 
that people can accept or reject, while also incorporating them with their own predispositions.  
Rather than a simple information transfer to individuals, the media are a complex space of 
collective practices and we must resist the temptation to overstate its role in the construction of 
meaning and place (Silverstone 2007).  This research favours Livingstone’s (1993; 1996; 2000, 
2005) conception of a thinking audience, actively decoding (Hall 1980) and using their 
individual experience and knowledge to evaluate and judge mediated information (Gamson 
1992; see also Corner 2000).  Having reviewed the debate about media effects, the coming pages 
transition to outlining the potential impact of news framing.   
                                                
21 Schroder and colleagues (2003: 127-28) contend Hall’s “left-wing political scholarship from the 1970s” 
muddies the water when it comes to seeing true media effects.  Others (Golding and Murdock 1979; 
Stevens 2002), however, have criticized Hall’s encoding and decoding model for placing too much 
emphasis on ideology, while ignoring economic questions such as who owns the news organization 
producing the potentially hegemonic content.  
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2.46.  The Potential Influence of News Framing 
 
Contested — and continually debated — the influence of media frames is, admittedly, not clear 
cut.  But media frames, arguably, do something.  They are consequential on some level.  Public 
opinion, argue Kinder and Nelson, (2005: 103), often “depends in a systematic and intelligible 
way” on how issues are constructed by political actors and the news media.  Considerable 
research makes solid empirical claims about the power of media framing on audiences22.  
Druckman (2001), for instance, replicated Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) historic Asian 
disease framing experiment, confirming that test subjects opted for risk-adverse frames at 
significant statistical differences.  Most of media framing research, stress Lecheler and de Vreese 
(2011), focuses on political communication and therefore moves beyond simple 
stimulus/response effects (Kahneman and Tversky 1984).  For many in the field, there is little 
doubt: media frames constructed by both journalists and political actors can have a “significant 
impact” on people’s judgment (Tadlock, Gordon, and Popp 2007: 196). This thinking envisions 
voters relying on news media frames to shape – in part – their thinking about politics (Johnson-
Cartee 2005).  The power of media frames are, arguably, further enhanced by the agenda setting 
(McCombs and Shaw 1972) influence of the news media on audiences.   
 
The influence of media frames, argues Chong and Druckman (2007: 104), happens “when (often 
small) changes in the presentation of an issue or an event produces (sometimes large) changes in 
opinion.”  Simon and Jerit’s (2010) framing experiment, for instance, found that individuals 
exposed to almost identical news articles about abortion came to divergent opinions about the 
medical procedure after reading differently framed news samples.  Individuals who read the 
“baby” article were more inclined to support abortion regulation versus those who read the 
almost identical “fetus” story.  Of note, participants who read a third article where the words 
fetus and baby were used interchangeably were similarly disposed to abortion regulation as those 
who only read the “baby” article.  
                                                
22 See, for example, Gamson and Modigliani 1987; Zaller 1992; Zaller 1994; Iyengar 1997; Nelson, Oxley, and 
Clawson 1997; Druckman 2001; Lewis 2001; Druckman 2001a; Scheufele 2004; Berinsky and Kinder 2006; Page, 
Shapiro, and Dempsey 2007; Philo 2008; Lecheler and de Vreese 2011. 
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In a similar way, Shen (2004) measured how preexisting opinions about stem cell research and 
oil drilling in Alaska meshed with people’s existing beliefs about ethics, economics and 
environmental concerns.  A week before exposing participants to differently framed news stories, 
she assigned subjects to schema groups based on a pre-survey.  Shen’s (2004: 400) research 
concluded that people are more likely to accept novel news frames if they are consistent or 
“resonated” with existing beliefs.  Still, Kinder (2007), who conducted several cognitive framing 
experiments himself, offers some curmudgeonly advice, arguing such studies amplify effects.  
Likewise, Brewer and Gross (2010: 168) call on framing research to turn to the “world outside” 
in search of the true influence of media frames on audiences (I return to these concerns – and 
how I attempt to overcome them – in the coming methods chapter.)  
 
2.47.  News and Individual Factors  
 
Often viewed as negative or manipulative, media frames sponsored by elites evoke “nefarious 
possibilities” of “freewheeling exercises in pure manipulation” (Druckman 2001: 1041).  
Another view holds that framing happens because citizens look to “credible elites” for 
“guidance” to sort out complicated events or issues (Druckman 2001: 1061). Significant 
scholarship (Zaller 1992; Lewis 2001; Kinder and Nelson 2005; Chong and Druckman 2007; 
Berinksy 2009; Baum and Groeling 2010a, 2010b; Brewer and Gross 2010) suggests elite media 
frames shape public opinion.  Yet, the presence of a frame in the news media does not 
necessarily correlate directly with an impact or influence on the receiver.  Individual factors can 
also play a substantial role (Kosicki and McLeod 1990; Gamson 1992; Scheufele 1999; McQuail 
2005; Brewer and Gross 2010).  While McQuail (2005: 532) concedes “…it is highly plausible” 
media frames do resonate with audiences and do, in fact, have an impact “with some regularity in 
important as well as trivial cases,” he remains skeptical about them being the only influence on 
opinion formation for several reasons: 
 
1. Opinions can emerge from long-term personal circumstances; 
2. The media are not as influential as the social world; 
3. People increasingly self-select media;  
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4. Different media motives have different impacts; 
5. Both sides of the story news coverage cancels out the impact of competing media frames;  
6. People are reluctant to change their minds; and  
7. Audiences can resist media messages (McQuail 2005).   
 
So, while news frames can have an influence on individuals, it is most likely a confluence of 
media messages and individual factors that shape political opinions.  People, naturally, draw on 
their own experiences when processing media messages.  For their part, Price, Tewskbury and 
Powers (1995: 23) describe framing as “a kind of ‘hydraulic’ pattern, with thoughts of one kind, 
stimulated by the frame, driving out other possible responses.” People are a not a tabula rasa, of 
sorts, evaluating mediated communication by only the information contained within, for 
instance, a news report.  Individuals are constantly incorporating “their own thoughts, going 
beyond the information provided and drawing out some basic implications on their own” (Price, 
Tewksbury, and Powers 1997: 496). 
 
Conceptualizing the influence of media frames requires an interactive and multi-level analysis.  
Frames, as noted in the previous section about news framing, need to be recognized as both 
“devices embedded in political discourse” and “internal structures of the mind” (Kinder and 
Sanders 1990: 74).  Gamson and Modigliani (1987: 143) helpfully conceptualized frames as  
“a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of 
events . . . The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue.”   
 
Similarly, Entman (1993: 53) defined frames as “mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide 
individuals’ processing of information.”  To that end, media messages are only “part of the 
process by which individuals construct meaning” (Gamson and Modigliani 1989: 2).  Gamson 
(1992) constructively explains how individuals blend both public discourse and their own 
knowledge and experiences to form attitudes.  The coming pages turn to a more detailed outline 
of Gamson’s work and utility for conceptualizing how people develop their opinions about 
politics.   
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2.48. Gamson’s Model of Political Opinion Formation  
 
Gamson’s (1992) book Talking Politics challenges traditional views (Lippmann 2004 [1922]; 
Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1968; Bennett 1975; Neuman 1986) of average voters as 
oblivious and passive actors incapable of articulating even the most basic knowledge about 
politics or current events.  The sociologist also dispels the simplistic interpretations of 
individuals drawing solely (or heavily) on media discourse to construct their understanding of 
politics. “Media discourse,” Gamson offers (1992: xi), “is clearly not the only resource that most 
people use to construct meaning on political issues.”  Opinion formation, Gamson stresses, is 
much more sophisticated and complex than most political science accounts.  Amidst a 
“cacophony of media clatter,” people turn to their own experiences and “popular wisdom, and 
knowledge” to make sense of politics (Gamson 1992: xi).  As Figure Three depicts, individuals 
construct opinions through the mix of processing media discourse, experiential knowledge and 
popular wisdom. 
 
Figure 3 - Gamson’s (1992) Model of Negotiating Meaning   
 
 
Media Discourse 
Popular 
Wisdom 
Experiential 
Knowledge 
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Gamson (1992) determined that Americans’ views about affirmative action, for instance, are 
shaped by their individual identity, personal experiences, conversations with friends — and 
media discourse.  Gamson’s focus groups about four issues: (1) affirmative action; (2) nuclear 
power; (3) the Arab-Israeli conflict; and (4) the slump in American industry reveals how, as 
people sort through these issues, their discussions do mimic media messages — but also notably 
folds in their own experience and knowledge.   
 
Gamson’s (1992) work is also decidedly anti-elitist, too.  His research is grounded in three core 
assumptions about people: (1) they are not “so passive”;  (2) they are “not so dumb”; and (3) 
they “negotiate with media messages in complicated ways that vary from issue to issue” 
(Gamson 1992: 4).  Gamson rejects traditional concern (Lippmann 2004 [1922]) about voters 
drowning in a sea of competing ideas and willing to listen to emotional and irrational appeals or 
media frames.  His research also attempts to “reconcile” notions of how low-information citizens 
negotiate complex issues and events to form political opinions (Iyengar 1991: 7).  Gamson 
(1992: 6) does not reject concerns about such “handicaps” — but insists citizens, unlike so much 
social science depictions, are not unsophisticated and ill-informed and, in fact, do “read media 
messages in complicated and sometimes unpredictable ways, and draw heavily on other 
resources as well in constructing meaning.”  The coming pages explain each factor in some 
detail.   
 
2.49.  The Media and Constructing Meaning  
 
For Gamson (1992: xi), the media represent a “system in which active agents within specific 
purposes are constantly engaged in a process of supplying meaning.”  But instead of thinking of 
media messages as a simple stimuli, mediated communication represents only one part of a 
“complex symbolic contest” where meaning emerges from “thinking individuals” blending both 
their own experiences and news content (Gamson 1992: xii).  Gamson (1992) stresses that 
individuals can rely mainly — and even exclusively — on media to form opinions about issues, 
events or political actors.  It is important to stress that the “readers” of media discourse are not 
“passive recipients” in their opinion formation (Herda-Rapp 2003: 545).   
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According to Gamson (1992), political attitudes emerge from a confluence of individual factors 
and media frames that spotlight facts, making them more salient or applicable, especially when it 
coms to foreign policy (Western 2005).  Media frames and the rhetoric of public figures such as 
U.S. President Ronald Reagan were echoed repeatedly in Gamson’s focus groups.  Often, 
participants repeated so-called catch phrases that were popular in the media or used by 
politicians.   
 
The media offer cues or structures for individuals to form opinions about issues, events and 
political actors, according to Gamson (1992).  Lippmann (2004 [1922]), an astute observer of 
political opinion, stressed almost a century ago that the news media help frame the pictures in 
our minds: 
“Each of us lives and works in a small part of the earth’s surface, moves in small circles, 
and of the acquaintances knows only a few intimately.  Of any public event that has wide 
effect we see at best only a phase and aspect … Inevitably, our opinions cover a bigger 
space, a longer reach of time, a greater number of things, than we can directly observe.  
They have, therefore, to be pieced together out of what others have reported and what we 
can imagine” (Lippmann 2004 [1922]: 33). 
 
Zaller (1992), echoing Lippmann, highlights the importance of the news media in his receive, 
accept sample (RAS) model of public opinion formation, stressing that elite media frames often 
lay the foundation for public attitude (see also, Edelman 1964; Gamson and Modigliani 1987; 
Kinder and Sanders 1990).  Zaller (1992: 311) in fact, rejects notions of minimal media effects, 
conceding that no single news story  “may have great effect, but at the cumulative effect of many 
stories over a period of months or years may nonetheless be large” (see also Iyengar 1991).  
Zaller (1992, 1994) contends that the balance of persuasive news media messages can shape 
public attitudes about political issues and events.  In a similar vein, Berinksy (2009) highlights 
the importance of news media messages, arguing that people cue to the view of partisan leaders 
to form opinions about foreign policy. 
 
As noted earlier in the section about the practice of journalistic news framing, Iyengar (1991) 
posits that journalists frequently frame their stories in episodic or thematic ways.  Iyengar (1991: 
11) concluded individuals “are exquisitely sensitive” to this type of news framing.  New stories 
framed in a thematic fashion encourage audiences to not connect narratives to larger systems and 
localize consequences and blame at the individual level.  Episodic stories about poverty, for 
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instance, encourage people to blame lazy individuals for being economically disadvantaged.  
“[P]eople,” writes Iyengar (1991: 137), “settle upon causes and treatments that “fit” the observed 
problem.”  To that end, episodic frames encourage hegemonic interpretations of issues and 
events, “leading to the trivialization of public discourse and the erosion of electoral 
accountability” (Iyengar 1991: 143). Moreover, episodic framing diminishes public discourse, 
preventing people “from cumulating the evidence towards any logical, ultimate consequence” 
(Iyengar 1992: 48).  News stories framed in a thematic way, on the other hand, encourage 
audiences to connect issues in the news to larger social structures. A thematic story about 
poverty, for example, shifts blame for such economic hardship away from individuals to larger 
structural problems such as education and racism.   
2.50. Popular Wisdom  
Popular wisdom is knowledge that is common to everyone.  Gamson’s model (1992: 123) 
determined that many people use popular beliefs and narratives to negotiate meaning, defining it 
as a “general rule of thumb that relates the experience to some popular maxim that it illustrates.”  
Gamson (1992) found that are there are usually two ways by which popular wisdom gets folded 
into thinking about politics: (1) rules of thumb; and (2) analogies about everyday life.  The “rules 
of thumb include proverbs, maxims, and biblical sayings” (Gamson 1992: 124).  For many, 
popular wisdom is natural and taken for granted.  It is part of their history or culture. Gamson 
(1992: 123) found that many of his focus group participants prefaced their arguments with 
statements such as:  “That’s the way life is”; “It’s human nature”; and “As everyone knows.”  
Popular wisdom, therefore, relies on common knowledge and is more likely found in 
homogenous groups.   
Popular wisdom is both an individual resource and a cultural one.  It represents a person’s 
personal experience and knowledge — but also “maxims and analogies” that “resonate with 
broad cultural themes” (Gamson 1992: 143).  To be sure, popular wisdom communicates a 
cultural theme.  When popular wisdom resonates with media frames, individuals connect the two 
(Gamson 1992).  The “success or failure” of media messages depends on: 
“resonances with popular thinking, active elite sponsorship, and media practices that 
might favour some frames over others. Frames develop in a dialectic fashion, as 
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contesting parties articulate counter-frames to meet their opponents’ preferred 
interpretations (Price et al. 2005: 182).  
People frequently rely on popular conceptions or heuristics to form political attitudes.  Zaller 
(1992: 1), for instance, posits that individuals use ideas that are “most immediately salient to 
them or the “top of the head”” (see also Taylor and Fiske 1978).  
 
The influence of media frames on audiences is most noticeable when the focus of attention is 
consistent with an individuals’ common sense view of the world (Chong and Druckman 2007). 
Media frames, to be sure, mingle with “fundamental human values” and have an impact on 
decision makers and public policy choices (Miller and Parnell Riechert 2001: 108).  As Tuchman 
(1976) stressed, framing means accepting some facts and rejecting others. In a similar way, Petty 
and Cacioppo’s (1986) elaboration likelihood model (ELM) predicts that people tend to spend 
more time thinking about (and are more likely to accept) ideas and arguments that dovetail with 
their predispositions. Simply put, individuals prize information that corresponds with their own 
popular wisdom and experiential knowledge because it avoids the uneasiness of incorporating 
information that is incongruous with an individual’s predispositions into opinion formation.   
 
2.51. Experiential Knowledge 
 
Individual experience also has a profound influence on how people think about politics.  Think, 
for example, about the unemployed worker.  His or her experience will undoubtedly play a role 
in how that person feels about the economy and government services for the out of work.  This 
type of knowledge, argues Gamson (1992: 123), can be both direct or by proxy because it has a 
“privilege[d] place: it says, “I know because I saw it myself, firsthand.””  Individuals actively 
rely on their experiences to “negotiate the meaning of issues”  (Price et al. 2005: 181).      
“Experiential knowledge is valued precisely because it is so direct and relatively 
unmediated.  Although there is penalty of selectivity in the memory of experience, it is 
our own selectivity, not someone else’s” (Gamson 1992: 126). 
 
Moreover, this type of knowledge can inspire empathy, allowing people to step out of their 
personal situation to understand how others feel in a similar situation.  A formerly unemployed 
worker, for instance, may be sympathetic to those who are currently unemployed because she or 
he knows what it is like to be without a job. 
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Social groups often influence experiential knowledge.  Converse (1964) posits that reference 
groups frequently shape how people arrive at their political opinions.  The influence of groups is 
sociotropic (Mutz 1998).   Individuals situate themselves politically based on experiential factors 
such as race, ethnicity, nationality, religion and other tribal factors.  People even “evaluate 
parties and candidates in terms of their expected favourable or unfavourable treatment of 
different social groupings in society” (Converse 1964: 216).   This referencing — or deference 
— to groups extends to foreign policy attitudes, too.  Berinsky (2009) challenges scholarship 
(Holsti 2004; Jentleson 1992; Page and Shapiro 2007) that argues the public comes to their 
opinions about support for war in a rational way.  According to Berinksy (2009), foreign policy 
— akin to domestic politics — is shaped largely by individual’s predispositions and their social 
groupings.  “Attachment to and enmities towards politically relevant groups,” argues Berinsky 
(2009: 62), “provide the baseline reaction towards war.” 
 
Emotion can also plays a critical role in how people form political opinions.  In his book 
dismissing Descartes’ famous assertion I think therefore I am, Damasio (1994) contends that 
emotions and feelings are central to how individuals interpret their social world and construct 
meaning.  The neurologist argues emotions are not divorced from reason — but are 
“indispensable for rationality” (Damasio 1994: xvii).  Nevertheless, considerable political 
science, psychology and economics scholarship (see, for example, Edwards 1977; Edwards and 
Newman 1986) posits that individual decision-making is a cost-benefit choice, whereby actors 
weigh the utility of options such as voting for candidate A over candidate B.  Bounded 
rationality models (see, for example, Tversky and Kahneman 1973, 1974; Kahneman and 
Tversky 2000; Tetlock and Mellers 2002), similarly, highlight analytical choices — but 
recognize that people use shortcuts (heuristics) to make decisions. Westen (2007), convincingly, 
challenges orthodox Western philosophy's separation of reason from emotion in opinion 
formation.  “In politics,” argues Westen (2007: 35), “when reason and emotion collide, emotion 
invariably wins.” 
“Although the marketplace of ideas is a great place to shop for policies, the marketplace 
that matters most in American politics is the marketplace of emotions” (Westen 2007: 35-
36; italics in original). 
 
  114 
Westen (2007) stresses that emotional connections to “communities, tribes, sects, or nations” 
often supersede rational notions of decision-making in politics.  Marcus (2002), as well, argues 
that emotion is crucial to political thinking — and theorists need to account for feelings in 
political deliberation.  Akin to Mouffe (2000), Marcus (2002), in fact, argues that public 
discourse benefits from emotion.   
 
Emotion and opinion can even override factual information.  “[O]ur brains,” stresses Westen  
(2007: 100), “have a remarkable capacity to find their ways towards convenient truths — even if 
they are not that true.”  Challenging existing media frames in an individual’s minds is difficult. 
“If a strongly held frame doesn’t fit the facts, the facts will be ignored and the frame will be 
kept” (Lakoff 2004: 37).  Druckman and Bolsen (2011), of particular interest to this research, 
concluded that factual information has little sway or utility in the face of emotion.  Facts, the pair 
found, have negligible influence on individuals’ initial reactions to news information.  Secondly, 
individuals do not prize frames containing facts over ones that do not.  Finally, once people make 
up heir minds, they process factual information in a biased way, attempting to confirm their 
initial opinion.  To be sure, the political brain is decidedly emotional.  We are skeptical of 
information that conflicts with our values (Westen 1985; Haidt 2003; De Waal 2005).   As 
Francis Bacon observed four-hundred years ago: 
“The human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion … draws all things else 
to support and agree with it.  And though there be a great number of weight of instances 
to be found on the other side, yet these it either neglects or despised … in order that by 
this great and pernicious predetermination the authority of its former conclusion may 
remain inviolate” (Bacon, as quoted in, Westen 2007: 89). 
 
Westen (2007), notably, suggests that political campaigns focus on emotion over substance.  
“You can slog it out for those few millimeters of cerebral turf that process facts, figures and 
policy statements,” he writes (2007: 88), or political campaigns can effectively frame their 
message as emotional appeals to voters.  
 
2.52. Conclusion: The confluence of Media, Experience and Popular Wisdom  
 
Gamson’s (1992) model suggests public opinion represents a confluence of media messages, 
experiential knowledge and popular wisdom.  The process is, admittedly, not direct  — but 
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multi-level.  Personal experiences are, of course, produced by cultural experiences, including 
media discourse.  Moreover, media messages “have no fixed meaning but involve a negotiation 
with a heterogeneous audience that may provide them with meanings quite different from the 
preferred reading” (Gamson 1992: 125).  People read in their own meanings when interpreting 
media frames. Popular wisdom bridges both the personal and the cultural.  It incorporates both 
personal experience and links them to common knowledge or rules of thumb.  Popular wisdom is 
also woven into media discourse:   
“Analogies to everyday life and popular maxims are often invoked to make abstract 
frames more immediate and concrete.  Popular wisdom is not only a conversational 
resources but a resource for sponsors of different media frames and for journalists as they 
interpret events.  By linking media discourse to popular wisdom, it is thus brought closer 
to experiential knowledge” (Gamson 1992: 126). 
 
To that end, media frames that appear more natural and in line with popular wisdom have a 
better chance of resonating with publics.  Some media frames possess a “natural advantage 
because their ideas and language resonate with a broader political culture.  Resonances increase 
the appeal of a frame by making it appear natural and familiar” (Gamson 1992: 135).   
“Not all symbols are equally potent.  Certain packages have a natural advantage because 
their ideas and language resonate with larger cultural themes.  Resonances increase the 
appeal of a package; they make it appear natural and familiar.  Those who respond to the 
cultural theme will find it easier to respond to a package with the same sonorities” 
(Gamson and Modigliani 1989: 5). 
Having completed my overview of the relevant theory underpinning this research, the ensuing 
pages seeks to outline this study’s conceptual framework and research questions 
 
2.53.  Conceptual Framework and Research Questions  
 
This chapter offered two storylines about framing.  The first outlined how frame-building and 
media content are shaped by three levels of influence: (1) social; (2) institutional; and (3) 
routines and practices (Shoemaker and Reese 2014). The second half of this chapter 
conceptualized how frame-setting may influence audiences’ political opinions.  In line with 
Denzin’s (1989: 297) notion of triangulating theory with a mind to placing several concepts “side 
by side to assess their utility and power” this chapter underpins this study’s conceptual 
framework.  What follows now is a description of the system or circuit that this research 
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imagines shaping both news content and potentially individuals’ political opinions. As Figure 
Four illustrates, media framing occurs at two different stages: (1) frame-building; and (2) frame-
setting (Scheufele 2000; D'Angelo 2002a; de Vreese 2005). Frame-building, as this chapter 
outlined, involves a mix of factors — social, institutional and routines and practices — that 
influence news production (Tuchman 1978a; Gans 1979; Gitlin 2003 [1980]; Snow and Benford 
1992; Shoemaker and Reese 2014). Frame-setting, on the other hand, envisions the potential 
influence of media frames on audiences.   
  
 
 
Figure 4  An Integrated Process Model of Framing (de Vreese 2005: 52) 
 
 
 
 
As Figure Five illustrates, a convergence of factors shape both frame-building (news media 
content) and frame-setting (information processing).  The social system or ideological level 
defines the horizon of what gets talked about and how those issues and evens get talked about.  It 
is also at this level that political actors articulate media frames to advance their strategic 
interests.  
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Figure 5 — Conceptual Framework   
 
The news media’s normative role is also influenced at the social system level, affecting how 
news professionals conduct themselves at the routines and practices level.  At the social 
institution level, embedding and indexing continually structure news production. The normal, 
everyday methods and practices of journalists lead them to prize certain stories over other and to 
frequently fact check the media frames sponsored by elites. The churn of these three factors, I 
contend, influenced the coverage the news media produced about the war in Afghanistan.   
 
The potential influence of media on audiences also represents an assemblage of factors as Figure 
Five illustrates.  The media discourse produced in the first part of the circuit mixes with the 
experiential knowledge and popular wisdom of individuals to potentially produce people’s 
political opinions.  Audiences, to be sure, are sophisticated and active readers.  They can resist 
media messages.  But ample research suggests political opinions likely represent the confluence 
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of media discourse and people’s predispositions.   To test this conceptual framework, this study 
poses a number of research questions in relation to: (1) how micro, meso and macro-level factors 
shaped coverage of the conflict in Kandahar; and (2) how Canadians arrived at their opinions 
about the war.  My main Research Question (MRQ) evaluates: what impact government and 
military media frames about the war in Afghanistan had on journalists covering the conflict and 
the Canadian public.  I propose eight sub-research questions: 
 
R1. How was Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan framed in the news media? 
 
R2. What role did news values play in shaping news content? 
 
R3. How do journalists (if at all) fact check the preferred media frames of the military and 
government leaders surrounding Canada’s military efforts in Afghanistan? 
 
R4. What role does indexing play in shaping the news media’s coverage of Canada’s military 
mission in Afghanistan? 
 
R5. How (if at all) does journalistic fact checking influence audiences’ judgments about war? 
 
R6. How are audiences influenced (or not at all) by the popular wisdom concerning 
peacekeeping? 
 
R7. How are Canadians’ attitudes towards its military and its intervention in foreign conflicts 
influenced (or not at all) by experiential knowledge? 
 
R8. How does the confluence of media discourse, popular wisdom and experiential knowledge 
potentially shape Canadians’ attitudes towards its military and its intervention in foreign 
conflicts? 
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Chapter Three: Research Methodology   
 
3.0. Introduction 
 
This chapter outlines the methods used to answer the eight research questions posed at the end of 
the last chapter.  It offers both a rationale and a description of this study’s content analysis and 
population-based survey experiment.  I begin this methods chapter by outlining the classic 
content analysis (CA) I performed to assess and measure both research questions one to four: 
  
R1. How was Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan framed in the news media? 
 
R2. What role did news values play in shaping news content? 
 
R3. How do journalists (if at all) fact check the preferred media frames of the military and 
government leaders surrounding Canada’s military efforts in Afghanistan? 
 
R4. What role does indexing play in shaping the news media’s coverage of Canada’s military 
mission in Afghanistan? 
 
This work’s CA (n = 900) allowed me to quantify the extent — and impact — of framing, news 
values, fact checking and indexing.  Recognizing the constitutive and informational role of news 
media as a source, reference point, validator, and barometer for topics of social, cultural, and 
political significance, this research examined how Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan was 
represented in the Canadian news media.  CA remains a useful tool for quantifying media 
practice and content (Riffe, Lacy, and Fico 2008; Neuendorf 2002; Althaus 2003; Bauer 2007; 
Porpora et al. 2008; Harp et al. 2010; Krippendorff 2013; Speer 2017).  The coming pages 
outline why a content analysis offers a useful means to assess the factors that shaped news 
coverage of the conflict in Afghanistan.  It is important to note that this research’s content 
analysis acts as a springboard for this research’s subsequent attempt to assess the impact of 
mediated messages on Canadian audiences.  To enhance this work’s external validity, the media 
samples used as treatments in this work were drawn from examples identified by the CA.   
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The second section of this chapter details the procedures and justifications used to assess 
research questions five to eight: 
 
R5. How (if at all) does journalistic fact checking influence audiences’ judgments about war? 
 
R6. How are audiences influenced (or not at all) by the popular wisdom concerning 
peacekeeping? 
 
R7. How are Canadians’ attitudes towards its military and its intervention in foreign conflicts 
influenced (or not at all) by experiential knowledge? 
 
R8. How does the confluence of media discourse, popular wisdom and experiential knowledge 
potentially shape Canadians’ attitudes towards its military and its intervention in foreign 
conflicts? 
 
This research’s representative population-based survey experiment (n = 1131) tested: (1) the 
potential impact of media discourse about Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan; (2) the 
potential impact of journalistic fact checking on audiences; (3) and the possible confluence of 
media discourse, popular wisdom and experiential knowledge shaping Canadians’ opinions 
about the war in Afghanistan. The subsequent pages outline the procedures and rationale for my 
content analysis before taking up the same topics concerning my population-based survey 
experiment.   
 
3.1.  Rationale 
 
Content analysis merges both qualitative and quantitative features, allowing for a thorough 
examination and identification of common phenomena in media texts. In particular, CA provides 
an effective tool for identifying and quantifying frames across many media samples (Matthes and 
Kohring 2008). Several scholarly examinations of framing (Herman and Chomsky 2002 [1988]; 
Entman 1991; Woolley 2000; Entman 2003; Bennett et al. 2006, 2007; Baum and Groeling 
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2010a; Baum and Groeling 2010b; Speer 2017) have, for example, examined how government 
and military leaders and journalists frame media messages about war, conflict and terrorism. By 
analyzing a large sample of news content, CA identifies and provides a count of variables — 
source, frames and oppositional readings — enabling researchers to infer larger meanings (Bauer 
2007; Riffe et al. 2008). Moreover, if we accept audiences are influenced — even minimally — 
by the new media then a systematic assessment of actual media texts for patterns and trends 
ideally predicates audience research (Philo 2001; Bauer 2007; Shoemaker and Reese 2014).  
CA remains a useful method for quantifying what media do with elite discourse (Hallin 1986; 
Bennett 1990; Entman 1991; Woolley 2000; Bennett et al. 2006, 2007; Baum and Groeling 
2010a; Baum and Groeling 2010b; Speer 2017).  Leaders in the field of CA (Riffe et al. 1998; 
Neuendorf 2002; Bauer 2007; Krippendorff 2013) contend the research tool offers an efficient 
means for analyzing media.  The method allows researchers a nimble means to “turns words into 
numbers” and deduce larger meaning(s) and execute longitudinal examinations of media 
(Franzosi 2004: 4).  Bauer (2007: 135) highlights four advantages of CA:  (1) it constructs “a text 
corpus as an open system in order to pick up trends and changing patterns”; (2) its comparisons 
can reveal “differences”; (3) it offers evidence to relate to other phenomenon; and (4) the method 
can create “maps of knowledge… embodied in texts.”    
 
Critics, on the other hand, argue that CA fails as a methodology because of its trivial applications 
to quantify insignificant problems or phenomena (Holsti 1969).  CA — by no means, of course 
— offers any metrics for understanding the potential impact of media messages (Bauer 2007). 
After considering other methodological approaches (discourse analysis, interviews with 
journalists), a classic content analysis was chosen as the best systematic means for measuring — 
empirically — the shaping factors influencing the news media’s coverage of Canada’s military 
mission in Afghanistan.  
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3.2. Defining Content Analysis  
 
Definitions and applications of CA or content analysis are inconsistent in the literature, with 
some calling it a method and others labelling it an analytical approach (Deacon et al. 1999).  
Bauer (2007: 132) describes CA as “systematic classification and counting of text units.” 
Berelson (1952: 18) defined CA as “a research technique for the objective, systematic, and 
quantitative description of the manifest content of communication.”   Budd, Thorp and Donohew 
(1967: 2), in a similar fashion, hold that “content analysis is a systematic technique for analyzing 
message content and message handling — it is a tool for observing and analyzing the overt 
communication behaviour of selected communicators.”  Holsti (1969: 14), on the other hand, 
emphasizes the “technique’s” merits for drawing inferences.  Weber (1985: 9),  champions the 
“set of procedures” that lead to suppositions.  Krippendorff (2013) stresses that inferences from 
CA are replicable and valid.  In a comparable way, Neuendorf (2002: 10), highlights the 
scientific method, with its “attention to objectivity, intersubjectivity, a priori design, reliability, 
validity, generalizability, replicability and hypothesis testing.”  To be sure, a systematic CA 
“distill[s] a large amount of material into a short description” so as to construct “maps of 
knowledge” (Bauer 2007: 132, 35). Simply put, CA provides a snapshot of journalistic efforts. 
 
3.3. The Difficulty of Finding Media Frames 
 
Given its subjective nature, questions persist about CA’s reliability, specifically with respect to 
identifying and assessing media frames (Gamson and Modigliani 1987; Miller 1997; Scheufele 
1999; Grandy 2001; Hertog and McLeod 2001; Tankard 2001; Matthes and Kohring 2008).  It 
remains “extremely difficult” to eliminate the research’s subject position from frame 
identification and analysis (Van Gorp 2005: 503). Many researchers are vague — and even silent 
— about how exactly they pinpoint frames.  Hanson (1995: 384), for instance, writes that the 
frame “emerged from the analysis.”  Similarly ambiguous, Haller and Ralph (2001: 412) offer 
that “news frames were found.”  In equally amorphous fashion, Coleman and Dysart (2005: 
13)(2005) stress their “deep reading […] informed the authors of the emergent frames.”  Simon 
(2001) and Tankard (2001), not surprisingly, argue this fuzzy methodology sparks questions and 
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uneasiness about bias, arbitrariness and methodological rigour.   Matthes and Kohring (2008) go 
further, suggesting researchers consciously or unconsciously find the frames they go looking for.   
In traditional CA, six typical approaches prevail in framing research, according to Matthes and 
Kohring (2008).  The forthcoming pages offer a brief picture of each — and their strengths and 
weaknesses.  This is done with a mind to justifying this CA’s hybrid method of frame 
identification and analysis.   
 
(1) Hermeneutic Approach:  With its origins deeply rooted in qualitative research, hermeneutic 
CA examines a small sample population of texts so as to make connections with wider discourse.  
This interpretive method connects and links frames with larger cultural events (Matthes and 
Kohring 2008).  Several concerns persist about researcher bias, validity, reliability — and how, 
exactly, researchers identified the frames they quantify in their CA.  Downs (2002: 47), in fact, 
concedes that the implicit subjectivity of the approach makes it “more experiential and 
contextually contingent than empirical.”   
 
(2) Linguistic Approach:  Linguistic CA (Entman 1991; Pan and Kosicki 1993; Esser and 
D'Angelo 2003) identifies frames by analyzing what words get used and where they get used.  
The text essentially provides the building blocks for systematically identifying and analyzing the 
frame.  Critics charge the approach is too complex, questioning how words intertwined together 
construct a frame.  Akin to concerns about hermeneutic analysis, those that doubt the method, 
worry about its reliability and ability to be replicated (Matthes and Kohring 2008). 
 
(3) Manual Holistic Approach:  This inductive process of media texts analysis builds towards 
frame identification (Simon and Xenos 2000).  This iterative approach leads to a codebook and 
subsequent coding. Deep readings by researchers draw out themes or frames found in texts. 
Skeptics argue the approach shares similar problems with the hermeneutic approach — and 
question its validity and reliability.   
 
(4) Computer-assisted Approach:  Frame mapping relies on the assumption that certain words 
form the foundation of frames (Matthes 2009: 261).  Computer software catalogue word 
groupings in order to identify frames.  Critics, however, wonder why researchers would rely on 
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computers for what is largely a subjective analysis.  Moreover, they question with clumps of 
words actually compose a concrete frame.  Computers cannot detect the nuances of frames 
(Matthes and Kohring 2008).  
 
(5) Deductive Approach:  This approach uses frames found in literature to create codes to 
analyze text.  Literary critic Northrop Frye (1982) famously asserted that the Bible formed the 
“mythological framework” underpinning Western literature.  Semetko and Valkeburg (2000), in 
fact, offer five generic frames: human interest, conflict, economic ramifications, morality and 
responsibility. 
 
(6) Cluster Frame Analysis: Like the computer-assisted approach, Matthes and Kohring (2008) 
contend that frames follow certain patterns.  Statistical factor analysis, the researchers offer, 
provides a way to confirm the existence of frames.  “When some elements group together 
systematically in a specific way,” they argue,  “they form a pattern that can be identified across 
several texts in a sample.  We call these patterns frames” (Matthes and Kohring 2008: 263).  
Skeptics of this method worry that computers can miss frames or evolving issues in complicated 
— and nuanced — news media texts.    
 
This research employed a manual holistic approach.  In order to overcome the methodological 
deficiencies outlined above, this CA first determined theoretical grounding and goals (Bell 
2001).   Neuendorf (2002: 107), as well, stresses that theory and past research can help to define 
variables, conceptual foundations and hypothesis with the aim of getting “the researcher to think 
critically about the nature of his or her study.”  To that end, this research began with the four 
research questions detailed at the beginning of this chapter.  
 
Moreover, this research disaggregated frames between those sponsored by government and 
military leaders and how journalists structured (or framed) their stories.  Not a lot of research 
separates the frames that are attributed to sources and those that are generated by news 
professionals (Speer 2017).   It is critical for this work to separate the framing to see how 
journalists deal with the frames sponsored by government and military leaders.  Making a 
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distinction between the frames allowed me to assess if journalists fact checked the frames used 
by officials.  
 
In preparation for developing the coding scheme and schedule, I began by reading numerous 
Canadian federal government policy documents and speeches surrounding the military mission 
in Afghanistan. As well, a Strategic Counsel survey in July 2007 of Canadians about their 
attitudes towards the military mission largely informed the variable adoption.  The polling firm’s 
questions mirrored the talking points (or media frames) used repeatedly by the government and 
military leaders in their communication efforts about the war.  The Canadians surveyed by The 
Strategic Counsel (2007) 23were asked about the consequences if Canada withdrew its forces 
after 2009, considering: 
 
1. “The Taliban will regroup and come back into power in Afghanistan”; 
2. “The authority and legitimacy of the United Nations would be severely damaged”; 
3. “Canada’s reputation within the international community would suffer”; 
4. “The rights of women and children will be negatively affected”; 
5. “More terrorist attacks on Western nations such as Canada will occur”; and 
6. “Afghanistan’s economy would become more reliant on the cultivation of poppies for the 
production of opium and heroin” (The Strategic Counsel 2007: np). 
 
Canadians were also asked if they support the government’s justification for the military 
mission: 
 
1.  “The Afghan people want the assistance of Canada to remove the Taliban threat” and 
2.  “Canada’s contribution is making a real  difference” (The Strategic Counsel 2007: np) 
 
                                                
23  The survey results found that between 53-81 per cent of survey respondents agreed with the 
government’s rationale for war.  Still, only seven per cent of Canadians “strongly supported” the military 
mission. The polling firm surveyed 1,000 Canadians between July 12 and July 16, 2007.  The margin of 
error was +/- 3.1 per cent 19 times out of 20 (CTV 2007).   
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After a careful reading of government texts, this research moved to a second inductive phase of 
reading numerous (n = 45) news media samples between 2006-2011 concerning Canada’s 
military mission in Afghanistan with a mind to identifying themes and media frames.  Akin to 
Rendon and Nicolas (2012), a two-step inductive approach to developing coding categories was 
employed.  This analysis of media texts revealed rhetorical patterns and consistent media frames 
first identified in government documents.   This process produced a tentative list of 10 frames to 
search for in a pilot project (see Appendix One for a complete list of frames).  
 
3.4. Identifying the Media Frame  
 
In order to overcome the methodological deficiencies outlined above concerning researcher bias 
influencing frame identification, this study took pains to define how it determined the frames it 
would single out for analysis. Entman (1993: 52; italics in original) helpfully contends that 
framing requires “select[ing] some aspects of a perceived reality and mak[ing] them more salient 
in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.”  
This research’s frame identification process also adopted Matthe’s (2009) criteria for 
establishing the presence of a frame.  Inspired by Matthes and Kohring (2008), this research’s 
CA employed an elementary, manual cluster analysis, whereby the coding process looked for 
combined words such as “helping women and children” or “making Afghanistan safer.”  This 
was done to improve this CA’s frame identification reliability and validity.   
Robinson’s (2002: 138-39) CA surrounding the “CNN Effect” determined that keyword analysis 
proved “the toughest test” for identifying frames. This research’s frame identification paid 
particular attention, for instance, to moral speech devices, such as “brave” or “evil” that officials 
often evoked in their media frames about Canada’s military efforts in southern Afghanistan. 
Using Entman’s (1993) definition of frames, this research’s inductive phase found that 
fundamental factors grouped together in an organized fashion, composing established patterns.  
Table Two bellow illustrates how this study’s frames fit into Matthe’s (2009) four criteria:  (1) 
“problem definition”; (2) “causal interpretation”; (3) “evaluation”; and (4) “treatment 
recommendation” (Matthes 2009: 264). 
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Table 2 — Frame Elements - Operational Definition24 
 
Promote a 
Particular Problem 
Definition  
Causal 
Interpretation 
Moral Evaluation  Treatment 
Recommended  
“The Taliban will 
regroup and come 
back into power in 
Afghanistan” 
“Canada’s military 
efforts are making 
Afghanistan safer.  
The armed forces are 
winning or beating 
the insurgents 
(Taliban)” 
“The authority and 
legitimacy of the 
United Nations 
would be severely 
damaged” 
“We need to fight the 
terrorists were the 
terrorists live; 
instead of fighting 
them at home.”  
“More terrorist 
attacks on Western 
nations such as 
Canada will occur” 
“Canadian Forces are 
making progress — 
fighting the 
insurgency (Taliban), 
enhancing 
development,  
“Canada’s reputation 
within the 
international 
community would 
suffer” 
"We need to restore 
democracy.”   
“Afghanistan’s 
economy would 
become more reliant 
on the cultivation of 
poppies for the 
production of opium 
and heroin” 
 “The rights of 
women and children 
will be negatively 
affected” 
“Canada’s 
contribution to 
reconstruction and 
development in 
Afghanistan is 
making a real 
difference to 
improving the lives 
of Afghan people”. 
  “The Afghan people 
want the assistance 
of Canada and other 
countries to remove 
the Taliban threat” 
 
  Soldiers/Military/Mi
ssion — endowed 
with brave, noble, 
efficient, strong, 
warrior-like, 
dedicated 
characteristics. 
 
 
                                                
24 Arguably, some of these frames contain more than one element.    
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This careful definition of frames and cluster analysis adds, arguably, to the reliability and 
validity of this CA’s frame identification and analysis.    
3.5. Pilot Project  
 
In order to further enhance the reliability and validity of this CA, a pilot project (n = 45) was 
conducted.  That work identified a need to refine my coding schedule.  The so-called talking 
points for military and government leaders detailed above captured many of the frames used by 
military and government leaders.  The small-scale CA, however, identified a few more nuanced 
frames. Many government and especially military leaders stressed winning the “hearts and 
minds” of Afghan people.   In a complementary way, several samples include a government or 
military official highlighting the “progress” of Canadian Forces in southern Afghanistan. 
Moreover, my coding scheme surrounding “more terrorist attacks” happening in the West also 
needed broadening because government and military leaders were often more subtle or nuanced 
in their articulation of the terrorism frame.  In one sample, a general argues Canadian Forces are 
required in Afghanistan so as to ensure there is no “fertile ground for terrorist organizations to 
operate” in the country.   The pilot project added three more frames to the coding schedule (see 
Appendix One for a complete list of this CA’s variables).   
 
3.6. News Media Sample 
 
The media texts (or sampling frame) for this CA, were drawn randomly from 48 months (January 
2006 – December 2009) of Canadian news media coverage of Canada’s military mission in 
southern Afghanistan.  Using the news archive Infomart.com, the search terms “Afghanistan” 
and “Canada” produced a population of 12,057 news media pieces about Canada’s military 
mission in Afghanistan between January 1, 2006 - December 31, 2011 (entire mission).  This 
sample drew from four media organizations — CBC National Radio News25, The Globe and 
Mail, The National Post and CTV National News.  
  
                                                
25 I covered the military mission in southern Afghanistan twice as an embedded journalist for the 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) in 2006 and 2007. 
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Figure 6 — Possible Media Samples — 2006-2009 
 
 
The news media’s coverage of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan dropped substantially 
after 2009 as Figure Six illustrates.  The political debate about the controversial mission 
essentially ended with a confidence motion in Canada’s House of Commons in 2008, pledging 
Canadian Forces stay until the end of 2011 (Canadian Press 2014).  Moreover, of the 162 
Canadians killed in Afghanistan, 132 died between 2006-2009 (CBC 2014a).    
This CA decided to “ring-fence the range” of its sample collection around the most intense 
period of public debate — 2006 - 2009 (Deacon et al. 1999: 123). This period was, arguably, the 
sharpest time for government and military leaders to engage in framing the military mission in 
the media.  As Bauer (2007) and Krippendorff (2013) note, representation often depends on the 
research question.  As well, Riffe et al. (1998) contend purposive sampling is determined by the 
analytical problem proposed by the research.  As a result, this CA incorporates a representative26 
or systematic sample (n = 900) comprised of 10 per cent of the nearly 9,000 possible samples 
                                                
26 A representative is a typical example or specimen reflecting the quality and kind of media concerning 
Afghanistan and Canada.  This rationale is in line with Kensicki (2004).   
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(population) of news media about Canada’s military mission identified by Infomart.com’s search 
engine27.     
This CA chose four national media organizations — CBC National Radio News, The Globe and 
Mail, The National Post and CTV National News. The Globe and Mail and The National Post 
are Canada’s two national newspapers. CTV and CBC broadcast nationally and have large 
audiences.  The samples are spread almost evenly amongst the news organizations (see Table 
Three) and each of the 48 months, making it a more valid sampling frame from which to make 
generalizable inferences about the news media’s coverage of Canada’s military mission in 
Afghanistan. 
 
Table 3 — Media Samples  
 
Media 
Organization 
Type Count  % 
Globe and Mail Newspaper 262 29.2 
National Post Newspaper 230 25.6 
CBC Radio News Radio 193 21.4 
CTV National 
News 
TV 215 23.9 
(n = 900) 
 
3.7. Systematic Sample 
 
Systematic sampling requires researchers to choose every nth unit for the corpus (Riffe et al. 
2008; Krippendorff 2013).  This sample also represents a manageable amount of material for 
coding.  “Taking every nth unit becomes a probability sample when the starting point is 
randomly determined” (Riffe et al. 2008: 108).  Systematic samples “favour” content analysis 
when the texts are derived from routine publications and broadcasts (Krippendorff 2013: 116).  
To that end, I used a random number generator to pick a number between one and 10.  The 
online tool chose four.  As a result, I harvested every fourth sample identified by Infomart.com’s 
search for my corpus. For each month, I alternated starting at the top and the bottom of the 
possible samples to collect every fourth media sample.  
                                                
27 This research’s focus on national English media organizations is, admittedly, a limitation.  An analysis 
of Quebec media about the conflict in Afghanistan is likely to yield different results.   
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During the collection process, it was necessary to kick out a number of false positive samples 
because they did not directly deal with Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan.  Only samples 
that deal directly with Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan were added to my corpus. When 
a potential sample was excluded, the next appropriate sample (fifth, sixth, seventh, etc.) was then 
chosen from the population in order to replace the sample that was eliminated. 
3.8.  Limitations of a Classic Content Analysis  
 
Reducing a myriad of news media words about the conflict in Afghanistan to numbers is not 
without its drawbacks.  To be sure, conflating text to numbers strips away important elements 
contained within the media content. There is no deep examination of language patterns and 
symbols contained within the text (van Dijk 1985; Wodak and Meyer 2001) in a content analysis.  
CA abridges such considerations.  Moreover, CA lacks the deep descriptive analysis that comes 
with discourse analysis (Foucault 1980).  Boucher’s (2009) thick and descriptive discourse 
analysis of how Canadian leaders talked about the country’s military mission in Afghanistan, for 
example, reveals how political actors struggled to articulate a consistent narrative about the war.  
I attempt to overcome the shortcomings of CA by offering a number of lengthy examples in the 
coming findings and discussion chapter to better explain and contextualize the factors that 
shaped news content about Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan.   
It is also important to emphasize here that the news archive Infomart.com reduces broadcast 
stories to transcripts.  The texts analyzed for this research were stripped of the colour and 
emotion that is often conveyed by pictures and sound.  To be sure, this represents a limitation 
(Matthes 2009).  Visual analysis of the framing of war (Butler 2009) and terrorism (Zelizer 
2002) has merits.  As Rose (2001: 10) stresses, “visual modes of conveying meaning are not the 
same as written modes.”  Reducing broadcast stories to texts strips samples of important socially 
constructed visual information (Penn 2007).   
“To understand a visualization is thus to enquire into its provenance and into the social 
work that it does.  It is to note its principle of inclusion and exclusion, to detect the roles 
that it makes available, to understand the way in which they are distributed, and to 
decode the hierarchies and difference that it naturalizes” (Fyfe and Law 1988: 1).  
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While recognizing the importance of visuals, ultimately this research is aimed at understanding 
the media frames used by government and military leaders to strategically position the war in 
Afghanistan and how journalists fact checked those frames.  As a result, a detailed visual 
analysis is beyond the scope of this work.  
3.9.  Coding/Inter-coding Reliability 
 
Because of the potential for bias (Rendon and Nicolas 2012), an independent coder was recruited 
and trained to assess a random sample of 11 per cent of the media articles (n = 100) in an effort 
to validate this research’s coding (Neuendorf 2002; Krippendorff 2004).    The second coder was 
recruited early on in the coding process.  At the onset of the coding, the researchers and second 
coder coded 10 samples together, using an initial coding scheme.  Mindful of “how much 
interpretation can be involved in applying a schedule,” some extra key words and definitions 
were added to the coding schedule or rule book during this preliminary coding (Deacon et al. 
1999: 128).  Attention was paid to applying a systematic interpretation to all the samples 
(Deacon et al. 1999; Bauer 2007; Krippendorff 2013).  
After that initial coding, an online random number generator determined which samples were 
chosen for double-checking by the second coder.  This process produced a very high overall 
inter-coder reliability —  r = agree / (agree + disagree) — of above 80 per cent for all variables.  
Most of the variables were above 90 per cent.  The online ReCal (“Reliability Calculator”) tool 
was used to compute the intercoder/interrater reliability coefficients (Krippendorf 2004; Hayes 
and Krippendorf 2007; Lu and Shulman 2008; Speer 2017) for all the variables (see Appendix 
Two). Reliability more than 80 per cent is considered high and indicates a well-defined coding 
scheme and a robust sampling validity that can stand the test of being replicated (Bauer 2007; 
Krippendorff 2013). 
3.10. Data Analysis  
 
This research’s analysis is grounded not in finding deterministic link — but probabilistic 
relationships (Kellstedt and Whitten 2013).  My analysis employed a number of statistical 
methods compatible with CA (Bauer 2007; Bryman 2012; Krippendorff 2013).  I used the 
  133 
computer software SPSS to compute the CA’s frequencies.  Because all of the coding variables 
in the CA were categorical, I used a series of cross tabulations and Pearson’s chi-squared tests to 
evaluate statistical associations concerning this work’s research questions.  This work’s 
statistical analysis relied on the conventional social science 0.05 statistical significance level to 
interpret the real differences between groups under evaluation (Bryman 2012). As noted above, 
Appendix Two Appendix provides the Scott's Pi, nominal Krippendorff’s alpha, and Cohen's 
Kappa for the study’s inter-coder reliability.  Having outlined this research’s CA procedures, the 
coming pages turns to this work’s population-based survey experiment.   
 
3.11. Population-based Survey Experiment  
 
The second section of this chapter outlines the rationale and procedures for a population-based 
survey experiment aimed at testing the potential impact of the news media’s fact checking 
concerning Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan.  Moreover, this experiment also assesses 
the confluence of factors – media discourse, popular wisdom and experiential knowledge – that 
may have shaped Canadian’s opinions about the war in Afghanistan.  Specifically, this method 
seeks to assess the four research questions posited at the conclusion of the previous chapter: 
 
R5. How (if at all) does journalistic fact checking influence audiences’ judgments about war? 
 
R6. How are audiences influenced (or not at all) by the popular wisdom concerning 
peacekeeping? 
 
R7. How are Canadians’ attitudes towards its military and its intervention in foreign conflicts 
influenced (or not at all) by experiential knowledge? 
 
R8. How does the confluence of media discourse, popular wisdom and experiential knowledge 
potentially shape Canadians’ attitudes towards its military and its intervention in foreign 
conflicts? 
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The ensuing pages lays out the rationale and methods for this research’s population-based survey 
experiment.  As noted at the onset of this chapter, this experiment embedded in a survey builds 
on this research’s content analysis.  The media treatments used in this study approximate the 
news coverage of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan.  I begin this section by providing a 
brief description of the constituent parts of a population-based survey experiment: surveys and 
experiments.  Combining the two methods, Hovland (1959) contends, offers “the royal road to 
wisdom (Hovland, as quoted in Iyengar McGrady 2007: 206).   
 
Surveys remain a staple of gathering generalizable data about populations (de Vaus 1996; Fowler 
2009; Kellstedt and Whitten 2013)28. Opinion surveys extrapolate generalities about public 
attitudes based on random samples chosen from the general population (Fowler 2009).  
Moreover, the method offers a relatively economical means to garner evidence about a large 
population (Iyengar and McGrady 2007).  Scholarly research frequently uses representative 
surveys to measure, for instance, the impact of media frames (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Nelson 
and Kinder 1996).   
 
In addition to sampling error, which reflects the statistical uncertainty of sampling, there are 
other potential sources of inaccuracy in a survey, including non-response bias, response bias, 
coverage bias and poorly designed questionnaires (Groves et al. 2009; Fink 2013).  Furthermore, 
self-reporting media use in survey research tends to represent “a byproduct of the very same 
political attitudes that are considered effects of media consumption” (Iyengar and McGrady 
2007: 205).  To be sure, surveys often produce unclear results29 concerning the influence or 
effects of media exposure.  For media and communication scholarship, this poses a problem, 
according to Iyengar and McGrady (2007: 204) because “the most fundamental weakness of the 
survey is that it provides little control over the key phenomenon of media exposure.” 
 
                                                
28 This chapter, by no means, offers a comprehensive review of survey methodology — and represents, 
admittedly, the tip of the iceberg.  For detailed survey methodology, see: Moser & Kalton, 1971; 
Buckingham & Saunders, 2004; Dillman, Smyth and Christian, 2009; Fowler 2009; Groves et al. 2009; 
Bryman, 2012; Sue & Ritter, 2012; Fink, 2013; and Gobo and Mauler, 2014. 
29 Notably, Andrew Cooper, British Prime Minister David Cameron’s former director of strategy and 
pollster, discounts the quality of surveys because of methodological concerns, including response rates 
and estimates of who actually votes (Colville 2017).   
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Experimental research30, on the other hand, seeks to understand cause-and-effect relationships, 
whereby the design “controls and randomly assigns values of the independent variable to the 
participants” (Kellstedt and Whitten 2013: 72). Using controlled conditions, researchers observe 
change(s) to the dependent variable by systematically treating or changing one or more 
independent variable.  The baseline (or control) allows researchers to compare data from 
manipulated circumstances to evidence where there is no intervention.  An experiment is defined 
as “objective observation of phenomena which are made to occur in a strictly controlled situation 
in which one or more factors are varied and the others are kept constant” (Zimmey 1961: 18; 
italics in original).  Experiments, arguably, offer the most “unambiguous evidence of causation” 
concerning the influence of media (Iyengar and McGrady 2007: 207).   
 
Derided for its origins in positivism, audience experiments routinely get dismissed by scholars 
who question effects researchers for using statistical methods “as instruments of torture on the 
data until it confuses something which could justify publication in a scientific journal” 
(Cumberland 2001: 21).  Yet, audience experiments long ago have moved well beyond the 
hypodermic needle model theory originally imagined by early media effects research.  It is, of 
course, difficult, to prove a causal connection between message and its potential influence on an 
individual’s attitudes or behavior (Imai et al. 2010).  But, rigorous experiments and appraisals 
“favour[s] some tentative explanations” about the impact of media messages (Schroder et al. 
2003: 323).  Again, this research aims to highlight the probabilistic relationship between media 
messages and people’s political opinions (Kellstedt and Whitten 2013) 
 
So-called deceptive surveys, which embed experimental manipulation into random, 
representative surveys, can assess the impact of media messages while achieving random 
assignment and control (Brewer & Gross, 2010: 169).   Questionnaires, containing differently 
framed treatments, frequently get used to measure the impact of different messages. Kangas, 
Niemela and Varjonen (2014), for instance, used a deceptive survey to measure how competing 
                                                
30 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to offer a detailed description of audience experiments.  For 
experiment design see: Christensen, 1997; Schroder, Drotner, Kline and Murray, 2003; Maxwell and 
Delaney, 2004; Iyengar and McGrady 2007; Willer and Walker, 2007; Berger, 2011; and Montgomery, 
2012. 
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frames shaped public opinion about policy change.  Their research stratified respondents (n = 
1,500) into five different groups.  Different pools of respondents were asked differently framed 
questions based, among other things, on equality, rightfulness and cost frames.  The research 
concluded that to be “successful, a politician must simplify the issue and appeal to moral 
sentiments rather than present too many difficult ‘factual’ viewpoints” (Kangas et al. 2014: 73).  
 
A hybrid methodology, population-based survey experiments combine the advantages of 
experiments and surveys (Piazza, Sniderman, and Tetlock 1989; Sniderman and Grob 1996; 
Conley and Glauber 2005; Mutz 2005; Avant and Sigelman 2006; Eaton and Visser 2008; Mutz 
2009, 2011; Pingree et al. 2012; Ostfeld and Mutz 2014).  The method embeds an experiment in 
a representative survey — and can offer insight into the relationship between cause and a 
potential influence.  Population-based survey experiments utilize the survey sampling techniques 
to test representative samples of respondents’ reactions to experimental treatments (Mutz 2011). 
The method often uses online panel surveys — with random participant assignment — in order 
to examine the potential influence of independent variables on the dependent variable of interest 
to researchers (Kellstedt and Whitten 2013).   
 
A leading proponent of the method calls population-based survey experiments “more experiment 
than survey” because the research tool uses the utility of random assignment in order to allow for 
statistically significant casual inferences (Mutz 2011: 3).  Moreover, population-based survey 
experiments also overcome the traditional critique (Hovland 1959; Kinder 2007; Brewer and 
Gross 2010) of the artificiality of laboratory experiments.  Online panel surveys, which have 
become quite common over the last decade, are considered more natural or routine in 
comparison to laboratory settings.  Respondents participate in the research online, usually from 
their home or office.  The experiment is embedded in what appears to be a routine survey.  
Moreover, population-based survey experiments allow researchers to test the potential impact of 
news media messages with a representative populations while “eliminating population average 
treatment effect” caused by homogenous groups of, often, undergraduate students (Mutz 2011: 
20).   
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In terms of validity, Mutz (2011) argues that population-based survey experiments offer the best 
of both words: (1) the internal validity of experiments; and (2) the generalizability of surveys 
with representative samples31.  Random assignment ensures internal reliability for population-
based survey experiments (Holland 1986; Bryman 2012; Kellstedt and Whitten 2013).  The 
experiment inside a survey offers the further advantage of “rul[ing] out spurious relationships” 
surrounding the media treatment (Mutz 2011: 138).  Moreover, representative samples allow 
researchers to generalize about the population under investigation (Todorov and Mandisodza 
2004).  At their core, population-based survey experiments “have an unusually rich collection of 
advantages, combined with very few disadvantages” (Mutz 2011: 157). 
 
3.12. Research Background: Canada’s Military Mission in Afghanistan - 2006-2011 
 
As detailed in the introduction, Canadian government and military leaders set out to strategically 
and systematically sell the war in Afghanistan (Government of Canada 2008a). As I noted in the 
theory chapter, journalists frequently fact check the preferred frames of government and military 
leaders. As the coming chapter outlines, two frames stood out in the CA — safety/security and 
reconstruction/development.  As the CA also found, these frames were most likely to be fact 
checked by journalists at a statistically significant level.  
 
Safety and Security: Canadian government and military leaders often attempted to frame the 
military’s efforts in Afghanistan as making the volatile region of Kandahar safer and more 
secure.  
 
Reconstruction and Development: Government and military leaders often tried to justify 
Canada’s military efforts in Afghanistan by suggesting Canadian Forces were helping to 
reconstruct or restore the war-torn country.   Officials also frequently contended the development 
work would improve the lives of Afghan people. 
                                                
31 Admittedly, online, panel-based surveys are not probability-based.  Respondents are not selected 
randomly because no complete list of voters' IP Internet addresses exists (Zurkin 2015).  This study’s 
respondents were drawn from a pre-stratified online research panel population.  The precision of this 
online population-based survey data is measured using confidence intervals (Simpson 2012).  
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To examine the potential link between news coverage of the war in Afghanistan and support for 
the war, this study’s population-based survey experiment tested participants’ responses to 
questions after they read news stories closely approximating those analyzed in this study’s 
content analysis.  These fabricated 32  news stories highlighted the preferred frames of 
government and military leaders — and also spotlighted journalistic fact checking of those 
frames. This experiment aimed to test whether the preferred frames of government and military 
leaders influenced public perceptions and how (if at all) the fact checking of those media frames 
by journalists might have also influenced public opinion.  Table Four outlines the segmented 
groups.   
 
Table 4 — Frame Stimuli / Treatment  
Group Frames  
One Control 
Two Safety 
Three Safety + Journalistic Fact Check 
Four Reconstruction 
Five Reconstruction + Journalistic Fact Check 
 
 
3.13. Population-based Survey Experiment Design 
 
This research’s population-based survey experiment attempted to shed light on how the media 
frames used by government and military leaders may have influenced audiences’ thinking about 
support for Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan.  Moreover, it seeks to test the potential 
impact of journalistic fact checking. This research randomly divided respondents into five 
different groups: 
 
 
                                                
32 The ethical ramifications of this method are outlined later in this chapter.  
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Control Group:  participants received no media treatment    
 
Frame Stimulus Security Group One: participants were exposed to a news story highlighting a 
government and military frame suggesting Canadian Forces were helping to improve security in 
Kandahar;  
 
Frame Stimulus Security Group Two:  participants were exposed to a news story highlighting 
a government and military frame suggesting Canadian Forces were helping to improve security 
in Kandahar.  The news story also contained a fact check casting doubt on the military’s efforts 
to improve security in the volatile region.   
 
Frame Stimulus Reconstruction Group Three:  participants were exposed to a news story 
highlighting a government and military frame suggesting Canadian Forces were helping to 
reconstruct and rebuild war-torn Kandahar;  and  
 
Frame Stimulus Reconstruction Group Four:  participants were exposed to a news story 
highlighting a government and military frame suggesting Canadian Forces were helping to 
reconstruct and rebuild war-torn Kandahar.  The news story also contained a fact check casting 
doubt on the long-lasting impact of the military’s development efforts.   
 
3.14. Questionnaire  
 
Mutz (2011) suggests keeping population-based survey experiment questionnaires short.   She 
argues it is critical to keep respondents engaged. Diagnostic frames are found to have the biggest 
influence on audiences.  With that in mind, the survey was kept to 29 questions and took 
respondents (on average) about 10 minutes to complete.    
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In the planning stages of the questions, attention was paid to determining the attitudes, beliefs 
and values that this research wished to measure in relation to Canada’s military mission in 
Afghanistan (Fink 2013).  This study’s research questions drove the information needs of the 
questions.  Respondents received questions in a fixed order (Groves et al. 2009).  Fink’s (2013: 
38-41) seven rules for writing closed survey questionnaire guided the process of writing this 
population-based survey: 
 
1. The questions were tangible and meaningful.  That is, the questions were clear in their 
purpose.  Explanations, as the coming pages outline, offered reasons for why the questions 
were being asked; 
2. Simple language was used.  The survey was free of jargon and complicated concepts.  (The 
pre-test revealed no concerns amongst respondents about the wording or intent of the 
questions.); 
3. All the questions focused on respondents’ personal experiences.  The questions only asked 
about respondents’ opinions;  
4. The questions avoided loaded or biased words;  
5. I was aware of my own biases when writing the questions.  I worked hard to make all the 
questions as neutral as possible; 
6. The questions and their order reflect a sensitivity about personal questions. The more 
sensitive personal demographic questions were asked at the end.  Admittedly, there were no 
particularly sensitive personal questions included in this population-based survey 
experiment; and 
7. Each question contained only a single thought.  Some of the questions included preambles or 
contextual information.  Attention was paid to keeping every sentence simple and geared 
towards someone with a sixth to eight-grade reading level (Fink 2013: 38-41).   
 
This population-based survey experiment used both a ten-point scale and a Likert-type six-point 
ordinal scale to assess respondents’ attitudes towards Canadian Forces and its combat role in 
Kandahar (Fowler 2009; Groves et al. 2009; Fink 2013).  Respondents were asked about their 
agreement or disagreement with statements.  To ensure internal reliability and validity of the 
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ordinal measurement scales, manipulation checks were included in the questionnaire (Bryman 
2012).  The coming pages detail this population-based survey experiment’s procedures. 
 
This study’s population-based survey experiment questionnaire began by offering some context 
and instructions to respondents.  Participants were told (see preamble in Appendix Three) to 
expect questions gauging their interest and engagement with Canadian public affairs and the 
media. They were also informed that they did not have to participate in the research – and could 
quit at any time.   
 
The questionnaire began with demographic questions such as sex, age, education and region (see 
Appendix Three).  To make the population-based survey experiment feel like an authentic survey 
(and before being asked their opinion about the main dependent variable), the questionnaire 
asked (Q.1.6 and Q.1.7) respondents about their support concerning recent federal political 
issues, including the budget and plans to relocate thousands of Syrian refugees to Canada. 
 
Fletcher et al.’s (2009) examination of declining public support for Canada’s military mission in 
Afghanistan found that Canadians who adhered to a “peacekeeping” orientation were less likely 
to support the military mission than those in the so-called “realist” camp who prefer to see 
Canada’s military used primarily for combat.  Also of note, “more knowledgeable” and 
“emotional” Canadians were found to be the most supportive of the mission (Fletcher et al. 2009: 
920).  These findings are in keeping with Chong and Druckman’s (2007) conclusions about the 
greater impact of media frames on knowledgeable individuals.  Moreover, Canadians’ attitudes 
towards  “peacekeeping” conform with Druckman’s (2001) position that frame adoption is more 
likely when the message is congruous with deep personal beliefs — and especially when they 
come from credible sources, such as government officials.   This research assumed that 
predispositions amongst Canadians — the so-called division between the “peacekeeping” and 
“realist” camps — about the country’s military were likely central to opinion formation about the 
war.  To that end, this population-based survey experiment asked respondents (before being 
asked about their opinions concerning the main dependent variable) to first classify themselves 
according to their preference for the use of Canada’s armed forces.   
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Q1.8: Some people believe Canadian armed forces should focus on combat.  Others, 
however, believe Canadian armed forces should be focused on peacekeeping. What do you 
think should be the main focus of Canadian armed forces?   
 
(1) Armed combat   (2) Peacekeeping   (3) Both  
 
The questionnaire then followed with a question asking respondents to choose between the two 
roles. 
Q1.9: If you have to choose between only armed combat and peacekeeping, what do you 
think should be the main focus of Canadian armed forces?  
 
(1) Armed combat   (2) Peacekeeping   
 
Fletcher et al. (2009) also found that pride (emotion), knowledge and ideology played a 
significant role in determining how supportive Canadians were of their country’s military 
mission in Afghanistan.  To that end, a series of questions about pride in mission, political 
engagement and ideology followed the peacekeeping questions.   
Q1.10: Between 2006-2011, thousands of Canadian troops were in combat in the 
southern region of Afghanistan.  Thinking back on that time, how do you feel about 
Canada’s military efforts in that south Asian country (with one being not proud and 10 
being very proud)? 
 
1 to 10 (tap and drag) 
 
Q1.11: Generally speaking, how interested are you in politics? 
 
1 to 10 (tap and drag) 
 
Q1.12: In politics people sometimes talk of left and right.  Where would you place 
yourself on the scale below, where 1 is left and 10 is right? 
 
1 to 10 (tap and drag) 
 
Again, in an effort to make this study’s population-based survey experiment feel more like an 
authentic online survey, questions Q1.13 and Q1.14 mirrored the typical horse race polling 
question, asking respondents who they would vote for today and who they voted for in the 2015 
federal election (see Appendix Three).   Q.15 to Q.19 attempt to assess respondents’ knowledge 
about Canadian politics and current events (see Appendix Three).  The sum of the right answers 
divided by the total number of questions (five) produced a knowledge score for use as an 
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independent variable to assess the impact of knowledge on the main dependent variable.  After 
these questions, the survey then transitioned to its main purpose:  seeking to determine the 
potential influence of government and military framing and journalistic fact checking on 
audiences.    
 
3.15. Stimuli /Treatment  
 
Participants (randomly and almost equally assigned to the five groups detailed above) were 
exposed to one news article incorporating the media frames described above. (Respondents in the 
control group were not exposed to a news treatment.)  Respondents in the treatment groups were 
told that in an effort to refresh their memory, they would have to read a short representative news 
story concerning the war in Afghanistan (Pingree et al. 2012).  Respondents assigned to the 
control group were offered only the most essential context (see Appendix Three).   
 
Respondents assigned to the four other treatment groups were provided fabricated news samples 
that closely mirrored samples analyzed in the CA (Shen et al. 2004).   The media samples or 
treatments serve three purposes:  (1) to create media samples that strongly articulate the preferred 
media frames of government and military leaders; (2) allow the researcher to maximize the 
effectiveness of the experimental treatment and measure how frames resonate with audiences 
when journalists fact check those frames in the same news story; and (3) replicate a typical news 
report about the war to increase realism.   Q3.1 (below) offered respondents an unchallenged 
security frame sponsored by Canada’s defence minister.  Q.4.1 (below) offers almost the exact 
same media treatment — but with a typical journalistic fact checking (in bold) identified by this 
research’s content analysis.   
 
Security framed story (with no journalistic fact check) — Q3.1: Between 2006-2011, 
Canada assumed a combat role in southern Afghanistan as part of a NATO-led military 
mission.  In an effort to refresh your memory, please read the following short 
representative news story from that period.  After you read the short news story, you’ll be 
asked whether you agree or disagree with a number of statements. 
 
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan — The defence minister says Canadian soldiers are making 
the war-torn country of Afghanistan a “much safer” place.  Peter MacKay toured a road 
construction project and a newly opened causeway over the Arghandab River during a 
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whirlwind three-day tour.  “Kandahar is much safer now than it was before we arrived – 
and Canadian Forces are needed to restore this country’s security after decades of war,” 
said Peter MacKay.  The defence minister says the reconstruction projects he visited 
would have been impossible had security in the volatile region of Kandahar not improved 
over the last year.  MacKay adds Canadian Forces remain focused on training Afghan 
soldiers and police so they can handle security once coalition forces leave. 
 
The following question asks whether you agree or disagree with the statement.  Thinking 
about Canada’s combat role in southern Afghanistan as part of a NATO-led military 
mission between 2006-2011, how much do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements:  I supported Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan. 
 
1. Strongly disagree   
2. Somewhat disagree   
3. Slightly disagree   
4. Slightly agree   
5. Somewhat agree   
6. Strongly agree 
 
Security framed story (with journalistic fact check) — Q4.1: Between 2006-
2011, Canada assumed a combat role in southern Afghanistan as part of a 
NATO-led military mission.  In an effort to refresh your memory, please read the 
following short representative news story from that period. After you read the 
short news story, you’ll be asked whether you agree or disagree with a number of 
statements.  
 
KANDAHAR, Afghanistan — The defence minister says Canadian soldiers are 
making the war-torn country of Afghanistan a “much safer” place.  Peter 
MacKay toured a road construction project and a newly opened causeway over 
the Arghandab River during a whirlwind three-day tour.  “Kandahar is much 
safer now than it was before we arrived – and Canadian Forces are needed to 
restore this country’s security after decades of war,” said Peter MacKay.  The 
defence minister says the reconstruction projects he visited would have been 
impossible had security in the volatile region of Kandahar not improved over the 
last year.  MacKay adds Canadian Forces remain focused on training Afghan 
soldiers and police so they can handle security once coalition forces leave.  Yet, 
data from an independent security firm clearly shows that insurgent attacks 
have dramatically increased this year over last.   Attacks have jumped 77 per 
cent from last year.  
 
The following question ask whether you agree or disagree with the statement.  Thinking 
about Canada’s combat role in southern Afghanistan as part of a NATO-led military 
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mission between 2006-2011, how much do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements:  I supported Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan. 
 
1. Strongly disagree   
2. Somewhat disagree   
3. Slightly disagree   
4. Slightly agree   
5. Somewhat agree   
6. Strongly agree 
 
 
3.16. Validity and Reliability 
 
To check validity and reliability of the fabricated media stories, a pre-test was conducted before 
the main data collection (Mutz 2011; Eaton and Visser 2008).  The pre-test (n = 38) assessed: (1) 
the possible power of the treatments; (2) if the news media treatments were valid and well 
conceived; and (3) if there are any other problems (clarity or technical) with the questionnaire.  
A post-survey questionnaire of all pre-test respondents found no concerns about the survey or its 
instructions.  A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to compare the possible 
influence of fact checking on support for the war.  There was a statistically significant influence 
of the independent variable (fact checking) on the dependent variable (support for the war) at the 
p< .05 level amongst the five groups (F(4)(33) = 7.71, p = 0.001), suggesting the media 
treatments had some influence on respondents.  An analysis of the pre-test data also found a 
moderate uphill (positive) to a strong uphill (positive) linear (Pearson Correlation) relationship 
between the main dependent variable and the prompts included later in the questionnaire (see 
Table Five).  
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Table 5 – Pre-test Prompt Correlations  
Main Dependent Variable Prompt  Correlation Coefficient R 
Control Support Control Safe Prompt .578* 
Security Group One Support Security Group One Safe 
Prompt 
.696* 
Security Group Two 
Support 
Security Group Two Safe 
Prompt 
.590* 
Reconstruction Group One 
Support 
Reconstruction Group One 
Reconstruction Prompt 
.415* 
Reconstruction Group Two 
Support 
Reconstruction Group Two 
Reconstruction Prompt 
.498* 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.   
 
There was also a statistically significant moderate uphill (positive) linear relationship (r (38) = 
.574, p < .01.) between the main dependent support variable and the variation question (Q.7.4) 
asked at the end of the questionnaire, suggesting the treatment was resonated with respondents 
(Mutz 2011).  
 
3.17. Ethics  
 
Experiments occasionally require deception — and necessitate an honest and “carefully worded” 
explanation after the questionnaire was completed (Mutz 2011: 101).  This research’s deception 
was short-lived and — frankly — not that different from actual media accounts during Canada’s 
military involvement in Afghanistan.  The media treatments were based on a sample identified in 
the content analysis and only slightly modified to increase the treatment’s impact.  The slight 
alteration is likely to have little lingering or consequential impact on respondents (Mutz 2011).  
“If participating in a science scientific study does not expose people to any greater deception or 
inaccuracy than watching [TV talk shows] (an activity that is not generally considered harmful, 
even for children), then it seems reasonable the benefits outweighed the risks, particularly if 
debriefing is possible” (Mutz 2011: 106). 
 
In keeping with an honest debriefing, respondents received a message sharing information about 
the scope and purpose of the research. This message made clear that this research hopes to 
understand how media frames influence thinking about Canada’s role in Afghanistan.  The 
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message informed participants that the news samples they read were based on real-world 
samples but manipulated slightly to create valid stimuli (see Appendix Three).  Respondents 
were also provided an online link with information about the survey company’s privacy policies. 
Having outlined this population-based survey experiment’s design, I now wish to address who 
participated in this research – and how they were chosen. 
 
3.18. Participants / Anonymity, Data Protection, Privacy and Treatment Assignment 
 
A representative sample of Canadians participated in this research’s population-based survey 
experiment.   The Toronto-based survey company Vox Pop Labs collected a pre-stratified sample 
(n = 1136) from its online research panel33. The sample was balanced on gender, education, age, 
vote choice and region to match Canada’s population characteristics (Mutz 2011).   Participants 
could opt to take the survey in either French or English.  Panel respondents were initially 
recruited as part of an online national voter engagement tool administered by Vox Pop.  Vote 
Compass is marketed by its Vox Pop and its media partner, the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation, as “an educational tool developed by political scientists designed to help you 
explore how you fit in Canada's political landscape” (Vote Compass 2016: np).  After 
participating in the voter engagement tool, respondents were asked to supply their e-mail if they 
wished to participate in further online surveys.   
 
Panel respondents receive no incentive for participation in surveys — and have the option of 
declining any surveys.  Vox Pop’s online panel response rate, with one e-mail prompt, averages 
18 per cent (Kerr 2016).  Given that Canada’s major combat role in Afghanistan ended in late 
2011, respondents younger than the age of 23 were not able to participate in the population-based 
survey experiment.   
 
                                                
33 A random sample of 1,000 Canadians is considered standard and representative. The precision of this 
online population-based survey is consistent with a similar telephone survey –– and data is measured 
using confidence intervals (Simpson 2012).  Where appropriate, this research reports the confidence 
intervals.  As an average, this research’s data has a credibility interval of plus or minus 3.5 points.  
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For privacy reasons, I only received aggregate — non-identifying — data from the survey 
company34.    Vox Pop stores all of its data in an encrypted — password-protected — data base 
and restricts its use to business requirements including, but not necessarily limited to: (1) 
research and analysis; (2) panel studies; (3) audience segmentation; (4) technical processing; and 
(5) addressing of queries, technical problems or complaints.  The survey company does not sell 
its panel’s contact information to third parties.  Having outlined how respondents were recruited, 
I now wish to detail who participated in my population-based survey experiment.   
 
3.19.  Respondents’ Demographics  
 
Demographics, such as age, sex, education, income and region, can have an important influence 
on people’s political opinions (McCombs et al. 2011).  This section sketches a picture of the 
Canadians who responded to this study’s population-based survey experiment.  As I noted 
earlier, 1,131 Canadians participated in this study’s population-based survey experiment.  The 
average age of respondents was 55. There was an overrepresentation of male respondents (60.2% 
compared to 39.8%)35.  Respondents came from all regions of Canada and closely align again 
with current Canada Census data concerning populations across the country (see Figure Seven).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
34 Vox Pop’s full privacy policy is available at: http://voxpoplabs.com/privacy-policy/ 
35 To compensate for the predominance of male respondents, all frequencies reported in this research are 
weighted to align with the most recent Canadian census data (49.5% male / 50.5% females).  Gender 
weighting is not used for any inferential statistics in this research.   
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Figure 7 – Regional Response Breakdown  
 
(n = 1,131) 
 
This population-based survey experiment captured a well-educated sample.  More than half of 
this study’s respondents completed a college education or a bachelor’s degree (see Figure Eight 
for a complete breakdown of education levels).   
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Figure 8 – Education Levels  
 
(n = 1,131) 
 
More than half (54.4%) of respondents were employed (full-time, part-time or self-employed) or 
in school.  Six per cent of respondent were unemployed.  Nearly four in ten (39.1%) respondents 
were retired when they participated in the population-based survey experiment in the fall of 
2016.  On average, most respondents were middle class, earning a median income between $60-
80,000 CAD (see Figure Nine for a complete picture of the income levels of respondents).  
Notably, respondents were somewhat informed about Canadian institutions and politics, with 
more than two-thirds getting three out of five knowledge questions correct (M = .6405 SD = 
.20888).  Yet, this study’s statistical analysis found no statistically significant associations 
between individual’s knowledge score and other variables under the microscope in this research.   
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Figure 9 – Income Levels 
 
(n = 1,131) 
 
Notably, more than two-thirds (69.5%) of respondents indicated that they were somewhat   
(24.3%) or very interested (45.2%) in politics.  Less than a third (30.4%) of respondents 
registered that they were not at all interested (18%) or not very interested (12.4%) in political 
matters.  Respondents also self-identified as slightly more left (mean 4.7%) than right when 
asked to place themselves on the left/right spectrum of politics.  This study’s horse race political 
question found that four in ten (40.1%) of respondents, at the time, favoured voting for the ruling 
Liberal Party of Justin Trudeau (see Table Six for a complete breaking down of voter intentions).   
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Table 6 — Partisan Support  
 
(n = 1,131) 
 
Female respondents self-identified as more liberal than conservative than males when prompted 
to place themselves on a 10-point left/right spectrum, c2(1, N = 1131) = 12.320, p = .001 (see 
Table Seven for a complete breakdown of percentages and counts).   
 
Table 7 - Gender Left/Right Ideology36 
Gender Left — % / Count Right — % / Count 
Female 71.1% / 320 28.9 / 130 
Male  60.9 % / 415 39.1% / 266 
(n = 1,131) 
 
This research’s findings correspond with other national survey data from around the same time 
this study’s questionnaire was in the field in late September and early October 2016.  In the 
                                                
36 For easier statistical analysis, the 10-point left/right scale was broken into two groups: one to five was 
grouped as left and six to 10 was grouped as right. 
Vote Intention  % 
Liberal Party 40.1 
Conservative Party 22.9 
New Democratic Party (NDP) 6.2 
Green Party 3.6 
Bloc Québécois  Party 4.2 
Other Party or Candidate 0.9 
Do Not Know 13.4 
No Intention to Vote 2.7 
Intend to Spoil Ballot 5.4 
Not Eligible to Vote 0.7 
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summer leading up to this population-based survey experiment, the Liberal Party averaged 47.3 
per cent support in federal polls (Grenier 2016).  Support for the ruling Liberals dropped over the 
fall of 2016, suggesting — perhaps — that this population-based survey picked up on the 
government’s falling support.   
 
Overall, respondents scored low in terms of activism (participation in unions, demonstrating, 
signing petitions, etc.) with a mean score of 32 per cent.  Nearly three-quarters (74.1%) of 
respondents indicated that they accessed news media several times a day.  The remaining — 
almost quarter (24.8%) — of respondents reported accessing news media once a day or once a 
week.  Newspapers (41.9%) were the main source of news, followed by radio (23.8%), television 
(17.6%), blogs and alternative news sources (9.9%), and social media (6.9%).  Self-reporting 
media use is, however, problematic for researchers (Iyengar and McGrady 2007). The 
experimental treatment used in this research aims to overcome this deficiency.  Having painted a 
picture of the respondents who participated in this research, I now wish to outline how I plan to 
analyze the population-based survey experiment data, before I address more issues concerning 
this method’s limitations.  
  
3.20. Data Analysis 
 
As with this study’s CA, the analysis of this work’s population-based survey experiment was 
mindful of the debate surrounding causality.  This research is grounded in attempting to highlight 
probabilistic relationships (Kellstedt and Whitten 2013).  Statistical analysis is used to interpret 
the respondents’ answers (Fowler 2009; Groves et al. 2009; Bryman 2012; Fink 2013).  As with 
the content analysis, this study’s analysis began with simple — but telling — frequencies.  
Inferential statistical analysis enables this work to make conclusions about the statistical 
significance of its findings — and most importantly, make determinations about the “real” 
differences between the media treatment groups in this research (Fink 2013: 115).  
 
The data from this population-based survey also lends itself well to correlations between 
respondents and their responses.  As chapter five details, this research aims to understand the 
differences between groups exposed to different media treatments.  Inferential statistical 
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techniques such as the Pearson Chi-square and ANOVA are used to test this work’s research 
questions (Nordstokke et al. 2011). Chapter five concludes with a binary logistic regression model 
as a means to predict the confluence of statistically significant factors that potentially predict 
Canadians’ opinions about the war in Afghanistan.  This type of analysis allowed me to consider 
“individual-level variations on relevant political dimensions” associated with experiential 
knowledge and popular wisdom (Berinksy 2009: 64).  The conventional .05 level of significance 
is used in this research as an indication of statistical significance (Bryman 2012).   
 
3.21. Limitations 
 
There are limits to this study’s population-based survey experiment, of course.  Like traditional 
experiments, some scholars (Barabas and Jerit 2010) criticize survey experiments for not being 
natural and overestimating effects because the treatments are only temporary or “one-shot 
exposures” (Barnhurst and Mutz 1997: 150).  Barabas and Jerit (2010: 226) concluded that 
researchers need to be cautious about knowledge claims “when extrapolating from survey 
experiments.”  Other critics (Kinder 2007) contend that framing experiments, in particular, 
inflate their perceived influence because the message (or treatment) is blatant to respondents, 
priming their answers to survey questions.  
 
Brewer and Gross (2010: 168) call on media and communication scholarship to turn to the 
“world outside” in search of the impact of media frames. This work attempts to overcome 
criticism of laboratory effect by embedding its experiment in a routine online survey.  Moreover, 
this work enhances its external validity by exposing respondents to natural treatments.  The 
content analysis, as I stressed before, informed the media samples that this study used as 
treatments.   
 
To be sure, though, questions persist about whether experimental treatments are influenced by 
respondents’ attitudes and life experience (Mutz 2011).  As well, media framing treatments may 
be unrealistic because frequently the influence of frames are often negated by competing frames 
in the real world (Sniderman and Theriault 2004).  Mutz (2011: 152), however, insists that 
random assignment cancels out such “extraneous influences.”  Moreover, as this research’s 
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theoretical foundation and analysis makes clear, media effects are definitely not a linear 
relationship – but likely a confluence of factors including media discourse, popular wisdom and 
experiential factors (Gamson 1992).   
 
While surveys and this research’s population-based survey experiment does offer insight into 
what respondents think, the method, admittedly, does not always provide a clear picture of why 
respondents feel or think a certain way. Compared to interviews or focus groups, surveys or 
online population-based survey experiments do not provide rich, descriptive detail about why 
people feel the way they do or the thought process that led them to their opinions (Bryman 
2012).  As well, population-based survey experiments are prone to missing data.  Respondents in 
this research did not answer all the questions37.  As well, I was not able to probe respondents 
about their opinions.  There was no opportunity to scrutinize or explore the answers of 
respondents.  Simply put, there was no follow-up with respondents about their answers.  In my 
conclusion, I offer a number of thoughts about the research that can overcome the limitations of 
this research’s findings.   
 
As I noted in the introduction, I am also well aware of concerns about the reductionist qualities 
of surveys and experiments.  Boiling complex public discourse down to statistics is not without 
its problems (Habermas 1974[1964]; Lewis 2001). It is also difficult to assess the true feelings of 
Canadians about their country’s involvement in Afghanistan years after the military mission 
ended.  Yet as chapter five argues, this research’s experiment data does offer insight – consistent 
with theory and other empirical findings – into the factors that likely shaped Canadians’ attitudes 
about the wars in Afghanistan.  These factors, I contend, continue to influence current views 
about Canada’s military – and represent meaningful insight into future overseas ventures for 
Canadian Forces.  Moreover, my findings provide solid foundation for subsequent qualitative 
research that may yield more descriptive understandings of Canadians’ opinions about their 
military and their international role.  I detail that potential research trajectory also in my 
conclusion.   
 
                                                
37 Thirty-six respondents were excluded from this research because they did not complete the entire 
survey. 
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3.22. Conclusion  
 
This chapter explained how both a content analysis and a population-based survey experiment 
are used to assess the research questions posed in the previous chapter.  The content analysis 
helps to answer this research’s questions surrounding the factors that influenced media coverage 
of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan. It evaluates the news media as a proxy of public 
discourse about the war in Afghanistan.  This study’s content analysis specifically measured four 
shaping variables: (1) framing; (2) news values; (3) fact checking; (4) and indexing.  The 
analysis focused on how these factors potentially shaped news coverage of Canada’s military 
mission in Afghanistan.   Chapter four outlines the CA’s main findings and offers a detailed 
discussion about this work’s data.    
 
This study’s population-based survey experiment offers a means to test the potential influence of 
media messages and journalistic fact checking on Canadian news consumers.   The survey data 
also helps to explain how a confluence of media discourse, popular wisdom and experiential 
knowledge best explains Canadians’ attitudes concerning their military and its combat role in 
Kandahar.  Chapter five details and analyzes the findings generated by this study’s population-
based survey experiment.  The coming chapter turns to this research’s content analysis findings 
and analysis.  
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Chapter Four:  “But it is not getting any safer!”  
 
4.0. Introduction 
 
This chapter details and analyzes this research’s content analysis (n = 900) findings.  It answers 
this study’s first four research questions: 
 
R1. How was Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan framed in the news media? 
 
R2. What role did news values play in shaping news content? 
 
R3. How do journalists (if at all) fact check the preferred media frames of the military and 
government leaders surrounding Canada’s military efforts in Afghanistan? 
 
R4. What role does indexing play in shaping the news media’s coverage of Canada’s military 
mission in Afghanistan? 
 
As I detailed in the introduction, Canadian government and military leaders attempted to 
strategically frame the media coverage of the war in Afghanistan.  The “frame-building” process 
(de Vreese 2005: 52) surrounding the news coverage of Afghanistan involved both the external 
frames of government and military leaders as well as the internal framing factors of the news 
media.  This research’s content analysis (n = 900) offers insight into the mediated dynamic of 
framing Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan.  The preferred frames of government and 
military officials are present in three-quarters of the news coverage of the war.  My content 
analysis found scarce counter-hegemonic positions represented in the news coverage of Canada’s 
military mission in Afghanistan.  This study’s data highlights that while journalists 
overwhelmingly indexed their news and analysis to elite sources, they frequently fact checked 
the frames sponsored by government and military leaders. To do this, journalists largely used 
elite criteria and the stated goals of officials to critique or impeach the media frames of military 
and government leaders.  Moreover, much of the fact checking focused on the government and 
military’s execution of its policies, such as making Kandahar safer.  Events in Afghanistan, 
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especially the deteriorating security, I argue, spurred journalists to fact check the frames — and 
especially the improving security frame — sponsored by government and military leaders.  In 
terms of a contribution, this research challenges, in part, the indexing norm (Bennett 1990), 
adding more evidence to the argument supporting an events-driven conceptualization of news 
media counter-framing (Wolfsfeld 1997; Baum and Groeling 2010a; Baum and Groeling 2010b; 
Porpora et al. 2010; Speer 2017).  This research’s findings also support arguments surrounding 
news media coverage being bounded by elite debate (Hall 1980; Hallin 1986; Bennett 1990; 
Entman 1991; Schudson 2001).  This research’s data also suggests that most of the coverage of 
Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan was episodic and event-oriented rather than thematic 
and contextual.  
 
For the sake of simplicity and coherence, this chapter blends both its research findings and its 
analysis. The data is presented first, followed by a discussion.  In an effort to address my first 
research question about how Canada’s military mission in Kandahar was framed in the news 
media, this chapter starts by outlining and interpreting the focus of the Canadian news media’s 
coverage of Afghanistan. After that, I take on my second research question concerning the 
shaping quality of news values on reporting and analysis about the conflict.  From there, I assess 
my third research question concerning how journalists fact checked the media frames sponsored 
by government and military officials.  I conclude this chapter by examining the role indexing 
played in shaping the news coverage of the war in Afghanistan.  As a means of structuring and 
theoretically grounding this chapter’s data and analysis, I use the three levels of Shoemaker and 
Reese’s (2014) hierarchy of influences model that I outlined in my theory chapter (see Table 
Eight).  
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Table 8 — Three Levels of the Hierarchy of Influences Model 
Level  Definition News Media Shaping Value or Phenomenon  
Social System Ideology  Ideology / Horizon of Possibility 
Framing 
Normative Conceptions of Journalism  
Routines and 
Practices  
Rules, Habits, 
Forms, Methods and 
Patterns 
Counter-framing and Fact checking 
News values 
Social Institution Institutions  Embedding journalists with military 
Indexing 
 
 
4.1. Framing and Focus of News Media Coverage of the War in Afghanistan  
 
The coming pages address this work’s first research question:  (R1) How was Canada’s military 
mission in Afghanistan framed in the news media? 
 
As outlined in the introduction, and detailed more thoroughly in the preceding methods chapter, 
the government and military officials clearly attempted to systematically author the media 
messages coming out of its officials’ mouths.  Not surprisingly then, the media frames sponsored 
by government and military leaders are present at least once in 76.4 per cent of the news media 
coverage about the conflict in Afghanistan (see Figure 10).   This research’s content analysis 
counted multiple frames in one-third (34.9 %) of all the coverage of the war in Afghanistan (see 
Figure 11).  News and commentary about the war in Afghanistan frequently, for instance, 
coupled reconstruction with safety and security frames (49.7%), c2(1, N = 900) = 187.136, p = 
.001.  A National Post story, for example, links redevelopment with security, quoting an expert 
as saying “[y]ou just cannot have reconstruction and development unless there’s security. It all 
works together”(Goodspeed 2007: np). 
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Figure 10 - Government / Military Frame  
 
(n = 900) 
 
Figure 11 – Multiple Preferred Government / Military Frames  
 
 (n = 1,003) 
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By means of an example, a 2006 column in The Globe and Mail entitled “Are we mice or men?” 
highlights a number of preferred government and military media frames, exhorting MPs debating 
an extension to the military mission to view the conflict as an ethical obligation or duty.   The 
editorial (which is worth quoting at some length) argues that the “evil” insurgents must be 
resisted with force. 
“For years, our representatives have stood at podiums around the world to preach 
Canada’s commitment to peace, democracy, justice, women's rights and a better deal for 
the poor. Afghanistan is the place to put our money where our mouth is. If we shirk our 
duty there, then all the fine speeches about how “the world needs more Canada” are 
nothing but talk.  
 
Afghanistan needs more Canada in the worst way. Its struggle to recover from decades of 
civil war, foreign occupation and tyranny is under threat from a resurgent Taliban and 
their allies in terror. Canada and its partners in the international stabilization force are the 
only thing keeping hope for that recovery alive.  
 
Canada’s mission has two aims: The first is to help Afghans rebuild their country and 
create a working representative government. The second is to repel those, like the 
Taliban, who seek to derail that effort and put the country in medieval chains again” (Gee 
2006: np) 
 
As the example above makes plain, multiple frames sponsored by government and military 
leaders showed up — mixed together — in the new coverage of the conflict in Afghanistan.   
 
Government and military leaders frequently framed their media messages about the military 
mission in terms of progress surrounding goals such as improving security and helping to 
redevelop Afghanistan.  In 2008, for example, Defence Minister Peter MacKay lauded the 
momentum and success of Canadian Forces during a visit to Kandahar.   
“We’re seeing roads being built, bridges completed in areas where, because of the 
security situation and concerns, those projects couldn’t have occurred just a year ago,” 
MacKay told journalists in Afghanistan” (Moore 2008: np).   
 
Notably, the defence minister dismissed a United Nations report released that week suggesting a 
rise in insurgent activity when challenged by journalists. “Of course the insurgency remains a 
real challenge,” MacKay conceded. 
“But you have to look at it in relative terms. You have to do a retrospective occasionally, 
look at where we were five short years ago, two years ago and then gauge what some of 
these reports are saying.  By North American standards, there’s obviously a lot of work to 
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do. By Afghan standards, I would suggest they’ve come a long way and they’re 
continuing to make very positive steps forward” (Moore 2008: np).   
 
Later on in this chapter, in the section concerning fact checking, I outline how progress —
achieving the government and military’s stated goals surrounding improving security  — became 
a proxy, of sorts, by which journalists fact checked the stated goals of government and military 
leaders.   
 
4.2. Little Counter-framing or Counter-hegemonic Coverage 
 
Only a small fraction (2.7%) of the news media’s coverage of Canada’s military mission in 
Afghanistan was found to be counter-hegemonic (Pratt 2004). Notably, as well, the news media’s 
coverage of the war in Afghanistan was overwhelmingly (90%) episodic compared to thematic 
(10%).  This research’s content analysis discovered few critiques of militarism and Canada’s 
combat role in Afghanistan.  Independent of the prevalent fact checking of government and 
military framing of the conflict, which I address later in this chapter, the news media rarely 
questioned hegemonic positions concerning war and foreign affairs.  The reporting and analysis 
that was counter-hegemonic mostly highlighted numerous concerns about human rights and the 
treatment of Afghan detainees (73%). Writing for The Globe and Mail about turning Afghan 
detainees over for torture, columnist Rick Salutin (2009) charged that the practice would spark 
recrimination among Muslims and inspire more terrorism.  
“By attacking and occupying two Muslim countries instead of selectively pursuing a 
small band of terrorists, decision-makers caused great, mounting danger to their own 
people, as well as devastating two societies. They must have known these would be the 
results. I have never been able to believe they didn't realize it. They went ahead because 
the gains to be made outweighed in their minds the costs. 
In the case of the United States, the gains might have been in terms of oil, as well as 
ideology. In the case of Canada, the stakes may be pettier: to curry favour with the U.S. 
or rebuild what was seen as a wrecked military. 
Who really cares? It ought to have been foreseen and probably was. No good could come 
of this war” (Salutin 2009: np). 
 
Salutin was not alone — but his forceful questions about the rationale for the war, as this 
research’s analysis of the Canadian news media found, were rare.  Most of the coverage, as I will 
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argue in the coming section, conformed to hegemonic positions and the “sphere of consensus” 
(Hallin 1986: 117) concerning Canadian foreign policy and the country’s military role in 
Afghanistan.   
 
4.3.  Episodic Focus of Coverage 
 
As noted above, nine in 10 stories were episodic or driven by events.  Nearly six in 10 (58.3%) 
stories or commentaries about the conflict in Afghanistan focused on combat, death and injuries, 
military equipment and reconstruction and Canada’s development effort. Eighteen per cent of the 
coverage equated Canadian soldiers and the military mission to a heroic or noble effort.  Nearly 
four in 10 (38.9%) of the sponsors of this noble and heroic framing originated with government 
and military sources, c2(9, N = 900) = 286.748, p = .001.   As well, journalists themselves 
(17.9%) also framed soldiers in these brave terms in some of their coverage, c2(9, N = 900) = 
286.748, p = .001.  Of note, the majority of this framing came in editorials or commentaries 
(27.4%), Letters to the editor (13.8 %) and features (37.5%).  Only 16.6 per cent of news 
coverage suggested soldiers or the mission was brave or heroic, c2(3, N = 900) = 10.468, p = 
.017. 
 
Nearly a quarter (23.6%) of the coverage framed the conflict in a moral tone.  That is, the 
military mission was framed as a sacrifice or an effort elevated to a duty to help Afghanistan or 
part of Canada’s international effort in the war on terror.  In a media sample from the fall of 
2007, for instance, Prime Minster Stephen Harper said Canada had “a moral responsibility [in 
Afghanistan] (CBC 2007).  Of note, most (84.8%) of the moral framing appeared in editorials, 
commentaries or letters to the editor, suggesting editorial writers, columnists and members of the 
public adopted the preferred media frames of government and military leaders, c2(3, N = 900) = 
50.219, p = .001.   Again — not surprisingly — nearly three in 10 (29.8%) of this moral talk was 
sponsored by government and military leaders, c2(7, N = 900) = 248.984, p = .001.  Having 
outlined this research’s data concerning hegemonic media framing, I now transition to offering 
an analysis of my findings.   
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4.4. Analysis:  Social System Level – Influences on News Coverage  
 
 
In line with Shoemaker and Reese’s (2013) hierarchy of influences model, this work’s data 
highlights the shaping imprint of the social system or ideology on the news media’s coverage of 
Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan.  This research’s data reveals scant truly counter-
hegemonic representations that actively created “an alternative hegemony on the terrain of civil 
society in preparation for political change” (Pratt 2004: 332).  The news content surrounding 
combat operations in Kandahar was clearly shaped by dominant ideology (Herman and Chomsky 
2002 [1988]; Hallin 1994; Gitlin 2003 [1980]; King and Wells 2009). The “ideological 
environment” surrounding the war pervaded the news coverage, producing a largely hegemonic 
interpretation of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan in the reporting and analysis about the 
war (Hall 1982: 65).  There is clear evidence that views outside the usual elite consensus were 
excluded from the news media’s representation of the conflict (Hallin 1986; Bennett 1990; 
Entman and Rojecki 1993), resulting in the “triumph of establishment perspectives — the status 
quo — in political discourse, and the acceptance of the ruling elite’s worldview as “common 
sense”” (King and Wells 2009: 17). To be sure, as the coming section on sources and indexing 
also makes clears, critics of the war (counter-hegemonic voices) were conspicuously absent from 
the news media account of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan.  My research’s data adds 
to the evidence that the news media largely adheres to the “sphere of legitimate consensus” 
(Hallin 1986: 117) when covering war.   
 
Analogous to Gramsci’s (1971) notion of hegemony, Canada’s governing Conservative Party 
and the military officials subordinate to them — using sophisticated public relation techniques 
(Brown 2003) — attempted to articulate a common sense view about the war in Afghanistan.  As 
I spelled out in my first chapter, government and military leaders (through the media) tried to 
systematically define a way of talking publicly about Canada’s military role in Afghanistan. 
Stephen Harper telegraphed this horizon repeatedly.  Remember, the day after securing a 
minority Parliament in the 2006 general election, the prime minister-designate lauded the 
Canadian soldiers deploying to Kandahar, calling them courageous defenders of democracy 
(Kirton 2006: 37). 
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Months later, in a House of Commons debate about extending the mission, Harper linked 
Canada’s military role in Kandahar to the global war on terrorism.   
“The events of Sept. 11, 2001 was a wake-up call, not just to Americans but to people in 
all free and democratic nations. Two dozen Canadians were killed as result of the attacks 
on the twin towers.  Canada is not safe from such attack, and we will never be safe from 
such attacks as long as we’re a society that defends freedom and democracy” (CBC 
2006d: np). 
 
Flowing from the limited horizon of what is “sayable” about war and foreign policy, government 
and military leaders produced media frames to talk about the war in the news media (Laclau 
2006: 114). Media frames, such as helping to make Kandahar safer, were used to “temporarily 
fix meaning and ways of understanding” to advance the political agenda of garnering public 
support for the combat operation (Cammaerts 2016: 30). As my research’s data shows, Harper 
and other government and military officials succeeded, in part, in getting the news media to echo 
and amplify their preferred media framing of the conflict in Afghanistan.   
 
Ideology or the horizon clearly influenced how the war in Afghanistan and Canada’s military 
was framed in news coverage.  Moreover, it is important to note that the government and 
military’s media frames were stripped of their ideological tone and infused with a common sense 
value (van Dijk, 2008). Canadian Forces were helping to restore democracy and helping women 
and children. Journalists, arguably, internalized the frames sponsored by elites, naturalizing their 
rhetoric and endowing it with a common sense (Reese and Lewis 2009: 777; see also Schudson 
2002). As Althusser (1984: 49) contends, the impact of ideology results in “the practical 
denegation of the ideological character of ideology by ideology.” “Common sense tends to be 
articulated as objective truth and as rational, and thus as anti-ideological” (Cammaerts, 2015: 5).  
To be sure, the government and military’s common sense media frames, exclude “alternative” — 
counter-hegemonic — understandings of war (Jackson 2005: 178).  
 
Many academics and experts were, though, offering counter-hegemonic interpretations of 
Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan early on in the conflict.  International law expert 
Michael Byers (2006: np) told Members of Parliament and Senators soon after combat 
operations in Kandahar started in 2006 that Afghanistan “was the wrong mission for Canada”, 
arguing that Canadian foreign policy should concentrate on peacekeeping instead.  Academics 
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also questioned Canada’s tactics in Afghanistan (Greaves 2008), while others doubted whether 
NATO countries such as Canada were equipped to deal with Afghanistan’s counter-insurgency, 
concluding the military organization’s “expectations of success were not realistic” (Kay and 
Khan 2007: 163).  Furthermore, a number of aid agencies also publicly chastised Canada for its 
focus on combat over reconstruction and development (Kairos 2007)38. Counter-narratives and 
arguments contrasting the government and military’s preferred media framing of the conflict 
were publicly available.  Despite this, my research’s data clearly underscores that the news 
media offered few counter-hegemonic interpretations of the Canada’s military mission in 
Afghanistan, sticking instead, for the most part, to the usual events-oriented coverage that 
focused its critiques on assessing the progress of government and military framing of the 
conflict.  
 
There was far too much episodic coverage and not enough thematic coverage, questioning and 
challenging hegemonic understandings of Canada’s involvement in the conflict and the political 
economy of war (Keen 2011).  Most of the news coverage, as this content analysis found 
“reproduce[d] the attitudes of the powerful” (Fowler 1991: 23), raising questions about 
journalism’s supposed normative role as a watchdog in democracy if the coverage of 
Afghanistan mostly echoed elite positions.  All too frequently, though, there are normative 
discrepancies between the what ought to be and the what is, as Gramsci (1971: 172) observed. 
 
This work’s data highlights how larger macro or structural forces such as the interests of the 
military and the industries that support it were not widely challenged in the news media’s 
coverage of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan. The media’s bias for violence over non-
violence is clear (Roach 1993).  After all, the “news media [are] not well disposed to peace. The 
war correspondent has no equivalent peace correspondent…” (Spencer 2005: 1; see also 
Carruthers 2011: 32).   To be sure, the coverage of the conflict failed “to identify the 
metanarratives or grand strategies that explain the link between different wars over extended 
periods of time” (Boyd-Barrett 2004b: 25).  Because the news and commentary about 
                                                
38 The Harper government halted spending on Kairos in 2009 because of the aid group’s position on the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  Some leaders of Kairos suspect the aid organization was politically targeted 
and then audited by Canada Revenue Agency (Curry 2014). 
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Afghanistan was largely episodic and lacked thematic values such as context (Saideman 2016), 
critical assessments were, therefore, absent from the coverage of the conflict (Lewis et al. 2006).  
As Lewis (2004: 308) concluded about the news coverage of Iraq, much of the reporting and 
analysis about the war in Afghanistan was also “focused on [the] progress of the war at the 
expense of broader contextual issues.”  Aligned with Iyengar’s thinking (1991: 137), the episodic 
news coverage produced by Canadian journalists, arguably, “trivialize[ed] … public discourse” – 
and allowed the news to become a “spokes[person] for dominant groups and their ideology.”  
Additionally, the predominance of episodic coverage, presumably, silenced important critical 
questions about war in mediated public discourse.  “There is not one but many silences,” 
Foucault (1990: 27) argues, “and they are an integral part of the strategies that underlie and 
permeate discourses.” This privileging — through absence — also represents an intangible 
power that is “most effective when least observable” (Lukes 2005 [1974]: 1).   
 
Because of the predominance of events-oriented coverage, government and military leaders 
were, arguably, able to more easily define and frame the war and Canada’s role in making it 
appear natural.   
“‘[T]hose who run the dominant institutions secure their power in large measure directly 
and indirectly, by impressing their definitions of the situation upon those they rule, and, if 
not usurping the whole of ideological space, still significantly limiting what is thought 
through society” (Gitlin 2003 [1980]: 10; italics in original). 
 
It is beyond the scope of a content analysis to understand why journalists conformed to 
hegemonic interpretations of the war.  Yet, the literature suggests that journalists, fearing flack 
from elites, frequently produce content in line with dominant ideology because they fear the 
flack that inevitably comes from not conforming to hegemony (Herman and Chomsky 2002 
[1988]).  To be sure, Canadian journalists knew they were being watched by government and 
military leaders (Pugliese 2009).  There were clear rules about what journalists could report.  
Some journalists were even kicked out of the embedding program for breaking the rules (ABC 
2006).  It is a fair assumption that journalists policed themselves, ultimately echoing and 
amplifying the preferred media frames of government and military officials.  After all, there are 
limits of journalistic critique – and things the news media dare not question because “news 
routines are skewed toward representing demands, individuals, and frames which do not 
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fundamentally contradict the dominant hegemonic principles (Gitlin 2003 [1980]: 270-71; 
original in italics). 
 
With respect to public relations and spin, this research’s data highlights how government media 
messages influence journalists and the coverage they produce (Cook 1998; Meyer 2002; Graber 
2003; Carruthers 2011). Government and military leaders relied on public relations techniques to 
frame the war in an effort to advance their political agenda.  There are normative implications 
related to this political communication.  As the section on fact checking later in this chapter 
shows, government and military leaders often inflated or hyped the progress Canadian Forces 
were making in Kandahar. This torqued spin left journalists definitely less trusting of officials 
(DeCillia 2009).  The next chapter also argues the spin may have left many in the public cynical 
about the government and military’s intention concerning Afghanistan.   
 
This research’s data suggests the ideological environment in which news media content are 
produced limits and constrains the coverage journalists produce about war (McCullagh 2002: 
53).  With respect to my first research question (R1), I conclude that Canada’s military mission 
in Afghanistan was framed largely in the news media in hegemonic terms.  This research adds to 
the existing evidence supporting the shaping power of ideology on news content (Hall et al. 
1978; Gitlin 2003 [1980]; Hallin 1994; Shudson 2001; Shoemaker and Reese 2014).  This 
evidence, of course, raises questions about journalism’s normative watchdog role in democracy, 
which I address near the end of this chapter.  First, though, I need to presage that discussion 
about journalism and democracy by presenting and analyzing this study’s findings concerning 
news values and fact checking and indexing.   
 
4.5. News Values Influence  
 
This section focuses on this study’s second research question:  (R2) what role did news values 
play in shaping news content? 
 
As I noted in the previous section, 90 per cent of the coverage was episodic.  This content 
analysis only found that one in ten stories was thematic.  The news coverage of Canada’s 
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military mission in Afghanistan was overwhelmingly driven by events.  The focus of the 
reporting and analysis was trained largely on combat, death and injuries, military equipment and 
reconstruction and development efforts, comprising nearly six in ten (58.3%) stories or 
commentaries about the conflict (see Figure 12).  The protracted parliamentary debate about 
when Canadian Forces should leave Kandahar accounts for more than a quarter (27.3%) of the 
focus of the news media coverage of Afghanistan. Almost three in ten (29%) of the stories and 
commentaries about the conflict in Afghanistan spotlighted personal stories about Canadian 
soldiers serving in Kandahar. More than three-quarters (76.9 %) of the entire coverage of the 
conflict highlights the violence in Afghanistan.  (The coming analysis provides a number of 
examples to paint a fuller picture of these findings.)  
 
Figure 12 – Focus of News Coverage  
(n = 900) 
 
4.6.  Analysis: News Values Influence  
 
Journalists covering the war in Afghanistan clearly favoured some stories over others.  Event-
driven stories about combat, death and injuries were the focus of near six in ten stories and 
commentaries about the war.  Akin to Galtung and Ruge's (1965) understanding of news values, 
this work’s content analysis found that certain stories — certain narratives — were clearly prized 
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over others.  Three news values (Shoemaker and Reese 2014: 171) definitely imprinted a  
shaping power on the news media’s reporting and analysis of the war, with a clear focus on: (1) 
timeliness; (2) conflict and controversy; and (3) human interest.  
 
The episodic coverage detected by this research’s content analysis is, of course, consistent with 
the timeliness imperative of news (Fowler 1991).  The growth of 24-hour online publications and 
the increasing demands of profit-motivated news, has increased the demands for more content 
(McChesney 2002; McChesney and Nichols 2010).  As a result, journalists are increasingly 
focused on events.  It stands to reason then that stories about combat, death and injuries became 
staples of the news media coverage of the war in Afghanistan between 2006-2009.  There is, of 
course, the “obvious appeal” of the “drama of conflict” (Tumber and Webster 2006: 16).  As this 
content analysis found, ramp ceremonies39, whereby an honour guard carries the remains of a 
dead soldier to a waiting plane on the Kandahar Airfield, were featured prominently in the news 
media. The repatriation ceremonies often led TV and radio news bulletins.  Moreover, the 
solemn occasions lent themselves to vivid narratives:   
“Eight young men, some of them with their own battle wounds, carried the coffin of the 
131st Canadian soldier killed in Afghanistan to the cargo plane that will carry his body 
back to his loved ones in Canada. 
 
The ramp ceremony held at dusk here Friday was much like the many that preceded it. 
But, for the troops who were closest to Private Jonathan Couturier, it was an evening of 
intense grief. 
They hugged and wiped tears from their eyes after bidding goodbye to their 23-year-old 
comrade - a soldier who was remembered by his commanding officer as polite, helpful, 
and someone who “wouldn't kill a spider”” (Galloway 2009: np).  
To be sure, this study’s data underscores that there was a clear stress in the Canadian news media 
between 2006-2009 on narratives (Uko 2007) or “narrativity” (Jacobs 1996: 373) that framed 
Canadian soldiers and the military mission as heroic or noble.  
 
                                                
39 Embedded journalists complained constantly that their main purpose at the Kandahar Airfield was 
death watch (Bergen 2009).  Even during my own time as an embedded reporter, numerous editors and 
news executives told me that they did not want me off the base too much in case I missed the death of a 
Canadian soldier. 
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The news values of conflict and controversy were also prominent in the coverage.  An abundance 
of news coverage about the conflict highlighted the precarious security in Afghanistan, 
conforming with journalism’s emphasis on tension (Uko 2007) and the so-called negative 
(Sabato 1991; Patterson 1996; Capella and Hall Jamieson 1997; Baum and Groeling 2010b). 
Moreover, the ongoing political debate amongst MPs about extending Canada’s military mission 
in Afghanistan represented nearly a third of the coverage about the combat operation — and 
corresponds well with the news media’s focus on horse race politics and process over policy 
(Bennett 2012).   
 
To be sure, elite disagreement — and inter-party disagreement, especially (Baum and Groeling 
2010a) — is a staple of political news coverage and the Canadian news media diligently 
highlighted the disagreement about Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan within the Liberal 
Party.  Similarly, the controversy over the treatment of Afghan detainees — and disagreement 
amongst Canadian politicians over prisoners — also highlights the news media’s propensity to 
highlight conflict (Baum and Groeling 2010a).  Journalists aimed their spotlight on the political 
debate between Canadian MPs, reflecting the “sphere of legitimate controversy” (Hallin 1986: 
117). Opposition politicians naturally criticized the government’s secretive and evasive answers 
concerning the military’s transfer of captured insurgents to Afghan prisons were torture was 
likely happening.  The news media, in turn, dutifully reported on the controversy.  For instance, 
in early 2008, after it emerged that Canadian Forces had stopped their practice of handing 
battlefield detainees over to Afghan authorities that were known to torture prisoners, opposition 
MPs accused the government of a cover-up. News accounts from the time (as below) highlighted 
the conflict: 
“The bombshell revelation spells more trouble for the minority Conservatives who were 
already under fire for what the independent panel called governments’ lack of “candour” 
surrounding the mission. 
 
Liberal Leader Stéphane Dion said the revelations prove Harper's government has been 
misleading Canadians about the military's handling of Afghan detainees” (MacCharles 
and Campion-Smith 2008: np). 
 
Controversy was not the only news value that underpinned much of the coverage. 
Correspondents covering the war in Afghanistan also spotlighted the human interest and personal 
side of the war as well.   
  172 
 
My CA found clear focus in the reporting and analysis on the personal or human-interest aspects 
of the war.  There were numerous stories, for instance, about Canada's largest coffee and baked 
goods chain, Tim Hortons, operating in Kandahar.  There were even stories when the iconic 
Canadian fast food restaurant ran out of doughnuts (CBC 2006e).  This research’s CA also 
discovered a clear emphasis on the personal heroics of Canadian soldiers serving in Kandahar.  A 
Globe and Mail column in April of 2007, for instance, extols the bravery of 24-year-old private 
Jess Larochelle with the 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment:   
“Of the many who behaved with courage and grace on Oct. 14, the day that a little 
fortified position called Strong Point Centre was attacked by the Taliban, probably no one 
else was spoken of with quite the same head-shaking admiration that accompanied the 
mere mention of Larochelle’s name.  
This was a function of the grit and hard-headedness he had demonstrated but also of his 
tender years – he was, as his platoon commander Lieutenant Ray Corby later described 
him, this baby-faced kid who had just held it all together so magnificently.  
When the Taliban attacked that Saturday, it was in a disciplined way and from multiple 
directions, using RPG fire and a heavy volume of small arms. Pte. Larochelle was alone 
in an OP, or observation post, in a defensive position on a hill where the Light Armoured 
Vehicle couldn’t go. Lt. Corby saw an RPG hit the OP and assumed the worst.  
He conducted himself in exemplary fashion this day too, but by the time he was able to 
make it up to the OP to check on the lone soldier – Lt. Corby was only three weeks into 
the job as the 9 Platoon boss and one of his sections had just returned from leave – his 
gnawing concern appeared to be well-founded. The first time he called out, there was no 
answer. “The second time I yelled, I saw this little head pop up,” he said.  
It was Pte. Larochelle, who in short order gave Lt. Corby covering fire so he could jump 
in the OP safely, then calmly briefed him on what he’d been doing – firing at the 
attacking enemy to the west with the machine gun and rocket launchers, then turning his 
back to the enemy and firing to the eastern flank to protect it.  
Pte. Larochelle was almost out of ammo, and, as Lt. Corby said, would have been 
forgiven if in the circumstances he'd stopped firing and ducked down. But he never did” 
(Blatchford 2007b: np). 
Akin to much of the coverage of the second Gulf War (Reese 2004: 249), whereby embedded 
journalists focused extensively on the story of soldiers and the “face of troops”, Canadian 
journalists in Afghanistan similarly concentrated much of their coverage on the courageous 
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military men and women serving in Afghanistan.  Without a doubt, the heroic narrative made 
compelling stories for newspapers, radio and TV.    
 
Arguably, as Henry L. Mencken once railed against, there was too much “sentimental human-
interest scribblers turning out maudlin stuff about the common soldier” (Menchen, as quoted in 
Desmond 1984: 463) at the expense of more substantive and thematic coverage about Canada’s 
military mission in Afghanistan.  Similarly, this type of storytelling about the conflict in 
Afghanistan corresponds with Hallin and Gitlin’s (1993) observation that the news media 
highlights sentimental ties between heroic soldiers at the front and people back in the homeland 
during times of war.  The Canadian news media’s coverage of Afghanistan also parallels 
Taylor’s (1995: 235) observation that war:  
“produces a stream of human stories of tragedy and heroism; they involve the 
deployment of troops and weapons in a manner which makes for exciting copy and 
pictures; they invoke heightened emotions of patriotism, fear anger and euphoria; and 
they involve winners and losers.”   
 
In line with this chapter’s arguments concerning the influence of ideology on news content, this 
research’s data suggests that news values also produced hegemonic interpretations of the conflict 
in Afghanistan in the news media.  From the government and military’s perspective, the 
abundance of troop-focused coverage, arguably, framed the war in favourable terms with 
likeable — and relatable — everyday soldiers fighting heroically for their country against a war 
on terror. As my theory chapter outlined, the focus on the personal often flows from the 
attachment embedded reporters have for the soldiers they are covering.   
“[T]he journalists not merely observed their subjects, but lived their lives and shared their 
experiences, and those experiences were of such emotional intensity that the form of 
prose which journalists use to take the reader into that experience – the ‘I was there’ form 
– provided not only a window for the reader, but also a door for partiality irrespective of 
any desire to remain the detached professional outsider”  (Morrison and Tumber 1988: 
96). 
 
It is important to highlight this type of storytelling because it is a strategy with a political aim.  
Journalist Brian Stewart, who covered the conflict in Afghanistan, contends senior Canadian 
Forces officials strategically (and with considerable acumen in their execution) set out to try to 
“manipulate” news coverage by highlighting every day soldiers and their heroism (Stewart, as 
quoted in DeCillia 2009: 30).  As a U.S. military commander in charge of press relations during 
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the first Gulf War boasted, the narrow focus of embedded reporters on soldiers produced a 
“soda-straw view of the world” (James DeFrank, as quoted in Rid 2007: 152; see also Carruthers 
2011: 233; Tumber 2009).  No doubt, embedding has its benefits for the military.  Journalists 
Jeff Gralnick puts it well: 
“Remember…  you are not being embedded because that sweet old Pentagon wants to be 
nice.  You are being embedded so you can be controlled and in a way isolated” (Gralnick, 
as quoted in Tumber and Palmer 2004: 51) 
 
News coverage that focuses on the narrative of war and personal stories, arguably, perpetuates 
hegemony.  Clearly, this type of reporting about war is “more desirable” for officials than the 
old-fashioned way of control through censorship and “striking a blue pencil through undesirable 
material, demanding post facto corrections, or attempting to snatch back newspapers that have 
already been distributed” (Carruthers 2011: 7).  Commensurate with Hall et al.’s (1978: 56, 76) 
thinking, this CA offers more evidence that the news media do not relay government propaganda 
in the usual transactional form — but instead frequently take on government and military 
leaders’ framing, perpetuating cultural touchstones with a “taken-for-granted” quality that 
ultimately represented an “amplification spiral.”  Regrettably, this type of events-oriented, 
episodic storytelling ignores bigger structural questions and perpetuates elite interests (Boyd-
Barrett 2004b).  With respect to my second research question (R2), I conclude that news values 
shaped, in part, the news coverage of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan, producing 
largely sympathetic accounts of Canadian soldiers. The coming section transitions now to 
considering how another journalistic routine and practice, fact checking, also shaped news 
content about Afghanistan.   
 
4.7. Fact checking Government and Military Leaders’ Frames  
 
This research’s third research question attempts to measure the extent of fact checking in the 
news media’s coverage of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan:  
 
R3. How do journalists (if at all) fact check the preferred media frames of the military and 
government leaders surrounding Canada’s military efforts in Afghanistan? 
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More than three-quarters (76.5%) of the news media reporting and analysis containing a 
preferred government or military frame prompted a journalistic fact check, c2(1, N = 900) = 
390.035, p = .001.  Typical of this approach, The Globe and Mail’s Graham Smith challenges 
Canada’s Chief of Defence Staff claims that Canadian Forces were helping to improve security, 
writing: “Canada’s top soldier has dismissed the growing violence in Kandahar as ‘insignificant,’ 
contradicting all public data and highlighting the growing gap between Canada's upbeat view of 
the war and the sober analysis from other NATO countries” (Smith 2008a: np; italics added).   
Smith’s story (worth quoting at some length) goes on to impeach the top general’s claims:   
“General Walter Natynczyk, Chief of the Defence Staff, has frequently claimed troops 
are making progress, but during a visit to Afghanistan this weekend he offered his first 
specific comments on the number of Taliban attacks. 
 
In Kandahar province we’re generally along the same lines as we have been the past few 
years,” General Natynczyk said. “Looking at the statistics, we’re just a slight notch, 
indeed an insignificant notch, above where we were last year.” 
 
Pressed by journalists to back up his claim, Gen. Natynczyk turned to his commander of 
all overseas forces, Lieutenant-General Michel Gauthier, who gave a figure that initially 
appeared to support the general’s assessment. A comparison of figures from June, 2007, 
and June, 2008, shows violence was similar during the two months, he said. 
 
“They’re within 3 or 4 per cent of each other, so certainly not a marked increase in any 
way shape or form,” Lt-Gen. Gauthier said. 
 
The lieutenant-general later corrected himself, saying the comparison was, in fact, limited 
to the first days of July. He provided no other data. Neither of the two senior Canadian 
officers explained why they based their assessments on a span of days, instead of 
following the practice of most security analysts who examine months and years. 
 
Gen. Natynczyk’s claim that violence has not significantly increased in Kandahar does 
not fit any of the published statistics, all of which show major increases in Taliban attacks 
since 2005” (Smith 2008a: np) 
 
The news story40 then details statistics refuting or fact checking the general’s claim about 
improving security.  
 
                                                
40 Cohen (2009: 188), of note, lauds the journalists who wrote this story in his book Critical Thinking 
Unleashed, suggesting American journalists would have done well to be more skeptical of American 
officials’ claims of WMD in the lead up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq.    
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This study’s statistical analysis confirmed an association between this type of official media 
framing and fact checks sponsored by journalists (63.9%, p < .001, FET).  Journalists themselves 
(and not opposition politicians or critics of the war) presented the largest and most sustained 
challenge to government and military media framing in the reporting and analysis about 
Afghanistan. Simply put, journalists fact checked the media preferred frames of government and 
military leaders.  The challenges by journalists grew over time, too.  In 2006, slightly less than 
half (49.8%) of the news media coverage about Afghanistan contained a fact check of a 
government or military frame.  Challenges to government and military leaders’ framing grew to 
64.4 per cent in 2007; dropped to 56.7 per cent in 2008; and then rose to 62 per cent in 2009,  
c2(3, N = 900) = 11.266, p = .011.   
 
Notably, the largest percentage of fact checking (56.9%) focused on challenging government and 
military leaders’ claims of improving security.  After that, 16.3 per cent of fact checking focused 
on the government and military’s execution of its stated goals.  Much of this fact checking 
questioned if the government and military were making progress on military and development 
goals in Kandahar. For instance, a 2007 story entitled “Afghan aid an exercise in feeling good”, 
disputes Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s claims of “making progress” to help reconstruct 
Afghanistan (Ivison 2007: np).  The story highlights a recent Canadian Senate report suggesting 
Canada’s reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan were “sparse” and “unsatisfactory” (Ivison 2007: 
np). Moreover, the news report also quotes an aid expert who contends Canada’s development 
efforts in Kandahar are “so minimal as to be non-existent” (Ivison 2007: np).  To be sure, 
though, improving security, as the coming section spells out, was the considerable focus of 
journalistic fact checking.   
 
4.8. Violence & Safety and Security  
 
More than three-quarters (76.9%) of news and commentary mentions the seemingly perpetual 
violence and precarious security in Afghanistan.  In a Globe and Mail feature about training 
Afghan police officers, for example, the story ends pessimistically, stressing that insurgents were 
increasingly killing Canadian soldiers with suicide bombers and roadside improvised explosive 
devices (Koring and Dobrota 2007).  Mentions of the deteriorating security in Afghanistan 
increased from 76.1 per cent in 2006 to 77.8 per cent in 2007.  Concerns about security rose 
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again to 82.8 per cent in 2008 before falling below the four year average of 76.9 per cent to 70.9 
in 2009, c2(3, N = 900) = 9.610, p = .022.    
 
Deteriorating security became a perpetual theme in the narrative and fact checking about 
Afghanistan.  In 2009, for instance, a feature story in The Globe and Mail highlighted how the 
precarious safety in Kandahar had some women wishing for the relative security — but 
repression — of the Taliban regime.  
“Over the past eight years, Canada alone has spent $10-billion in its effort to rebuild 
Afghanistan; improving the situation of women in Kandahar – the most fundamentalist of 
Afghanistan’s 34 provinces – was originally an intended byproduct of the mission. 
 
But lately, deteriorating security has forced Kandahar's women to began forfeiting gains 
they only recently won: They are quitting jobs instead of seeking them, dropping out of 
class rather than signing up, slipping on burkas instead of shedding them. And despite 
constitutional guarantees and legal changes aimed at providing equality to women and 
ending practices such as bride buying, the status of women these days is little changed 
from that of their forebears” (Leeder 2009: np).   
 
There was a clear association between the mention of safety or security (85.4%) in news and 
analysis about the war and a fact check (overwhelmingly authored by a journalist), c2(1, N = 
900) = 51.130, p = .001. Notably, the data shows no statistical association between a journalist’s 
location and their propensity to fact check government and military frames.  Journalists in 
Canada (58.8%) and embedded reporters in Kandahar (58%) fact checked government and 
military frames with almost the exact same regularity.   
 
4.9.  Analysis: Reality Versus Government and Military Media Framing 
 
My findings support the contention that the journalistic routine and practice of fact checking 
shaped news coverage of the war.  Corresponding to other research (Tuchman 1978a; Gans 
1979; Mermin 1996; Dobbs 2012; Graves 2016; Graves et al. 2016), this CA’s data indicates that 
the journalistic routine and practice of holding decision makers accountable (Jones 2009) shaped 
the coverage of the conflict in Afghanistan.  This research’s findings, I contend, supports theory 
and evidence (Baum and Groeling 2010a; Baum and Groeling 2010b; Speer 2017) suggesting 
that dramatic events offer journalists and opportunity to counter-frame events and issues.   
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From the onset of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan in 2006, journalists covering the 
combat operations fact checked government and military media frames.  In addition, there was a 
clear association between frame contestation by journalists and mentions of safety and security 
in the news coverage.  Canadian Forces were, simply put, not making the volatile region of 
Kandahar safer as government and military officials kept claiming. Journalists, in turn, compared 
government and military leaders’ media frames against their own observations or the facts in 
Kandahar to “determine” the truthfulness of official framing (Uscinski and Butler 2013: 163).  
They were resisting and contesting the common sense hegemony about the war articulated by 
government and military leaders (Gramsci 1971).  
 
Canadian journalists’ propensity to fact check the claims of government and military leaders 
were also likely influenced by the acrimonious relations between the new Conservative 
Government and the news media (DeCillia 2009).  The Harper government’s public disdain for 
the news media (Wilson 2006; Martin 2010; Harris 2014; Saideman 2016), arguably, heightened 
the adversarial relationship between journalists and officials, leading news professionals to be 
more suspicious of officials’ framing of the war.  A panel of expert Canadians appointed by the 
Conservative government to study Afghanistan concluded, in fact, that the Harper government 
“failed to communicate with Canadians with balance and candour” about the conflict 
(Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan 2008: 20).  Journalists experienced 
that lack of sincerity first hand.   
 
Canadian journalists covering the conflict felt they were being spun by government and military 
leaders (DeCillia 2009).  Journalism and political communications represents a two-way street, 
of sorts.  To be certain, political actors need to carefully manage their relationship with the media 
in order to increase the chances of their preferred media frame(s) being adopted by journalists 
(Entman 2004). In line with Habermas’ pragmatics of human communications, all 
communication (no mater how asymmetrical) is “essentially derived from the basic form of 
dialogue and must be seen as relationships between active human subjects” (Hallin 1994: 20). To 
that end, journalists walk a delicate balance of appealing to sources for information but not 
wishing to appear to be co-opted (Hallin 1994).  
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“They must maintain the integrity of their relationship with their audience and also the 
integrity of their own self image and of the social relationships that make up the 
profession of journalism. Maintaining these relationships requires a certain minimum of 
honesty” (Hallin 1994: 32). 
 
In the aftermath of the abject failure (and co-opting, arguably) of American journalism in the 
lead up to the second Gulf War (Massing 2005; Bennett et al. 2006, 2007), Canadian journalists 
were on guard against government spin and misinformation (DeCillia 2009). Overly optimistic 
claims about progress and improving security likely became a red flag, of sorts, for journalists to 
critique. Canadian journalists likely felt compelled to respond in a more aggressive — fact 
checking — fashion. 
 
This study’s data also adds to the evidence supporting Baum and Groeling’s (2010b: 34) 
contention that news coverage of war evolves over time with an increasing focus on the 
“discrepancies between” the preferred media frames of government and military officials and 
reality in the war zone.  Journalists, after all, are interpreters (Zelizer 1993; Schudson 2013) — 
and dramatic events “may encourage journalists to take the initiative” to counter-frame events if 
they conflict with their own observations (Speer 2017: 298; italics in original).  “If the text frame 
emphasizes in a variety of mutually reinforcing ways that the glass is half full,” stresses Entman 
(1993: 56), “the evidence of social science suggests that relatively few in the audience will 
conclude it is half empty.”  Baum and Groeling’s (Baum and Groeling 2010a: 10) elasticity of 
reality theory holds that over time — as the media gains more knowledge about the conflict they 
are covering — they “have the opportunity to retrospectively assess the reliability of prior elite 
rhetoric” (see also Brody 1994). Unlike the war in Iraq that Baum and Groeling (2010b) studied, 
where journalists only began counter-framing the war after no WMD was found and a volatile 
insurgency erupted, reality asserted itself at the beginning of combat operations in Kandahar in 
2006.  
 
Canadian reporters covering the conflict in Kandahar began weaving their observations about the 
precarious security in Afghanistan into their coverage from the start of Canada’s combat role in 
Kandahar.  The Canadian news media’s coverage of Afghanistan “parallel[ed] objective 
indicators of reality” that Canadian journalists witnessed themselves from the onset of Canadian 
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Forces’ combat operations in southern Afghanistan (Baum and Groeling 2010b: 188).  The 
indexing hypothesis holds that elite disagreement is necessary for the news media to increase 
their critical accounts of events and issues, especially in the realm of foreign affairs (Bennett 
1990).  Dramatic events, as this research’s data shows, can also precipitate journalistic counter-
framing.  This work’s findings also bolster evidence in support of Entman’s (2003: 415) 
cascading activation model that explains how “interpretive frames” can originate from 
journalists, who are “not entirely passive receptacles for government propaganda.”  My findings, 
in line with Speer (2017), raise questions about the indexing hypothesis’ predictive qualities and 
add further evidence backing an event-driven conceptualization of the potential for counter-
framing by journalists.  (I return to an updated concept of indexing later in this chapter, but 
before that, I discuss the underlying motivations for fact checking in the coverage of Canada’s 
military mission in Afghanistan.)  
 
As I noted earlier, the violent insurgency in nearby Iraq and the failure to find WMD seeped into 
the consciousness of Canadian journalists, inoculating them to what they perceived as spin 
concerning the conflict in Afghanistan.  While fact checking has recently come under the 
spotlight because of Donald Trump’s presidency, the practice represents a decades-long 
interpretive turn (Schudson 1993; Zelizer 1993; Baum and Groeling 2010b; Schudson 2013; 
Barnhurst 2014) in journalism.  In the last decade, U.S. news organizations such as 
FactCheck.org and PolitiFact institutionalized fact checking (Graves 2016). The practice has 
emerged as an “antidote to the stenographic reporting” that allowed the Bush administration to 
peddle its dubious justifications for invading Iraq (Graves 2016: 62).  To be sure, the failure to 
find WMD represented an important intellectual break (Allan and Zelizer 2004: 224) for 
journalists, offering news professionals an opportunity to “destabilize hegemonic discourses and 
identities” about their craft and its practices (Carpentier 2005: 209). This research’s data suggests 
that reporting and analysis about Afghanistan should be viewed as part of the growing 
interpretive style (Schudson 2013) and fact checking form (Graves 2016) of journalism.  In the 
aftermath of one of journalism’s great failures to effectively challenge the Bush administration’s 
rationale for invading Iraq, reportage about the war in Afghanistan comports with the increasing 
propensity of journalists to fact check elites’ claims, especially about war (Dobbs 2012).  
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This work’s findings suggests that the continuous fact checking — and focus on deteriorating 
security — became a theme or trope throughout all the coverage, suggesting the possibility of 
pack journalism, whereby journalists cue off one another creating a meta-narrative shared by 
most news professionals (Mendelsohn and Crespi 1970; Hall Jamieson and Waldman 2004; 
Kovach and Rosentiel 2014).  Baum and Groeling (2010b) found that the deteriorating security, 
after time, became a shorthand, of sorts, for journalists covering the Iraq war.  This research’s 
data highlights a prevailing media narrative took root quickly concerning Canada’s military role 
in Afghanistan: that is, Kandahar was unsafe — and security was deteriorating.  A column 
published a year into the conflict, in the summer of 2007, entitled “Canadian troops forced to 
start from scratch” sums up the futility of keeping Kandahar safe infused in much of the news 
coverage:   
“Like Sisyphus, the Greek mythological figure condemned to push a boulder up a hill 
every day only to see it roll right back down, Canadian soldiers here are trapped in a loop 
that has the fourth iteration of troops battling for the exactly the same ground their 
predecessors in southern Afghanistan fought to take.  
… 
Canadians have been fighting and dying for the same pieces of ground in the same two 
volatile areas – the lush plains of the notorious Zhari and Panjwai districts that border the 
Arghandab River – just west of the provincial capital since February, 2006.  
The pattern is always the same: The Canadians invariably win the military battle, send 
the Taliban and the various warlords and drug criminals who are their natural allies on 
the run, hand over to the fledgling Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and then 
find most of their hard-fought gains are lost in the fetid stew of corruption, ineptitude and 
tribal quarrels that remains the norm in this part of the country” (Blatchford 2007a: np).  
This column is also representative of how Canadian journalists inserted their own observations 
instead of the usual he said/she said practice of quoting the other side to challenge government 
and military media frames.  Compared to the domestic journalists covering the conflict (and 
political debate surrounding the war), embedded journalists did not have readily available 
sources in Kandahar to critique the government and military’s framing.  Lacking access to 
critical voices, embedded correspondents in Afghanistan, in line with professional norms, often 
used their own reporting (what they knew and saw) to “challenge the official version of events” 
(Cook 2005: 106).  
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It is also important to highlight that Canadian journalists used elite criteria and definitions to fact 
check the frames sponsored by officials.  Government and military leaders’ frames were 
consistently assessed by elite-defined and administered “objective” rules, laws, standards and 
codes (Ettema and Glasser 1989: 2). This way of impugning elite frames, in effect, turned larger 
questions about the government and military’s motivations and actions into quantitative or 
scientific demands.  While the news media may have fact checked the frames sponsored by 
elites, those frames still structured the stories, commentaries and editorials they produced. Elite 
frames provided the intellectual scaffolding for journalistic production. “Journalists’ reliance on 
elite sources,” Nelson, Clawson and Oxley (1997: 238) concluded, means that even when 
journalists “dispute the sources’ assumptions or conclusions, they still construct the story in 
terms established by that source,” meaning elites have considerable power to frame news even 
when the news professionals contests their preferred interpretation. 
 
As Bennett (2012) has argued, the news ritual of assessing and challenging political actors’ 
objectives produces distorted coverage.  When journalists fact checked government and military 
framing, they still incorporated — and even highlight — the frames sponsored by political actors 
in their coverage.  This practice, arguably, moves beyond storytelling to producing “meaning in 
the service of power” (Thompson 1990: 7) and questions the power journalists possess to 
challenge, as Baum and Groeling (2010b) describe. Contradicting a media frame, after all, 
enviably evokes the frame (Lakoff 2004). This conclusion, of course, dovetails with my previous 
arguments concerning the overwhelming hegemonic coverage produced by Canadian journalists 
about the conflict in Afghanistan.  I offer a lengthier discussion about the implications of this 
practice for normative watchdog notions of journalism later on in this chapter. 
 
With respect to my third research question (R3), I conclude that journalists robustly fact checked 
the preferred frames of military and government leaders surrounding Canada’s military efforts in 
Afghanistan.  Yet, as I have argued, this practice does not represent a truly counter-hegemonic 
expression.  As the beginning of this chapter made clear, the overwhelming body of news 
coverage of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan was confined to a “sphere of consensus” 
(Hallin 1986: 117) about the conflict and Canada’s international role.  Simply put, fact checking 
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also does not push beyond hegemonic boundaries.  The next section transitions to outlining and 
analyzing my findings concerning indexing.  
 
4.10. Indexing  
 
Research question four considers the shaping power of indexing:  R4. What role does indexing 
play in shaping the news media’s coverage of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan? 
 
Consistent with what one might expect about news coverage of a war, military and government 
officials comprise nearly half (47.3%) of the primary sources in the news media about Canada’s 
military mission in Afghanistan (see Figure 13).   
 
Figure 13 – Primary Sources  
 
(n = 900) 
 
Journalists comprised nearly two in ten (19.8%) of the primary sources in the reporting and 
analysis of Afghanistan.   In much of this reporter-led news content about the conflict, broadcast 
journalists were reporting live from the war zone on radio or television.  Both CTV and CBC 
made considerable use of reporter-only so-called rants for radio or ROCs (Reporters on Camera) 
for television to convey breaking news from the battleground. Compared to expensive satellite 
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time for live reports, the reporter-only pre-packaged stories were easy and economical to send 
back to newsrooms as compressed audio or video digital files using the Internet.   
 
Experts and academics (7.9%) represent the third largest group of primary sources.  Average 
Canadians were also used as primary sources in 7.9 per cent of the media coverage.  Typical of 
this, Canadians were reflected in Vox Populi (voice of the people or so-called streeters) to reflect 
public mood about the war.  At a repatriation ceremony in 2007 for six dead Canadian soldiers, 
for instance, a CBC Radio story quotes a young man questioning the mission as the death toll 
escalated.   
“The loss that Canada is taking is it really a good thing for them to be over there? And if, 
you know, they don't see that they're going to solve problems over there, it might be a 
good idea to, you know, maybe get out” (Stoffel 2007: np).      
 
Afghan civilians were present in 4.3 per cent of the news media. In a 2008 Globe and Mail story 
highlighting how hunger was on the rise despite aid efforts, a Kandahar man is quoted about 
increasing food prices. “Sometimes the children cry, and we give them a bit of bread,” he told 
the newspaper reporter, “but we cannot give them enough.  Maybe we will start begging or 
stealing, I don't know” (Smith 2008b: np).  Canadian opposition politicians were only found in 
4.3 per cent of the reporting and analysis about Afghanistan.  As well, critics of the war were 
negligible (0.3%) as primary sources. Of note, voices outside of the government and military 
(opposition politicians, academics, non-governmental organizations) did, however, increase as a 
percentage of primary sources from 22.4 per cent in 2006 to an average of 27.7 per cent for the 
four years, c2(9, N = 900) = 17.5111, p = .041.  Government and military leaders clearly, though, 
dominated the coverage as primary sources.  It was a slightly different story when it comes to 
secondary sources. 
 
4.11. Indexing: Secondary Sources 
 
More than four in ten (44.7%) news media accounts of Afghanistan did not include a secondary 
source (see Figure 14).  When media coverage does contain a secondary source, official 
government and military officials again comprise the largest percentage at 26.2 per cent.  
Opposition politicians made up 9.6 per cent of secondary sources. In 2007, for example, New 
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Democratic Party (NDP) leader Jack Layton called on the government to withdraw Canadian 
Forces from Afghanistan immediately.  “The strategy we’re following,” Layton told reporters, 
“is wrong; we should take our troops out” (Freeman 2007: np).   
 
Figure 14 – Secondary Sources  
(n = 900) 
 
Experts and academics were present as secondary sources in 7.1 per cent of the Canadian news 
media’s coverage of the conflict in Afghanistan.  Average Canadians were found in 5.1 per cent 
of the reporting and analysis.  Afghan officials and civilians comprised 3.2 per cent of secondary 
sources.  Non-governmental organization sources, such as the International Red Cross, were 
presented in less than one per cent (0.9%) of the news media about the conflict.  Critics of the 
war were almost non-existent as secondary sources at 0.1 per cent of the coverage.  Insurgents, 
interestingly, had a higher chance of being used as a secondary source at 0.4 per cent.  Similar to 
what my content analysis found with primary sources, voices outside of the government and 
military increased as secondary sources in media coverage from 22.9 per cent in 2006 to an 
average of 27.6 per cent between 2006-2009, c2(9, N = 900) = 25.131, p = .003.   Primary and 
secondary sources played an important role, as the coming section details, in terms of frame 
sponsorship.   
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4.12. Frame Sponsorship 
 
When a preferred media frame of government and military leaders is present in news and 
analysis about the conflict, government and Canadian Forces officials are, not surprisingly, the 
largest (52.9%) sponsors of these frames (see Figure 15).  A newspaper headline from 2008, for 
example, quoting military leaders, reads: “Fine Canadians, courageous men; Three slain soldiers 
are remembered for their bravery, dedication and love of adventure” (Moore 2008: np).  In the 
story, Prime Minister Harper praises the dead soldiers' “selfless service” to Canada, “while 
helping to ensure a brighter future for the Afghan people” (Moore 2008: np).    
  
Figure 15 - Frame Sponsor 
(n = 900) 
 
Journalists covering the war echoed frames sponsored by government and military leaders, too.  
News professionals (24%) were the second largest sponsor of preferred government and military 
media frames.  This adoption of the government and military’s preferred frame(s) often came in 
commentaries and editorials.  In a column entitled “A soldier's motto: Always come back for 
your friends”, The Globe and Mail’s Christie Blatchford, for example, extols Warrant Officer 
Willy MacDonald bravery, describing how the soldier “with machine-gun fire and RPGs raining 
down on him” helped his wounded comrades (Blatchford 2009).  
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4.13. Embedded Journalists vs. Non-embedded Journalists Use of Sources 
 
 
Not surprisingly, journalists embedded with Canadian Forces turned to sources that were readily 
available in Afghanistan: that is, government and military leaders.  Statistical analysis (two-sided 
Fisher's exact test) determined that embedded journalists relied more heavily on military (34.2%) 
sources than journalists in Canada (16%), p < .001, FET.  Journalists in Afghanistan also 
featured government sources in their coverage at a slightly higher rate (18.8%) compared to 
journalists in Canada (18.2%), p < .001, FET.  As noted above, opposition politicians were rarely 
primary sources in the news media.  This was particularly pronounced in coverage from 
embedded journalists with only 3.5 per cent of primary sources being opposition politicians.  In 
most of this type of content generated by embedded correspondents, vising delegations of MPs 
and Senators to the KAF were primary sources.  In early 2007, for instance, opposition Members 
of Parliament touring the Kandahar Airfield complained that the Conservative government 
trumped up security concerns to purposely restrict their access to reconstruction and 
development efforts outside the secure military installation of KAF.  Liberal MP and foreign 
affairs critic Ujjal Dosanjh criticized the ruling Conservatives, questioning if the defence 
minister had: 
 “ordered the general not to let us go out of the wire because of safety reasons. I thought 
that was the kind of decision that one makes on an operational basis. The general makes 
that decision. What does the minister know about safety sitting in Ottawa?” (Smith 
2007). 
 
Journalists (mostly based in Ottawa on Parliament Hill) were more likely (6.3%) to include 
opposition politicians as primary sources in their coverage than embedded journalists in 
Afghanistan, p < .001, FET.  In terms of secondary sources, embedded journalists again relied 
heavily on government (8.3%) and military officials (20.6%).  Canada-based journalists also 
featured government sources (10.8%) as secondary sources in their coverage, but were much less 
likely to use military officials (8.2%) than their counterparts in Afghanistan, p < .001, FET. 
Opposition politicians as secondary sources were also more frequently found in Canada-based 
stories (13.8%) compared to coverage with an Afghanistan dateline (7.8%), p < .001, FET.  
 
As might be expected, nearly five in ten stories or commentaries (46.8%) from Canadian-based 
journalists focused on the political debate about the military mission.  In contrast, embedded 
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journalists in Afghanistan focused on the politics of the war at a lower rate (19%), c2(18, N = 
900) = 120.172, p = .001.   Embedded journalists mostly focused on the military (31.4%) and 
deaths and injuries (28.9%), c2(18, N = 900) = 120.172, p = .001.  In terms of episodic versus 
thematic coverage, there was no statistically significant difference between embedded (81.8% / 
18.2%) and Canada-based journalists (86.6% / 13.4%).  Most of the news content — no matter 
who generated it or where it came from — was overwhelmingly tied, as I pointed out earlier, to 
events.  
 
4.14. Analysis: Indexing 
 
The forthcoming pages interpret the shaping power of indexing on Canadian media coverage of 
the war in Afghanistan.  I begin by evaluating embedding’s influence.  Second, I analyze the 
shaping power of indexing on coverage of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan.  This 
section engages with the broader debate in media and communications scholarship concerning 
the power of official sources or dramatic events to shape news content.  In the one camp 
(Tuchman 1978a; Hallin 1986; Herman and Chomsky 2002 [1988]; Bennett 1990, 2012; Gitlin 
2003 [1980]; Bennett et al. 2006, 2007), officials are endowed with considerable influence over 
shaping media discourse.  On the other side (Wolfsfeld 1997; Baum and Groeling 2010a, 2010b; 
Porpora et al.  2010; Speer 2017), dramatic events afford more (but not complete) power to the 
news media to counter-frame events and issues.  The coming pages do not refute the indexing 
hypothesis — but argues that a more refined conceptualization of indexing’s shaping influence 
on news content is required in media and communication scholarship.   
 
4.15. Indexing and Embedding 
 
There were, no doubt, practical reasons for why so many government and military officials were 
quoted in coverage from Afghanistan.  Journalists embedded with Canadian Forces clearly 
turned to the sources that were readily available in Afghanistan: military leaders, mostly and 
government officials, secondly.  Statistical analysis determined that embedded journalists relied 
more heavily on military sources than journalists who covered the issues and events surrounding 
the war from Canada.  This conclusion is rather prosaic, of course.  In many cases, journalists in 
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Afghanistan only had access to military sources.   Correspondents embedded with Canadian 
Forces during military action (or battles) mostly only had access to military personnel41.   
 
Journalists in Canada, of course, had easier access to different (more critical) sources and, 
therefore, used them more frequently. Journalists need sources (primary and secondary) to 
produce content quickly and efficiently.  Information must come from somewhere.  Furthermore, 
journalists are increasingly expected to produce news — and lots of it (Davies 2009; Fenton 
2010; Freedman 2010; McChesney and Nichols 2010; Zelizer 2017).  The churn of everyday 
news forces journalists to turn to easily accessible sources, usually officials.  Just as journalists 
often gravitate towards the easiest frame for their stories (Entman 1991), they also frequently 
turn to sources who are right in front of them.  This is especially true when news breaks.  It is not 
surprising then that this research’s data shows that embedded Canadian journalists mostly quoted 
government and military officials.   
 
The lack of opposition voices in Afghanistan may also explain, in part, the propensity to fact 
check government and military media frames.  As a routine, journalists want to balance their 
coverage.  Without the other side to the story easily available in Kandahar, news professionals 
no doubt felt a compunction to balance their stories with counterpoints to official rhetoric. 
Mermin (1996) posits that when there is consensus, journalists search for conflict.  This, in turn, 
usually results in critiques of how elites execute their policy decisions.  Absent critical voices to 
include in their stories, journalists, undoubtedly, wanted to include “conflicting possibilities” 
surrounding the efforts of “officials to achieve the goals they had set” concerning, for instance, 
security or development (Mermin 1996: 191). 
 
This research’s findings about embedded journalists’ reliance on military and government 
sources, of course, correspond with an institutional perspective on the news media.  In line with 
ample scholarship (Gans 1979; Tuchman 1978a; Fishman 1980; Cook 1994, 2005) highlighting 
                                                
41 Embedded journalists, of course, had access to communication such as cell phones, computers and even 
the Internet with the help of portable satellites.  They also employed so-called fixers (local Afghan 
journalists and interpreters) who could gather information to supplement their embedded coverage.  There 
was even the possibility of calling a Taliban spokesperson for comment.  
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the relationship between institutions and the news media, embedded journalism, arguably, 
represents the ultimate form of listening post news production, whereby journalists live and work 
alongside military personnel. There is a political economy, as well, to the embedding 
arrangement.  News organizations invest considerable resources and money in attaching their 
news professionals with the military.  In return, news managers expect their embedded 
journalists to produce compelling war stories.   Journalists, in turn, know to churn out the copy.  
 
As detailed in my theory chapter, embedding gets routinely criticized as propaganda dressed up 
as news (Knightly 2003 [1975]; Keeble 2004). Critical scholarship legitimately questions the 
frequent sympathetic, jingoistic and patriotic tone of news and analysis produced by embedded 
correspondents.  All too often, the coverage echoes and amplifies the spin of government and 
military leaders waging the war, failing to live up to normative conceptions (Allan and Zelizer 
2004). Carruthers (2011: 9) sums up the disparity between theory and the reality of war coverage 
well: 
“[I]n wartime we’re apt to see how starkly media practice contradicts liberal theory.  Far 
from subjecting patriotic jingoism to withering critiques, skewering xenophobic or 
outright racist representations of foreign antagonists and challenging whether it’s 
necessary to tackle an international dispute with guns and bombs, media outlets, often 
appear positively eager to act as war’s cheerleaders.  Just when deliberative democracy 
cries out for vigorous debate, media may seem at their most supine and credulous.” 
This research offers a slightly different insight into embedding than usually offered in media and 
communications research, highlighting that while Canadian journalists covering the war 
alongside military forces did largely gravitate towards official sources, they also consistently fact 
checked or challenged government and military rhetoric about the war in Afghanistan. Yet, as 
this chapter’s earlier section on the social system (or ideology) makes plain, the challenges of 
journalists only went so far.  As well, there was a glaring absence of counter-hegemonic voices 
and thinking in the news coverage about the conflict.  Key questions about the war and the 
justifications for international conflict did not get asked.   
 
Admittedly, it is difficult to make definitive conclusions about the impact of embedding on 
Canadian news content based on this research’s content analysis.  Understanding how 
embedding influences journalists’ decision-making requires different methods, such as 
interviewing or observing embedded reporters.  Knowing why journalists produced the types of 
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stories they produced is unknowable with this study’s content analysis.  But this research’s data 
sheds light on what types of coverage Canadian journalists covering the conflict produced. In 
line with this research’s data, Lewis et al. (2003) and Lewis (2004) concluded that while 
embedded journalists covering the invasion of Iraq in the second Gulf War showed no bias, their 
coverage highlighted the narrative or story and ignoring critical questions about the war.   The 
same is true with the Canadian news media’s coverage of the war in Afghanistan.   
 
Canadian officials did not hide their hopes that embedding journalists with military personnel 
would promote a positive image of Canada’s armed forces and its war efforts in Afghanistan  
(Canadian Expiditionary Forces Canada 2006).  To be certain, political actors often “take great 
pains to generate support for waging war, enlisting mass communication media to help bolster 
the case” (Carruthers 2011: 6).  This research’s CA illustrates well how the cohabitation, of 
sorts, between the Canadian media and military produced content that frequently painted 
Canadian Forces in patriotic, noble and heroic terms.  Having considered the impact of indexing 
surrounding embedded journalists, I now wish to consider the potential impact of elite 
disagreement on shaping news and analysis about the war.   
 
4.16. What Unified Elite? 
 
Traditional indexing theory holds that elite disagreement often leads journalists to be more 
critical in their coverage (Hallin 1986; Bennett 1990).  As detailed in my theory and methods 
chapter, this research disentangles elites, viewing them not as a monolithic bloc but competing 
factions.  Conceptualizing government and military leaders as one bloc and other political actors 
as another side is helpful.  This study’s data illustrates well how disagreement amongst different 
sections of Canadian elites likely fuelled criticism of the war in the news media.  To be sure, this 
work’ data surrounding primary or secondary sources shows that elites do not represent a 
singular — and unified — bloc.  All too frequently, elites are represented as some sort of 
consolidated — and singular — hegemonic force.  This work adds to the evidence that elites are 
not always unified — but different blocs fighting to articulate a common sense (Gramsci 1971).  
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In contrast to the U.S. where there was more consensus — both bipartisan support and 
Congressional authorization of force for both the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq — there were 
clear battle lines and different perspectives amongst political actors represented in Canada’s 
Parliament (Bratt 2007).  Canada’s House of Commons was split over the question of 
Afghanistan. For the most part, the Bloc Québécois and the New Democratic Party wanted to 
pull Canadian Forces out of Afghanistan immediately. Controversial parliamentary motions 
extending the mission were largely brokered between the ruling Conservatives and the official 
opposition Liberal Party (BBC 2008). Even some Liberals, who initially committed Canadian 
troops to Kandahar while in power in 2005, questioned Canada’s commitment to the conflict 
while in opposition (Gross Stein and Lang 2007).    
 
Discussing U.S. foreign policy, Senator Arthur Vandenberg famously contended that “politics 
stops at the water’s edge” (Vandenberg, as quoted in Baum and Groeling 2010b: 5).  
Vandenberg’s aphorism does not apply to Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan.  Debate 
over the war became a wedge issue of sorts. The governing Conservatives used the parliamentary 
debates over extending the mission as a means of distinguishing itself from other parties in the 
minority Parliament.  In the spring of 2006, for instance, the Conservatives surprised the House 
of Commons with an unexpected — and immediate — vote on extending and expanding 
Canada's involvement in Afghanistan (Bratt 2007).  As the governing Conservatives surely 
expected, the Quebec nationalist Bloc Québécois and the left-leaning New Democratic Party 
opposed the motion.  The Conservatives’ political calculus worked, smoking out the divided 
Liberal Party who had approved the mission while in government the year before (Saideman 
2016).   The vote exposed a split in the Liberal party, highlighting the party’s flip flop on the war 
and, arguably, making them look weak to some Canadian voters.  Longtime political analyst 
John Ibbitson declared the party not ready to govern: 
“[T]he [Liberal] [P]arty that led this country through the Second World War, that took us 
to Korea and to Kosovo, is in shambles, split on Afghanistan and in the midst of a 
leadership campaign. So while leadership candidate Michael Ignatieff declared his 
“unequivocal support” for the new deployment, John McCallum announced his intention 
to vote against it, saying, “This whole process is insulting”” (Ibbitson 2006: np). 
 
Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan became a hot political issue — and a political hammer, 
of sorts, for the Conservatives to beat their opponents with.  The governing party wrapped itself 
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in the Canadian flag, depicting itself as defender of Canadian values and its opponents as weak, 
dithering and unpatriotic.  Conservatives, in fact, branded the leader of the NDP “Taliban Jack” 
for suggesting NATO negotiate a peace deal with the insurgents (Walkom 2007: np).  As this 
research’s CA data shows, journalists aligned their coverage to this debate, highlighting and 
focusing on the parliamentary debate about extending military operations in Kandahar.  
Journalists, to be sure, reflected the “sphere of legitimate controversy” (Hallin 1986: 117)  
surrounding Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan.  As the political debate about the war 
heated up, journalists, predictably, reflected the “growing strains and division” amongst political 
actors about the conflict, offering “far higher amounts of critical news coverage without 
abandoning objective journalism” norms (Tumber and Palmer 2004: 163; see also Hallin 1986).  
This is, of course, to be expected.  The news media, after all, prizes conflict and tends to over-
represent elite disagreement as part of a “professional incentive that shapes journalists’ standards 
of newsworthiness” (Baum and Groeling 2010b: 5).   
 
While not as well represented as government and military leaders in the news coverage of the 
war in Afghanistan, opposition politicians clearly had an influence on the tone of it.  The 
inclusion of opposition politicians in coverage of the war is associated with government or 
military preferred frames being fact checked in the news media.  Journalists usually did the fact 
checking – but often the news professionals challenged government and military leaders’ claims 
of progress and improving security with critiques offered by opposition MPs.  For instance, in a 
Globe and Mail story entitled “Weakness in mission exposed, critics say”, Liberal foreign affairs 
critic Bob Rae stressed that Canada’s efforts to make the volatile region of Kandahar safer were 
being hampered by the open Afghan-Pakistan border that allowed insurgents to move back and 
forth easily.  Rae told the newspaper: 
“The fact of the matter is, not only is al-Qaeda working on both sides of the border... but 
the intellectual, the military, the financial support of the Taliban is, if anything, stronger 
in Pakistan than it is in Afghanistan” (Clark 2007: np).   
 
In this case, and others, the opposition was positioned as part of the journalistic fact check to the 
government and military media framing of the war.  In addition, journalists often backed up the 
opposition’s counter-framing with statistics about the war’s progress or facts they had observed 
themselves in Kandahar.  The story above, for example, adds more details, gleaned from the 
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reporter’s own observations and knowledge, about how the unpredictable border between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan was putting Canadian troops in greater danger.   
 
The political fallout from the invasion of Iraq south of the border in the United States in 2006 
and 2007 also likely compounded Canadian opposition to the war in Afghanistan. U.S. President 
George W. Bush’s handling of the Iraq war made him increasingly unpopular in 2005 and 2006, 
enabling American journalists to be more critical of the rationale for the war (Bennett et al 
2007).  Bush was also extremely unpopular in Canada after 2004 (Azzi and Hillmer 2016).  
Canadian political actors — and journalists — were no doubt aware of the growing public 
skepticism about the two wars (Iraq and Afghanistan) both internationally and at home.  In 
addition to the full-blown civil war in Iraq, the insurgency in Afghanistan was heating up 2006.  
Politicians often make calculated decisions about whether to support war based on their 
perceived sense of the potential success of the conflict (Berinsky 2009). Canadian journalists 
cued to the growing unease of opposition politicians, fuelling their fact checking of the Harper 
government’s media framing of the war.  
 
Opposition politicians, who did not support combat operations in Afghanistan, likely felt 
emboldened to speak more critically about the war given public opinion polls suggested 
Canadians had grown wary — quickly — of the military mission in Afghanistan in the first year 
(The Strategic Counsel 2007). Entman (2003, 2004), in fact, predicts legislators are often vocal 
or silent about war based on the public’s mood. Public discontent, in turn, gets reflected in the 
news media.  Entmans’s (2003, 2004) cascading activation concept holds that government 
officials, such as the U.S. president, have more framing power when their frames are congruent 
with pubic views of issues and events. As well, the framing of Canada’s combat mission in 
Kandahar was not consistent with traditional notions of Canadian Forces as peacekeepers. It is 
conceivable that opposition politicians’ framing represented a more “exciting, compelling, and 
controversial storyline” than the media framing offered by government and military leaders 
(King and Wells 2009: 19).  As I argue in the coming section, indexing’s power to shape media 
coverage to the contours of elite debate is more nuanced than originally posited by Bennett 
(1990).   
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4.17. An Updated Conception of Indexing’s Effect 
 
In line with the traditional account of the indexing hypothesis (Bennett 1990), Bennett and his 
colleagues (2007: 30) continue to argue that the U.S. news media all too frequently slavishly 
adheres to “stenographic reporting” (see also Bennett 2012).  The researchers concluded that 
journalists failed, for instance, to adequately interrogate the Bush administration’s questionable 
rationale for invading Iraq in 2003.  Moreover, Bennett et al. (2006) contend that journalists 
ignored clear evidence and alternative sources pointing towards U.S. soldiers torturing Iraqi 
detainees at the Abu Ghraib Prison. 
“[T]he mainstream news generally stays within the sphere of official consensus and 
conflict displays in the public statement of the key government officials who manage the 
policy areas and decision-making processes that make the news” (Bennett et al. 2007: 
49).   
 
This work’s data highlights somewhat contradictory evidence concerning the debate about 
indexing.  On the one hand, the dramatic and precarious security situation in Kandahar afforded 
journalists covering the conflict more latitude to fact check and counter-frame the conflict in 
opposition to the preferred frames of government and military officials (Wolfsfeld 1997; 
Lawrence 2000; Entman 2003, 2004; Baum and Groeling 2010b; Porpora et al. 2010; Speer 
2017).  Yet, journalists used elite criteria to critique government and military frames, 
perpetuating, arguably, hegemonic interpretations of the war (Iyengar 1991; Lakoff 2004).  
 
Bennett et al.’s (2007) amended conception of indexing does offer certain circumstances under 
which indexing does not automatically translate into news coverage merely echoing and 
amplifying elite debate.  Factors such as events, technology, investigative journalism and 
counter-spin offer opportunities for journalists to challenge hegemonic interpretations of war.  
The deteriorating security in Kandahar, I contend, spurred Canadian journalists covering the 
conflict in Afghanistan to fact check the preferred media frames of government and military 
leaders. The precarious situation in the war-torn country was beyond the media framing control 
of Canadian government and military leaders, enabling journalists covering the conflict to fact 
check the frames offered by government and military leaders. Wolfsfeld (1997: 167) similarly 
found that dramatic events of the 1987 Palestinian intifada spurred the U.S. news media to adopt 
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the “injustice and defiance frame” over the Israeli government’s “law and order frame” even 
though the latter had more political and economic power.  
 
If, as this CA’s data suggests, journalists are challenging the frames of government and military 
officials from the onset of conflicts and fact checking has become common place in the news 
media, this work’s findings raises questions about indexing theory’s predictive applications 
given how Canadian journalists were fact checking government and military frames from the 
start of the conflict — and not “over time” as they acquired more “information about the event 
and develop[ed] alternative information sources” (Baum and Groeling 2010b: 5).  Future media 
and communication scholars should consider if indexing always forces media coverage to adhere 
to the forms of elite debate and whether journalists require elite disagreement to counter-frame 
news events.   
 
Bennett et al. (2007) also contend that investigative journalism offers the news media a chance to 
stray from elite media frames.  The controversy over the treatment of Afghan detainees also 
figured prominently in the coverage of Afghanistan.  Allegations of mistreatment of Afghan 
detainees, of course, starkly contradicted government and military leaders’ media frames of 
noble Canadian soldiers helping Afghanistan restore democracy and human rights after decades 
of war.  The Globe and Mail, as I stressed earlier in this chapter, doggedly pursued the story.   In 
2008, for instance, the newspaper uncovered internal government documents suggesting that 
despite government assurances to the contrary, Afghan detainees captured by Canadians were 
still being tortured in Afghan prisons.  The government tried to keep the inspection reports secret 
– but The Globe and Mail unearthed the records. 
“In one harrowing account, an Afghan turned over by Canadian soldiers told of being 
beaten unconscious and tortured in the secret police prison in Kandahar. He showed 
Canadian diplomats fresh welts and then backed up his story by revealing where the 
electrical cable and the rubber hose that had been used on him were hidden. 
“Under the chair we found a large piece of braided electrical cable as well as a rubber 
hose,” reads the subsequent diplomatic cable marked “secret” and distributed to some of 
the most senior officials in the Canadian government and officers in the Canadian 
military” (Koring 2008: np). 
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Without a doubt, the newspaper’s persistent investigation offered a degree of counter-hegemonic 
framing absent in much of the news media’s coverage of Canada’s military mission in 
Afghanistan.   
 
Certainly, despite the over-reliance on official sources, events in Afghanistan and enterprising 
reporting surely diluted the usual impact of indexing on media discourse about war.  With 
respect to my fourth research question (R4), I concluded that indexing played a shaping — but 
not definitive — role in the news media’s coverage of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan.  
This research adds to the debate surrounding the effect of indexing.  The indexing hypothesis, as 
I have argued, requires a more nuanced understanding given this work’s findings.  Elite 
disagreement can lead news coverage to incorporate more counter-frames — but dramatic events 
can also spur journalists to challenge the official framing of events and issues.  Moreover, 
journalists do not always require time to begin challenging elite frames as Baum and Groeling 
(2010b) contend. As the practice of fact checking becomes more commonplace, elite discourse 
may not continue to hold the shaping power it once had on news coverage.  Yet, as I have 
argued, fact checking does represent a true counter-hegemonic expression.  Having answered my 
four research questions, I now wish to turn to the implications these findings present for 
normative conceptions of the news media.   
 
4.18. Normative Conceptions of the News Media  
 
The debate over journalism’s role in democracy is well established in the literature (Gans 2003; 
Fenton 2010; McChesney and Nichols 2010; Taras 2014; DeCillia and McCurdy 2016).  This 
research illustrates how the news media can play different roles at the same time.  This study’s 
data found the Canadian news media playing at least three roles — (1) monitorial; (2) 
facilitative; and (3) collaborative — in the coverage of Canada’s combat operations in 
Afghanistan.  This section outlines these instances and discusses them with a mind to positioning 
the recommendations I make for journalists and news organizations in my conclusion.   
 
In line with Carey’s (1987) normative conception of journalists stimulating public debate in 
democracy, there is little doubt that some of the news and commentary focused on explaining 
  198 
Canada’s role in the volatile region of Kandahar.  Some of the coverage sought to interpret 
Afghanistan and Canada’s military mission (Christians et al. 2009).  A lengthy feature in The 
National Post in the fall of 2007, for instance, weaves a compelling narrative about the 
Canadians trying to rebuild the war torn country.   
“Donald McNamara, a retired Brigadier-General, visited Kandahar last year, a few weeks 
after the attack in Panjwaii that killed Pte. Williamson and Sgt. Tedford. He was shocked 
at the level of distress he saw there.  
“All military deaths are tragic,” says Brig.-Gen. McNamara, now a director at the 
Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies. “But I think there is some undue emphasis placed 
on them, on this side. It’s a kind of selfishness. Canadians must really try to understand 
what it's like in Afghanistan right now. It is a desperate place.” 
The debate about the current mission in Kandahar, he says, is focused too narrowly on 
the costs: Canadian lives, injuries and money spent” (Hutchinson 2007: np). 
The feature goes on to detail the precarious security of the country — but ends optimistically: 
“Trained by Canadian soldiers and police officers, the national army and police now 
patrol areas of Panjwaii, including Route Summit, which was completed this year.  
Afghan farmers have returned to their crops. It is harvest time in Panjwaii. Carts trundle 
along asphalt, past Strong Point Centre, or what’s left of it. Gone, likely, are the rough 
wooden crosses that were pounded into the soil, one for Blake Williamson, one for Darcy 
Tedford. The road is their memorial: It will last for decades” (Hutchinson 2007: np). 
Arguably, this type of news coverage added, meaningfully, to the public discourse about the 
conflict.   As I contend in my final chapter, the Canadian public would benefit from more of this 
type of journalism that takes its facilitative role seriously.    
 
As the previous section on fact checking made plain, there are also numerous examples of 
Canadian journalists adopting a monitorial or watchdog role (Christians et al. 2009) in their 
coverage of Afghanistan.  Journalists did fact check the government and military’s framing of the 
war.  Bennett and colleagues (2006: 469) stress that journalists can have “moments of 
independence” – but that ultimately subsides to a “general pattern of compliance with 
government news management.”  This work supports, in part, that contention.  Yes, journalists 
did fact check the frames sponsored by government and military leaders.  But, journalists relied 
on elite criteria to challenge officials’ frames (Ettema and Glasser 1998).   
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News and analysis containing fact checking still integrated and spotlighted the frames sponsored 
by government and military leaders. The binary ritual of using elite benchmarks to impeach the 
media frames sponsored by government and military leaders perpetuated hegemonic 
interpretations of the conflict (Ettema and Glasser 1998a, 1998b). Contradicting a frame 
inevitably evokes the frame (Lakoff 2004). “[I]f you negate a frame,” linguist George Lakoff 
said in an interview, “you have to activate the frame, because you have to know what you’re 
negating. If you use logic against something, you’re strengthening it” (Lakoff, as quoted in 
Rosenberg 2017: np).  In many ways, government and military sponsored frames repeated in the 
media — even if they are contested — become “connected to and implicit in practical life” 
(Gramsci 1971: 330).  
 
Canadian journalists might argue that their challenges to military and government frames 
exemplify their role as a watchdog, critical and independent of officials in line with the 
monitorial role of the news media (Christians et al. 2009).  But, a lot of the fact checking 
concerning Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan questioned the government and the 
military’s ability to execute it stated goals to, say, make Afghanistan safer or rebuild the war-
torn country.  The fact checking often focused on the lack of progress by Canadian Forces to 
make Kandahar safer.  This type of critique, as Mermin (1996) argues, challenges officials’ 
efficacy — but not policy decisions or hegemonic positions about war.  Mermin (1996: 181) 
contends this type of coverage “makes only a limited contribution to the public sphere.”  
Similarly, Orr (1980: 31) argues that this type of contestation of elite rhetoric by journalists is 
ultimately performative and “exhausts the potential for… serious critical engagement.”  
Ultimately, the news media’s fact checking restricted the “scope of debate by focusing on the 
policy’s execution, not its underlying assumptions or justifications” (King and Wells 2009: 14).  
 
Canadian journalists struggled with how to deal with government and military frames that ran 
counter to what they had observed about the situations in Afghanistan.  Journalists, as a rule, feel 
compelled to tell both sides of the story.  As a result, they frequently position the questionable 
frames of elites as plausible, even when they are suspicious of their truthfulness and the agenda 
of those sponsoring them.  As a reporter told Gans (1979: 130): “we don’t deal in facts but in 
attributed opinions.”  Canadian new professionals likely felt compelled to highlight government 
  200 
and military leaders’ framing of the war because of professional norms — and rigid ethical codes 
that regulate the practice of journalism.  However, this “occupational ideology,” as Reese (1990: 
390) labels it, ensures meaning is often constructed to perpetuate hegemony (Thompson 1990).   
 
American journalists recently struggled to deal with U.S. President Donald Trump’s ludicrous — 
and baseless — claim that former President Obama had wiretapped his phones at his New York-
based Trump Tower.  As Maza (2017: np) argues satirists and comedians have done a much 
better job unmasking Trump’s false claims immediately while mainstream “news networks spent 
countless hours hosting panel debates and interviews with government officials trying to 
investigate whether Trump’s conspiracy theory might have merit.”  Intriguingly, Young et al.’s 
(2017) recent experimental work found that humorous videos are an effective means of 
countering factually inaccurate perceptions amongst audiences. Commenting on Trump’s 
wiretapping claims, Sophia McClennan, the author of Colbert’s America and co-author of Is 
Satire Saving Our Nation? argues “the news media sort of seems like it has to take it seriously in 
order to be taken seriously” (McClennan, as quoted in Maza 2017: np).  McClennan urges 
journalists to move beyond the binary dialectic of presenting elite rhetoric or frames as credible 
when they know they are clearly not.   
“We think the journalist’s job is to show all sides of the story. But the journalist’s job is 
to show the truth.  And sometimes, in this case, going after the truth is going to be funny 
because the lies are so absurd that you can’t help but laugh” (McClennan, as quoted in 
Maza 2017: np).   
 
As this work’s data shows, the news media needs to be more thoughtful about how it challenges 
hegemonic framing of issues and events by elites. (I return to recommendations concerning fact 
checking in the concluding chapter.)  
 
The abundance of events-oriented coverage over thematic (substantive and contextual) coverage 
further compounds concerns about the collaborative role (Christians et al. 2009) of Canadian 
journalists’ coverage of the war in Afghanistan.  Episodic coverage, arguably, perpetuates 
hegemonic interpretations in the news media (Iyengar 1991). Journalists and their editorial 
leaders need to pay more attention to how episodic reporting can unwittingly perpetuate 
dominant meanings.  Journalistic rigour requires more than simply using official yardsticks or 
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values to discredit the frames of sources, especially when journalists know that elite claims are 
without merit.  This type of journalism is too reductionist, too simplistic.  Ethical and dogged 
journalism requires more imagination, nuance and complexity.  Informative journalism, hoping 
to challenge hegemonic framing, requires “more than what is contained within the powerful 
boundaries of the frame” sponsored by elites (Durham 2001: 134). 
 
There are not just two sides, for instance, to climate change.  The BBC, by means of an example, 
was criticized in 2011 for its “over-rigid” application of impartiality in its coverage of climate 
change, giving “undue attention to marginal opinion” (BBC 2011: 5). The British public 
broadcaster also came under fire for its overzealous impartial coverage of the Brexit campaign in 
2016, forcing its journalists “to supply… phoney balance… to give the appearance of debate” 
(Bennett 2016: np).  This form of journalism, argues Fallows (2016: np), presents politics and 
public policy as a he-said/she-said, everyone is to blame affair that occludes deeper 
understandings and leaves citizens “even more fatalistic and jaded about public affairs.”    
 
The problems detailed above concerning journalistic fact checking presents a worrying potential 
consequence for participatory democracies such as Canada (Lewis 2001). Influence, after all, 
begins with politicians constructing the context and information people will use to make political 
decisions.  Journalism in the facilitative and monitorial role aims to inform citizens so that they 
can make knowledgeable decisions in a democracy.  If journalists rely on elite criteria — the 
justifications or promises of political actors — to challenge the frames sponsored by officials, the 
public may be left with only hegemonic definitions of events and issues to consider.   To be sure, 
this form of critique perpetuates hegemonic interpretations (Iyengar 1991; Ettema and Glasser 
1998a 1998b; Lakoff 2004).  Moreover, there is compelling evidence that highlighting and 
challenging false claims in news coverage, in fact, confuses audiences, leading them to 
“misremember” lies as truth (Skurnik et al. 2005).  The coming chapter raises numerous 
concerns about audiences’ reactions to episodic news coverage.   
 
As this CA’s findings highlight, fact checking the rhetoric of elites is not enough because news 
coverage all too often relies on official frames to structure (usually episodic) stories about the 
war.  This ultimately ensures that the meaning of news coverage is closely aligned with the 
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dominant political and economic power system. Collaboration does not imply censorship.  
“Collaboration,” Christians et al. (2009: 197) stresses, “represents an acknowledgement of the 
state’s interest – to which the media accede either passively or unwittingly, reluctantly or 
wholeheartedly – in participating in the choices journalists make and the coverage they provide.”  
 
4.19. Conclusion 
 
This chapter outlined and analyzed this research’s content analysis findings.  This research’s CA 
assessed four research questions concerning framing, news values, fact checking and indexing. 
While journalists largely indexed their coverage to government and military sources, they did 
challenge, to a degree, government and military messages. Canadian journalists fact checked the 
preferred frames of government and military leaders, using elite criteria and benchmarks, failing 
ultimately to clearly challenge dominant positions. Moreover, news values — and the 
predominance of episodic coverage — also shaped the news coverage in hegemonic ways. 
Because the news coverage of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan was largely episodic 
and lacked a counter-hegemonic imagination, journalists failed to challenge more fundamental 
structural issues and justifications for the war.   
 
Akin to Hallin’s analysis (1986) of the Vietnam War, Canadian journalists ultimately ended up 
echoing and amplifying the government and military’s common sense about the conflict in 
Afghanistan. It is during times of war when democracies and citizens need critical and 
autonomous journalism the most (Jensen 2003). Episodic, event-oriented coverage provides only 
“scattered morsels” and not sufficient information and context to allow the public to “gain wide 
understanding as a sensible alternative to” the interpretations sponsored by government and 
military leaders (Entman 2004: 17). “Too much of the press,” argues The Guardian’s Katherine 
Viner (2016: np), “often exhibited a bias towards the status quo and a deference to authority.”  
As this study data shows, Canadians and democracy were ultimately not well served because 
journalists did not offer a more complete and critical account of Canada’s military role in a 
distant war.  Having completed my analysis of the phenomena that shaped the news coverage of 
Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan, the subsequent pages transition now to reviewing and 
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analyzing the data that emerged from this research’s population-based survey experiment that 
assesses, in part, the impact of media message on public opinion.   
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Chapter Five:  Putting it All Together  
  
5.0.  Introduction 
 
This chapter provides both an overview of this research’s population-based survey-experiment (n 
= 1,131) data and an analysis surrounding the “frame-setting” (de Vreese 2005: 52) process that 
potentially influenced Canadians’ opinions about the war in Afghanistan.  It begins by first 
assessing the impact of fact checking in the news media on Canadian audiences.  Second, it 
assesses the influence on public opinion of Canadians’ attachment to peacekeeping.  This chapter 
then transitions to evaluating the impact of various demographic and social and political aspects 
— what Gamson (1992) called experiential factors — influencing Canadians’ opinions about the 
war in Afghanistan. I conclude this chapter by offering a binary logistic regression analysis 
designed to explain the potential confluence of media discourse, popular wisdom and 
experiential knowledge that likely shaped public attitudes about Afghanistan.  Like the previous 
chapter, this empirical chapter also integrates data and analysis.  
 
As I stressed in both my introduction and my methodology chapters, my interpretation of this 
study’s population-based survey experiment makes careful knowledge claims. I offer 
supplementary evidence (survey and focus group data, for instance) and other scholarship and 
commentary to supplement my analysis.     
 
This chapter seeks to assess four of the eight research questions posed in my theoretical chapter:   
 
R5. How (if at all) does journalistic fact checking influence audiences’ judgments about war? 
 
R6. How are audiences influenced (or not at all) by the popular wisdom concerning 
peacekeeping? 
 
R7. How are Canadians’ attitudes towards its military and its intervention in foreign conflicts 
influenced (or not at all) by experiential knowledge? 
 
  205 
R8. How does the confluence of media discourse, popular wisdom and experiential knowledge 
potentially shape Canadians’ attitudes towards its military and its intervention in foreign 
conflicts? 
 
Akin to Gamson's (1992) metaphorical imagery of a forest of issues that people navigate to 
arrive at their political decisions, I believe it is useful to imagine Canadians similarly making 
their way through a wilderness of media messages, popular wisdom and their own experiential 
knowledge to arrive at their beliefs concerning the war in Afghanistan.  As the coming pages 
argue, media messages may have played a part in attitude formation about the conflict — but 
popular wisdom and experiential knowledge (Gamson 1992) or “predispositions” (Zaller 1992: 
6) also had an influence on public opinion about the conflict.  While this study’s experiment data 
points to no immediate impact of journalistic fact checking on support for the war, my data does 
suggest a small — statistically significant — influence on individuals exposed to news stories 
that highlight improving security in Kandahar.  To begin this chapter, I consider the potential 
impact of fact checking on news audiences.   
 
5.1.  Fact Checking & Support for the Military Mission  
 
This work’s fifth research question (R5) attempts to measure the impact of journalistic 
fact checking on audiences: 
 
R5. How (if at all) does journalistic fact checking influence audiences’ judgments about war? 
 
As described in the methodology chapter, respondents (n = 1131) were equally divided into (and 
randomly assigned to) four treatment groups and one control group.  Table Nine details the level 
of support Canadians had for their country’s military mission in Afghanistan after being exposed 
to a media treatment (or no treatment for respondents in the control group).   
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Table 9 – Treatment Group & Level of Support 
 
 Control 
Group 
Support 
Security 
1 – 
Frame 
Support 
Security 
2 – 
Frame 
Support 
(with 
fact 
check) 
Reconstruction 
1 – Frame 
Support 
Reconstruction 
2 – Frame 
Support (with 
fact check 
Overall 
Support 
Count 228 227 225 225 226 1131 
Missing 903 904 906 906 905 0 
Mean 3.93 3.81 3.59 3.63 3.66 3.724 
Median 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Std. 
Deviation  
1.586 1.673 1.691 1.881 1.639 1.696 
Variance 2.514 2.8 2.86 3.3537 2.688 2.877 
Skew -0.393 -0.371 -0.193 -0.210 -0.1.97 -0.274 
(n = 1,131) 
 
Mean support amongst Canadians is lower in all treatment groups containing a fact check than in 
the control group.  Support for the war in Afghanistan was highest in the control group that 
received no media information about the conflict.  Notably, though, support for the war increased 
slightly in the reconstruction story treatment group containing a fact check (M = 3.66, SD = 
1.69) than in the treatment group containing only the government and military media frame 
about rebuilding Afghanistan (M = 3.63. SD = 1.88). 
 
Notably, there is no statistically significant difference between support for the conflict in 
Afghanistan between all the groups. A non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis Test found no statistically 
significant difference between individuals exposed to stories containing fact checks and those 
who did not (H (4) = 1123, p =.654).  Simply put, fact checking in the news media had no 
statistically significant influence on people’s support for the war (see Table 10 for a breakdown 
between each group). Admittedly, I did not measure whether people changed their minds based 
on the journalistic fact checking or whether they believed the correction.  This is a limitation that 
I return to in my section on recommendations for future research in the next chapter. (I also 
revisit the impact of news stories with preferred government and military frames — and no 
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journalistic fact checking — in the concluding section of this chapter outlining and assessing the 
confluence of factors that potentially shaped Canadians’ attitudes about the war.)   
 
Table 10 - Treatment Groups & Hypothesis Test of Independent Samples   
Treatment Groups Independent-Samples Kruskal-Walis Test 
Sig. 
Treatment: Security frame - with no fact check 0.307 
Treatment: Security frame - with fact check 0.140 
Treatment: Reconstruction frame - with no 
fact check 
0.754 
Treatment: Reconstruction frame - with fact 
check 
0.979 
 
This research’s data suggests42  partisan identification may play a role in the interpretation of 
news coverage containing fact checking.  Even after being exposed to a news sample containing 
a fact check, Conservative and Liberal supporters are overwhelmingly more supportive of the 
Canadian military’s combat efforts in Kandahar than New Democratic, Green and Bloc 
Québécois supporters (see Tables 11 and 12).   
 
Table 11 — Security Frame with Fact Check  
Party Low Support % / n High Support % / n 
Conservative 12.5% / 6 87.5 % / 42 
Liberal 38.8% / 33 61.2% / 52 
New Democratic  66.7% / 10 33.3% / 5 
Green 77.7% / 7 22.3% / 2 
Bloc Québécois  100 % 7 0% / 0 
(n = 164) c2(8, N =164) = 41.057, p = .001 
 
  
                                                
42 For the sake of simplicity, the six-point Likert Scale of support for Canada’s military mission in 
Afghanistan was divided into two groups:  low support and high support.   
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Table 12 — Reconstruction Frame with Fact Check  
 
Party Low Support % / n High Support % / n 
Conservative 10% / 4 90% / 36 
Liberal 40% / 44 60% / 66 
New Democratic  57.1% / 8 42.9% / 6 
Green 66.7% / 6 33.3% / 3 
Bloc Québécois  75% / 9  25% / 3  
(n = 185) c2(9, N = 185) = 34.711, p = .001   
 
The data also reveals a small uphill positive correlation between support and respondents who 
identified themselves as on the right of the ideological spectrum, r (1128) = .350, p < .01.  The 
coming pages transitions to interpreting these findings.  
 
5.2. Analysis:  Influence of Journalistic Fact checking 
 
This research’s data suggests journalistic fact checking has no impact on Canadians’ support for 
the war in Afghanistan.  There is no statistical difference in support for the war between 
individuals exposed to news reports highlighting the preferred frames of government and 
military leaders and others who read news accounts containing information that fact checked 
official frames.  To be certain, my findings concerning fact checking comport with recent studies 
suggesting fact checking in news has little impact on audiences (Kuklinksi et al. 2000; Skurnik et 
al. 2005; Nyhan and Reifler 2010; Pingree 2011; Nyhan and Reifler 2012, 2015; Nyhan et al. 
2017).  Undoubtedly, the human brain is stubborn.  Ample literature (Westen 1985; Haidt 2003; 
Lakoff 2004; De Waal 2005; Westen 2007; Druckman and Bolsen 2011) highlights how people 
ignore information that is not in line with their beliefs.  Be it confirmation bias (Nickerson 1998) 
or filter bubbles (Resnick et al. 2013) people often seek out information — and news media  
(Warner and Ryan 2011) — that substantiate their views.  Misconceptions are robust — and 
people are often unwillingly to be persuaded by new information (Lakoff 2004).   
 
The current news media environment may also even be exacerbating this phenomenon.  
Recently, long-time journalist Carl Bernstein, made famous for his role in the Watergate scandal, 
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proclaimed that the fractured media environment — where conservatives generally watch the all-
news cable network Fox and liberals watch MSNBC or CNN — has created what he called a 
“cold civil war” in the United States.  The legendary journalist asserted that it is “becoming 
impossible’ to have a “fact-based debate” because of the current ideologically divided 
configuration of the American news media (Bernstein, as quoted in Thomsen 2017: np).  
“Different sets of viewers,” he added, see CNN and Fox as “representing different truths” 
(Bernstein, as quoted in Thomsen 2017: np).  
 
In line with Kuklinksi et al. (2000), this work’s data suggests that factual information aimed at 
correcting or challenging political spin or misinformation has little influence on audiences. Fact 
checking, even with competing claims, could be leading Canadian audiences to doubt what is 
true because the news media does not clarify the veracity of both sides’ assertions (Pingree 
2011). The news media’s fact checking about Canada’s military role in Afghanistan may have 
even backfired, reinforcing ideological positions and views (Nyhan and Reifler 2010).  This 
research’s data suggests that partisan identification may lead some Canadians to disregard 
journalistic fact checking.  This study shows that Conservative and Liberal Party supporters 
exposed to journalistic fact checking are more positive about the war than other partisans, 
suggesting predispositions are more important than new information.  Individuals, stresses 
Berinksy (2009: 84), disregard “new information in favour of more important considerations”, 
including partisanship, group identities and the media messages of partisan leaders.  “In the 
battle between facts and partisanship,” writes Berinsky (2009: 124), “partisanship always wins.”  
“People tend to resist arguments that are inconsistent with their political predisposition 
but they do so only to the extent that they possess the contextual information necessary to 
perceive a relationship between the message and their predisposition” (Zaller 1992: 44; 
italics in original).    
 
People essentially respond to new information not based on argument 43 but “their values and 
predispositions” (Zaller 1992: 47).  In a contest between facts and partisanship, Gaines et al. 
(2007) similarly concluded that party loyalty invariably triumphs (see also Berinksy 2009).   
 
                                                
43 For the sake of simplicity, the six-point Likert Scale of support for Canada’s military mission in 
Afghanistan was divided into two groups:  low support and high support.   
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To be sure, ideologically motivated supporters can sometimes disregard facts, despite knowing 
that they are true.  Nyhan et al. (2017), in fact, recently concluded that Donald Trump supporters 
understood the discrepancies between what the then presidential candidate said and the truth, but 
that disconnect did not alter their support for him.  Support is often influenced by tribal loyalty 
and not factual fidelity.  Partisans may take journalistic “corrections literally, but apparently not 
seriously” (Nyhan et al. 2017: 17).  
 
With respect to my fifth research question (R5), I conclude (that journalistic fact checking does 
not have an immediate influence on news audiences’ attitudes about war.  This research supports 
other arguments and evidence (Kuklinksi et al. 2000; Skurnik et al. 2005; Nyhan and Reifler 
2010; Pingree 2011; Nyhan and Reifler 2012, 2015; Nyhan et al. 2017) questioning the efficacy 
of fact checking in the news.  
 
I hope findings such as this do not deter journalists from fact checking elite rhetoric.  As I make 
clear in my conclusion, the practice is important and can be improved. Moreover, not all fact 
checking falls flat with audiences.  Fridkin, Kenney and Wintersiek (2015), notably, found that 
fact checking does have consequences on some segments of the public. Negative fact checks, 
which impeached the truthfulness of claims made in political advertisement, were more 
influential than positively framed corrections. To be sure, the fact checks offered to respondents 
in this research were mild, raising the question if more pronounced — and aggressive — fact 
checking might have had a bigger impact on audiences.  Similarly, van der Linden et al. (2017: 
1) concluded that an emphasis on consensus about science can “inoculate” individuals against 
misinformation from climate change deniers.  Their experiment (n = 2167) found that warning 
people in advance about the political motives of groups and people spreading misinformation 
“protect[ed]” people against accepting false information.  Lewandowsky et al. (2013: 399) also 
found that emphasizing scientific consensus “neutralizes the effect” of misinformation about 
climate change.  
 
Baum and Groeling's (2010a) intriguing assessment of American public opinion concerning the 
Iraq War found that elites — and especially President George W. Bush — had considerable 
shaping power over attitudes concerning the conflict in the Middle East.  As the war waged on – 
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and success seemed fleeting — that advantage dissipated as “reality” collided with the public’s 
increasing negative information about the war.  Public opinion in the U.S. concerning the 
conflict was “elastic”, argue Baum and Groeling (2010a: 434), “allowing alternative frames to 
challenge the administration’s preferred frame” (see also King and Wells 2009).  The Bush 
Administration’s framing power dissipated as news coverage increasingly challenged frames 
sponsored by government and military officials.  The drip, drip, drips of the news media’s fact 
checking slowly changed people’s attitudes about the war.  Arguably, journalistic fact checking 
matters “not through Watergate-style exposes but via thousands of small factual interventions” 
(Graves 2016: 227).  Perhaps, research should focus on the long-term impact of journalistic fact 
checking; not short term, one-shot exposure.  (I offer some suggestions about future research and 
consider the utility of fact checking in the recommendations of my concluding chapter.) 
 
At its most simple level, changing minds relies on receiving new information and then accepting 
the recently digested information, which results in an opinion change (Zaller 1992). Fletcher and 
colleagues (2009) concluded that Canadians who accepted government and military leaders’ 
framing of the war (those individuals who agreed with the government and military’s media 
frames about the war) were more positive about Canada’s military role in Kandahar. Yet, 
Fletcher and his colleagues (2009) concluded that information was only one part of the calculus 
about support for the war in Canadians’ minds.  As I noted in my methods section, this 
research’s knowledge score was not significantly correlated with attitudes about the war.  But as 
the coming pages details, predispositions (how people feel about peacekeeping compared to 
armed combat) and emotion (pride in the mission) are strong predictors of support for the war. 
The ensuing pages turn to evaluating those potential influences.  I begin with the possible 
influence of popular wisdom on attitudes about the war. 
 
5.3 Popular Wisdom and Peacekeeping  
 
This section aims to address this research’s sixth question (R6).  It considers:  How are 
audiences influenced (or not at all) by the popular wisdom concerning peacekeeping?  This 
study’s population-based survey experiment data reveals that Canadians have a clear preference 
for the role of their military.  A majority of respondents expressed a resounding desire to see 
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Canadian Forces be used solely for peacekeeping (50.7%).  Only 4.3 per cent of Canadians 
believe the military should be deployed solely for armed combat.  The remaining 45 per cent 
revealed a desire to see Canadian Forces used for both peacekeeping and combat.  When forced 
to choose between peacekeeping and armed combat, individuals overwhelmingly (78.5%) 
preferred using their country’s military for peacekeeping instead of armed combat (21.5%).   
 
Female Canadians are overwhelmingly more supportive of seeing Canadian armed forces used 
exclusively for peacekeeping (86.4%) compared to armed combat (13.6%), c2(1, N = 1112) = 
38.298, p = .001.  While at a slightly lower level than women, male respondents were also more 
supportive of a peacekeeping role (70.4%) compared to armed combat (29.6%), c2(1, N = 1112) 
= 38.298, p = .001.  
 
Region also plays an important role in determining Canadians’ attitudes toward the role of 
Canada’s military. Across Canada, three-quarters (76.7%) of Canadians register a preference for 
using Canada’s military solely for peacekeeping over armed combat (23.3%), c2(3, N = 1108) = 
120.134, p = .001.  It is a different story in Quebec.  Individuals living in the mostly French-
speaking province prefer that Canadian Forces be used exclusively for peacekeeping (84.8%) 
instead of armed combat (see Table 13 for a complete breakdown of peacekeeping compared to 
armed combat by region).   
 
Table 13 - Regional Breakdown & Military Role 
 
Region Armed Combat -  %/n Peacekeeping -%/n 
Atlantic Canada  21.1 / 16 78.9 / 60 
Quebec  15.2 / 49 84.8 / 274 
Ontario 29.2 / 113 70.8 / 274 
West and North 23.3 / 258 75.2 / 242 
(n = 1093) 
 
The interplay between political interest and views on the military are significant (84.8%)  and 
noteworthy.  Canadians who professed little or no interest in politics are more likely to indicate a 
preference for peacekeeping over armed combat for the country’s military, c2(3, N = 1112) = 
24.837, p = .001 (Table 14 offers a breakdown of political interest and peacekeeping compared 
to armed combat preferences). 
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Table 14 – Political Interest & Military Role    
 
Political Interest  Armed Combat -  %/n Peacekeeping -%/n 
Not at all interested 11.7 / 24  88.3 / 182 
Not very interested 21.5 / 29 78.5 / 106  
Somewhat interested 22.5 / 58 77.8 / 203 
Very interested  28.8 / 147 71.2 / 854 
(n = 1112) 
 
There is a strong association between Canadians’ placement on the left/right ideological 
spectrum and their attitudes about Canada’s military role and its combat mission in Afghanistan.  
Individuals who placed themselves on the left side of the ideological classification system, 
overwhelmingly (88.6%) prefer to see Canada’s military used exclusively for peacekeeping, c2(1, 
N = 1112) = 162.577, p = .001.  Canadians who identify as right of centre were less inclined to 
choose peacekeeping over armed combat.  Notably, however, a majority (54.7%) of right-wing 
Canadians do prefer that the country’s military be used for peacekeeping, c2(1, N = 1112) = 
162.577, p = .001.   
 
As might be expected, given the findings concerning fact checking and voter preference, partisan 
identification is also connected with Canadians’ views about the country’s armed forces’ role.  In 
comparison to Liberal party voters (16.3%) and New Democratic Party supporters (10.1%), a 
majority of respondents who said they would voter for the Conservative Party of Canada (55.9%) 
prefer to see Canadian Forces used for armed combat over peacekeeping, c2(9, N = 1112) = 
230.949, p = .001 (see Table 15 for a complete breakdown of voter intention and armed combat 
versus peacekeeping role).  
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Table 15 – Voter Intention - Armed Combat Versus Peacekeeping  
Voter Intention Armed Combat % / n Peacekeeping % / n 
Liberal Party 16.3 / 42  90.4 / 394  
Conservative Party 55.9 / 146  44.1 / 115  
New Democratic Party 
(NDP) 
10.1 / 7  89.9 / 62  
Green Party 4.9 / 2  95.1 / 39  
Bloc Québécois Party 8.7 / 4  91.3 / 42  
Other Party or Candidate 54.5 / 6 45.5 / 5  
Do Not Know 18.5 / 27  81.5 / 119  
No Intention to Vote 29.4 / 10 70.6 / 24  
Intend to Spoil Ballot 19.7 / 12  80.3 / 49  
Not Eligible to Vote 28.6 / 2  71.4 / 5  
(n = 1112) 
 
Individuals who scored higher on the activism scale were also more likely to want to see 
Canada’s military used for peacekeeping over armed combat, c2(8, N = 1112) = 16.789, p = .032.  
 
Of note, Canadians who felt a higher degree of pride in the military’s combat mission in 
Afghanistan overwhelmingly (83.8%) prefer to see Canadian Forces used primarily for armed 
combat, c2(1, N = 1076) = 111.608, p = .001.   Similarly, those Canadians who express a higher 
degree of comfort in seeing Canadian Forces return to Afghanistan in a combat role (58.4%), 
prefer to see the country’s military used solely for armed combat as well, c2(1, N = 1110) = 
143.135, p = .032.  
 
Support for the war in Afghanistan was, not surprisingly, highest amongst Canadians who prefer 
an exclusive armed combat role for Canadian Forces (85.7%), compared to those who prefer a 
peacekeeping one (14.3%). This research’s data found no statistically significant association 
between age, education, income and media use and Canadians attitudes about whether the 
country’s military should be used for peacekeeping or armed combat.   Having sketched this 
research’s important findings concerning peacekeeping, I now turn to analyzing the data.   
  215 
5.4. Analysis: Popular Wisdom About Peacekeeping 
 
“The image of a Canadian soldier wearing his blue beret, standing watch at some lonely 
outpost in a strife-torn foreign land, is part of the modern Canadian mosaic, and a proud 
tradition” (General Paul Mason, as quoted in Whitworth 2005: 89). 
Along with geography and histories, nations share “myths and memories” (Smith 1991: 43). As I 
noted in the onset of this thesis — and as this research’s data clearly confirms — peacekeeping is 
wrapped up in the very fabric and identity of Canadians.  The ideal of peacekeeping is at the 
heart of the Canada’s “imagined community” (Anderson 1991: 6) and, arguably, one of the “core 
myths” (Francis 1997: 10) of the country. Peacekeeping is a “proud Canadian tradition” (Dorn 
2005: 27), part of “our genetic code as a nation” (Off 2000: 2) and continues as a current priority 
for Canada’s military (Government of Canada 2017).  Previous research contends peacekeeping 
defines, in part, many Canadians’ “national identity” and represents something to be “celebrated” 
(Dorn 2005: 7).  This work, similar to Fletcher and his colleagues (2009), not surprisingly, found 
that a majority of Canadians who favour a peacekeeping role for Canada’s military, were less 
supportive of the country’s combat operations in Afghanistan between 2006-2011.  Moreover, 
this study’s data highlights that those Canadians who support peacekeeping are much less 
inclined to want to see Canadian Forces return to a combat role in the South Asian country.  
To be sure, Canadians’ narratives about peacekeeping correspond with Gamson’s (1992) 
understanding of popular wisdom. As this research’s data makes plain, the popular beliefs — or 
“ideology of consensus” (Fowler 1991: 49) — surrounding peacekeeping remains potent for 
many Canadians.  These findings underscore that the peacekeeping is, arguably, intrinsic to 
Canadians’ concept of themselves, “draw[ing] upon its important historical myths and cherished 
symbols, that give expression to its most elevated aspirations and its loftiest ambitions” (King 
and Wells 2009: 8). 
For many Canadians, peacekeeping is one of those distinctions, like universal healthcare, that 
distinguishes themselves from Americans. Contrasts or differences between Canadians and their 
southern neighbour, sociologists have long posited, often end up defining Canadians’ identity 
(Lipset 1990; Langlois 1999).  A national survey of Canadians in 2017 confirmed many people 
in the northern country want to actually increase the differences between themselves and 
Americans, revealing that only two in ten Canadians believed the country “should try to be more 
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like the United States 44 ” (Anderson and Coleto 2017: np). Peacekeeping definitely sets 
Canadians apart from their neighbours in the U.S.   
This study’s data also highlights that Canadians who expressed little or no interest in politics 
accepted the traditional popular wisdom of Canada as a peacekeeping nation. Canadians who pay 
less attention to politics, no doubt, spend little time critically evaluating foreign affairs and the 
role of Canada’s military overseas.  Politically disinterested Canadians, as this data suggests, 
likely rely on shortcuts and heuristics (Scheufele and Scheufele 2010), turning to their “shared 
knowledge of what “everyone knows” about the altruisms of peacekeeping to arrive at their 
attitudes concerning the role of Canada’s military (Gamson 1992: 123-24). Low-information 
citizens frequently use heuristics or elite cues in the place of meaningful information to form 
political opinions (Popkins 1991).  Ample research has shown that poorly informed individuals 
use cues from elites or media discourse to form attitudes (Lupia 1994; Pokins 1991; Sniderman, 
Brody Tetlock 1991; Berinsky 2009).  In line with this study’s data, Fletcher and colleagues 
(2009) also found that Canadians who knew the true nature of Canada’s combat role in 
Afghanistan were more supportive of the military mission than those who did not.  This study, 
however, found no statistically significant association between education and media use and 
support for a peacekeeping role over armed combat.     
As noted earlier, support for Canada’s military mission in Kandahar dropped precipitously in the 
first 12 months of the conflict (CTV 2007).  This research clearly highlights that Canadians 
prefer to see their military used for peacekeeping instead of armed combat, suggesting Canadians 
may have rejected the perpetual combat associated with Kandahar because it was incongruous 
with many Canadians’ “predispositions” (Zaller 1992: 6) of Canadian Forces keeping the peace 
in distant places around the world. For many, the media representations of their military in 
Afghanistan were, arguably, incompatible with their traditional common sense (Gramsci 1971) 
view of the Canadian military.  The constant cacophony of combat video from Kandahar was 
likely discordant with Canadians’ conventional understanding or popular wisdom (Gamson 
                                                
44 The national online survey of 1,500 Canadians drew from a representative panel of nearly a half million 
Canadians.  Online surveys are not truly random, of course.  ABACUS DATA estimates that the margin 
of error for a comparable probability random sample of 1,500 Canadians would be +/- 2.6 per cent, 19 
times out of 20.   
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1992) associated with their military.  After all, the news media “can become an articulator of 
concern when the images presented interact with other information that questions the validity of 
policy” (Morrison and Tumber 1998: 349).   Canadians’ attitudes about the war in Afghanistan 
likely tapped into existing popular wisdom about Canada’s military.  Similar to Shen (2004: 
400), this work’s data suggests pre-existing opinions matter:  that is, people are only likely to 
accept media fames if they resonate with existing beliefs and knowledge.  
As noted before, national surveys of Canadians detected a quick decline in public support over 
the first year of the war (The Strategic Counsel 2007) 45.  In one year, opinions shifted 
dramatically with two-thirds (66.5%) of Canadians opposed to combat in Kandahar.  Fletcher et 
al.’s (2009) Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis of this polling data concluded that 
a desire to see Canadian Forces used for peacekeeping is a statistically significant predictor of 
lower support for the conflict in Afghanistan.  Yet, their analysis found that the influence of 
peacekeeping as a predictor of support for the war versus armed combat fell considerably from 
2006 to 2007, suggesting that other factors, such as experiential knowledge, also played a role in 
influencing attitudes about the war.   
It is notable, particularly for this research’s arguments about peacekeeping, that public support 
was high for the more traditional stabilizing force role in Kabul between 2003-2005 (Saideman 
2016).  Conversely, Canadians’ opposition grew intensely to the frequent and fierce firefights in 
Kandahar between 2006-2011. Public support, however, increased, when Canada stopped 
combat in Kandahar and transitioned to training Afghan soldiers in Kabul between 2012-2014 
(Boucher and Nossal 2015).  Clearly, Canadians appear to prefer peacekeeping roles over armed 
combat. This research’s data also confirms that Canadians remain “highly committed to the 
“Canada-as-a-peacekeeper” ideal” (Boucher and Nossal 2015: 195). Comparable to this 
research’s data, Letourneau and Massie (2005) contend that the lack of consensus amongst 
Canadians is largely attributable to the military mission in Kandahar straying from historic 
configurations of Canadian Forces as peacekeepers.  This shaping factor is most pronounced 
amongst people living in Quebec.  
                                                
45 The polling firm surveyed 1,000 Canadians between July 12 and July 16, 2007.  The margin of error 
was +/-  3.1 per cent 19 times out of 20 (CTV 2007).   
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My data clearly shows that most Québécois are decidedly less enthusiastic about Canada’s 
military role in Afghanistan than the rest of the country.  Living in Quebec is a strong predictor 
of decreased support for Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan.  Canada’s military role in 
Afghanistan was controversial, to be certain, in the predominantly French-speaking province 
(Saideman 2016).  Opposition to Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan averaged 66 per cent 
in Quebec — and ran as high as 77 per cent between 2006-2011 (Boucher and Nossal 2015).  
This experiment’s data also underscores that most Québécois are less proud of the mission and 
more supportive of peacekeeping than other Canadians.  Quebecers also remain less likely to 
want to see Canadian Forces return to Afghanistan in a military role.  Aligned with Turenne and 
her colleagues' (2016: 274) contention, this research’s data adds evidence to the argument that 
Canada’s military mission in Kandahar “was something to be opposed” in Quebec.  An editorial 
in the Montreal Gazette after troops from the Quebec City area had deployed to Afghanistan in 
the summer of 2007, by means of an example, suggested the firm opposition amongst Québécois 
to combat in Kandahar was not a surprise. 
“Quebecers have consistently been the most pacifist of Canadians, from the time of the 
Boer War more than a century ago. Opposition to the Afghanistan campaign is no doubt 
intensified by the streak of anti-Americanism in Québécois society, and by the 
misconception that the Afghanistan mission is a U.S. operation, when in fact it is run by 
NATO with the participation of 36 other countries along with Canada” (Montreal Gazette 
2007: np). 
  
Similar to this research’s data, Rioux’s (2005) analysis of national survey data since the Second 
World War concluded that, amongst Canadians, Quebecers are more likely to oppose military 
spending and less likely to support armed conflict.  For historical and sociological reasons, Rioux 
(2005: 6) contends that Québécois possess “traditionally dovish attitudes towards military and 
defence issues, causing them to express more anti-military opinions than English-speaking 
Canadians.” While Boucher and Roussel’s (2008) analysis of survey data contradicts the 
perceived “conventional wisdom” of “French-Canadians being more dovish” (Rioux 2005: 5) or 
“pacifist” (Granatstein 2007: 121), the researchers, akin to this study’s data, concluded that 
Quebecers clearly prefer UN-backed peacekeeping operations over combat. 
Considering the evidence presented here concerning my sixth research question (R6), I 
concluded that that popular wisdom concerning peacekeeping has a profound influence on 
  219 
Canadians’ attitudes about their country’s military and its adventures overseas.  This work’s 
evidence adds to the scholarly argument surrounding the importance of Canadians’ popular 
wisdom (Gamson 1992) and predispositions (Zaller 1992) shaping political opinions. Having 
offered an analysis of the importance of the influence of popular wisdom, this chapter now 
progresses to considering the role of experiential knowledge in attitudes formation about war. 
5.5. Experiential Knowledge and Canada’s Military Mission in Afghanistan  
 
This study’s seventh research question (R7) examines the impact on experiential knowledge on 
Canadians’ attitudes towards the war in Afghanistan:  How are Canadians’ attitudes towards its 
military and its intervention in foreign conflicts influenced (or not at all) by experiential 
knowledge? 
 
This research’s population-based survey experiment data 46 clearly shows that most Canadians 
are proud of Canada’s combat role in Afghanistan between 2006-2011, M = 5.7, SD = 3.341.  As 
well, support amongst Canadians for the mission — assessed on a six-point Likert scale — 
gravitated towards more supportive than less supportive, M = 3.68, SD = 1.651.  People across 
the country are less inclined to see Canada’s military return to Afghanistan in a combat role, M = 
2.21, SD = 1.49.  Male Canadians (57.7%) also express a higher degree of pride in Canada’s 
military mission in Afghanistan (2006-2011) compared to their female counterparts (49.7%)47, 
c2(1, N = 1097) = 6.811, p = .009.  Overwhelmingly, both male (67.2%) and female (76.7%) 
Canadians expressed disagreement with the idea of having Canadian Forces return to 
Afghanistan, c2(1, N = 1129) = 11.873, p = .001.    
 
Age is largely insignificant in relation to most of the dependent variables of interest for this 
study.  There is a statistically significant — but weak uphill positive linear relationship – 
between age and pride in the mission, r (1097) = .179, p < .01.  Older Canadians indicated they 
                                                
46 The six-point Likert scale was broken into two groups for easier statistical analysis.  Group one 
comprised those respondents who strongly disagree, somewhat disagree and slightly disagree.  Group two 
included those who slightly agree, somewhat agree and strongly agree.   
47 For easier statistical analysis, the 10-point pride scale was broken into two groups: one to five was 
grouped as low pride and six to 10 was grouped as high pride.  
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are more proud of Canada’s military efforts in Afghanistan than younger individuals.  As well, 
my statistical analysis revealed nothing worth noting about education and employment status.  
 
Akin to popular wisdom concerning peacekeeping, region is a notable determinant when 
assessing dependent variables measured by this work’s population-based survey experiment.   
People living in Quebec consistently stand out as a significant variable determining perceptions 
of Canada’s military and its role in Afghanistan. As discussed in the previous section, Quebecers 
are decidedly less proud of Canada’s military efforts in Kandahar (2006-2011) than other 
Canadians.   Across the country, on average, Canadians expressed more pride (54.4%) than less 
(45.6%) when asked to gauge their pride in Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan, c2(3, N = 
1093) = 41.262, p = .001.  Six in ten people from Quebec (60.1%), however, say they feel little 
or no pride about Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan (see Table 16 for a regional 
breakdown of pride in Canada’s military role in Afghanistan).   
 
Table 16 - Regional Breakdown - Pride in Canada’s Afghanistan Mission  
 
Region Less Pride - % / n  More Pride - % / n 
Atlantic Canada  49.4 / 38 50.6 / 39 
Quebec  60.1 / 187 39.9 / 124 
Ontario 37.1 / 142 62.9 / 241 
West and North 40.7 / 131  59.3 / 131  
(n = 1093) 
 
 
Right of centre Canadians (70.8%), not surprisingly, express more pride in Canada’s military 
mission than those who identified as left of centre (45.5%), c2(1, N = 1097) = 64.497, p = .001.  
Consistent with the right/left divide, those on the right side of the spectrum (45.8%) also 
expressed a higher willingness to see Canadian Forces return to Afghanistan in a military role 
than those who self-identified as left of centre (20%), c2(1, N = 1129) = 82.903, p = .001.  Pride 
in Canada’s combat operations in Kandahar (2006-2011) is also highest amongst Conservative 
Party voters (80.1%) compared to the national average of 54.5 per cent for other partisans, c2(9, 
N = 1097) = 166.583, p = .001 (see Table 17 for a breakdown of partisanship and pride).  Left of 
centre party supporters, such as New Democratic Party  (31.3%), Green Party (21.1%) and Bloc 
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Québécois (16.3%), are decidedly less proud of the military mission than Liberal Party voters 
(56.8%). Conservative Party supporters (56.7%) are also much more supportive of the idea of 
Canada’s military returning to Afghanistan than the national average of just 29.1 per cent, c2(9, 
N = 1129) = 147.747, p = .001. 
 
Table 17 – Partisanship and Pride 
 
(n = 1,131) 
 
 
Given the left/right and partisan split, it is intuitive that there is a relationship between 
Canadians’ activism score (their willingness to protest, sign petitions, be involved with unions, 
etc.) and how it also plays a role in perceptions of Canada’s military and its five-year-long 
combat mission in Kandahar.   The data also shows a statistically significant — but very weak 
uphill negative linear relationship — between higher activism and pride in the mission, r (1097) 
= -.153, p < .01.  I now transition to analyzing this data.   
 
5.6. Analysis: Experiential Knowledge and Canada’s Combat Role in Kandahar  
  
“The story of how people construct meaning,” writes Gamson (1992: 9), “is, in fact, a series of 
parallel stories.”  This discussion seeks to illuminate the story of experiential knowledge 
influencing Canadians’ opinions about the war in Afghanistan. This study’s data illustrates well 
how individual experience — Canadians’ identities, their politics, and their emotions — shape 
how people think about Canada’s military operation in Afghanistan.  This section of the chapter 
attempts to interpret how the privileged experience and firsthand knowledge of Canadians 
Political Party  % 
Conservative Party 80.1 
Liberal Part 56.8 
New Democratic Party (NDP) 31.3 
Green Party 21.1 
Bloc Québécois  Party 16.3 
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influenced their attitudes about the war (Gamson 1992).  I begin by briefly evaluating the role of 
gender.  Second, I interpret the influence of political preferences and partisan politics on thinking 
about the conflict in Afghanistan.  Finally, I evaluate the importance of emotion (or pride) in 
Canadians’ feelings about their country’s military mission in Afghanistan.  
 
5.7.  Gender 
 
The literature concerning political communication and gender is well established.  It should 
come as no surprise that this research’s data underscores the gendered differences in Canadians’ 
attitudes towards war.  Like so much scholarship, political thinking — and foreign policy 
opinions, in particular — are decidedly gendered (Conover and Sapiro 1993;  Bendyna and 
Finucane 1996; Everts 2002; Eichenberg 2003; Eichenberg and Read 2015)48. Like their 
American counterparts (Eichenberg 2003), this research clearly shows that Canadian women are 
less militaristic than men.  Female Canadians are less supportive of the war in Afghanistan than 
males — and keener to see Canadian armed forces used exclusively for peacekeeping than men.  
As well, Canadian women were less proud of Canada’s military missions in Afghanistan than 
men. Still, gender’s influence on attitudes towards Canada’s military and its use is relevant when 
considering how experiential knowledge influences political attitude formation.   
 
This work’s findings dovetail with Fletcher and his colleague’s (2009) analysis of survey data 
about the conflict in Afghanistan.  That research concluded that gender was a significant 
predictor of support for the war.  Canadian women grew more disenchanted with the conflict 
over time.  Like this research, Fletcher et al. (2009) contend that understanding the gender gap is 
not as simple as male versus female preferences — but requires folding in how men and women 
were differently influenced by both their predisposition and the information they received49.  
Canadian women, for instance, who held an interventionist view concerning Canada’s military 
                                                
48 Conover (1988), notably, argues that feminism predispositions eclipses gender in determining feelings 
toward political issues.  This research is incapable of assessing that argument.  
49 While this research’s data found statistically significant associations between gender and preferences 
for the role of Canadian Forces, for instance, this work’s binary logistic regression analysis (detailed later 
in this chapter) did not show that gender is a statically significant predictor of support when holding a 
number of other independent variables constant.   
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were decidedly more receptive to government and military media frames about the war in 
Afghanistan (Fletcher et al. 2009).  Eichenberg and Read (2015: 243) urge researchers to move 
beyond “binary, gender-based characterizations” in their analysis of gender and public opinion 
and fold in individual-level associations and connections to offer a more nuanced picture of 
gender’s role in attitudes towards conflict and international relations.  To that end, the next 
section takes up interpreting other experiential knowledge that influenced how Canadians viewed 
the conflict in Afghanistan.   
 
5.8.  Politics and Attitudes Towards the Conflict in Afghanistan  
 
It is, of course, not remarkable that politics and partisanship plays a role in Canadians’ attitudes 
towards their military and its role in Afghanistan.  Those on the right are: (1) more supportive of 
Canada’s military; (2) more proud of the military’s combat mission in Kandahar; (3) more 
willing to return to a combat role in the South Asian country; and (4) bigger proponents of using 
Canadian Forces for intervention in foreign conflict.   This study’s data falls in line with surveys 
conducted during the height of the conflict (The Strategic Counsel 2006a, 2007).  Fletcher and 
his colleagues’ (2009) analysis, similarly, concluded that party support was rather static in 2006 
and 2007.  Conservative Party supporters were decidedly more positive about the war than those 
Canadians who preferred centrist or centre-left parties.   
 
As outlined in the introduction — and detailed in the previous chapter — Stephen Harper (and 
his Conservative government) championed Canada’s military mission and the soldiers fighting in 
Kandahar in the first year of the conflict.  In line with Gramsci’s (1971) understanding of 
hegemony, and detailed in the previous chapter, the Conservatives attempted to articulate a 
common sense about the war and Canada’s military role in it. Harper and his government 
described the conflict as part of a noble effort (Nossal 2010), compatible with “standing up for… 
core Canadian values” (Harper 2006: np). Afghanistan, essentially, became “Mr. Harper’s war” 
(Bratt 2007: 5). Moreover, debate over the war became a “political football” (Boucher and 
Nossal 2015: 74).  The Conservative Party used the conflict to advance its political agenda early 
on in its tenure as government, using a parliamentary debate in 2006 over extending the mission 
to expose division in the opposition Liberal Party (Saideman 2016). Theory suggests that 
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partisan Conservatives, no doubt, tuned in to the prime minister’s messages about the war 
(Berinsky 2009).   
 
The conflict came to define, in many ways, Harper and his Conservative Party.  The issue drew a 
distinction between Conservatives and other political parties.  Partisan Conservatives likely cued 
to their leader’s rhetoric (Zaller 1992; Berinksy 2009).  They embraced it, identified with it – and 
adopted it as their own thinking about the war, as this research’s data suggests.  Conservative 
Party supporters were more supportive of the war than other partisans.  This work’s findings add 
evidence to the argument that domestic partisanship is a significant predictor of support for war 
(Gaines et al. 2007; Jacobson 2008; Berinksy 2009).  This study’s findings suggest foreign 
policy — just like domestic politics — is shaped largely by partisanship. “[A]ttachment to and 
enmities towards political relevant groups, argues Berinsky (2009: 62) “provide the baseline 
reaction towards a war.”  Intriguingly, Loewen and Robinson's (2010) analysis of voting data 
and individual survey data produced compelling evidence that Conservative supporters were  
more supportive of the conflict in federal constituencies that had experienced the death of a local 
soldier.   
 
In general, individuals look to “credible elites” for “guidance” to sort out complicated events or 
issues (Druckman 2001: 1061) — and partisans, in particular, turn to party leaders to help form 
opinions (Zaller 1992; Berinsky 2015).  “[R]elatively subtle partisan messages,” contends Baum 
and Groeling (2010b: 131) can, in fact, “have large effects on opinion, even in high-salience 
issue areas like war and national security and among well-informed politically attentive partisans 
on the lookout for political manipulation and bias.” 
“[W]hen citizens observe elites engaging in partisan bickering about the merits of a 
policy, they tend to choose sides, largely though not perfectly along partisan lines” 
(Baum and Groeling 2010b: 3). 
 
These opinion formation short cuts or heuristics (Popkins 1991; Lau and Redlawsk 1997; Lupia 
and McCubbins 1998; Baum and Groeling 2010b) saves individuals time while allowing them to 
arrive at opinions that they believe coincide with their partisan self-interest.  Simply put, people 
prefer messages that are consistent with their party loyalties and political values (Sniderman and 
Theriault 2004; Chong and Druckman 2007; Castells 2009).  As this study’s data shows, the 
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connected factors of ideology and party identification are consistently found to be the most 
significant correlations influencing attitudes towards foreign policy (Holsti 2004).  This impact is 
likely heightened by the growing schism between Canadian political parties.   
   
Canada’s political system has grown increasing polarized in recent years (Johnston 2008, 2014).  
Many Canadians live in echo chambers, of sorts, where they only get exposed to information that 
is congruent with their own beliefs.  In 2012, long-time pollster Frank Graves, president of 
EKOS Research Associates, told the Montreal Gazette that in his analysis of decades of polling 
data, Canadians have moved away from their usually centrist political positions.   
“In terms of the whole panoply of issues, from foreign policy to economic policy to crime 
and justice policy to issues about parliamentary democracy, I have never seen Canadians 
this polarized” (Graves, as quoted in Scott 2012: np).   
 
Canadian political parties have also moved away from the centre, leaving their supporters with 
less and less in common with other Canadians who support other parties on the other side of the 
right/left ideological spectrum (University of Toronto 2012).   
“Obviously in the past people had party loyalty and they disliked the other parties. But … 
they didn’t hate the other parties in a visceral way. I think what you see now is a strong 
polarization between opposing camps … I think as a society we could become more 
divided” (Chris Cochrane, as quoted in University of Toronto 2012: np).   
 
As the political landscape grows more polarized and parties become progressively more 
homogenous — economically, racially, religiously, geographically — partisans acquire stronger 
ideological and position cues from their preferred party (Mason and Davis 2015).   Zaller (1992) 
posits that polarization, coupled with elite disagreement, leads individuals to side usually with 
their partisan leaders.     
 
This research’s data points to a stacking, if you will, of identities (Roccas and Brewer 2002) 
associated with support for the conflict in Afghanistan.  It appears that public opinion about the 
war was structured, in part, by social groupings (Converse 1964).  Socialization “ties the 
attitudes” of individuals to the elites that they identify with, such as partisan leaders (Zaller 1994: 
200).  This work’s data shows that older less-educated, right-leaning Conservative supporters, 
living outside of Quebec are more supportive of the war than other Canadians not sharing those 
demographic and socio-political factors.  Conservative Party supporters were more proud of 
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Canada’s role in Afghanistan and showed a stronger willingness to see Canadian Forces return to 
the country in a combat role.   
“When multiple social identities come into alignment, this alignment strengthens the 
effects of these identities on behaviour, and strengthens the cognitive and motivational 
bases of ingroup bias and negative emotion by increasing the perceived differences 
between the groups, regardless of the true differences between them” (Mason 2013a: 1).   
 
Understanding Canadians’ support for the war in Afghanistan, therefore, needs to account for 
multiple identities and factors.  It appears, Canadians use their social groups as a reference to 
arrive at their attitudes about war (Berinsky 2009). Berinsky, in fact, argues that individuals use 
“group loyalties and enmities at the same time…” to arrive at attitudes about war that “accord 
with their predispositions” (Berinksy 2009: 72). 
 
To be sure, this study’s data highlights that support for the war amongst Canadians represents a 
folding together of experiential factors (McCombs et al 2011). For many Canadians, a stronger 
affinity for the military and Canada’s war in Afghanistan flows not just from a single identity 
such as where they live or their gender — but also their party preference.  This study’s data 
highlights a stacking of identities, associations and positions helping to entrench political 
attitudes. This interpretation, though, does not take into account the importance emotion plays in 
how Canadians view their military and the war in Afghanistan.  In the coming section, I address 
the importance of incorporating pride into a more complete understanding of support for the war.  
 
5.9. Emotion and its Role in Opinion Formation   
 
This research’s data reveals that Canadians’ emotional investment (their pride) in Canada’s 
military mission in Afghanistan also had a significant influence on attitudes about the war.   This 
research’s population-based survey experiment found an uphill (positive) correlation between 
support for Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan and pride. Pride in Canada’s role in 
Afghanistan is also, not surprisingly, associated with a willingness to see Canadian Forces return 
to a combat role in South Asia. Experiential knowledge, such as emotion, “is valued precisely 
because it is so direct and relatively unmediated” (Gamson 1992: 126).  Westen (2007: ix; italics 
in original) puts it well: 
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“[T]he vision of mind has captured the imagination of philosophers, cognitive scientists, 
economists, and political scientists since the eighteenth century — a dispassionate mind 
that makes decisions by weighing the evidence and reasoning to the most valid 
conclusions — bears no relation to how the mind and the brain actually work.” 
 
Pride’s role in opinion formation concerning Afghanistan was an important shaping factor, 
arguably, because it allowed Canadians to incorporate their “past experience” and the 
evaluations they made about the country’s history with “contemporary circumstances” for a 
speedy evaluation of the war in Afghanistan (Marcus 2000: 221).   
This research’s data also dovetails neatly with Damasio's (1994) contention that emotion is 
instrumental in how individuals construct meaning.   In contrast to cost-benefit political decision-
making (Edwards 1977; Edwards and Newman 1986) and bounded rationality models (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1973, 1974; Kahneman and Tversky 2000; Tetlock and Mellers 2002), this 
research’s findings illustrate how pride factored into how Canadians engaged with Canada’s 
military mission.  This study’s empirical findings also adds to scholarship (Everts 2002; 
Berinsky 2009; Fletcher et al. 2009) urging researchers to steer away from entrenched debates 
over rational publics making deliberative political decisions (Page and Shapiro 1992).  Mouffe 
(1999, 2000; 2005), as well, defends making space for conflict and agonistic pluralism, 
contending that not all politics is strictly rational.  This research only assessed the role of pride in 
the mission.  Anger may very well have played a role in Canadians’ attitudes about the conflict 
in Afghanistan.  (I return to the possibility of evaluating anger in my concluding chapter’s 
suggestions about future research.)    
With respect to my seventh research question (R7), I concluded that Canadians’ political 
opinions about the war in Afghanistan represent a mix of experiential knowledge.  In particular, 
this study adds to the weight pointing towards the importance of emotion in opinion formation. 
The coming section examines the confluence of media discourse, popular wisdom and 
experiential knowledge on Canadians’ attitudes towards Canada’s military mission in 
Afghanistan.   
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5.10. Putting it All Together  
 
This section addresses this research’s eighth (and final) research question (R8):  R8. How does 
the confluence of media discourse, popular wisdom and experiential knowledge potentially shape 
Canadians’ attitudes towards its military and its intervention in foreign conflicts? 
 
As the previous section detailed, a number of demographic and socio-political variables 
(experiential factors) are associated with Canadians’ views of Canada’s combat operations in 
Afghanistan. The ensuing section assesses how media discourse, popular wisdom and 
experiential factors can possibly come together to produce Canadians’ attitudes about the war in 
Afghanistan. To answer this question, I undertook a binary logistic regression analysis of the 
population-based survey experiment data to estimate or predict the relationship between the main 
dependent variable of support 50  for Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan and the 
independent variables surrounding (1) media discourse; (2) popular wisdom; and (3) experiential 
factors. Table 18 details the impact of independent variables (while holding them constant) on 
the main dependent variable of support for the war in Afghanistan.   
 
A Canadian with high levels of pride in the military mission increases the chances of that 
individual having high levels of support for the military mission in Kandahar by a factor of 1.458 
or 79 per cent. Canadians on the right side of the ideological spectrum are more likely to be 
highly supportive of the military mission than those on the left by a factor of 1.15 times (12%).  
Residents in Quebec are less likely to be highly supportive of the military mission by a factor of -
.0.686 times or, put another way, the probability of someone from Quebec not being highly 
supportive of the military mission is 60 per cent more likely than individuals from the rest of 
Canada.  Moreover, those Canadians who prefer a peacekeeping role for Canadian Forces are 
also less likely to be highly supportive of Canada’s military role in Afghanistan by a factor of -
.576 times. That is, those individuals who prefer peacekeeping for Canada’s military are 123 per 
                                                
50 In an effort to simplify the predictive model — and eliminate the subtle differences between six levels 
of support in the Likert Scale — I divided respondents into two groups: (1) low support; and (2) high 
support.  I then conducted a binary logistic regression analysis using SPSS to assess support for Canada’s 
military role Afghanistan.  
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cent less likely to be highly supportive of the military mission in Kandahar than those Canadians 
who prefer an exclusive combat role for the military.   
 
Table 18 – Binary Logistic Regression Model: Support for Combat51 
 
Variable Parameter Errors Exp (B) 
Peacekeeping Role Exclusively  -.552* 
(.240) 
- 0.576 
Treatment Group 2 (Security 
Frame no Fact check)  
.475* 
(.243) 
1.607 
Pride in Mission 3.77*** 
(.028) 
1.458 
Quebec -.377* 
(.198) 
- 0.686 
Left / Right Spectrum 
 
 
 
*p < .05; ** p< .01; *** p< .001 
(n = 1135) 
.140*** 
(.035) 
 
 
1.15 
 
 
 
 
Of note, individuals who were exposed to a news story featuring an improving security frame 
sponsored by government or military officials (with no journalistic fact checking) are also more 
likely to be highly supportive of the military mission in Afghanistan by a factor of 1.607 times 
than individuals exposed to the other media treatments.  Expressed another way, Canadians 
exposed to a media frame highlighting improving security in Kandahar (with no fact checking) 
are 32 per cent more likely to be highly supportive of Canada’s combat role in Afghanistan than 
respondents who read other news stories in this population-based survey experiment.  Gender 
was not found to be a statistically significant predictor of support for the war when holding other 
variables constant.  The coming pages discuss these findings.   
                                                
51 The Pseudo R-Square (Nagelkerke) is .421, suggesting that the 42 per cent of variance in the model is 
explained by the variables.  This value is consistent with a good-fitting model (Kuha and Lauderdale 
2014).  
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5.11. Analysis:  Putting it All Together  
 
In line with Gamson’s (1992) thinking about political attitude formation, this research’s binary 
logistic regression analysis suggests that Canadians weave media discourse, popular wisdom and 
experiential knowledge into their political opinion formation.  This work illustrates well that 
media are “just one among many resources that citizens may draw from their “tool kit” in 
working through public issues (Price et al. 2005: 205). The coming pages offer an analysis of the 
confluence of statistically significant independent variables that can predict support for Canada’s 
military mission in Afghanistan.  I begin by evaluating the impact of popular wisdom and 
experiential factors on support.  As I have already offered a detailed discussion of the role of 
peacekeeping, pride, Quebec and left/right ideology in opinions about the war in Afghanistan, I 
will restrict most of the coming analysis to evaluating the potential impact of the news media 
frames on Canadians’ opinions about the conflict in Afghanistan. This study’s data suggests 
government and military media frames can have some influence on thinking about the conflict – 
but it is not the only influence.  
 
5.12. Popular Wisdom and Peacekeeping 
 
As this research’s data highlights, Canadians have an overwhelming preference for seeing their 
armed forces used for peacekeeping over armed combat.   This work’s statistical analysis clearly 
shows that a preference for peacekeeping (instead of armed combat) is a significant predictor of 
support for the war in Afghanistan, when holding other factors constant.  As I have argued early 
on in this chapter, many Canadians likely rely on the heuristics or mental shortcuts about 
peacekeeping to form their attitudes about the conflict in Afghanistan.  It is a phenomenon 
echoed by other recent research.  
Underscoring this work’s data, a national survey (conducted around that same time as this 
population-based survey was surveying Canadians) concluded that nearly three-quarters of 
Canadians want Canadian Forces to play a role in future – even yet to be determined – UN 
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peacekeeping missions (CTV 2016) 52. It is noteworthy that Canadians are so committed to the 
idea of peacekeeping that they are willing to support a mission without any knowledge about: (1) 
where Canadian Forces might be deployed; (2) the role of the military in the undetermined 
country;  (3) and, intriguingly, the danger level of the potential mission.  As I noted in the 
introduction, many Canadians — and even some political actors — initially believed Canadian 
Forces would be keeping the peace in Kandahar.  This study’s data — and the recent survey data 
mentioned above – suggests Canadians remain truly committed to the idea of peacekeeping.   As 
this work makes plain, for many Canadians, keeping the peace is inherently viewed as “good” 
while other military endeavours are seen as “bad” (Wagner 2007: 54; italics in original).  
5.13. Experiential Knowledge  
 
As this work’s binary logistic regression analysis found, pride is a significant and robust 
predictor of support amongst Canadians for the war in Afghanistan, while holding other factors 
constant.  Similar to this research’s findings concerning pride, Fletcher and his colleagues’ 
(2009) regression analysis evaluating the predictive power of a number of similar independent 
variables concerning support for the war in Afghanistan concluded that emotion played a crucial 
role in shaping attitudes about Canada’s combat mission in Afghanistan.  Fletcher and his 
colleagues observed that government and military leaders were only able to retain high support 
amongst those Canadians who expressed pride in the mission.  Fletcher et al. (2009: 927) argue 
that “efforts to 'educate and inform' Canadians failed” because information, minus emotion, did 
not resonate with Canadians.  This research, too, clearly shows that pride is an essential factor in 
political attitude formation about Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan. As Marcus (2003: 
206), contends emotion is crucial to forming political opinions because “reason requires emotion 
not just to recruit its abilities but also to execute its conclusions.”   
 
This research’s binary logistic regression also found that living in Quebec is a statistically 
significant predictor of low support for Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan. As I argued 
above, a desire to see Canadian Forces used for peacekeeping is a powerful predictor of support 
                                                
52 The national polling firm Nanos conducted a “national dual-frame (land and cell) hybrid telephone and 
online survey of 1,000” Canadians between September 24-27, 2016. The margin of error is reported as +/-  
3.1 per cent, 19 times out of 20.   
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for Canada’s military role in Afghanistan amongst Quebecers. Congruous with Roussel and 
Boucher (2008), this work’s data adds to evidence that there are differences, while holding a 
number of independent variables constant, between English and French Canada when it comes to 
political attitudes about the country’s military and its role overseas.  
 
Additionally, as I argued above, partisan politics plays an important role in Canadians’ opinions 
about the war in Afghanistan.  Yet, party identification is not a statistically significant predictor 
of attitudes towards the conflict in this work’s binary logistic regression analysis.  Ideology, 
however, plays a role in how Canadians feel about the conflict.  Canadians who self-identify as 
right on the ideological spectrum are more likely to support the military mission than those on 
the left.  Canada’s two main governing parties (Liberals and Conservatives) incorporate a wide 
range of individuals with diverse ideological positions (Johnston 2008).  The Liberal and 
Conservative Party are big tent parties with supporters who identify as both left and right.  This 
research’s data found, for instance, that 20.7 per cent of Conservatives voters identified as left on 
the ideological spectrum.  Ideology, therefore, as this research’s data indicates, is a more 
statistically significant indicator of support for the war in Afghanistan than party identification.  
Having briefly evaluated the importance of peacekeeping, pride, Quebec and left/right politics as 
predictors of support for the war in Afghanistan, I now turn to a fuller analysis of the potential 
influence of some media frames on Canadians’ attitudes about the conflict. 
 
5.14.  Media Discourse and Canadian Attitudes Towards the Conflict in Afghanistan 
 
As I have noted a few times before, Canadians were initially enthusiastic about their military’s 
involvement in Afghanistan. Some research (Boucher and Nossal 2015) suggests the declining 
support for Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan after 2007 may have been influenced by 
the disagreement — and even ambivalence — about the war amongst political actors.  As this 
research’s content analysis makes clear, elites were not united about the mission, resulting in 
conflicting messages for the Canadian public. Saideman (2016) argues that the disjointed 
messaging and disagreement amongst Canadian politicians left the Canadian public confused.   
Yet, this study’s data provides contradictory evidence, to be sure, about the influence of elite 
media messages.  This work’s binary logistic regression analysis found, while holding other 
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variables constant, that a story highlighting government and military frames about improving 
security in Kandahar (with no journalistic fact check) was a statistically significant predictor of 
increased support for the conflict.   
 
Commensurate with other research (Zaller 1992; Zaller 1994; Mermin 1999; Western 2005; 
Berinsky 2009; Baum and Groeling 2010a; Baum and Groeling 2010b), this study’s findings 
suggests that some Canadians are, indeed, responsive to elite media frames.  It is possible that 
government and military media frames repeated in news coverage can sometimes act like a 
recipe that individuals use to cook up their opinions in a way that is compatible with elites’ 
agendas (Kinder and Sanders 1996: 156).  Some Canadians, my data suggest, incorporated the 
attributes highlighted in the media frames into their evaluation of the conflict in Afghanistan.   
 
Gamson (1992: 118) observes that for some individuals, media are their “exclusive resource… 
used in the construction of meaning.”  As this study’s content analysis discovered, much of the 
news media’s coverage of Afghanistan was episodic, too.  The media treatments in this study’s 
experiment were also events-oriented. Iyengar (1991) concluded that episodic coverage 
frequently leads audiences to hegemonic interpretations.  To be sure, audiences often “echo” the 
qualities and characteristics encapsulated in news stories (Rill and Davis 2008: 613).  Canadians’ 
attitudes about the conflict began with their own preconceptions and personal experiences, but 
they may also have been shaped — in some way — by news media frames.  The restoring 
security in Afghanistan frame in this study’s audience experiment came from a source with 
considerable authority (the defence minister).  Individuals, as these data suggest, are sometimes 
swayed by what political actors say and do.  Consistent with other research (Golan and Wanta 
2001; Rill and Davis: 2008), this work suggests that audiences sometimes use the media frames 
sponsored by elites to form their political attitudes. This study also bolsters Entman’s (2007) 
contention that when government and military officials give citizens something to think about, it 
may, indeed, be the first step in getting people to think and act in a certain way.      
 
Yet, it is too simplistic to think that there is a direct, linear, relationship between the media 
frames of elites and acceptance by audiences (Livingstone 2000).  As a predictor, exposure to the 
security frame treatment in this experiment was not the largest predictor in this study’s statistical 
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model. At best, we can conclude that individuals sometimes incorporate elite media discourse 
into their opinion formation — but it is best to think of attitude formation as a confluence of 
predispositions and media messages.  As Berinsky (2009: 69) argues, theories of “elite 
competition” about framing war — conducted largely through the news media — overcome the 
deficiencies of event-driven or success-dependent theories that predict public support for war — 
but they do not account for the multitude of factors influencing what people think. 
 
People, of course, do not just make up their minds based on media messages alone — and are, in 
fact, frequently “influenced by pre-existing meaning structures” (Scheufele 1999: 105).  That is, 
media messages might play a part in influencing individuals.  More likely, though, the influence 
of media frames represents the sum of media messages and a confluence of other predispositions 
such as political leanings (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007).  Couldry (2004), as I stressed in my 
theory chapter, urges media and communication scholarship to de-centre media (and its power) 
and conceptualize our lives as media-related.   This research adds to the weight of Gamson ’s 
(1992: xi-xii) argument that: 
“The mass media are a system in which active agents within specific purposes are 
constantly engaged in a process of supplying meaning.  Rather than thinking of them as a 
set of stimuli to which individuals respond, we should think of them as the site of a 
complex symbolic contest over which interpretations will prevail.  This culture system 
encounters thinking individuals, and political consciousness arises from the interweaving 
of these two levels.” 
 
This work also highlights the importance of not overemphasizing the media’s role in 
constructing meaning (Silverstone 2007) — but instead imagining it as a site of contestation and 
negotiation (Gramsci 1971) for audiences.  Scheufele (1999) urges media research to use 
multilevel analysis to understand the impact of an individual’s predispositions and media 
discourse (see, for example, McLeod and Pan 1989; Pan and McLeod 1991; McLeod, Pan, and 
Rucinski 1995).  Scheufele (1999), in fact, highlights Gamson’s (1992: 67) call to examine “the 
interplay between two levels — between individuals who operate actively in the construction of 
meaning and socio-cultural processes that offer meanings that are frequently contested.”  
 
Having considered a number of factors shaping Canadians’ attitudes towards the war in 
Afghanistan, I conclude — concerning my eighth research question (R8) — that opinion 
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formation about intervention in foreign conflicts are, in fact, best understood as a potential 
confluence of media discourse, popular wisdom and experiential knowledge. As I have argued, 
this research adds to the growing evidence that political attitude formation is best theorized as a 
complicated mix of factors.  A sophisticated analysis of understanding how people arrive at 
political attitudes requires investigating many levels at the same time.   
 
5.15. Conclusion  
 
Canadians’ opinions about their military and the conflict in Afghanistan, as I have argued in this 
chapter, represent a confluence of media messages, experiential knowledge and popular wisdom.  
Attitude development happens at multiple levels. This work’s data confirms a theoretical need to 
understand public opinion formation as complex and multifaceted.  While fact checking in news 
appears to have no influence on Canadians, news stories highlighting improving security frames 
(absent journalist fact checking) can play a role in political attitude formation, when controlling 
for other factors.  To be sure, media discourse is not the only influence on Canadians’ opinions 
about war and their military. Popular wisdom about Canada’s role as a peacekeeping nation 
underpinned many Canadians’ evaluations of the conflict in Afghanistan.  As well, Canadians’ 
experiential knowledge — gender, politics and pride — also shape attitudes about Canada’s role 
in Afghanistan.  In line with Western (2005: 15), this research adds to the evidence that political 
opinions are “formed by a blend of information and predisposition.” Having outlined and 
analyzed this study’s main findings, I now wish to offer some concluding thoughts and 
recommendations in my final chapter. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
6.0. Introduction  
 
As you know, the genesis of this thesis began on a rugged old road next to an ephemeral 
irrigation canal connected to the Arghandab River in Afghanistan.  Despite the arid conditions of 
Kandahar, I remember feeling like I was constantly treading water in a churning ocean of 
military spin while embedded as a reporter with Canadian Forces.  I worried about being a 
mouthpiece — a propagandist — for the Canadian military.  I was also deeply skeptical about 
the justifications government and military leaders were offering about Canada’s combat role in 
Kandahar.  I feared myself — and my news colleagues in Kandahar — were not being 
aggressive enough in pushing back against the government and military leaders’ media framing 
of the conflict.   
 
The American media’s recent failure to properly challenge U.S. President George W. Bush’s 
bogus claims of Iraq’s so-called Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as a pretext to invade the 
Middle Eastern country, left me deeply skeptical of Canadian journalists’ ability to resist the 
Canadian government and the military’s framing of the war in Afghanistan.  As well, I feared 
that embedding with Canadian Forces left me captured by the tunnel vision of embedding.  As I 
reflect on my experience of reporting on the war now, I believe I only told part of the story in 
Afghanistan because I saw the war through the military’s eyes.  I also regret that Canadian 
audiences only received a very narrow view of what was going on in Afghanistan. 
 
I also was curious about the influence of the media coverage on Canadians. Admittedly, at the 
time, I had a much less sophisticated conceptualization of the influence of the news media.  Still, 
as a big consumer of public opinion data, I was curious to know how public opinion about the 
war shifted so quickly in the first year of Canada’s military mission in Kandahar.  The war in 
Afghanistan, to be certain, was different from what most Canadians were familiar with.  After 
all, in the lead up to the deployment of Canadian Forces, the defence minister implied that 
Canadians would be peacekeeping in Kandahar.  What I witnessed in southern Afghanistan was 
at odds with traditional popular wisdom of what Canadian Forces did overseas.  I even began one 
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of my television reports about a major battle in Kandahar in the summer of 2006 with the line 
‘This is definitely not peacekeeping’.   I often talked with my colleagues in Kandahar (and my 
editors in Canada) about how Canadians would feel about seeing their soldiers fight a war 
instead of keeping the peace.  I was also curious in the initial few months of the war about how 
Canadians would react to seeing dead soldiers come back from the war.  This thesis reflects my 
scholarly attempt to sort out those two fundamental questions:  what impact did government and 
military leaders’ media framing of the war have on journalists and the public? 
 
This concluding chapter offers the denouement to this study.  Its aim is to provide a resolution to 
the research questions I posed — and sketch a path forward for future research.  This chapter 
begins by restating this study’s main empirical conclusions.  From there, it switches to a brief 
discussion of this work’s main theoretical interventions.  Subsequent to my comments about 
theory, I detail the methodological lessons I take from this research.  After describing my 
methodological reflexivity, I transition to outlining a possible future research trajectory that 
flows from this study.  As well, I offer a number of recommendations for journalists concerning 
fact checking as a practice.  I conclude by offering some comments on the lessons that Canadian 
democracy can draw from this research.  
  
6.1. Empirical Findings 
 
This section provides a brief summary of this research’s main empirical findings.   To reiterate, 
this research posed one over-arching research question and eight sub-questions: 
 
MRQ. Main Research Question:  what impact did government and military frames about the war 
in Afghanistan have on journalists covering the conflict and the Canadian public? 
 
R1. How was Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan framed in the news media? 
 
R2. What role did news values play in shaping news content? 
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R3. How do journalists (if at all) fact check the preferred media frames of the military and 
government leaders surrounding Canada’s military efforts in Afghanistan? 
 
R4. What role does indexing play in shaping the news media’s coverage of Canada’s military 
mission in Afghanistan? 
 
R5. How (if at all) does journalistic fact checking influence audiences’ judgments about war? 
 
R6. How are audiences influenced (or not at all) by the popular wisdom concerning 
peacekeeping? 
 
R7. How are Canadians’ attitudes towards its military and its intervention in foreign conflicts 
influenced (or not at all) by experiential knowledge? 
 
R8. How does the confluence of media discourse, popular wisdom and experiential knowledge 
potentially shape Canadians’ attitudes towards its military and its intervention in foreign 
conflicts? 
 
6.2. Framing Canada’s Military Mission in Afghanistan  
 
My first research question (R1) examines how the conflict in Afghanistan was framed in the 
news media.   
 
R1. How was Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan framed in the news media? 
 
More than three-quarters of the news coverage of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan 
contained a preferred government or military frame.  There was scant counter-hegemonic 
framing of the news coverage of the conflict.  Plus, 90 per cent of the coverage was episodic and 
not thematic.  Other than fact checking official frames, the news media rarely questioned 
hegemonic positions.  The coverage of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan did not often 
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stray from the spheres of “consensus” and “legitimate controversy” described by Hallin (1986: 
117).  
 
This research adds evidence to the argument that the social system remains an important 
influence on news production.  This work’s data shows that the news and analysis generated 
about Canadian Forces’ combat operations in Afghanistan was clearly influenced by the social 
system in which it was produced (Hallin 1986; Herman and Chomsky 2002 [1988]; Hallin 1994; 
Gitlin 2003 [1980]; Shoemaker and Reese 2014).  Views (and voices) outside the usual elite 
consensus and acceptable elite disagreement about withdrawing from Kandahar, for instance, 
were rarely included in the news media’s representations about the conflict (Hallin 1986; Bennett 
1990).  The government and military’s sophisticated public relation efforts succeeded, in part, 
because official media frames dominated the news coverage of the conflict.  The news media’s 
reporting and analysis about Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan was clearly not 
“detached” from “society’s political, cultural and economic structures” (Carruthers 2000:15). 
The perpetuation of dominant discourse is further compounded by the types of stories — or news 
values — that the news media prize.   
 
6.3. The Influence of News Values  
 
This research’s second question (R2) attempted to measure the influence of news values on news 
content. 
 
R2. What role did news values play in shaping news content? 
 
This study’s content analysis clearly demonstrates that news values (Galtung and Ruge 1965) 
shaped the type of coverage produced about Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan.  The 
news media focused its spotlight on events (episodic coverage) over more contextual and 
analytical (thematic) reportage and commentary.  An overwhelming 90 per cent of the coverage 
was episodic.  There was a heavy emphasis (58.3%) on combat operations and death and injuries.  
This study’s content analysis discovered a clear emphasis on: (1) timeliness; (2) conflict and 
controversy; and (3) human interest (Shoemaker and Reese 2013: 171).  
 
  240 
This research’s data, as I argued in chapter four, clearly adds to evidence that news values — the 
types of stories and narrative that journalism prizes — reproduce hegemonic interpretations 
about the military and war.  The Canadian news media’s focus on rank and file soldiers fighting 
heroically to make Afghanistan safe perpetuated dominant positions and values in the news 
media.  This CA’s findings bolsters the argument (Herman and Chomsky 2002 [1988]; Bennett 
1990; Bennett et al. 2006, 2007; Bennett 2012) that the news media sustain hegemonic 
interpretations and positions by amplifying the “cultural touchstones” embedded in government 
and military leaders’ media frames (Hall et al. 1978: 56).  The echoing and amplifying of 
dominant values through media messages is further compounded, as I have argued, by the 
overwhelming prominence of episodic storytelling that ignores (or silences) bigger structural 
questions about war and foreign policy (Boyd-Barrett 2004b).  And while journalists may claim 
that fact checking is an expression of counter-hegemony, this research’s data suggests otherwise.   
 
6.4.  Fact checking the Media Framing of Canada’s Military Mission in Afghanistan 
 
My third research question (R3) explored how Canadian journalists fact checked the preferred 
media frames of the military and government surrounding Canada’s military efforts in 
Afghanistan.   
 
R3. How do journalists (if at all) fact check the preferred media frames of the military and 
government leaders surrounding Canada’s military efforts in Afghanistan? 
 
This study’s data confirms that from the earliest days of the conflict, Canadian journalists fact 
checked government and military claims about the military mission in Kandahar.  This research 
found a clear — and statistically significant — association between government and military 
frames and journalists fact checking.  This research supports a more events-driven understanding 
of journalistic counter-framing (Speer 2017).  Aligned with Baum and Groeling’s (2010a, 2010b) 
elasticity of reality theory, I contend that the precarious security in Afghanistan led Canadian 
journalists to challenge overly optimistic framing of improving security and reconstructing the 
war-torn country of Afghanistan sponsored by government and military leaders.   In its simplest 
form, Canadian Forces did not make the volatile region of Kandahar safer — and journalists 
reflected this.  After all, journalists are interpreters.  The media framing supported by 
  241 
government and military officials was not consistent with what journalists were seeing with their 
own eyes.  Reality asserted itself early on in the conflict in Kandahar (Baum and Groeling 
2010a) – but the practice was not truly counter-hegemonic.   
 
To fact check government and military media framing, journalists consistently assessed those 
frames against “objective” rules, laws, standards and codes (Ettema and Glasser 1989: 2).  
Official media frames were turned into quantitative or scientific criteria that journalists could 
assess.  Was security really improving?  Were reconstruction efforts really helping everyday 
Afghans recover after decades of war?  While fact checking may have challenged officials’ 
media frames about the war, government and military frames, nevertheless, still structured much 
of the news coverage about the conflict.  While journalistic routines dictate that reporters 
produce objective stories — “hover[ing] seemingly detached” — from their construction, they 
ultimately reproduce “dominant understandings and values, while simultaneously professing the 
ideological innocence of news so manufactured” (Carruthers 2000: 18; see also Pedelty 1995).     
 
The government and military’s media frames still provided the intellectual scaffolding, if you 
will, that journalists used to frame their stories. In line with Bennett (2012), I contend that the 
journalistic practice of assessing government and military framing with elite criteria produced an 
incomplete picture of the war in Afghanistan for Canadian audiences.  Fact checking what 
officials say, inevitably, incorporates — and even spotlights — the framing of political actors.  
Challenging a frame inevitably conjures up the frame (Lakoff 2004). I will offer a broader 
discussion about the implications of this media phenomenon later in this chapter.  Before that, 
though, I wish to turn now to this research’s key findings concerning indexing.   
 
6.5.  Indexing the War to Officials  
 
This research’s fourth research question (R4) assesses how indexing shaped the news media’s 
coverage of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan.   
 
R4. What role does indexing play in shaping the news media’s coverage of Canada’s military 
mission in Afghanistan? 
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This study’s data confirms this conjecture.  Canadian journalists overwhelmingly used officials 
as sources in their coverage of the conflict in Afghanistan.  According to the traditional 
conceptualization (Bennett 1990) and even more recent research (Bennett et al. 2006, 2007), the 
propensity of journalists to index their coverage to officials leads to news coverage that generally 
echoes elite debate.  This research’s data, I have argued, suggests something different.  The 
Canadian news media were aggressive about fact checking government and military leaders’ 
claims about the war.  The reporting and analysis about Afghanistan was not a stream of 
uncontested government and military spin.  Journalists pushed back against official framing that 
did not match their observations and knowledge.  
 
This tendency of Canadian journalists to challenge the framing of the war in Afghanistan by 
government and military leaders conforms, as I have argued, with the growing interpretive style 
(Zelizer 1993; Schudson 2013) and fact checking form (Graves 2016) of journalism over the last 
decade or more. It is important to emphasize that the violent insurgency in nearby Iraq and the 
failure to find WMD, arguably, spurred journalists covering the war in Afghanistan to be more 
skeptical.  After American journalists failed to adequately critique the main justification of the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq, Canadian journalists were on-guard, if you will, about officials’ framing of 
the war in Afghanistan.   
 
As well, Canadian political actors were not united about the war in Afghanistan. Similar to 
Hallin’s (1986) seminal work concerning the news media’s coverage of the Vietnam War, 
Canadian journalists were also sensitive to  government and military consensus and disagreement 
about the conflict in Afghanistan.  This research’s data illustrates well that media coverage of the 
conflict in Afghanistan was fuelled, in part, by the elite disagreement over Canada’s military 
mission Afghanistan.   To be sure, Stephen Harper’s minority government faced the prospect of 
facing an opposition-sponsored confidence motion over Canada’s combat role in Kandahar.  As a 
result, the Conservative government’s survival hinged on the question of Canadian Forces’ 
participation in Afghanistan.  Journalists were, of course, attuned to this elite disagreement.  The 
coming pages turns now to the potential influence of the news coverage on audiences.   
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6.6. The Influence of Journalistic Fact checking 
 
My fifth research question (R5) evaluates if fact checking in news influences audiences’ 
opinions about war.  The data from this study clearly demonstrates that news fact checking does 
not have a statistically significant immediate influence on attitudes towards war. Similar to other 
research (Kuklinksi et al. 2000; Skurnik et al. 2005; Nyhan and Reifler 2010; Pingree 2011; 
Nyhan and Reifler 2012, 2015; Nyhan et al. 2017), this work adds to the evidence that 
journalistic corrections do not spark the desired result in audiences.  As noted in chapter five, it 
is possible that traditional (so-called he said / she said) reporting that features both sides and 
competing claims may have lead audiences to doubt the fact checking they encounter in news 
(Pingree 2011).  
 
As I highlighted in the previous chapter, journalistic fact checking can sometimes entrench 
positions and views (Nyhan and Reifler 2010). This study’s findings suggest predispositions 
matter more than new — corrective — information when it coms to political opinion formation.  
Partisans, in fact, appear to resist fact checking when it contradicts with their established 
positions. Berinksy (2009: 84) contends citizens discount new information that does not mesh 
with their partisan identifications.  Facts, it appears, do not matter as much as party loyalty.  
Other predispositions also have an important shaping function as well on political opinions 
concerning war.     
 
6.7. Popular Wisdom 
 
 
This study’s sixth research question (R6) examined how audiences may be influenced by popular 
wisdom concerning Canada’s military:  
 
R6.  How are audiences influenced (or not at all) by the popular wisdom concerning 
peacekeeping? 
  
My data clearly demonstrates that Canadians’ preference for a peacekeeping role for their 
military plays a significant role in determining how Canadians feel about their military and their 
roles overseas.  A preference for peacekeeping is a significant predictor of opposition to the war 
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in Afghanistan.  Historically, people who live in Quebec are particularly disposed to seeing 
Canadian Forces used exclusively for peacekeeping. This research confirms this predisposition.  
As I discussed in the last chapter, it is notable that public opinion was decidedly more 
enthusiastic for the military’s deployment in Afghanistan when Canadian Forces were involved 
in more traditional peacekeeping roles between 2003-2005 and 2011-2014, compared to the 
combat role between 2006-2011 in Kandahar (Boucher and Nossal 2015; Saideman 2016).   
 
This study confirms the shaping power of popular wisdom on political opinions.  The strongly 
held public belief that Canadian Forces should be used exclusively for peacekeeping, as I have 
argued, ran up against the reality of soldiers fighting a brutal — and bloody — insurgency in 
Afghanistan.  The constant combat images from Kandahar, I contend, were incongruous with the 
popular wisdom most Canadians hold about their military. The discordance between the notions 
of peacekeeping and combat operations likely played a role in the quick drop in public support 
for Canada’s military mission in Kandahar. The idea of Canadian Forces keeping the peace 
internationally will likely continue to be a potent influence on how Canadians want their military 
used.  Governments who wish to use Canadian Forces for combat roles overseas will, no doubt, 
have to overcome the popular wisdom Canadians have about their military to gain widespread 
public support.  Fletcher and his colleagues (2009) suggest increased support for combat is 
possible if elites engage with the public on an emotional level.  The coming section addresses the 
importance of experiential factors such as emotion.   
 
6.8. Experiential Knowledge  
 
My seventh research question put experiential factors under the microscope, asking: 
 
R7. How are Canadians’ attitudes towards its military and its intervention in foreign conflicts 
influenced (or not at all) by experiential knowledge? 
 
In line with considerable literature, this study found that gender plays a role in shaping attitudes 
about Canadian Forces and thinking about the war in Afghanistan (Conover and Sapiro, 1993; 
Eichenberg 2003).  Female Canadians are less supportive of the war in Afghanistan than their 
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male counterparts.  They were also less proud of Canada’s combat role in Kandahar and more 
inclined to prefer that the country’s military stick to peacekeeping only.  Gender, however, was 
not a statistically significant predictor of support for the war in Afghanistan when holding all the 
other socio-political and demographic variables constant in my binary logistic regression 
analysis.   
 
Partisan politics, as this research’s data illustrates, also had an influence on Canadians’ attitudes 
towards the military and the combat mission in Kandahar.  Not surprisingly, the ideological 
spectrum offers a useful predictor of Canadians’ attitudes towards the role of their military and 
the war it fought in southern Afghanistan.  This study’s population-based survey experiment 
found that Canadians on the right side of the spectrum are: (1) more supportive of Canada’s 
military; (2) prouder of the military’s combat mission in Kandahar; (3) more willing to return to 
a combat role in South Asia; and (4) more likely to support an interventionist role over a 
peacekeeping one for Canadian Forces.   
 
Partisan Conservatives, it appears, largely embraced their party leaderships’ view of the 
military’s role and its combat mission in Afghanistan.  Conservative Party supporters were much 
more supportive than other partisans of the conflict in Kandahar.  They also felt the most pride 
about the military mission. Conservative voters, in fact, want to see Canadian Forces return to a 
military role in Afghanistan now.  As I argued in the discussion section of the previous chapter, 
the increasing polarization of Canadian politics (Johnston 2014) has entrenched attitudes. 
Moreover, multiple social and political identities likely tend stack on top of themselves (Roccas 
and Brewer 2002; Mason 2013b; Mason and Davis 2015) with gender, region, education level 
and politics compounding people’s opinions of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan.   
 
This research also highlights the importance of emotion in political opinions.  Pride emerged as a 
significant predictor of how Canadians felt about the war in Afghanistan.  This study bolsters 
evidence suggesting emotion, is a central element in the development of political opinions 
(Gamson 1992).  How proud — the honour, credibility and dignity — that Canadians ascribed to 
the war in Afghanistan proved to be a considerable predictor of support for Canada’s military 
mission in Kandahar. Canadians, clearly, incorporated their “predispositions” (Zaller 1992: 6; 
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Western 2005: 5) or “past experience” and the considerations they made about that history with 
“contemporary circumstances” (Marcus 2000: 221) to arrive at their opinions about the conflict 
in Kandahar.  This finding, as I noted in the previous chapter, conflicts with rational choice 
models and cost-benefit political decision making theories.  Future political communication 
research needs to take emotion seriously when considering how people form their political 
opinions.  To be sure, a combination of variables likely influenced public opinion about 
Canada’s combat role in Afghanistan.  The coming section considers the mixing of these factors.   
 
6.9. A Confluence of Factors Shaping Opinions About War 
 
This thesis’ eighth research question (R8) examines how Canadians’ attitudes are influenced by 
multiple factors at the same time: 
 
R8. How does the confluence of media discourse, popular wisdom and experiential knowledge 
potentially shape Canadians’ attitudes towards its military and its intervention in foreign 
conflicts? 
 
This research’s binary logistic regression clearly shows that Canadians’ attitudes about the 
country’s military mission in Afghanistan is best understood as a confluence of media messages, 
popular wisdom and experiential knowledge.   
 
This research’s data suggests that some media messages can influence how people feel about 
war.  As this work’s analysis (binary logistic regression) found, exposure to a news story 
highlighting the government and military’s improving security frame (absent any journalistic fact 
checking) is a statistically significant predictor of positive support for the war in Afghanistan.  
To be sure, public attitudes about war frequently align with elite media framing (Zaller 1992; 
Zaller 1994; Mermin 1999; Berinsky 2009; Baum and Groeling 2010a; Baum and Groeling 
2010b).  As I have argued, many Canadians likely folded the media framing of Afghanistan.  It is 
worth noting, that this research’s content analysis determined that much of the news coverage 
about Afghanistan was episodic and events-oriented.  The media treatments in this study’s 
audience experiment were also episodic. As Iyengar (1991) posited, episodic news coverage 
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frequently inspires hegemonic interpretations.  It is plausible that some Canadians echoed the 
government and military media frames that dominated news coverage of Afghanistan (Rill and 
Davis 2008).  But media discourse is, of course, not the only factor that influences public 
opinion.   
 
As I have argued, it is prudent not to over-emphasize the new media’s role in constructing 
meaning (Couldry 2004).  Media are one part of attitude formation.  Canadians’ opinions about 
the war in Afghanistan represent a coming together of factors including: (1) media discourse; (2) 
popular wisdom surrounding peacekeeping and Canadian Forces; and (3) experiential 
knowledge, including gender, region, political orientation and emotion.  Having highlighted this 
research’s key empirical findings, the coming pages transition to a discussion about the 
theoretical tensions this work addressed.  
 
6.10. Theoretical Interventions 
 
This study’s main research question assesses the influence government and military frames had 
on both journalists and the Canadian public.  At its core, this research attempts to understand the 
shaping power of elite media frames on the news media and the public.  It questions the 
hegemony of elite media frames.  It seeks to understand how these frames sponsored by 
government and military leaders are “susceptible [to] being challenged by counterhegemonic 
practices” (Mouffe 2005: 8) employed by journalists.  Moreover, this work seeks to illuminate 
how hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces may (or may not) influence public opinion about 
war.  There is, of course, an analytical and “dialectical relationship between what we understand 
through theory and what we know through practice” (Mansell 2012: 33).  
“[T]he proper locus for the study of social reproduction is in the immediate process of the 
constituting of interaction, for all social life is an active accomplishment; and every 
moment of social life bears the imprint of the totality”  (Giddens 1993: 8). 
 
There are theoretical implications to this study’s main research question.  This section evaluates 
the theoretical tensions this study’s empirical findings attempt to address, including:  (1) the 
limits and benefits of Shoemaker and Reese’s (2014) hierarchy of influences model; (2) the 
predictive power of indexing because of fact checking and dramatic events; (3) the implications 
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of fact checking concerning normative conceptions of the news media in democracy; and (4) the 
confluence of factors that shape public opinion about war.   
 
6.11. The Hierarchical Model? 
 
Shoemaker and Reese’s (2014) hierarchy of influences model offered a helpful categorization 
tool for conceptualizing this study’s research questions concerning the shaping power of micro, 
meso and macro forces that influenced the news media’s coverage of the war in Afghanistan.  It 
was a useful means for mapping the shaping power of different social and individual factors. As 
I outlined at the onset of this thesis, this study wanted to understand how Canadian elites framed 
the war in Afghanistan and what journalists did with those media messages.  Embedded 
journalists produced most of the news media’s coverage of Canada’s military mission in 
Afghanistan.  As a result, I restricted my emphasis to three levels of the hierarchy of influences 
model:  (1) social system; (2) social institutions; and (3) routines and practices.  As I noted in my 
theory chapter, the other two levels (media organizations and individuals) surely shaped the 
coverage of the war in Afghanistan — but are not aligned with this research’s main goals. 
 
Shoemaker and Reese’s (2014) model is not perfect, though.  It lacks precision and a clear 
theoretical means to differentiate between the overlap of levels.  As Nam-Jin (2004) pointed out, 
and this research makes clear, it remains difficult to distinguish between levels.  The fuzziness of 
how to separate the different levels is exemplified by this research’s findings and analysis.  
Clearly, the phenomena that shape the news media can originate within more than one level. It is 
theoretically possible, for instance, that the proclivity of Canadian journalists (even those who 
were embedded) to index their coverage of Afghanistan to government and military leaders is 
also situated at other levels of the model.  Ideology, institutions, organizations and individual 
journalists can all play a role in why journalists gravitate towards official sources.  As well, 
indexing can be imagined as a confluence of all the levels.  In the context of the news coverage 
of Afghanistan, broadcast news organizations may have favoured official sources because it was 
easier to get Canadian Forces to comment on-camera who were readily available at the Kandahar 
Airfield over the Afghan people who lived outside the wire.  News organizations’ editorial 
leaders may have also dictated what types of sources their journalists incorporated into their 
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coverage.   As well, news professionals may have also felt normatively compelled to gravitate 
towards officials in their coverage of the conflict.  Canadian leaders had decided to send soldiers 
into harm’s way — and journalists may have believed it was necessary to hold those political 
actors accountable for their decision.  This is supposition, of course.  I offer this speculation to 
illustrate the blurriness of differentiating between the levels in the hierarchy of influences model 
(Shoemaker and Reese 2014). This research does not precisely pinpoint indexing’s level of 
origin.  Nevertheless, with this study’s focus on government and military media framing, it was 
prudent to conceptualize indexing as an institutional level influence.   
 
The lack of clarity about levels can produce research that reaches different determinations about 
the impact of micro, meso and macro-level influences.  The distinctions and overlap between the 
levels may be fuzzy, but the location of a media shaping phenomena in the hierarchy of 
influences model is, arguably, not essential to identifying the shaping factor, in the first place, 
and secondly measuring its influence on news media content. The propensity of journalists to 
index their stories to official sources can originate at the routines and practices level or the 
ideological level.  Different researchers — with different research agendas — will conceptualize 
different media phenomena at different levels in an effort to answer their research questions.  
Media and communication scholars need to justify their level of focus, citing empirical and 
theoretical reasons.  My study examined the potential shaping power of officials on the news and 
analysis about Afghanistan.  Specifically, it was interested in gaining insight into the contested 
media framing dynamic between government and military officials and journalists surrounding 
the conflict in Kandahar.     Journalists covering the conflict as embedded media generated much 
of the coverage.  As a result, this work put the social level, social institution level and routines 
and practice level under the microscope.   
 
While calling their model a hierarchy, Shoemaker and Reese (2014) urge researchers to 
incorporate a multi-layered analysis of the overlap between the levels.  As this study illustrates, 
news stories, were influenced by:  (1) routines and practices; (2) institutional forces; and (3) 
social and ideological factors. The Canadian news media’s coverage of the war in Afghanistan 
represents the sum of one level or many levels as articulated in Shoemaker and Reese’s (2014) 
hierarchy of influences model.  This research’s data and analysis shows that Canadian journalists 
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were not completely submissive to government and military framing or rigidly bounded by 
indexing.  This study found “linkages between levels… as interactive and multi-directional” 
(Reese and Shoemaker 2016: 406), begging the question if the model should continue to be 
called a hierarchy.   As this research’s data suggests, the model is clearly not a hierarchy.  
Perhaps, as Nam-Jin (2004) contends, Shoemaker and Reese’s model is best understood as an 
organizing scheme.  I offer some suggestions later in this chapter concerning future research 
about why the hierarchy of influences model needs to be coupled with theory that accounts for 
power dynamics. The coming pages, however, transition to the theoretical tensions concerning 
indexing addressed by this work.   
 
6.12. Indexing & Dramatic Events  
 
The debate about indexing’s power to shape news coverage divides into two camps.  In the 
traditional camp, journalism largely echoes and amplifies elite discourse (Hall et al. 1978; Hallin 
1986; Herman and Chomsky 2002 [1988]; Hallin 1994; Mermin 1999; Massing 2004).  Bennett 
and colleagues (2007) argue that journalists’ overreliance on official sources leading up to the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq, for instance, produced news coverage that did not adequately interrogate 
and challenge official justifications for the military intervention. On the other side of the 
scholarly debate, journalists are afforded more agency as autonomous actors who frequently 
contest elite media framing (Althaus 2003; Baum and Groeling 2010b; Porpora et al. 2010; 
Potter and Baum 2010; Speer 2017).  
 
Yet, Bennett et al.’s (2007) updated conception posits that events, technology, investigative 
journalism and counter-spin provide opportunities for the news media to stray from hegemonic 
meanings and interpretations.  As I have argued, in the context of the events in Kandahar, the 
precarious security (perpetual suicide attacks, IEDs, etc.) spurred journalists to fact check the 
preferred framing of government and military officials.  This work’s content analysis also found 
some evidence of investigative journalism (notably surrounding the handling of Afghan 
detainees) allowing Canadian journalists to push past the bounds of government and military 
framing of the conflict in Afghanistan (see also Saideman 2016).  However, as this study’s CA 
makes clear, there were very few counter-hegemonic expressions in the coverage about Canada’s 
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military mission in Afghanistan.  Additionally, a lot of the fact checking assessed the 
government and military’s execution of its goals instead of policy decisions or larger structural 
questions (Mermin 1996).  Moreover, nine in ten pieces in the news media about Afghanistan 
were episodic and not thematic.  As a result, much of the events-oriented news coverage of the 
war in Afghanistan did not move beyond elite interpretations of our social world.  (Assessing the 
impact of technology’s impact on indexing was beyond the scope of this research.)   
 
Baum and Groeling (2010a) posit that the news media’s ability to avoid the shaping power of 
indexing increases as journalists covering the conflict gain more knowledge from reporting in the 
war zone.  Embedded journalists, for instance, are able to evaluate for themselves if official 
claims and rationales for war are, in fact, true.  Time essentially enables journalists to evaluate 
government and military leaders’ media frames about war with facts that they observe on the 
ground. More than three-quarters of the news and analysis featured fact checking that challenged 
the preferred media frames of government and military leaders.  This research’s data shows that 
journalistic fact checking of Canada’s military mission commenced immediately with the 
Canadian Forces’ deployment to Kandahar.  This coverage, as I have argued, is not a new 
phenomenon – but falls in line with the growing interpretive style (Zelizer 1993; Schudson 2013) 
and fact checking form (Graves 2016) of journalism.   Yet, this phenomenon, especially in the 
era of hightened fact checking in the Trump era, begs theoretical questions about the predictive 
power of indexing. The evidence from this research adds to the evidence that fact checking has, 
indeed, become an entrenched routine and practice.  Yet, the means by which journalists 
challenge elite frames are not, arguably, truly counter-hegemonic expressions.   
 
6.13. Fact Checking’s Impact on Counter-framing  
 
Fact checking — and demands for accountability — are becoming central to modern journalism 
(Jones 2009; Graves et al. 2016).  Notably, in 2016, Oxford Dictionary’s word of the year was 
“post truth”, noting that facts “have become less influential in shaping public opinion than 
appeals to emotion and personal belief” (Steinmetz 2016: np).  Moreover, U.S. President Donald 
Trump’s seemingly endless claims of “fake news” and “alternative facts” have positioned fact 
checking at the centre of political communications. Some have even suggested that Trump’s 
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presidential run has “ushered in a whole new era of fact checking in journalism” (Golshan 2016: 
np).  A doyen of U.S. journalism, Carl Bernstein, even recently called on the American news 
media to stand up and challenge the “malignant presidency” of Trump (Bernstein, as quoted in 
Rojas 2017: np).   Some have called this the golden age of journalism (King 2017: np).   
 
Hannan (2016: xviii) defines “post truth journalism” as the proclivity of the news media to 
“reproduce what politicians say without critical comment, thereby allowing falsehoods to 
proliferate in public discussion.”  Yet, this is happening at the same time as the growth – and 
institutionalization – of fact checking in journalism.  This study’s findings raise questions about 
the efficacy of fact checking at two levels: (1) the journalistic practice level; and (2) the audience 
influence level. Additionally, my findings trigger theoretical questions about the indexing norm.  
Perhaps if journalists are increasingly skeptical of what political actors say and do – and if news 
coverage increasingly fact checks elite rhetoric – then there exists the potential for the news 
media to present a less hegemonic interpretation of our social world.  Yet, that is, of course, not a 
certainty, as this research’s analysis also suggests, because of the news media’s propensity to 
offer fact checking that largely relies on elite criteria to assess political actors’ rhetoric.  
 
The abundance of fact checking by Canadian journalists did not completely challenge hegemonic 
interpretations about the war in Afghanistan, as I have argued.  Fact checking, in these cases, 
only goes so far.  It is not a truly counter-hegemonic expression.  This type of corrective news 
does not offer an “alternative hegemony on the terrain of civil society in preparation for political 
change” (Pratt 2004: 232).  Fact checking an elite claim with one or two sentences — as much of 
the news coverage about Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan did — is, arguably, not 
sufficient information for audiences to make considered decisions about the war.  To be certain, 
this research clearly illustrates that government and military leaders still had considerable 
shaping power over the news media representations of Canada’s combat operations in Kandahar. 
This research’s findings, in turn, question theories of journalism’s normative role in democracy.  
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6.14.  Fact Checking and Journalism’s Normative Role 
 
Nellie Bly, Veronica Guerin, Seymour Hersh, Woodward and Bernstein:  their names evoke 
images of fearless — and crusading — reporters, doggedly uncovering the truth and holding the 
powerful accountable.  Rooted in a normative Burkian conception of a Fourth Estate, most 
Canadian journalists see themselves as watchdogs (Ward 2015).  Many Canadian journalists will, 
undoubtedly, contend that their propensity to fact check government and military framing of the 
war represents the normative manifestation of their monitorial role in democracy (Jones 2009; 
Graves 2016).  As I have stressed, though, a vast majority of the news stories and commentaries 
about the war were episodic, lacking thematic (substantive and contextual) elements.  The 
prominence of events and storytelling forced critical assessments of the war and militarization 
“into the background” (Lewis et al. 2003).  As Iyengar (1991: 137) argues, it is likely that 
coverage focusing on brave and heroic soldiers over trenchant reporting and analysis did not 
produce a rich public discourse about the war. This research’s data raises theoretical questions 
about watchdog conceptions of journalism in democracy.   
 
As I have argued, the binary practice of contesting official frames with elite values reinforced 
hegemonic representations of the war in Afghanistan.  As Ettema and Glasser (1998a, 1998b) 
have argued, judging officials’ claims with elite yardsticks or values obscures deeper meanings.  
In the Kandahar context, challenges to elite frames became technical — and often more about 
execution critiques, whether elites were living up to their promises to make the region safer, for 
instance. This practice is divorced, I contend, from the wider knowledge production required to 
understand our social world.  
 
The news media’s raison d’être and authority “depends on its declared ability to provide an 
indexical and referential presentation of the world at hand” (Zelizer 2017: 154).  This positivist 
means of knowledge construction — with its emphasis on truth — often does not prize 
“subjectivity, relativity, engagement, construction and reflexivity” (Zelizer 2017: 154).  Many 
journalists, no doubt, assume that their fact checking of elite media frames constitutes a 
contribution to the facts, truth and reality that democratic citizens use to make informed 
decisions. But fact checking – despite its intentions to correct elite spin and misinformation — 
  254 
still puts a spotlight on the government or military’s media frame.  Contradicting a frame in the 
news media still incorporates — and sparks in the receiver’s mind — the frame in the coverage 
(Lakoff 2004).   
 
It is also worth stressing again that the overabundance of events-oriented coverage questions 
whether journalists are living up to their normative monitorial role.  This research suggests an 
emphasis on event-oriented news coverage is more consistent with a collaborative role and not a 
monitorial role (Christians et al. 2009).  Journalists may fact check what elites are saying — but 
when those challenges are contained within episodic coverage, the media messages, arguably, 
perpetuate elite definitions and positions.  Theoretically, there are detrimental consequences for 
participatory democracies if the news media are filled with hegemonic values (Lewis 2001). 
Persuasion starts with political actors framing the debate within which individuals form their 
political opinions.  The news media’s abundance of events-oriented coverage is best understood 
as collaboration (Christians et al. 2009: 197) whereby journalists — unknowingly and without 
resistance — reproduce meaning that benefits power.  Future media and communication 
scholarship should recognize that fact checking does not always represent a truly counter-
hegemonic expression.  I now wish to consider the theoretical debates that this work explored 
concerning how people form opinions about war. 
 
6.15. The Confluence of Factors Shaping Public Opinion  
 
As I argued in the preceding chapter, a confluence of factors likely influenced how Canadians 
viewed the military mission in Afghanistan.  Much of the literature surrounding public opinion 
concerning war stresses a rational public reacting to the success or failure of the conflict or 
casualties (Mueller 1973; Eichenberg 2005; Gelpi et al. 2006; Gartner 2008; Gelpi et al. 2009).  
Other scholarship (Zaller 1992; Brody 1991; Zaller 1994; Berinsky 2007, 2009) emphasizes the 
impact of elite media framing of conflict. In line with substantial literature (Everts 2002; 
Berinsky 2009; Fletcher et al. 2009; Fletcher and Hove 2012), this study suggests it is wise to 
move beyond thinking of publics as rational and deliberative (Page and Shapiro 1992).  Instead, 
it is clear that feelings offer an important independent variable that political communication 
researchers must account for.  It is, indeed, crucial that scholarly analysis makes space for — but 
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also defends — the salience of emotion and the affective in democratic debate (Mouffe 1999, 
2000; 2005).  It is time to move beyond thinking of democratic citizens as human calculators 
adding and subtracting the pros and cons or levelheaded computers weighing the arguments on 
both sides.  The complicated — messy — emotional nature of the human brain needs to be 
factored into research considering how individuals arrive at their political opinions.   
Emotion, as this research shows, needs to be conceptualized as an important predictor of public 
attitudes towards war. This study’s population-based survey experiment found a positive 
correlation between pride in the military mission and support for it.  Clearly, Canadians turned to 
experiential knowledge (Gamson 1992), such as emotions, in their thinking about the war.  
Attitudes about the conflict did not represent a neat cost-benefit analysis (Edwards 1977; 
Edwards and Newman 1986) or even rational choice (Tversky and Kahneman 1973, 1974; 
Kahneman and Tversky 2000; Tetlock and Mellers 2002).  In line with Damasio (1994), this 
research concludes that emotion is key in understanding how people construct their political 
thinking.  Moreover, my results highlight a need for a nuanced understanding of how individuals 
fold in emotion, media discourse and other predispositions such as popular wisdom and 
experiential knowledge into their political opinion formation.  Having outlined this research’s 
theoretical contributions, I now transition to this concluding chapter’s thoughts about its 
methods.    
6.16. Methodological Reflections  
 
This section reflects critically on the cause and impact of this research’s methodological choices.  
The coming pages focus, in particular, on the strengths of this study’s methods and the 
innovative ways I overcame the weaknesses of my methodological choices.  Primarily, however, 
I wish to highlight this study’s contribution to media and communication scholarship.  I begin by 
considering this study’s content analysis before providing a critical reflection on my population-
based survey experiment.  I also offer a number of suggestions about how this study might be 
improved.   
To be sure, I am well aware of my position as a white, privileged male.  Moreover, I am 
conscious of how my professional experience as a journalist who covered the conflict in 
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Afghanistan likely coloured my view of the journalism produced by the correspondents who 
covered the war.  I know that my subject position had a profound impact on my research 
questions and subsequently on the methods geared at answering my research questions. To that 
end, an interpretive philosophy underpinned this work’s approach. I was aware of the “cultural 
assumptions” that influenced and informed this work’s emphasis and interpretation (Rubin and 
Rubin 2005: 29-30).  
As well, as I detailed in the methods chapter, classic content analysis are often thought of as 
quantitative research, but the coding is subjective, meaning concerns persist about its reliability, 
specifically when it comes to identifying media frames (Gamson and Modigliani 1987; Miller 
1997; Scheufele 1999; Grandy 2001; Hertog and McLeod 2001; Tankard 2001; Matthes and 
Kohring 2008).  It was, admittedly, impossible to divorce my subjectivity – my experience as a 
journalist – from the coding (Van Gorp 2005).  Unlike a lot of CA concerning news framing 
(Hanson 1995; Haller and Ralph 2001; Coleman and Dysart 2005), I tried to be exacting in my 
description and methods for identifying how this work identified news frames sponsored by 
government and military officials.  I was acutely aware of Matthes and Kohring’s (2008) 
suggestions that researchers consciously — knowingly or unknowingly — find what they go 
looking for.   
To that end, the coding searched for combined words such as “helping women and children” or 
“making Afghanistan safer.”  This was done with a mind to increasing identifying media frames 
sponsored by government and military officials and enhancing this research’s reliability and 
validity.  I also used Entman’s (1993) definition of frames in the inductive phase to establish 
patterns and common words for frames. I looked for four elements: (1) a problem; (2) an 
interpretation that attributed blame; (3) an evaluation; and (4) a fix or treatment to the problem 
defined in the media frame (Matthes 2009). 
 
Moreover, I deliberately used Uscinski and Butler’s (2013: 163) definition of fact checking — 
the process of “comparing” the statements of elites “to ‘the facts’ so as to determine whether a 
statement about these topics is a lie” (2013: 163) — to identify and quantify how journalists 
challenged the media frames sponsored by government and military leaders. These definitions 
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proved useful for identifying and quantifying how government and military officials attempted to 
frame the conflict in Afghanistan and how journalists covering the war responded to those 
frames with fact checking aimed at holding political actors culpable for their rhetoric (Jones 
2009; Graves 2016).   These definitions — and this work’s systematic methods of identifying 
frames and fact checking – offer a useful system for future content analysis research examining 
similar news media phenomena.    
 
This study benefited from making a distinction between the frames sponsored by government 
and military leaders and the frames used by news professionals to structure their news and 
commentary.  Few media and communication studies disaggregate the two (Speer 2017).  Most 
research does not distinguish between the source (elites or journalists) of frames (Bennett et al. 
2006) or assesses frames solely considering the source (Baum and Groeling 2010b).  Separating 
frames allowed this study to analyze how journalists deal with the media frames perpetuated by 
government and military leaders and other political actors.  It also made it possible to measure 
the autonomy of journalists to counter-frame the war in Afghanistan.  As well, the distinction 
made it possible to measure if (and how) news professionals fact checked the frames used by 
officials.  
 
This study benefited from engaging a second coder early on in the content analysis to double-
check my coding.  Ensuring a high intercoder reliability early on in the process confirmed that 
the coding schedule was robust and valid.  Ultimately, this research’s CA methods produced 
statistically significant empirical findings about how government and military leaders attempted 
to frame the war in Afghanistan and how journalists fact checked that media framing.  Moreover, 
these findings offered a number of interesting theoretical insights into debates about indexing 
and fact checking. I deliberately set out to produce statistically significant findings concerning 
the Canadian news media’s coverage of the war in Afghanistan.  I chose to do a classic content 
analysis (with a random sample) because I wanted to be able to make generalizable conclusions 
about how journalists responded to government and military framing of the war in Afghanistan. 
Moreover, I wanted to engage theoretically with other scholarship (Bennett 1990; Entman 2003, 
2004; Bennett et al. 2006, 2007; Baum and Groeling 2010a, 2010b; Graves 2016; Speer 2017) 
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about indexing, framing and fact checking.  Using a similar method to the research to which I 
wish to engage critically with offers me a better footing to step into these scholarly debates.  
 
While one part of my rationale for this research is an attempt to respond to the deficit of 
scholarly analysis of the news coverage of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan, I also 
wanted to produce research that might grab the attention of journalists, journalism educators and 
news organizations. My findings concerning the journalistic practices of fact checking and 
indexing raise normative questions about the news media’s watchdog role in democracy. As my 
coming section on recommendations argues, journalists and their news organizations can do a 
better job when it comes to challenging the hegemonic positions of government and military 
leaders surrounding war.  I hope this research sparks a more considered debate about how 
journalists cover conflict.  To that end, I consciously chose to do a classic content analysis over a 
more qualitative method because I know the news media prize surveys and statistics over what is 
often regarded as more subjective research (Lewis 2001).   
 
This research’s methods also attempt to build a bridge between media messages and audience 
reception.  It endeavours to understand both media production and its potential impact. This 
work analyzes both the type of news media Canadians had access to surrounding the war in 
Afghanistan and examines its potential influence.  This research wanted to move beyond having 
to guess at what the media did or what audiences thought of media texts (Philo and Berry 2004). 
Fletcher and colleagues (2009: 925) concluded that the Canadian government’s “information 
transmission” about the war in Afghanistan (despite the low public support) succeeded. Media 
and communication scholarship, however, has largely ignored the actual media messages 
available to Canadians during the conflict. This research responds to this deficit.   
 
Fletcher et al. (2009) used survey data to evaluate Canadians’ opinions about the war.  The 
researchers concluded that government and military leaders largely succeeded in getting 
Canadians to accept the government and military’s media framing surrounding the combat 
operation.  The researchers infer that Canadians accepted government information because 
survey respondents identified the media talking points (or frames) used by officials.  Unlike 
Fletcher and his colleagues, this research tested actual media frames to examine their potential 
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impact on Canadians.  Moreover, this research — at a theoretical level — conceptualized the 
news media as a site of contestation.  As a result, this work also sought to assess the potential 
impact of journalistic fact checking mixed with government and military media frames.  As a 
result, this work, arguably, offers a more complex understanding of the influence of media 
discourse on opinion formation concerning war.  
Using the findings from my content analysis as a springboard, this research assessed how actual 
media messages may have influenced Canadians’ attitudes towards the conflict in Afghanistan. 
The combination of a content analysis with a population-based survey experiment provides a full 
examination of media production and its potential influence on its consumers. Notably, this 
research’s treatment did not come in an unnatural laboratory setting but in the form of a more 
natural online survey.  Additionally, this work attempted to overcome the typical limitation of 
experiments where meaning making associated with media treatments are only “variations in 
message comprehension”  (Price et al. 2005: 182).  Instead, this work’s analysis folds in other 
factors such as popular wisdom and experiential knowledge that can shape people’s attitudes 
about war.  
To be sure, though, the influence of the news media remains a contentious concept in the 
academy (Corner 2000; McQuail 2005; Curran 2006).   Without question, as this work’s data 
illustrates, it is difficult to isolate the specific influence of media messages.  “Influence,” as 
Corner (2000: 376) stresses, is at “the contested core of media research.”  I draw insight from 
Corner’s (2000) work.  While acknowledging that the news media are “primary producers and 
distributors of popular knowledge”, questions (mostly methodological) persist about the actual 
influence of mediated messages on public opinion (Corner 2000: 376-377).  Citing Miller and 
Philo’s (1996) polemic, Corner (2000: 388) contends too much media and communication 
research is “nervous” about commenting on the influence of media.  Like Corner (2000: 393), 
this research is not interested in drawing direct connections between media “message x” 
determining the “thought or action of y.”  This study is humbly interested in illuminating the 
potential consequences of the news media on audiences.    
 
With that in mind, I used Gamson’s (1992) model purposefully to conceptualize the complexity 
of media discourse, popular wisdom and experiential wisdom mixing together (or not) to 
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potentially form people’s political opinions.  I believe, though, that questions surrounding the 
influence of media messages should be fundamental to media and communications research 
(Corner 2000).  Laswell (1948: 116), no doubt, posed the essential question about the 
communication process: “Who, said what, in which channel, to whom, with what effect?”  This 
research attempts to unpack that multi-dimensional way media can influence political opinions.  
 
There is potential to improve on the design of this study’s population-based survey experiment.  
Shah and colleagues (2010), for instance, conducted a 2x2 experiment, employing a simulated 
radio broadcast to measure frames. They exposed a representative sample of individuals to 
differently framed news stories about a proposed housing development in an environmentally 
sensitive area.  The researchers then conducted cognitive interviews (Geiselman et al. 1985) after 
respondents were exposed to the different news media treatments. Shah et al.’s (2010) design 
might be able to better ascertain the impact of fact checking on audiences. Cognitive interviews 
definitely afford researchers more latitude to probe and follow-up with respondents about the 
potential influence of media messages.  Research along this line would, no doubt, produce more 
robust and descriptive findings.   
 
In hindsight, it would have been advantageous for this research to reduce its treatment groups 
from five to three to test the impact of journalistic fact checking.  This reduction — with the 
same sample (n = 1,131) divided between three groups — would offer more statistical power for 
an analysis of variance across three treatment groups (Iamai et al. 2011).  Moreover, it would 
have been prudent to assess whom respondents believed when exposed to a news treatment that 
contained both an official media frame and a journalistic fact check.  Did respondents understand 
the correction?  Did they believe it?  I also think it would have been wise to gauge the potential 
impact of anger on Canadians’ attitudes concerning the war in Afghanistan.  Similarly, I wished I 
asked respondents if they thought Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan was a success to 
assess that potential impact on support for the war.  Moreover, it might also have made sense to 
evaluate the impact of counter-hegemonic frames surrounding war.  As Lewis (2001) contends, 
the public is much more progressive than many surveys suggest.  It would be interesting to test 
this idea concerning war.   
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Focus groups, using this study’s research questions, might also produce more descriptive and 
insightful results.  This method would offer a researcher the opportunity to engage in an “open 
and creative dialogue with group participants” (Deacon et al. 1999) about the potential impact of 
the news media’s fact checking. To be sure, focus groups offer a strong opportunity for media 
scholars to explore “the dynamics of what experiential knowledge, and frames of interpretation 
audiences bring to bear in their use of media content” in shaping their political beliefs (Hansen 
and Machin 2013).  Philo and Berry (2011: 281) contend focus groups lead participants to 
“opening up” about how they feel, leading participants “to say what they really believe”  (see 
also Gamson 1992).  Having reflected on the benefits and drawbacks of this study’s 
methodological design, I now wish to offer a potential roadmap for future research.   
 
6.17. Future Research  
 
This section outlines a potential research trajectory that flows from this study’s findings and the 
theoretical tensions explored in this work. Future media and communication scholarship using 
Shoemaker and Reese’s (2014) model as an organizing system to understand the various factors 
that shape news content needs to recognize the hierarchy of influences model is not a theory.  It 
is a categorization tool.  It is conceptually useful for imagining the various levels of influence 
that produce news.  But the model needs to be combined with other theories to better analyze the 
phenomena that shape news coverage, as I have done in this study.  As I have emphasized in this 
work, media and communication scholarship that uses the model needs to place power — and its 
linkages to political and professional ideologies — at the heart of any analysis.   
 
Critical media scholarship needs to expose the constituent power relations influencing news 
production.  Caragee and Roefs (2004), of note, contend too much media framing research 
neglects the manifold expressions of political and social power.  Media frames, in particular, 
need to be linked to the expression of power (Tuchman 1978; Gitlin 2003 [1980]) because 
frames are both “an imprint of power” and “central to the production of hegemonic meanings” 
(Caragee and Roefs 2004: 222).  This research responds to that criticism.  Referencing Wolfsfeld 
(1997), Carruthers (2000: 17) observes that “no single theory can explain how all media behave 
in all wars.”  Indeed, critical scholarship often needs a toolbox full of theoretical devices to 
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conceptualize complex media and communication practices and influences.  As Silverstone 
(1999) so aptly noted, media scholarship is ultimately about power.   
“It is about the media’s power to create and sustain meanings; to persuade, endorse and 
reinforce. The power to undermine and reassure. It is about reach. And it is about 
representation: the ability to present, reveal, explain; and also the ability to grant access 
and participation. It is about the power to listen and the power to speak and be heard. The 
power to prompt and guide reflection and reflexivity. The power to tell tales and 
articulate memories” (Silverstone, 1999: 143). 
 
Shoemaker and Reese’s (2014) model is a helpful analytical tool — but it must be coupled with 
critical theory that can adequately explain power relations and their implications.   Attending to 
power relations is particularly important when it comes to the news media’s role in war.   
 
For 16 years now, NATO members have been fighting a war in Afghanistan.  And terrorism 
remains an ever-present threat.  War is a constant, making political communication about it even 
more salient in democratic countries.  Yet, as Brown (2003) points out, there are few disciplinary 
connections between communication studies and international relations.  Communication is 
clearly fundamental to convincing the public to support the war – but:  
“Much of what is written about the media and international conflict is built around a 
concern with how the conflict is reported.  Did the media accurately and objectively 
report events?  Did the military use illegitimate means to restrict or shape the coverage?” 
(Brown 2003: 97).   
 
This type of research often ignores the fundamental connection the political actors who advocate 
for war clearly recognize.  Officials at the Pentagon take communication about conflict seriously. 
They want their media messages to influence audiences.  Future media and communication 
research should take questions concerning these issues just as seriously.  “We must,” argues 
Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2010: 192), “bridge the theoretical and methodological interstices and 
bring our subject matter into full view, thereby illuminating the multiple and contested 
dimensions of war.”   
 
Beyond these general theoretical suggestions, I also wish to suggest a number of specific 
research suggestions.  Elsewhere I offered some preliminary conclusions about the impact of 
embedding on Canadian news coverage of the conflict in Afghanistan (DeCillia 2009). Speaking 
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with journalists revealed their compunction to resist officials’ media framing of the war.  Future 
interviews — with more journalists — could reveal greater insight into the growing prevalence 
of fact checking in modern journalism, especially in war coverage. This study’s content analysis, 
offers a solid launching point for follow-up qualitative interviews with Canadian journalists in 
the hopes of producing a “deeper interpretation” of this research’s findings (Flick 2006: 150).  
 
I am especially keen to explore how journalists understand their role in knowledge production.  
Plus, I would like to know how journalists react to concerns about fact checking leading 
audiences to different conclusions than expected by normative conceptualizations of 
accountability journalism.  If audiences do, in fact, disregard the news media’s corrections, then 
what do news professionals think they can do to change or improve on the practice? As well, this 
line of questioning holds the potential of better understanding journalists’ self-perception of their 
role in democracy. These research questions could also be explored in newsroom ethnography 
similar to Tuchman’s (1976) classic investigation.  Clark’s (2014) ethnography in a Canadian 
newsroom recently revealed intriguing findings concerning the factors that increase more 
diversity in news coverage.   
 
Additionally, my research suggests a need to look at reporting before and after dramatic events.  
Speer (2017) found that dramatic events can spark a turn in news coverage, spurring journalists 
to counter-frame events and issues in opposition to elite media framing.  Speer (2017) further 
suggests that examining news coverage pre and post-dramatic events can illuminate what triggers 
journalists to begin counter-framing issues and events and, thereby, contradicting or confirming 
the indexing norm.  Yet, future research may wish to investigate if dramatic events are still 
required to trigger journalistic counter-framing, especially if fact checking continues as a 
normative and ubiquitous journalistic practice.   
In the United States, online truth police such as FactCheck.org and PolitiFact have 
institutionalized a form of journalism that promotes accountability.  Moreover, the practice has 
been widely adopted by an increasing number of individual journalists outside of official digital 
fact checking organizations. This work adds to the evidence that fact checking does not have an 
immediate impact on audiences.  But there are questions about long-term effects and other – less 
traditional ways – of correcting audiences’ misconceptions.   
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As I detailed in chapter five, some research (Lewandowsky et al. 2013; van der Linden et al. 
2017) found that emphasizing consensus about climate science can inoculate the public against 
misinformation.  Young et al.’s (2017) recent experiment found that humorous videos can have a 
meaningful corrective impact. But these fact checking methods challenge traditional journalistic 
practices.  Conflict is often a key ingredient in news.   Moreover, journalism, especially political 
news, is a serious business.  So, would journalists be willing to accept these decidedly different 
forms of storytelling if they knew their corrections would have a better chance of correcting 
audiences’ misconceptions?    
Donald Trump’s rise to the Presidency of the United States sparked a rise in fact checking by 
journalists (Hepworth 2017).  News stories now regularly scream that the president’s claims are 
“patently false” or represent “a false claim” (Lederman 2017: np).  Days after taking office, The 
New York Times headline, in fact, declared that the president had repeated a “Lie About [the] 
Popular Vote in [a] Meeting with Lawmakers” (Shear and Huetteman 2017: np). Post-truth has 
become a marker of our time. While the term is imbued with a Golden Age-like sensibility, 
harkening to a more certain time, the notion of facts being less influential does, somehow, ring 
true in the wake of Trump and Brexit.  No doubt, there is a pressing need for critical scholarship 
that examines the importance of truth to media and communication.  Journalism, with its focus 
on truth, surely needs to be at the centre of such scholarly pursuits. Having sketched a path for 
future research, I now transition to some observations about what journalists can do differently to 
fact check in a more effective way.   
6.18. Recommendations for Fact checking  
 
The post-factual world represents a daunting challenge for journalists and democracy.   Historian 
Timothy Snyder warns about the consequences of a post-truth reality:   
“…if you want to rip the heart out of a democracy directly, if you want to go right at it 
and kill it, what you do is you go after facts. And that is what modern authoritarians do.  
Step one: You lie yourself, all the time. Step two: You say it’s your opponents and the 
journalists who lie. Step three: Everyone looks around and says, “What is truth? There is 
no truth.” And then, resistance is impossible, and the game is over” (Snyder, as quoted in 
Strachan 2017: np).   
There are no easy answers to the problem posed by elite manipulation and their misleading 
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statements concerning war. This is increasingly apparent with the Trump administration 
attempting to delegitimize the mainstream news media. Yet, in democracy, “[t]hose in 
government and other positions of trust should be held to the highest standards.  Their lies are 
not ennobled by their position; quite the contrary” (Bok 1978: 181). 
 
There is also no easy solution to increasing the efficacy of fact checking in journalism.  The 
literature (Kuklinksi et al. 2000; Haidt 2003; Lakoff 2004; De Waal 2005; Skurnik et al. 2005; 
Westen 2007; Nyhan and Reifler 2010; Pingree 2011; Nyhan and Reifler 2012, 2015; Nyhan et 
al. 2017) is decidedly pessimistic about people’s unwillingness to adopt information that is not in 
line with their own beliefs.  Journalism – with its compunction for telling both sides of the story 
– often does not help to clarify the veracity of the claims on both sides (Pingree 2011).  Fact 
checking often backfires, in fact, entrenching positions and views (Nyhan and Reifler 2010). 
Notably, the news media’s propensity to spotlight false claims frequently confuses audiences, 
leading them to “misremember” lies as truth (Skurnik et al. 2005).  So, what are journalists to 
do? 
 
Facts are important – but the way they are presented may be more important.  Cognitive science 
and linguistics expert George Lakoff contends it is not enough to simply counter political U.S 
President Donald Trump’s untrue claims, for example, by calling them false.  A better strategy, 
according to Lakoff, is to highlight how the American head of state diverts attention from real 
issues.  Reporters, Lakoff told CNN in February of 2017, need to “talk first about the truth, that 
he's diverting attention from the real issues” (King 2017: np). Exposing the political agenda of 
the elite has a better shot at getting audiences to accept corrected information, according to 
Lakoff.   
 
As noted in chapter four, news professionals may want to borrow a page from satirists and not 
take elite rhetoric so seriously. If news professionals know that Donald Trump’s claims about his 
predecessor, Barack Obama, wiretapping the phones in Trump Tower before the 2016 election is 
ludicrous and a diversionary tactic, why take it seriously?  Humour might, indeed, be one of the 
keys to dispelling audience misperceptions (Young et al. 2017).  Nyhan and Reifler (2012) offer 
a number of recommendations for increasing public trust in journalism, such as cutting down on 
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the errors journalist make and issuing corrections quickly when news organizations do get it 
wrong.  Their research also provides some guidance about fact checking, including: 
 
1. Avoid negations – corrections can reinforce misconceptions.  “Joe is cleared” is better 
than “Joe is not guilty”;  
2. Cut down on the reputation of misleading statements or false allegations.  Repeating false 
claims can make them stick in people’s minds.  As stressed before, invalidating a frame 
still provokes the frame (Lakoff 2004); 
3. Cut back on the partisan cues in corrections. Partisan cues can lead media consumers to 
disregard information that comes from a party they do not support.  As a result, keep 
mentions to party politics to a minimum in corrections;  
4. Use credible sources.  Credible sources, such as experts, have more sway with audiences; 
and  
5. Use graphics that correct misconceptions. They are more effective (Nyhan and Reifler 
2012).  
Nyhan and Reifler (2010) provocatively concluded that shaming dishonest elites may also offer 
an effective way to prevent misleading media messages from being articulated in the first place.  
To be sure, broadcast journalists could do a better job fact checking slippery politicians in real 
time while conducting interviews live on TV (Mantzarlis 2017).  In a similar vein, it may make 
sense to ban known liars from the airwaves.  If journalism’s main commitment is to the truth, it 
makes sense to not invite individuals who make have made false claims before on live television.  
Some media commentators have suggested that some of Trump’s spokespeople, for example, 
should be banned from doing television interviews (Saletan 2017).  MSNBC’s morning show has 
“blacklisted” presidential counsellor Kellyanne Conway from its show after her repeated 
misstatements on live television (Borchers 2017: np).  In a similar vein, Boehlert (2017) has 
argued that broadcasters should boycott White House press briefings and stop carrying the 
misinformation-laden forums live on TV.   This thinking comports, in some ways, with the 
public journalism movement of the mid-1990s that aimed to invigorate democracy with 
journalism committed to putting civic engagement and community at the forefront (Rosen 1999).   
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Additionally, journalists, I believe, need to be more reflexive about their role in knowledge 
production (Zelizer 2017).  Journalism plays a critical part in the construction of public 
knowledge (Lippmann 2002 [1922]; Nimmo and Combs 19383; Schudson 1995; Johnson-Cartee 
2005).  Yet, all too often, that role in knowledge production is obscured (Hackett 2006) and 
questions of how power relations shape news content are not top of mind in the craft of 
journalism (Folwer 1991). An increased reflexivity about this subjective knowledge production 
can lead to less hegemonic presentations of war and conflict.  
 
Hackett and Zhao (1998: 86) describe how journalism’s “regime of objectivity” imposes a very 
narrow — and hegemonic — interpretation of war in news coverage about conflict.  Objectivity, 
stress Lynch and McGoldrick (2005, 2006), amplifies conflict (Us versus Them) in war 
reporting. This is compounded by journalists’ propensity to index so much of their coverage to 
official sources.  There is, of course, the potential for counter-hegemonic expressions, but the 
regime of objectivity: 
“…provides a legitimation for established ideological optics and power relations.  It 
systematically produces partial representations of the world, skewed towards dominant 
institutions and values, while at the same time it disguises that ideological role from its 
audiences.  It thereby wins consent for ‘preferred readings’ ...embedded in the news” 
(Hackett and Zhao 1994: 161). 
 
As I detailed in my theory chapter, advocates of peace journalism (Galtung and Ruge 1965; 
Lynch and McGoldrick 2005, 2006) want news organizations and professionals to adopt a more  
conscious and reflective journalism practice aimed at:  
 
1. Highlighting the history and context of conflicts from every side (and not just both sides; 
2. Providing voice to all sides in the dispute; 
3. Reporting possible solutions; 
4. Exposing spin and lies; and  
5. Focusing on successful ends to conflicts and post-war developments. 
 
To be sure, peace journalism challenges traditional Western monitorial or watchdog ideals of 
objective, and detached journalism (Tumber 2009).  Loyn (2007: 1) forcibly argues that 
“creating peacemaking politicians is not the business of a reporter.” 
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“There is an inherent contradiction between the logic of a peace process and the 
professional demands of journalists. A peace process is complicated; journalists demand 
simplicity. A peace process takes time to unfold and develop; journalists demand 
immediate results. Most of a peace process is marked by dull, tedious negotiations; 
journalists require drama. A successful peace process leads to a reduction in tensions; 
journalists focus on conflict. Many of the significant developments within a peace 
process must take place in secret behind closed doors; journalists demand information 
and action” (Wolfsfeld 1997: 67).  
 
Hanitzsch (2004, 2007: 4) argues that peace journalism is also “prone to epistemological 
realism.”  Advocates of the practice, he argues, fail to appreciate that journalists do, in fact, 
recognize that their work is a “selective representation” (Schudson 2011: 33) and not an 
objective “mirror” of reality.  Moreover, proponents of peace journalism suggest that their 
interpretation of the world reflects a “true” reality. Hanitzsch contends this position is naïve and 
patronizing.  As well, Hanitzsch (2007: 1) questions if peace journalism is really an alternative to 
traditional reporting, concluding that the reform movement “comes as old wine in new bottles.”  
Loyn, a long-time war correspondent, concedes that journalistic notions of truth and objectivity 
are problematic — but insists on retaining the traditional practices (2007).    
 
Hanitzsch (20007) argues convincingly that the principles and goals of peace journalism are, in 
fact, merely tenants of good journalism.  That is: 
“…to make conflicts appear transparent through background information, to give voice to 
the views of all rivaling parties, to expose lies, cover-up attempts and culprits on all sides 
and to report on the atrocities of war and the suffering of civilians” (Hanitzsch 2007: 7).   
 
 
Notably, in his call for an ethical code of peace journalism, Irvan (2006) highlights many 
hallmarks of good journalism such as uncovering truth and exposing lies.  He also outlines 
newsgathering principles such as seeking non-elite sources, verifying claims, skepticism and 
verifying claims.  All of these values, of course, line up with traditional elements of journalistic 
standards and practice.  Irvan (2006:37) also suggests journalists should: “provide background 
information” and “exercise the ethics of accuracy, veracity, fairness, and respect for human 
rights.”  While conceding some of the critiques peace journalism proponents advance, Loyn 
(2007: 1) stresses that better coverage of conflict is best achieved by a “better application of 
known methods, not an attempt to reinvent the wheel.”  This, of course, begs the question: what 
can journalists do to better apply their craft?  
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Hackett (2006) identifies both individual (journalists, editorial leaders, journalism educators) and 
structural barriers (educational institutions, journalistic objectivity, source election, corporate 
media ownership) that prevent peace journalism’s objectives from becoming more mainstream.  
He doubts, however, that much of the Western commercial news media will feel compelled to 
change their practices. Hanitzsch (2007) also contends that structural factors are the biggest 
impediment to journalists covering conflict in a more considered way.  “To have any impact on 
the way the news is being made,” write Hanitzsch (2007: 7) “…the advocates of peace 
journalism must address the structural constraints of news production” such as shrinking staff 
and resources, time pressures, news values, availability of sources, danger, etc..  Hanitizsch 
(2007) is not, however, pessimistic about the possibility of change.  In fact, he thinks journalism 
practice can change, especially if emphasized in journalism training.  He encourages robust 
discussions about peace journalism in the field of journalism studies “where it resonates with 
ongoing efforts to promote excellence in journalism” (Hanitzsch 2007: 1).  Irvan (2006) similarly 
urges universities and journalism schools to provide more space for peace journalism.   
 
Hanitzsch (2007) remains skeptical about individual journalists overcoming structural factors 
such as economic restraints. Hackett (2006: 10), however, sees more latitude for individuals 
journalists to make choices because power dynamics: 
“may be manifested or even constituted, within the everyday routines and ethos of 
workaday journalism — a conception which implies the productivity and power of 
journalism, and the potential agency of journalists as social actors, without seeing it as 
entirely free-floating or self-determining.” 
 
Journalists — and their news organizations — can, arguably, change their routines and practices. 
As this study and others (Sigal, 1973; Tuchman, 1978; Bennett 1991; Entman 1993) highlights, 
when journalists use officials as their main sources, they, not surprisingly, reproduce elite views 
of the world.  As this research found, government and military leaders comprised the most 
common primary and secondary source for journalists covering the war in Afghanistan.  This 
indexing to officials, as I have argued, perpetuated a hegemonic view of the conflict.  Reese and 
Buckalew’s (1995: 41) examination of the Gulf War foregrounds how “the interlocking and 
reinforcing triangle of government, news media and corporate needs works together to further a 
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culture supportive of military adventures.”  Without a doubt, news coverage of war needs to 
include more diversity and ordinary people.  All too often, the people living through war and 
conflict are marginalized in news.  In the case of Afghanistan, Canadian journalists failed to 
include the voices of Afghan people in much of their coverage.  Talking to Afghans would have 
surely helped contextualize news coverage of the conflict — and produced decidedly less 
hegemonic representations of the war.   
 
News organizations and their professionals also need to pay attention to the overabundance of 
stories that are episodic over thematic. As this research makes clear, events-oriented coverage 
frequently reproduces hegemonic interpretations in the news (Iyengar 1991).  Akin to how public 
broadcasters such as the BBC keep exacting figures of how much time each party gets during 
elections (BBC 2017), it makes sense for news professionals to keep track of the diversity of 
their sources and count how much of their coverage is episodic compared to thematic.  As well, 
news organizations would be wise to include more counter-hegemonic voices in their coverage 
of war.  There is also a pattern of silencing protests about war in the mainstream news media 
(Gitlin 2003 [1980]; McLeod and Hertog 1992). More space needs to be made for dissent about 
war and conflict.  These metrics would, arguably, encourage more reflexivity about sources and 
coverage focus.  With respect to post-truth discourse, news professionals would also be wise to 
emphasize their role as interpreters.   Journalists can wisely shape the coverage they produce 
about post-truth discourse by translating coded language and double speak and contextualizing 
and interpreting statements by populist leaders (Romano 2017).    
 
Loyn (2007) contends that journalists are cognizant of these concerns.  Conceding that Lynch 
and McGoldrick (2005, 2006) were justified for criticizing journalists for uncritically accepting 
Western governments’ demonizing of the Taliban in Afghanistan after the 9/11, Loyn 
encourages journalists to do a better job contextualizing and explaining the roots of conflict. 
“But surely the antidote to this is a fuller context in the reporting of events, not discarding 
objectivity. Both the reporter and the audience need to know that there is no other agenda 
than explaining what is going on – that what you read, see on the screen or hear on the 
radio is an honest attempt at objectivity; that reporters treat any and every event with an 
informed skepticism, rejecting any attempt to co-opt them into involvement. Better 
reporting of the Taliban meant finding out what they were about, not promoting ‘non-
violent responses to conflict’” (Loyn 2007: 5).   
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To be sure, there is room for improvement.   
 
In the words of Carey (1987: 7), the news media needs to do a better job of “presid[ing] over and 
within the conversation of our culture: to simulate it and organize it, to keep it moving…”  
Undoubtedly, the news media have an important role in deliberative democracy.  As a result, 
journalists cannot merely report on what is going on — but must “seek to enrich and improve” 
understanding of our social world (Christians et al. 2009: 158). Ward (2015: 232), for his part, 
urges journalists to adopt what he calls a “pragmatic objectivity” that allows news professionals 
to scrutinize the events, issues and people they construct knowledge about. Journalists need to 
constantly test and challenge information before publishing it. According to Ward, the future of 
journalism is “investigative” and “interpretative” (Ward, as quoted in Rupp 2006: np).  At its 
core, this type of journalism, he contends, requires “well-designed inquiry, questioning, 
imagination, and interaction with other ways of thinking” (Ward 2015: 285).  This informative 
news can, according to Ward (2015: 309), make public debate “rational, inclusive, and objective 
as possible.” 
 
There are signs of hope, though.  Journalism is changing.  While newspapers and traditional 
broadcasters face declining audiences, online journalism is growing.  This new form of online 
journalism provides the potential for better reporting about war.  Online news has the potential to 
be more transparent.  It has more space for context and explanation.  Plus, hyperlinks allow web 
journalism to offer evidence other perspectives.  Online journalism also offers more opportunity 
for a conversation between journalists and their audiences.  As well, online technology offers 
activists and civil society a potentially equal platform for advancing peace and challenging 
hegemonic views (Cammaerts et al. 20016).   
 
Young journalists, some have argued, are increasingly more reflexive about their role in 
knowledge production, “prefer[ing] a more intimate, personal, even self-referential style to their 
journalism – something obviously connected to social media and Internet culture (Adams 2017: 
np).  
“It is easy for greybeards to mock this, to rear back in horror, to accuse the Snake People 
of being self-absorbed. But many younger people see a huge dollop of vanity — and 
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perhaps even fakery — in the pose my generation of journalists adopted of being above it 
all, pretending to deliver the news without the merest inflection of political bias or social 
position” (Adams 2017: np).   
 
Transparency, argues Adams, is the new objectivity for younger journalists.  Ultimately, 
changing the way journalists cover war requires a different way of thinking about the news 
media’s role in knowledge production.  Framing theory, as this thesis has detailed, is frequently 
viewed as an almost unconscious act, shaping and constraining events and issues. Galtung (1986, 
2002a, 2002b) envisions peace journalism as a decidedly deliberate orientation.  While I do not 
share the overt political agenda that peace journalism prescribes, I do believe, as I outlined 
above, that journalists should reframe how they report on war and conflict.  As Loyn (2006: 1) 
puts well, journalists do not need “a new toolbox” but instead need to apply their “old tools” 
better.  I now wish to transition to some lessons that can be drawn from this research for 
Canadian democracy. 
 
6.19. Some Lessons for Canadian Democracy 
 
Canada paid a heavy price for its involvement in Afghanistan.  The Canadian Forces lost 158 
soldiers in the conflict (Government of Canada 2017a)53. Without doubt, sending soldiers into 
harm’s way represents the most “difficult decision any government in Ottawa makes” (Gross 
Stein and Lang 2007).  Yet, the Conservative government and military officials failed to 
articulate a coherent discourse that captured public support for the military mission (Boucher 
2009: 141) . 
 
                                                
53 Journalists covering the conflict also sacrificed much.  My colleague, Canadian journalist Michelle 
Lang, lost her life covering the war in 2009.  Another colleague and friend, CBC journalist Melissa Fung, 
spent almost a month in 2008 in captivity, held by organized criminals demanding a ransom.  The fixer I 
worked with in Afghanistan, Shokoor Feroz, spent weeks in one of Kabul’s notorious prisons, suspected – 
wrongly – of playing a role in Fung’s kidnapping.   While I was in Kandahar in 2007, another 
CBC/Radio-Canada colleague, Charles Dubois, lost his leg in a roadside bomb explosion while on patrol 
with Canadian Forces.   
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This study also exposes government and military leaders’ reliance on spin to sell the war in 
Afghanistan.  As I have argued in the previous two chapters, this torqued framing left both 
journalists and the public cynical and less trusting of officials.   Clearly, given the long history of 
public opinion manipulation surrounding war, it is not surprising that political actors “fudge 
facts, withhold salient details, bluster, fib, and lie with particular persistence and determination 
when making the case for war” (Carruthers 2011: 34).  But, it is a troubling manifestation for 
civic life.  This type of leadership fuels cynicism about democratic institutions (Blumler and 
Gurevitch 1995).   But political actors are not the only party that deserves blame (Capella and 
Hall Jamieson 1997).    
 
Canadian journalists, as this research shows, failed to articulate a sufficiently critical account of 
the war. As noted in the previous chapter, there was no shortage of criticism — and sobering 
counter-hegemonic assessments — of Canada’s role in the conflict (Byers 2006; Greaves 2008).  
Aid agencies and security think tanks questioned whether Canadian Forces were prepared to 
handle Afghanistan’s counter-insurgency.  The emphasis on combat over reconstruction and 
development was also critically questioned.  Information challenging the government and 
military’s preferred media frames were easily available to journalists. Canadian journalists did 
fact check the frames sponsored by government and military officials – but big questions about 
militarism, foreign policy and the structure and industries that enabled it all, did not get asked.  
“[M]ilitary assumptions and values” were embedded “into the very definition of what is ‘normal’ 
in everyday life” (Turenne Sjolander and Cornut 2016).  The implications for Canadian 
democracy are troubling. Influence, of course, often starts when political actors define the 
discourse individuals draw on to form their political opinions.   
 
6.20. Conclusion 
 
The intellectual journey of this thesis began with a number of worrying questions.  While I was 
embedded with Canadian Forces, I wondered if instead of journalism, I was doing public 
relations for the Canadian military.  Was I seduced by the spin of my military handlers?  I 
questioned if my news stories were influencing how Canadians viewed the war.  Would my 
reporting increase or decrease public support for the conflict?  This study reflects my best efforts 
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to answer these questions.  By combining two methods, this study assessed both the influence of 
government and military leaders’ framing of the war on journalists and the public.  This study’s 
major findings include:  
 
1. The news media largely indexed their coverage of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan 
to official sources; 
2. Canada’s minority Parliament — and the lack of uniformity amongst elites – was reflected in 
the media’s news and analysis of Afghanistan; 
3. The news media’s coverage of Afghanistan focused mostly on death, injuries, corruption and 
the deteriorating security in Afghanistan; 
4. Journalists fact checked government and military media frames of the conflict, using elite 
criteria to judge the claims made by government and military leaders;  
5. Fact checking in news coverage of the conflict likely had no immediate impact on 
Canadians’ attitudes about the conflict;  
6. Canadians’ predispositions about peacekeeping had a profound influence on attitudes about 
the military and the war in Afghanistan; 
7. Quebecers are less supportive of seeing Canadian Forces involved in combat operations 
overseas;  
8. News coverage highlighting the improving security media frame (with no journalistic fact 
checking) influenced support for war; and  
9. Canadians’ opinions about their military and the war in Afghanistan is best understood as a 
confluence of media discourse, popular wisdom and experiential knowledge.   
 
This work, as I outlined, raises more questions than answers, both methodologically and 
theoretically. Further research may be able to better define the factors shaping both news content 
and public opinion. Ideally, focus groups or another audience experiment followed with 
cognitive interviews may provide a more complex picture of the impact of fact checking on 
audiences. This study offers a solid starting point for that follow up research.  Additionally, 
indexing and framing, to be certain, represents important powerful phenomena in the 
media/political nexus.  New research should explore the influence of fact checking and dramatic 
events on the indexing norm.   It is also crucial to fully understand the potential influence of fact 
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checking on news consumers. Future research should focus on illuminating fact checking 
methods that have a real impact on correcting misinformation amongst audiences.  
 
There are implications for journalism and democracy flowing from this research.  The news 
media’s coverage of war, as Carruthers (2000, 2011) contends, offers an important close-up look 
at the routines and practices of journalism that often go unnoticed during times of peace.  War is 
an important opportunity for scholars to critically examine not only what journalists do during 
these times, but also reflect on the normative implications of the coverage they produce at all 
times.  More and more — and especially during times of war — democracies need critical and 
autonomous journalists. Episodic, event-oriented coverage does not give citizens enough 
information and context to evaluate alternative potions to those promoted by government and 
military leaders (Entman 2004).  There is far too much bias towards the status quo in coverage of 
war and foreign affairs.  This research details a number of suggestions for journalists and news 
organizations to overcome these deficiencies.     
 
Considerable research has attempted to explain Canadians’ opinions about the war in 
Afghanistan (Fletcher et al. 2009; Loewen and Rubenson 2010; Fletcher and Hove 2012; 
Boucher and Nossal 2015; Saideman 2016).  Much of this research relies on the interpretation of 
survey data produced by national polling firms. None of this research really problematized the 
news media messages citizens have access to — and their potential influence on public opinion 
about war.  Moreover, no research, to date, has attempted to actually quantify how government 
and military media framing was actually represented in the news media.  This study responds to 
this deficit, concluding that Canadians did not receive uncontested media framing of the war in 
Afghanistan.  This work attempted to gauge the complexity of both media messages and people’s 
predispositions in their political attitude formation about war.  This work exposes the multitude 
of factors that potentially influence political thinking. 
 
What began with heat — the sweltering temperatures of Kandahar, my smoldering trepidation 
about both the media and the public being manipulated by the government and military — ends 
much cooler, in the mild spring climate of London and the even colder calculations of empirical 
research.  I began this journey questioning if journalists did their job, holding decision-makers to 
  276 
account for sending Canadian Forces into harm’s way.  I now wonder if the watchdog needs to 
stop barking so much and start thinking more. Democracy needs journalists to hold the powerful 
to account, of course — but the news media needs to be decidedly more reflexive about how it 
goes about making decision-makers answerable for their words and actions.   
 
The news media’s fact checking is not working.  The U.S. media devoted considerable time to 
challenging candidate Donald Trump’s mendacity.  Despite all his lying, he still got elected 
president.  Journalists have kept up their challenges — and Trump’s core supporters show no 
signs of abandoning their guy.  Journalists can do better.  Democracy deserves better.   I hope 
this research offers a starting point for a discussion about how journalism needs to evolve.  
Perhaps, this work can be the beginning of articulating a new common sense about changing the 
practice of journalism to foster a better — more robustly informed — democracy.  It is a dream, 
of course.  But as Hackett (1991: 281) puts so well, the news media are “not a level playing field, 
but sometimes it is possible, even playing uphill, to score points, to win a match, and perhaps 
occasionally even to refine the rules of the game.” 
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Appendix One 
 
Content Analysis — Coding Schedule  
April 2, 2015 
 
The units of analysis in this codebook are media samples from four Canadian news organizations — CBC National 
Radio News, CTV National TV, The Globe and Mail and The National Post.   
This codebook contains 18 variables and aims to quantify the framing of Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan 
between February, 2006 - December, 2009.  
V1 — ID Number — Unique identification number consecutively numbered from 01 (for the first sample), 02 (for 
the second sample).  Each sample gets a unique ID number.   
V2 — TITLE — Cut and paste title or headline directly from Infomart.ca. 
V3 — MEDIA — Record the sample’s media type:  CBC, CTV, The Globe & Mail or The National Post.  
1. CBC National Radio 
2. CTV National TV 
3. The Globe and Mail 
4. The National Post 
 
V4 — Date — DD/MM/YY  — Record month, day and year.  March 3, 2009 = 03.03.2009 
 
V5 — PERIOD – Record the year of publication or broadcast.   
 
1. 2006 
2. 2007 
3. 2008 
4. 2009 
 
V6 — TYPE — Record the type of sample — news, editorial/commentary, letters to the editor or feature.  All of the 
samples from CBC and CTV will be news or current affairs.  Infomart indicates under the headline if the media 
sample is news, editorial/commentary, letters to the editor or feature.   
 
1. News / Current Affairs  
2. Editorial/Commentary 
3. Letter to the editor  
4. Feature  
 
 
V7 — DATELINE/EMBEDED JOURNALIST:  Where was the media sample produced?  Where does it originate 
from? Is the reporter embedded with Canadian Forces?  Embedded journalists are attached with Canadian Forces.  
For newspaper samples, Informat identifies the dateline underneath the headline.  For broadcast stories, check the 
anchor/host introduction or the sign-off (Tom Parry, CBC News, Kandahar).   
 
0.     Not known / Not Applicable  
1. Afghanistan (Embedded reporter with Canadian Forces in Afghanistan) 
2. Afghanistan (non-embedded reporter)  
3. Canada (anywhere in Canada) 
4. Other (outside Canada or Afghanistan) 
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V8 — Episodic vs. Thematic:  Is the media sample episodic or thematic?  “The episodic news frame takes the form 
of a[n]…events-oriented report”  (Iyengar 1991: 14).  For example: a military battle, a soldiers, death, a political 
debate about Afghanistan.  “The thematic frame, by contrast, places public issues in some more general or abstract 
context or abstract context and takes the form of a “takeout,” or “backgrounder, report directed at general outcomes 
or conditions” (Iyengar 1991: 14).  For example: stories and commentaries that offer explanation, context and 
analysis of Canada’s military role in Afghanistan. 
0 = Not applicable or undetermined 
1 = Episodic  
2 = Thematic 
 
V9 – Counter-hegemonic:  Doe the media sample a critique or challenge of hegemonic forces?  Does the sample 
confront or oppose the existing status quo or political views concerning Canadian foreign policy and its military 
intervention in Afghanistan.  Counter-hegemony is the “creation of an alternative hegemony on the terrain of civil 
society in preparation for a war of position” (Pratt 2004: 332).  Does the sample, for example, question Canada’s 
role in the war?  Does the news or analysis question war?  Does the sample critique militarism?  Doe the sample 
critique the political economy of war?  Does the sample suggest there is an alternative to conflict or war? 
 
0 = Not applicable or undetermined 
1 = Yes - Counter-hegemonic 
2 = No - Hegemonic 
 
V10 — Focus:   Read the sample (unit of analysis) to determine its main focus.  Ask yourself:  what is the MAJOR 
or PRIMARY focus of the story?   Ask yourself what is this media sample mainly about? Sample may contain 
multiple focuses — but this variable seeks to determine what is the main focus of the sample or unit of analysis.  
 
0.    UNDETERMINED 
 
1. MILITARY (operation, troop numbers, deployment, battle, insurgents, offensive, stability, surge, expectations, 
strategy, goals, insurgents, renewed attacks, surge, resurgence, escalation of attacks, peace keeping, awarding 
military honours, negotiating with insurgents)  
 
2. POLITICS (debate about mission or troop numbers, including NATO troop numbers.  Justification or value of 
mission.  Fragility or questions about the value or efficacy of the Canadian or NATO-led mission.  
DEADLINE  for Canadian Troops to pull out or withdraw) 
 
3. DEATH (Military Deaths or injuries (Ramp Ceremony or body repatriation).  Afghan Military, Police, 
Civilian, Interpreter Death.  Death Toll (Civilian or Military). 
 
4. POLLS/PUBLIC OPINION  (Surveys about Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan, discussion of public 
attitudes towards Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan)  
 
5. DEVELOPMENT / RECONSTRUCTION (rebuilding roads, schools, helping Afghan people rebuild after 
decades of war) 
 
6. SECURITY, SAFETY SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN  (escalating violence — suicide attacks, IEDs or 
improvised explosive devices, road-side bombs). 
 
7.  HUMAN RIGHTS, prisoners of war, torture, ethic 
 
8. MULTIPLE  
 
V11 — SECURITY / VIOLENCE  
 
Does the sample mention or discuss security or safety in Afghanistan?   
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0 = No 
1 = Yes 
3 = Undetermined / NA 
 
V12 — PRIMARY SOURCE — Primary sources are “credible individuals and institutions granted media access to 
enable their initial framing of events which are assumed to be within the area of competence:  for instance, experts, 
officials, sources, courts, leading politicians, and senior religions figures” (Oxford Encyclopedia Media and 
Communication Studies 2016).  Sometimes, journalists will paraphrase or quote sources who articulate the frame.   
The primary sources will often be the main character in the story.  This source is often the focus of the story.  Often, 
the primary source is the person who is quoted or paraphrased the most.  Primary sources often sponsor the story’s 
frame.  This source frequently defines the conflict and problem in the story (diagnostic frame).  This source can also 
prescribe a solution (prognostic frame).  Ask yourself who is the main person or person speaking in this sample?  
Who does the story hinge around?  Who is the primary definer of the preferred frames? 
    
0.    Not Applicable  
1. Author/Journalist 
2. Government 
3. Military Official/Including NATO/UN 
4. Expert/Academic 
5. Insurgent/Taliban 
6. Other Politician (outside of government)  
7. Critic other than politician (activist) 
8. Afghan Official  
9. NGO  
10. Civilian - Afghan 
11. Civilian - Canadian  
12. Other  
 
V13 — SECONDARY  SOURCE —  Secondary sources are “credible individuals and institutions granted media 
access to enable their initial framing of events which are assumed to be within the area of competence:  for instance, 
experts, officials, sources, courts, leading politicians, and senior religions figures” (Oxford Dictionary of Media and 
Communication Studies).  Sometimes, journalists will paraphrase or quote source who articulate the frame.  The 
secondary source places a subordinate or supporting role to the story’s main character.  This source is often reacting 
to the primary source.  Often, the secondary source will not quoted or paraphrased as much as the primary source.   
Who is quoted second most?  Who is the second most conspicuous person in the story?   
 
0.    Not Applicable  
1. Author/Journalist 
2. Government 
3. Military Official/Including NATO/UN 
4. Expert/Academic 
5. Insurgent/Taliban 
6. Other Politician (outside of government)  
7. Critic other than politician (activist) 
8. Afghan Official  
9. NGO  
10. Civilian - Afghan 
11. Civilian - Canadian  
12. Other  
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V14 — FRAME – Preferred government of military frame 
 
Is one or more preferred military or government frame contained in the media sample?  See the list below.   
 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
3 = Undetermined / NA 
 
1. Safety / Security — This code seeks to assess whether the sample or unit contains a safety frame sponsored by 
a source.  Does the sample highlight the importance of safety or improving security?  This frame tends 
to be sponsored by Canadian military or government officials.  The frame attempts to connect 
Canada’s military efforts in Afghanistan to making the volatile region safer and more secure.    
2. Taliban Regroup — This code seeks to assess whether the sample or unit contains a Taliban regroup frame 
sponsored by a source.  This frame tends to be sponsored by Canadian military or government 
officials.  The frame attempts to connect Canada’s military efforts in Afghanistan with making sure 
that the Taliban does not regain power in Afghanistan. The frame sponsor may suggest something 
along the lines of  “the Taliban will regroup and come back into power in Afghanistan”;  
3. United Nations — This code seeks to assess whether the sample or unit contains a United Nations frame 
sponsored by a source.  This frame tends to be sponsored by Canadian military or government 
officials.  The frame attempts to justify Canada’s military efforts in Afghanistan by endowing it with 
the legitimacy of the United Nations.  The frame   suggests that Canada’s mission is lawful and 
appropriate because it is sanctioned by the UN. The frame sponsor may suggest something along the 
lines of “The authority and legitimacy of the United Nations would be severely damaged”; 
4.  Canada’s Reputation — This code seeks to assess whether the sample or unit contains a Canada’s reputation 
frame sponsored by a source.  This frame tends to be sponsored by Canadian military or government 
officials.  The frame attempts to justify Canada’s military efforts in Afghanistan by suggesting 
Canada’s international reputation would suffer if it did not participate in the United Nations-
sanctioned and NATO-led military mission. The frame sponsor may suggest something along the lines 
of “Canada’s reputation within the international community would suffer if…”;  
5. Women & Children —  This code seeks to assess whether the sample or unit contains a women and children 
frame sponsored by a source.  This frame tends to be sponsored by Canadian military or government 
officials.  The frame attempts to justify Canada’s military efforts in Afghanistan by suggesting 
Canada’s military mission is helping Afghan women and children. The frame sponsor may suggest 
something along the lines of  “Canadian Forces are helping to make Afghanistan safer so more 
women and children can attend school or get access to health care.”  Alternatively, the frame sponsor 
may suggest that without Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan “the rights of women and 
children will be negatively affected”; 
6. Terrorist Attack —  This code seeks to assess whether the sample or unit contains a terrorist attack frame 
sponsored by a source.  This frame tends to be sponsored by Canadian military or government 
officials.  The frame attempts to justify Canada’s military efforts in Afghanistan by suggesting 
Canada’s military mission preventing terrorist attacks in Canada or North America. The frame 
sponsor may suggest something along the lines of “More terrorist attacks will happen in Western 
nations such as Canada if the Taliban is not stopped in Afghanistan” The sample may, for example, 
refer to “more terrorist attacks” occurring anywhere in the world if NATO-led forces do not remain in 
Afghanistan. The frame sponsor may refer to western forces in Afghanistan serving as a deterrent to 
future terrorist attacks in western countries.  The sample may posses a suggestion that Canadian 
Forces are required in Afghanistan so as to ensure there is no “fertile ground for terrorist organizations 
to operate” in the country.  
7.  Afghan Economy — This code seeks to assess whether the sample or unit contains an Afghan economy and 
poppies frame sponsored by a source.  This frame tends to be sponsored by Canadian military or 
  281 
government officials.  The frame attempts to justify Canada’s military efforts in Afghanistan by 
suggesting Canada’s military mission is preventing a resurgence of illegal poppy agriculture.   The 
frame sponsor may suggest something along the lines of “Afghanistan’s economy would become 
more reliant on the cultivation of poppies for the production of opium and heroin”; 
8. Afghans want Help —  This code seeks to assess whether the sample or unit contains an Afghans want help 
frame sponsored by a source.  This frame tends to be sponsored by Canadian military or government 
officials.  The frame attempts to justify Canada’s military efforts in Afghanistan by suggesting the 
Afghans want help.   The frame sponsor may suggest something along the lines of “The Afghan 
people want the assistance of Canada and other countries to remove the Taliban threat”;  
9. Reconstruction — This code seeks to assess whether the sample or unit contains a reconstruction frame 
sponsored by a source.  This frame tends to be sponsored by Canadian military or government officials.  The 
frame attempts to justify Canada’s military efforts in Afghanistan by suggesting Canada’s efforts in 
Afghanistan are helping to reconstruct or restore the war-torn country.   The frame sponsor may suggest 
something along the lines of “Canada’s contribution to reconstruction and development in Afghanistan is 
making a difference to improving the lives of Afghan people.” 
10. Democracy —  This code seeks to assess whether the sample or unit contains a democracy frame sponsored by 
a source.  This frame tends to be sponsored by Canadian military or government officials.  The frame attempts 
to justify Canada’s military efforts in Afghanistan by suggesting Canada’s efforts in Afghanistan are helping to 
sponsor democratic practices.   The frame sponsor may suggest something along the lines of “Canada’s 
presence in Afghanistan is helping to restore democracy”; 
11. Progress — This code seeks to assess whether the sample or unit contains a progress frame sponsored by a 
source.  This frame tends to be sponsored by Canadian military or government officials. The frame sponsor 
may suggest something along the lines of Canadian Forces making progress, making a difference, making 
Afghanistan a safer and better place.  Ask yourself:  does the sample talk about making progress in 
Afghanistan in relation to Canada’s goals in the country?  These goals are:  (1) routing the Taliban; (2) 
stopping terrorism; (3) reconstructing Afghanistan; (3) eradicating the poppy trade; (4) enhancing the rights of 
Afghan women and children; (5) improving security; and (6) reconstructing Afghanistan’s war-torn economy 
and infrastructure. 
12. Soldiers/Military/Mission — This code seeks to assess whether the sample or unit contains a soldier or 
military frame sponsored by a source.  This frame tends be sponsored by Canadian military or government 
officials.  These frames attempts to justify Canada’s military efforts in Afghanistan by suggesting Canadian 
soldiers are described as brave, noble, efficient, strong, warrior-like, dedicated characteristics. The frame 
describes or implies that Canada’s efforts in Afghanistan are part of an important task or duty that is assigned, 
allotted, or self-imposed.  The military’s work is characterized as an important goal or purpose that is 
accompanied by strong conviction; a calling or vocation.  Does the sample convey that Canadian Forces have 
been set for some duty or purpose?  The frame sponsor may suggest Canada’s military mission is “important”, 
“noble”, “crucial” or “vital”.  The frame sponsor may suggest Canada’s military efforts is beyond normal 
because the mission involves an important goal or purpose that is accompanied by strong conviction; a calling 
or vocation.   
13.  “Hearts and Minds” — This code seeks to assess whether the sample or unit contains a “hearts and minds” 
frame sponsored by a source.  This frame tends to be sponsored by Canadian military or government officials.  
The frame attempts to justify Canada’s military efforts in Afghanistan by suggesting Canada’s efforts in 
Afghanistan are winning the “hearts and minds” of Afghan people by fighting the Taliban and reconstructing 
and developing the war-torn country. The frame sponsor may suggest something along the lines of Does the 
sample refer to winning the “hearts and minds of Afghan civilians?   That is, convincing Afghan civilians of 
the merits of NATO-led forces intervening in Afghanistan? 
 
V15 — FRAME TYPE  -   Which frame is primarily present?  This variable seeks to code what is the primary or 
main frame represented in the sample or unit of analysis.  See above for definitions. 
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1. Not Applicable  
 
2.   Safety / Security  
3.   Taliban Regroup  
4.   United Nations 
5.  Canada’s Reputation  
6.  Women & Children  
7.  Terrorist Attack  
8.  Afghans want Help   
9.  Reconstruction  
10. Democracy  
11. Soldiers/Military/Mission 
12. “Hearts and Minds”  
V16 — FRAME SPONSOR — If applicable, referring to V12, who is the source of the frame?   Primary definers 
are “credible individuals and institutions granted media access to enable their initial framing of events which are 
assumed to be within the area of competence:  for instance, experts, officials, sources, courts, leading politicians, 
and senior religions figures” (Oxford Dictionary of Media and Communication Studies).  Sometimes, journalists 
will paraphrase or quote source who articulates the frame. 
0.      Not Applicable  
1. Author/Journalist 
2. Government 
3. Military Official/Including NATO/UN 
4. Expert/Academic 
5. Insurgent/Taliban 
6. Other Politician (outside of government)  
7. Critic other than politician (activist) 
8. Afghan Official  
9. NGO  
10. Civilian - Afghan 
11. Civilian - Canadian  
12. Other 
13. Multiple  
 
 
V17 — Multiple Frames — Which other frames (if applicable) are present?  This variable seeks to identify what 
other  frame represented in the sample or unit of analysis.    Code as:  1, 3, 5, 12, for example.   
 
V18— Fact-Check — Does the sample offer a fact check to a government or military sponsored frame contained in 
the media sample?  Does the sample compare the statements of frame sponsors “to ‘the facts’ so as to determine 
whether a statement about these topics is” credible or true? Uscinski and Butler (2013: 163).  Challenges to frames 
can involve information that counters or casts doubt on the preferred government or military frame.  If a military or 
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government official, for instance, suggests that his forces are making Afghanistan safer, does the story contain 
information, observations, statistics or opinion that critiques or doubts that claim.  Does the sampl, by means of 
example, contain data or a quote suggesting violence is escalating.  Ask yourself if the journalists uses information 
or quotes to fact check the preferred government or military frame.  Sometimes, frames are challenged with 
information from an opposition politician or government or military critic.   
 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
3 = Undetermined / NA 
 
V19 — If applicable, referring to V15, who is the source?  Primary definers are “credible individuals and 
institutions granted media access to enable their initial framing of events which are assumed to be within the area of 
competence:  for instance, experts, officials, sources, courts, leading politicians, and senior religions figures” 
(Oxford Dictionary of Media and Communication Studies).  Sometimes, journalists will paraphrase or quote source 
who articulates the frame. 
 
0.      Not Applicable  
1. Author/Journalist 
2. Government 
3. Military Official/Including NATO/UN 
4. Expert/Academic 
5. Insurgent/Taliban 
6. Other Politician (outside of government)  
7. Critic other than politician (activist) 
8. Afghan Official  
9. NGO  
10. Civilian - Afghan 
11. Civilian - Canadian  
12. Other 
 
V20 — Does the media sample convey a moral tone or judgment about the conflict or military mission?  (Noble, 
just, important sacrifice, part of a larger so-called “war on terror”, etc.)  
 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
3 = Undetermined / NA 
 
V21 — If applicable, referring to V20, who is the source?    
 
0.    Not Applicable  
2. Author/Journalist 
3. Government 
4. Military Official/Including NATO/UN 
5. Expert/Academic 
6. Insurgent/Taliban 
7. Other Politician (outside of government)  
8. Critic other than politician (activist) 
9. Afghan Official  
10. NGO  
11. Civilian - Afghan 
12. Civilian - Canadian  
13. Other 
 
Primary definers are credible individuals and institutions granted media access to enable their initial framing of 
events which are assumed to be within the area of competence:  for instance, experts, officials, sources, courts, 
leading politicians, and senior religions figures (Oxford Dictionary of Media and Communication Studies).  
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V22 — Does the article frame Canadian soldiers or their military mission in Afghanistan as noble, heroic, just, 
patriotic, brave, honourable, brave, macho, good solider, dying honourably?   Does it mention or convey pride in 
Canadian soldiers?   
 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
3 = Undetermined / NA 
 
V23  — If applicable, referring to V22, who is the source?    
 
0.     Not Applicable  
1. Author/Journalist 
2. Government 
3. Military Official/Including NATO/UN 
4. Expert/Academic 
5. Insurgent/Taliban 
6. Other Politician (outside of government)  
7. Critic other than politician (activist) 
8. Afghan Official  
9. NGO  
10. Civilian - Afghan 
11. Civilian - Canadian  
12. Other 
Primary definers are credible individuals and institutions granted media access to enable their initial framing of 
events which are assumed to be within the area of competence:  for instance, experts, officials, sources, courts, 
leading politicians, and senior religions figures (Oxford Dictionary of Media and Communication Studies).  
Sometimes, journalists will paraphrase or quote source who articulates the frame.  
 
V24 – Does the media sample offer a personal story about a soldier?  Does the sample highlight or pay particular 
attention to an individual or a few individuals?  Is the media samples focal point of cynosure of the story?  Does the 
sample, for instance, make a soldier’s actions (bravery heroism) the spotlight?  Does the media sample use narrative 
and storytelling devices to put an individual soldier or a few soldiers in the spotlight?  
 
V25 — Does the sample mention Canada’s historical role as UN peacekeepers or suggest Canada’s mission in 
Afghanistan is peacekeeping?  
 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
3 = Undetermined / NA 
 
V26 — If applicable, referring to V24, who is the source?    
 
0.    Not Applicable  
1. Author/Journalist 
2. Government 
3. Military Official/Including NATO/UN 
4. Expert/Academic 
5. Insurgent/Taliban 
6. Other Politician (outside of government)  
7. Critic other than politician (activist) 
8. Afghan Official  
9. NGO  
10. Civilian - Afghan 
11. Civilian - Canadian  
12. Other 
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Primary definers are credible individuals and institutions granted media access to enable their initial framing of 
events which are assumed to be within the area of competence:  for instance, experts, officials, sources, courts, 
leading politicians, and senior religions figures (Oxford Dictionary of Media and Communication Studies).  
Sometimes, journalists will paraphrase or quote source who articulates the frame.  
 
V27 — Tone — What is the tone of the sample towards Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan?     
 
0.     Not Applicable  
 
1. Positive = A confident opinion or assertion (fully assured) about the military mission.   This sample is 
enthusiastic in its praise for the mission and its goals.  Samples will be optimistic about the war.   
 
2. Neutral = No opinion expressed in relation to Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan.  Often news stories 
will not be aligned with or support any side or position in the controversial mission  
 
3. Negative = A critical assessment of the military mission in Afghanistan.  These samples will often question the 
mission’s rationale, its goal.  Often, these samples will doubt the justification frames for the war sponsored by 
elites    
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Appendix Two 
 % Agree Scott's Pi 
Cohen's 
Kappa 
Krippendorff's 
Alpha 
n  
Agree 
n 
Disagree 
n 
Cases 
n   
Decisions 
V1 ID 100.0 1 1 1 92 0 92 184 
V3 Media 100.0 1 1 1 92 0 92 184 
V5 Period 100.0 1 1 1 92 0 92 184 
V6 Type 100.0 1 1 1 92 0 92 184 
V7 Dateline / 
Embed 100.0 1 1 1 92 0 92 184 
V8 Episodic / 
Thematic 100.0 1 1 1 92 0 92 184 
V9 Counter-
hegemonic 92.4 
0.844725
738 
0.84519230
8 0.84556962 85 7 92 184 
V10 Focus 88.0 0.852176453 
0.85252113
1 0.852979842 81 11 92 184 
V11 Security / 
Violence 90.2 
0.751463
305 
0.75172413
8 0.752814048 83 9 92 184 
V  12 Primary 
Source 94.6 
0.929252
538 
0.92926341
7 0.929637035 87 5 92 184 
V 13 Secondary 
Source 92.4 
0.902239
089 
0.90229100
3 0.902770398 85 7 92 184 
V 14 Preferred 
Frame Present 93.5 0.7125 
0.71279916
8 0.7140625 86 6 92 184 
V 15 Frame Type 88.0 0.798947055 
0.79924618
1 0.800039734 81 11 92 184 
V 16 Frame 
Sponsor 82.6 
0.776885
184 
0.77727341
5 0.778097764 76 16 92 184 
V 18 Fact Check 92.4 0.844725738 
0.84519230
8 0.84556962 85 7 92 184 
V 19 Frame 
Challenge Sponsor 89.1 
0.823687
236 
0.82395713
7 0.824645458 82 10 92 184 
V20 Moral Tone 87.0 0.652173913 
0.65988909
4 0.654064272 80 12 92 184 
V21 Frame Sponsor 85.9 0.652729384 
0.65740475
5 0.654616725 79 13 92 184 
V22 Brave Soldiers 94.6 0.860922147 
0.86094316
8 0.861678005 87 5 92 184 
V23 Frame Sponsor 90.2 0.775883069 
0.77609518
7 0.777101096 83 9 92 184 
V24 Personal Story 100.0 1 1 1 92 0 92 184 
V25 Peacekeeping 95.7 0.479858657 
0.48022598
9 0.482685512 88 4 92 184 
V26 Source 95.7 0.484232656 
0.48459383
8 0.487035739 88 4 92 184 
V27 Tone of 
Sample 91.3 
0.831886
706 0.83196347 0.832800365 84 8 92 184 
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Appendix Three 
 
Population-Based Survey Experiment 
English Questionnaire 
Q1.1 What is your gender? 
Male (1) 
Female (2) 
 
Q1.2 In which year were you born? 
 
Q1.3 In what province or territory do you live? 
Newfoundland and Labrador  (1) 
Nova Scotia  (2) 
Prince Edward Island  (3) 
New Brunswick  (4) 
Quebec  (5) 
Ontario  (6) 
Manitoba  (7) 
Saskatchewan  (8) 
Alberta  (9) 
British Columbia  (10) 
Yukon  (11) 
North West Territories  (12) 
Nunavut (13) 
 
Q1.4 What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
No schooling  (1) 
Some elementary or high school  (2) 
High school  (3) 
Apprenticeship or trade certificate or diploma  (4) 
College, CEGEP or college classique  (5) 
Bachelor’s degree (6) 
Master’s degree  (7) 
Degree in medicine, dentistry, veterinary medicine, or optometry  (8) 
Doctorate (9) 
 
Q1.5 What best describes your current employment status?  
I am in education  (1) 
I am unemployed  (2) 
I am self-employed  (3) 
I am in full-time employment  (4) 
I am in part-time employment  (5) 
I am retired (6) 
 
Q1.6 In its most recent budget, the federal Liberal government announced plans to run a $29-billion 
deficit.  How supportive are you of this decision (with one being not supportive and 10 being very 
supportive)? 
______ Tap and drag (1) 
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Q1.7 Since becoming government, the federal Liberals have resettled thousands of Syrian refugees in 
Canada.  How supportive are you of this decision (with one being not supportive and 10 being very 
supportive)?  
______ Tap and drag (1) 
 
Q1.8 Some people believe Canadian armed forces should focus on combat.  Others, however, believe 
Canadian armed forces should be focused on peacekeeping. What do you think should be the main focus of 
Canadian armed forces?   
Armed combat (1) 
Peacekeeping (2) 
Both (3) 
 
Q1.9 If you have to choose between only armed combat and peacekeeping, what do you think should be the 
main focus of Canadian armed forces?  
Armed combat (1) 
Peacekeeping (2) 
 
Q1.10 Between 2006-2011, thousands of Canadian troops were in combat in the southern region of 
Afghanistan.  Thinking back on that time, how do you feel about Canada’s military efforts in that South 
Asian country (with one being not proud and 10 being very proud)? 
______ Tap and drag (1) 
 
Q1.11 Generally speaking, how interested are you in politics? 
 
______ Tap and drag (1) 
 
Q1.12 In politics people sometimes talk of left and right.  Where would you place yourself on the scale 
below, where 1 is left and 10 is right? 
______ Tap and drag (1) 
 
Q1.13 If the Canadian federal election were to take place today, which party would you vote for? 
Liberal Party (1) 
Conservative (2) 
New Democratic Party (NDP) (3) 
Green Party (4) 
Bloc Québécois (5) 
Other party or candidate (6) 
I don't know right now (7) 
I will not vote (8) 
I will spoil my ballot (9) 
I am not eligible to vote (10) 
 
Q1.14 How did you vote in the last federal election in October of 2015? 
Conservative Party (1) 
New Democratic Party (NDP) (2) 
Liberal Party (3) 
Green Party (4) 
Bloc Québécois (5) 
  289 
Other party or candidate (6) 
I did not vote (7) 
I spoiled my ballot (9) 
I do not remember (10) 
 
Q1.15 Which Canadian institution do you think has the final responsibility to decide if a law is 
constitutional in Canada?   
House of Commons (1) 
Governor General (2) 
Supreme Court of Canada (3) 
Senate (4) 
 
Q1.16 Which party currently holds the second most seats in the House of Commons? 
Liberal Party (1) 
Conservative Party (2) 
New Democratic Party (NDP) (3) 
Green Party (4) 
Bloc Québécois (5) 
 
Q1.17 What fundamental freedom do you think is NOT guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms? 
Freedom of thought, belief (1) 
Freedom of peaceful assembly (2) 
The right to keep and bear arms (3) 
Freedom of religion (4) 
 
Q1.18 Who in Canada regulates pipelines that cross provincial and international boundaries? 
Local governments (municipalities) (1) 
Provinces (2) 
The National Energy Board (3) 
The Governor General (4) 
 
Q1.19 Which federal department issues passports? 
Citizenship and Immigration (1) 
Revenue Canada (2) 
Intergovernmental Affairs (3) 
Global Affairs Canada / Foreign Affairs (4) 
 
Q2.1 The following questions ask whether you agree or disagree with a number of 
statements.  Thinking about Canada’s combat role in southern Afghanistan as part of a NATO-led 
military mission between 2006-2011, how much do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements:  I supported Canada’s miliary role in Afghanistan. 
Strongly disagree  (1) 
Somewhat disagree  (2) 
Slightly disagree  (3) 
Slightly agree  (4) 
Somewhat agree  (5) 
Strongly agree (6) 
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Q2.2 Canada’s military helped to make Afghanistan safer. 
Strongly disagree  (1) 
Somewhat disagree  (2) 
Slightly disagree  (3) 
Slightly agree  (4) 
Somewhat agree  (5) 
Strongly agree (6) 
 
Q2.3 I am proud of Canada’s military role in reconstructing Afghanistan between 2006-2011. 
Strongly disagree  (1) 
Somewhat disagree  (2) 
Slightly disagree  (3) 
Slightly agree  (4) 
Somewhat agree  (5) 
Strongly agree (6) 
 
Q2.4 Canada’s forces should return to a combat role in Afghanistan. 
Strongly disagree  (1) 
Somewhat disagree  (2) 
Slightly disagree  (3) 
Slightly agree  (4) 
Somewhat agree  (5) 
Strongly agree (6) 
 
Q3.1 Between 2006-2011, Canada assumed a combat role in southern Afghanistan as part of a NATO-
led military mission.  In an effort to refresh your memory, please read the following short 
representative news story from that period.  After you read the short news story, you’ll be asked 
whether you agree or disagree with a number of statements. 
 
Q3.2 KANDAHAR, Afghanistan — The defence minister says Canadian soldiers are making the war-
torn country of Afghanistan a “much safer” place. Peter MacKay toured a road construction project 
and a newly opened causeway over the Arghandab River during a whirlwind three-day tour.“Kandahar 
is much safer now than it was before we arrived – and Canadian Forces are needed to restore this 
country’s security after decades of war,” said Peter MacKay. The defence minister says the 
reconstruction projects he visited would have been impossible had security in the volatile region of 
Kandahar not improved over the last year. MacKay adds Canadian Forces remain focused on training 
Afghan soldiers and police so they can handle security once coalition forces leave. 
 
Q3.3 The following questions ask whether you agree or disagree with a number of 
statements.  Thinking about Canada’s combat role in southern Afghanistan as part of a NATO-led 
military mission between 2006-2011, how much do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements:   I supported Canada’s miliary role in Afghanistan. 
Strongly disagree  (1) 
Somewhat disagree  (2) 
Slightly disagree  (3) 
Slightly agree  (4) 
Somewhat agree  (5) 
Strongly agree (6) 
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Q3.4 Canada’s military helped to make Afghanistan safer. 
Strongly disagree  (1) 
Somewhat disagree  (2) 
Slightly disagree  (3) 
Slightly agree  (4) 
Somewhat agree  (5) 
Strongly agree (6) 
 
Q3.5 I am proud of Canada’s military role in reconstructing Afghanistan between 2006-2011. 
Strongly disagree  (1) 
Somewhat disagree  (2) 
Slightly disagree  (3) 
Slightly agree  (4) 
Somewhat agree  (5) 
Strongly agree (6) 
 
Q3.6 Canada’s forces should return to a combat role in Afghanistan. 
Strongly disagree  (1) 
Somewhat disagree  (2) 
Slightly disagree  (3) 
Slightly agree  (4) 
Somewhat agree  (5) 
Strongly agree (6) 
 
Q4.1 Betwen 2006-2011, Canada assumed a combat role in southern Afghanistan as part of a NATO-
led military mission.  In an effort to refresh your memory, please read the following short 
representative news story from that period. After you read the short news story, you’ll be asked 
whether you agree or disagree with a number of statements.  
 
Q4.2 KANDAHAR, Afghanistan — The defence minister says Canadian soldiers are making the war-
torn country of Afghanistan a “much safer” place. Peter MacKay toured a road construction project 
and a newly opened causeway over the Arghandab River during a whirlwind three-day tour.“Kandahar 
is much safer now than it was before we arrived – and Canadian Forces are needed to restore this 
country’s security after decades of war,” said Peter MacKay. The defence minister says the 
reconstruction projects he visited would have been impossible had security in the volatile region of 
Kandahar not improved over the last year. MacKay adds Canadian Forces remain focused on training 
Afghan soldiers and police so they can handle security once coalition forces leave. 
 
Q4.3 The following questions ask whether you agree or disagree with a number of 
statements.  Thinking about Canada’s combat role in southern Afghanistan as part of a NATO-led 
military mission between 2006-2011, how much do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements:   I supported Canada’s miliary role in Afghanistan. 
Strongly disagree  (1) 
Somewhat disagree  (2) 
Slightly disagree  (3) 
Slightly agree  (4) 
Somewhat agree  (5) 
Strongly agree (6) 
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Q4.4 Canada’s military helped to make Afghanistan safer. 
Strongly disagree  (1) 
Somewhat disagree  (2) 
Slightly disagree  (3) 
Slightly agree  (4) 
Somewhat agree  (5) 
Strongly agree (6) 
 
Q4.5 I am proud of Canada’s military role in reconstructing Afghanistan between 2006-2011. 
Strongly disagree  (1) 
Somewhat disagree  (2) 
Slightly disagree  (3) 
Slightly agree  (4) 
Somewhat agree  (5) 
Strongly agree (6) 
 
Q4.6 Canada’s forces should return to a combat role in Afghanistan. 
Strongly disagree  (1) 
Somewhat disagree  (2) 
Slightly disagree  (3) 
Slightly agree  (4) 
Somewhat agree  (5) 
Strongly agree (6) 
 
Q5.1 As noted above, between 2006-2011, Canada assumed a combat role in southern Afghanistan as 
part of a NATO-led military mission.  In an effort to refresh your memory, please read the following 
short representative news story from that period. After you read the short news story, you’ll be asked 
whether you agree or disagree with a number of statements.  
 
Q5.2 KANDAHAR, Afghanistan — Canada’s defence minister says soldiers are helping to rebuild 
war-torn Afghanistan.  Peter MacKay toured a road construction project and a newly opened causeway 
over the Arghandab River during a whirlwind three-day tour of the volatile region of 
Kandahar.“Canada is making a real difference reconstructing Kandahar,” said Peter MacKay. “Our 
forces are needed to help rebuild this country after decades of war,” he added. MacKay stressed that 
Canada’s development assistance and aid will help improve the volatile region’s stability and 
economy.    
 
Q5.3 The following questions ask whether you agree or disagree with a number of 
statements.  Thinking about Canada’s combat role in southern Afghanistan as part of a NATO-led 
military mission between 2006-2011, how much do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements:   I supported Canada’s miliary role in Afghanistan. 
Strongly disagree  (1) 
Somewhat disagree  (2) 
Slightly disagree  (3) 
Slightly agree  (4) 
Somewhat agree  (5) 
Strongly agree (6) 
 
Q5.4 Canada’s military helped to make Afghanistan safer. 
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Strongly disagree  (1) 
Somewhat disagree  (2) 
Slightly disagree  (3) 
Slightly agree  (4) 
Somewhat agree  (5) 
Strongly agree (6) 
 
Q5.5 I am proud of Canada’s military role in reconstructing Afghanistan between 2006-2011. 
Strongly disagree  (1) 
Somewhat disagree  (2) 
Slightly disagree  (3) 
Slightly agree  (4) 
Somewhat agree  (5) 
Strongly agree (6) 
 
Q5.6 Canada’s forces should return to a combat role in Afghanistan. 
Strongly disagree  (1) 
Somewhat disagree  (2) 
Slightly disagree  (3) 
Slightly agree  (4) 
Somewhat agree  (5) 
Strongly agree (6) 
 
Q6.1 As noted above, between 2006-2011, Canada assumed a combat role in southern Afghanistan as 
part of a NATO-led military mission.  In an effort to refresh your memory, please read the following 
short representative news story from that period. After you read the short news story, you’ll be asked 
whether you agree or disagree with a number of statements.   
 
Q6.2 KANDAHAR, Afghanistan — Canada’s defence minister says soldiers are helping to rebuild 
war-torn Afghanistan.  Peter MacKay toured a road construction project and a newly opened causeway 
over the Arghandab River during a whirlwind three-day tour of the volatile region of 
Kandahar.“Canada is making a real difference reconstructing Kandahar,” said Peter MacKay.“Our 
forces are needed to help rebuild this country after decades of war,” he added. MacKay stressed that 
Canada’s development assistance and aid will help improve the volatile region’s stability and 
economy.   Yet, newly released federal government documents contradict the defence minister’s 
claims.  The internal records suggest Canada has spent most of its aid and reconstruction money on 
salaries and bureaucracy – and accomplished little that is sustainable. 
 
Q6.3 The following questions ask whether you agree or disagree with a number of 
statements.  Thinking about Canada’s combat role in southern Afghanistan as part of a NATO-led 
military mission between 2006-2011, how much do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements:   I supported Canada’s miliary role in Afghanistan. 
Strongly disagree  (1) 
Somewhat disagree  (2) 
Slightly disagree  (3) 
Slightly agree  (4) 
Somewhat agree  (5) 
Strongly agree (6) 
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Q6.4 Canada’s military helped to make Afghanistan safer. 
Strongly disagree  (1) 
Somewhat disagree  (2) 
Slightly disagree  (3) 
Slightly agree  (4) 
Somewhat agree  (5) 
Strongly agree (6) 
 
Q6.5 I am proud of Canada’s military role in reconstructing Afghanistan between 2006-2011. 
Strongly disagree  (1) 
Somewhat disagree  (2) 
Slightly disagree  (3) 
Slightly agree  (4) 
Somewhat agree  (5) 
Strongly agree (6) 
 
Q6.6 Canada’s forces should return to a combat role in Afghanistan. 
Strongly disagree  (1) 
Somewhat disagree  (2) 
Slightly disagree  (3) 
Slightly agree  (4) 
Somewhat agree  (5) 
Strongly agree (6) 
 
Q7.1 Typically, how much do you access news or current affairs? 
Several times a day  (1) 
Once a day (2) 
Once a week  (3) 
Two to three times a month  (4) 
Once a month (5) 
Less often than once a month  (6) 
Never  (7) 
Don’t know (8) 
 
Q7.2 Typically, from where do you get your news? (Rank the following items in order of importance) 
______ Newspapers (including online)  (1) 
______ Radio (including online streaming)  (2) 
______ Television (including online streaming)  (3) 
______ Blogs and alternative media websites  (4) 
______ Social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.) (5) 
 
Q7.3 In the past year, have you done any of the following? 
Did unpaid volunteer work for an organization (1) 
Belonged to a political party (2) 
Participated in a demonstration or march (3) 
Signed a petition online (4) 
Belonged to a union (5) 
Boycotted or chosen a product for ethical reasons (6) 
Signed a petition on paper (7) 
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Donated to a political party (8) 
None of the above (9) 
 
Q7.4 The following questions ask whether you agree or disagree.  Many international experts believe 
Afghanistan remains unstable – and continues to need international help with security. How much do 
you agree or disagree with the following statement: Canadian Forces should return to a combat role in 
Afghanistan.  
 
Strongly disagree  (1) 
Somewhat disagree  (2) 
Slightly disagree  (3) 
Slightly agree  (4) 
Somewhat agree  (5) 
Strongly agree (6) 
 
Q7.5 What is your current household income? 
$0-35,00 (1) 
$35-50,000 (2) 
$50-75,000 (3) 
$75-100,000 (4) 
$100-150,000 (5) 
Plus de $150,000 (6) 
Would rather not say (7) 
 
Q7.6 Thank you for taking part in this survey.  The results of the survey are anonymous. Please refrain 
from talking with friends and family about the survey for the next two weeks. This survey’s primary 
aim is to understand how people feel about Canada’s military mission in Afghanistan between 2006-
2011.  Specifically, it is interested in knowing how different news articles, emotions, attitudes and 
beliefs influence how people feel about Canada’s military involvement in Afghanistan.  The study was 
designed to test how people respond differently to different news articles.  The results of this study will 
contribute to academic research.  If the results are significant, the results may be published.  Thank for 
taking time to answer this survey’s questions.  If you have any questions, feel free to 
contact:  hello@votecompass.com. 
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